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Abstract
This thesis  a im s to exam ine an d  th e  role of the  bank ing  secto r in the origins 
and  propagation  of In d o n es ia ’s deep econom ic crisis. Specifically, the  objectives 
are: (1) to a sse ss  ban k in g  secto r w eaknesses in the  lead-up  to th e  crisis, (2) to 
exam ine the  consequences of a  w eak ban k in g  sector in m aking  the  econom y 
vulnerable to a  financial crisis, an d  (2) to h ighlight th e  p ropagation  process of 
the crisis, w ith p a rticu la r  em p h asis  on the  tran sm issio n  m ech an ism  provided 
by bank ing  channe ls .
In o rder to achieve th e se  objectives, m icroeconom ic an d  m acroeconom ic 
app roaches are  em ployed. The form er app roach  is u sed  to determ ine the factors 
co n tribu ting  to b an k in g  fragility. A m odel of ban k in g  fragility is es tab lished  and  
its  in ferences te s ted  in th e  em pirical analysis  u sing  a  Probit p rocedure. The 
la tte r  ap p ro ach  e lab o ra te s  possib le  m acroeconom ic in te rre la tio n sh ip s  betw een 
the  b an k in g  sec to r an d  th e  re s t of the  econom y. A m acroeconom ic m odel is 
developed, an d  its  in ferences d raw n  in the  em pirical analysis u sing  
co in tegrating  reg ression , vector e rro r correction  m odel, an d  im pu lse  response 
functions.
This s tu d y  re su lts  in several key findings. F irst, a t th e  onse t of the 
crisis, the  b an k in g  sec to r w as indeed  quite vu lnerable. The underly ing  banking  
prob lem s were: connec ted  lending, in ad eq u a te  equity  capital, low liquidity, and  
high  loan grow th, foreign liabilities, a n d  exposu res to system ic risk.
Second, th e  b a lan ce  of p ay m en ts  w as suscep tib le  to a  cap ital inflows 
reversal. T hree p rob lem s s ta n d  out: a  h igh  ra tio  of deb t service to to tal exports, 
low ra tio  of foreign exchange reserves relative to liquid foreign liabilities, and  
cu rren cy  m ism atch .
T hird , due to the  w eakness  of th e  ban k in g  sector, in te res t ra te  policy was 
not effective in stav ing  off the  specu la tive a tta ck s  th a t occurred  after the 
collapse of the Thai b a h t on 2 Ju ly  1997. In te re st ra te  increases only 
com plicated  the difficulties for ailing b an k s , and  ra ised  the  need  to bail them  
out.
F o u rth , bo th  in te re s t ra te  in c re ases  an d  large depreciation  generated  
recessionary  effects on real econom ic activities, especially investm ent. T hus, the 
adverse effects were m ain ly  ch an n e lled  th ro u g h  investm en t spending.
Fifth, while a  real dep rec ia tion  could  have been  expected to produce an  
expan sio n ary  effect, exports ac tua lly  con trac ted , partly  owing to a  reduction  in 
the su p p ly  of trade  cred it d u e  to th e  collapse of the  b ank ing  sector.
S ixth , the  w orsen ing  econom ic situa tion  in creased  bank ing  fragility. 
C oupled w ith  the socio-political cris is , th is  triggered b a n k  ru n s , leading to a 
loss of m o n e ta ry  control, cap ita l outflow s, heigh ten ing  inflation an d  a  collapse 
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A useful starting  point to d iscuss the recent financial crisis is to look at the 
opening paragraph of the foreword by Calvo et al (1996) in the Journal o f 
International Economics, 41, 1996, special edition, about the Mexican crisis 
1994-1995. If the word Mexico is replaced by Indonesia and a few sentences 
are modified slightly, the paragraph will look like this:
The [Indonesian] crisis took m ost people by surprise. Prior to the 
crisis [Indonesia’s] policies were highly praised by the IMF and the 
World Bank. The country [m aintained ‘the balanced budget’ 
principle, a  discipline th a t m ost developing countries only 
dream ed about]. Inflation [was under control, below the two-digit 
level], and m any believed th a t growth [could be susta ined  at 
around 6 to 7 per cent]. Yet, the crisis struck  in [August 1997] 
like a thunderbolt. International reserves -  a t a  historic record 
‘high’ in [June 1997 -  exhibited no m ajor drop when the currency 
finally collapsed]. In the afterm ath, [Indonesia’s] financial system  
was paralysed, and global investors rushed  to dum p their holdings
of Indonesian securities in a global stam pede............. In the  course
of a  few m onths, [Indonesia] went from being the apple in the eyes 
of I FIs to the family scoundrel, from the country  th a t brokers 
heartily recom m ended to the basket case. Why?
Of course, pre-crisis Indonesia and Mexico were different, and  the modified 
quotation is not m eant to imply tha t the origins of the two crises were the same. 
But w hat is striking is th a t they ended up with similar crises.
To m ake things worse, consider the following facts indicating th a t 
Indonesia was the worst affected country in the Asian crisis episode. The 
economy crashed  from 7.8 per cent annual growth in 1996 to m inus 13 per 
cent by 1998. This is the largest growth swing in any given country since the 
great depression. Moreover, domestic b an k s’ equity capital dropped from 41.3 
trillion rup iah  in Ju n e  1997 to m inus 24.1 trillion in December 1998. By Ju n e
1999, 71 private banks had been closed by the authorities. The J a k a rta  Stock 
Exchange index reached its lowest level in December 1997, dropping by about 
54 per cent, from its highest level of 740 points in Ju n e  1997. The price of a few 
dozen stocks were even cheaper th an  a piece of candy. Total private capital 
outflows from December 1997 to March 2000 were estim ated to be about $34 
billion, or equivalent to total private capital inflows for the preceding four years.
Clearly then, the question is how could the crisis happen? Admittedly, 
th is is a difficult question. As Hill (1999a, p.4) pu ts  it as: T here  is no single 
answ er to the question ‘what went wrong?’ ‘. He further argues th a t to develop 
a sound argum ent for explaining the crisis, one has to cast the net widely, 
drawing on theory, empirics, country detail, and institu tions, as well as recent 
history, economics, and politics.
However, a t the risk of om itting several factors th a t are im portant to 
develop a ‘convincing story’, the focus of this study is som ew hat narrow er, i.e. 
the role of banking sector in the origin and propagation of the crisis. There are 
four reasons th a t make such a narrow  focus interesting.
First, the ‘twin crises’ (i.e. balance of paym ent and  banking  crises) more 
frequently occurred in the 1980s and  1990s th an  in the 1970s (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1996 and  1999). Coincidently, m ost of the crisis countries em barked 
on domestic financial m arket and capital account liberalisation in the 1980s. 
Therefore, m any p u t the blame on th is policy shift.1 However, the problem  is 
th a t this conclusion was achieved by examining panel d a ta  (m ulti-country 
analysis) and may therefore suffer over generalisation. This is not to oppose 
th is view. However, there seem s to be a  need to conduct indepth  country 
analyses to uncover the underlying problem s. For instance, o ther studies point 
to problem s of weak enforcem ent of p rudential regulations, s truc tu re  of the 
ownership of banks, and connected lending (see for example Diaz-Alejandro 
1985, and M ishkin 1996 am ongst others). In other words, the real issue may 
not be financial liberalisation per se, b u t deep-rooted institu tional problem s of 
the financial system.
1 Glick and Hutchison (1999) also come up with this conclusion.
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Second, Kaminsky and R einhart (1999) also argue th a t the im pacts of 
the twin crises were far more costly th an  th a t of individual currency or banking 
crises. This suggests there is som ething special about the role of the banking 
sector in the origin and propagation of a  currency crisis.2 A weak-banking 
sector can make it difficult to defend a fixed exchange rate regime through an 
in terest rate  hike (Obstfeld 1994, and Obtfeld and Rogoff 1995). Once a 
currency collapse sets in, the w eakening financial position of firms can lead to 
an  increase in non-performing loans. The worsening of bank  balance sheets 
may trigger bank runs, which can lead to the disfunctioning of financial 
interm ediaries, the loss of m onetary control, and  capital flight (Mishkin 1996). 
This, in tu rn , transform s the twin crises into a  full-blown economic crisis.
Third, earlier studies regarding the developm ent of the pre-crisis 
Indonesian banking sector tended to suggest the state  of the sector was 
‘favourable’ for economic development (see for instance C hant and Pangestu 
1994, and Kenward 1997). Few have highlighted the problem s descriptively, 
e.g. violations of prudential regulations, ram pan t self-lending tactics in 
conglomerates owned banks, and high (but under-reported) exposure in the 
property sector. However, the fact th a t the  banking sector was the worst 
affected seem s to suggest serious problem s were accum ulating before the crisis, 
th a t somehow were not reflected in the official data. Note th a t the sector’s 
value added sh rank  by about 37 per cent in 1998, or about three times more 
th an  the average contraction in o ther sectors. Moreover, the public cost of 
bank  restructuring  in Indonesia is estim ated to be about 51 per cent of GDP, 
com pared with 5, 13, and 25 per cent in Malaysia, South  Korea, and Thailand, 
respectively (Lindgren et al 1999). This evidence points to the need for carrying 
out a  more rigorous and comprehensive assessm en t of the state of the 
Indonesian banking sector leading u p  to the crisis.
Fourth, the role of the banking sector in the origin and propagation of 
the crisis rem ains a  sparsely researched topic in the vast literature on the Asian 
crisis. Most knowledgeable academ ic observers have come to a  general 
consensus th a t a  weak financial system  is one of the key issues. However, only
2 This issue will be addressed again in section 1.2.
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a few studies have em phasised banking issues. 3 With regard to the Indonesian 
banking  sector, the literatu re  has generally been silent.4 The curren t study is 
an  a ttem pt to fill th is gap.
1.2. The Literature
This section briefly outlines the literature on financial crisis, with specific 
reference to the role of the banking sector. More specifically, it highlights the 
developm ent, both in theory and empirics, of three im portan t issues, namely 
the origin of banking  problem s, the consequences of a  weak banking sector, 
and  the transm ission  m echanism s of financial shocks in the context of an open 
economy m acroeconom ic framework. The purpose here is to set the focus of 
th is  thesis.
1.2.1. Sources of banking problems
Seven sources of banking problem s will be briefly highlighted, namely liquidity 
m ism atch, currency m ism atch, bo o m /b u st cycle, insurance problems, 
asym m etric inform ation, weak enforcem ent of pruden tia l regulations, and 
increased com petition. There are also several o ther factors, which are 
im portan t to consider. However, the purpose here is not to lists all possible 
factors, b u t to concentrates on a  few im portant factors.
Liquidity m ism atch  is an  inherent problem  for banks, as they generally 
lend long b u t borrow short. Because of this, even a  sound bank is prone to 
panic w ithdraw als of deposits (Diamond and  Dybvig 1983). Panics are more 
likely to occur w hen economic conditions deteriorate, and  as depositors become 
suspicious about im pending banking problem s (Postlewaite and Vives 1987, 
and  Gorton 1988). In the context of an  open economy, such  panics can resu lt in
3 Hahm  and Miskin (2000) is an  example.
4 Pangestu and  Habir (2000) a ttem pt to address banking issues in the context of 
Indonesian financial crisis. However, they do not provide precise m echanism s 
regarding the in terac tions between banking sector and the rest of the economy.
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capital flight and a balance of paym ents crisis (Goldfajn and Valdes 1997, and 
C hang and Velasco 1999).
Currency mismatch  becomes a problem when a large unexpected 
devaluation or depreciation occurs. Banks are exposed to exchange rate risks 
when they borrow in foreign currency and lend in domestic currency. This 
usually  occurs when a peg or quasi peg regime enjoys credibility for quite a  long 
period, and when foreign in terest rates are higher than  dom estic in terest rates. 
B anks are exposed to exchange rate risk when they lend in foreign currency to 
the non-tradable sector. Thus, when devaluation occurs, non-perform ing loans 
increase. In either case, devaluation worsens b an k s’ balance sheets.
Boom / bust cycle theory em phasises increased financial fragility during a 
boom period. Earlier work on this theory includes Fisher (1932 and 1933), 
Minsky (1977 and 1982) and Kindleberger (1978). The u p tu rn  in a  business 
cycle may be accom panied by ‘euphoria’, which leads banks to make 
insufficient provision for risk. It can also lead to a  high degree of speculative 
activity among investors in the assets m arket. The process is debt-financed, 
mainly by bank  loans, which increases the indebtedness of firms, money 
supply, and price levels. Asset prices soar, and the bursting  of th is bubble 
characterises the down tu rn  of the cycle. In tu rn , th is triggers panic ru n s  on 
bank  deposits and sales of financial assets. Kindleberger stresses th a t this 
process may involve departu re  from economic rationality.
Asym metric information problems occur because the individual borrower 
knows more about her own business than  the banks do. There are two 
problem s associated with this, namely adverse selection and m oral hazard. 
Adverse selection occurs before the transaction, because it is difficult for banks 
to d istinguish good from bad risk  loan applicants. Moreover, because bad risk 
applicants are likely to be the m ost eager to obtain loans they are also the m ost 
likely to be chosen. Moral hazard  occurs after the transaction , where banks 
have to suffer the hazards of ‘im m oral’ conduct by borrowers. Borrowers take 
excessive risks, b u t bank  cannot fully know this because of information 
asym m etries. This problem is more likely to occur when collateral is low or the
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net-worth of the borrower deteriorates (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, and G uttentag 
and  Herring 1984).
Incomplete debt contract is a  problem where banks cannot control all 
aspects of a borrower’s behaviour. This problem arises because banks cannot 
fully specify all of the possible circum stances to which a borrower’s behaviour is 
attached. The problem is made worse by the fact th a t bank  loans are not fully 
transferable or tradable, as m ost of the borrowers do not have sufficient 
credibility to obtain funds by issuing bonds. A bank  th a t is not satisfied with 
the borrower’s conduct cannot sell the loan to other parties. This implies th a t it 
is difficult for the bank  to avoid the risk  of an incoming loss.
Insurance problems arise when banks are implicitly or explicitly 
guaranteed by the authorities. Because the guarantee is usually  free or under 
priced (i.e. the tax payers bear the loss), it can create severe m oral hazard. In 
the context of an open economy, the banks will be highly leveraged by foreign 
creditors (Dooley 1997, and  Krugman 1998). When th is insurance scheme 
breaks down, the twin crises occur.
Weak enforcement o f prudential regulations will usually  end in a  severe 
financial crisis.5 In an  asym m etric information environm ent, it is difficult for 
depositors to discipline banks (i.e. by m eans of withdrawing deposits) because 
of the difficulty in screening ‘good’ from T)ad’ banks. Therefore, public 
m onitoring and controls on banks are delegated to the regulatory authorities. 
However, forbearances of prudential regulations are som etim es made possible 
due to the budgetary consequences of closing down large banks (i.e., the too big 
to fail phenomenon), possible systemic crisis, political interference, and a weak 
legal system. This can induce higher m oral hazard  problem s, which 
accum ulate, ready to be triggered to become a severe financial crisis.
Heightened competition can cause banking fragility, despite its positive 
im pact on efficiency. Three possible im pacts s tan d  out, nam ely a decline in
5 See Caprio (1997) for a  com prehensive discussion on prudential regulations.
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profitability, lower provision for risk , an d  loan  over-expansion  (Davies 1995). 
In o rder to streng then  m ark e t position , b a n k s  m ay adop t p redato ry  pricing 
(increasing deposit rates), leading to in c reases  in deposits  an d  loanable funds. 
T his can  lead to a  lending boom, b u t b ecau se  of th e  lower profitability and  
provision for risk, b an k s  will be less able to cu sh io n  an  adverse shock.
Indeed the  lite ra tu re  provides a  u sefu l guide for identifying possible 
sou rces  of bank ing  problem s. M ost of th e  analy ses  requ ire  u n d e rs ta n d in g  the 
s tru c tu re , conduct, and  perform ance of the  ban k in g  in d u s try  prior to the  crisis. 
In o the r w ords, it is im p o rtan t to a sse ss  w hether the  in d u s try  w as vulnerable 
before the crisis. This certain ly  requ ires  ana ly ses  of b a n k  ba lan ce  sh ee ts  and  
th e  underly ing  in stitu tio n a l set up .
1.2.2. Consequences of a weak banking system
Several factors th a t can  lead  to a  ‘d is tre sse d ’ ban k in g  system  w ere outlined  in 
th e  previous subsection . It is now  tim e to d iscu ss  th e  consequences of a  w eak 
b an k in g  system  in the contex t of th e  o n se t of a  financial crisis. Three possible 
‘scen a rio s’ are outlined as follows.
F irst, if the  b ank ing  secto r is p a rticu la rly  w eak, it can  trigger a  balance 
of paym en ts  crisis (Velasco 1987). A b a n k  bail o u t m ay  have to be financed  by 
p rin tin g  m oney if non-in flationary  m ean s  of finance are  very lim ited. As in 
K rugm an (1979), a  prolonged m o netary  expansion  will ex h a u s t foreign 
exchange reserves, w hich  can  m ake a  fixed exchange ra te  regim e 
u n su s ta in a b le .
Second, u n d e r a  w eak b an k in g  system , a  self-fulfilling cu rrency  a ttack  
can  occur (see O bstfeld 1994, an d  S achs et cd 1996, am o n g st others). In such  
a  case, an  exceptional in te re s t ra te  rise can  inflict add itional dam age to the 
system  in the  form of an  econom ic recession  an d  in c reases  in  non-perform ing  
loans. B ecause of th is, in te re s t ra te  policy w ould be n e ith e r credible nor 
effective in deterring  the  a ttack .
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Third, a  su b s tan tia l p a r t  of b an k  loans m ay be financed  by foreign 
borrow ing, w hich can  m ake bo th  the  ba lance  of p ay m en ts  an d  the  b an k s  
vu lnerab le  to a  su dden  drying u p  of in te rn a tio n a l liquidity  (Goldfajn and  Valdes 
1997, an d  C hang  an d  Velasco 1999). W ithdraw al of foreign cap ita l from the 
sy stem  cau ses  loan con traction  and  cap ita l outflow, triggering bo th  a  bank ing  
a n d  ba lance of p aym ents  crisis.
In sum m ary , the  lite ra tu re  provides th ree  possib le crisis scenarios, w hich 
could  be te sted  aga in st each  o ther in the  contex t of a  m acroeconom ic model. 
W ith th is  view in m ind, an  open-econom y version of th e  B ernake-B linder m odel 
(BBM) will be developed in C h ap te r 6.
1.2.3. Transmission mechanisms and crisis propagation
In th e  con tex t of an  open econom y m acroeconom ic fram ew ork, various 
tran sm iss io n  m ech an ism s can  be identified to analyse  th e  effects of a  change in 
th e  in te re s t ra te , exchange ra te  an d  o th e r variab les. This section will 
co n cen tra te  on th e  "banking ch an n e l’ of su ch  tran sm issio n s.
The in te re s t ra te  affects econom ic activity th ro u g h  th e  change  in  th e  cost 
s tru c tu re  of firm s. In explain ing the  G reat D epression , B ern an k e  (1983) 
sug g ests  th a t given a  heavy b u rd en  on borrow ers, fragility can  be m an ifested  by 
ra is in g  th e  real co st of in term ed iation  betw een len d ers  (banks) an d  som e 
c la sses  of borrow ers. This m ean s th a t  th e  h igher th e  leverage given to firm s, 
th e  m ore p ro n o u n ced  will be th e  im pacts of a n  in te re s t ra te  rise.
The idea  is th a t  an  increase  in  th e  ‘p rem ium  of ex te rn a l finance’ will 
m ake it n ecessary  for firm s to a d ju s t inventory, in v estm en t spend ing  and  
o u tp u t level (B ernanke and  G ertler 1995). The im m ediate  im p ac t w ould be in 
te rm s of th e  fall in  inventory  held by firm s. In th e  longer te rm , if th e  high 
in te re s t ra te  p e rs is ts , it m ay be n ecessary  to c u t in v estm en t an d  o u tpu t. 
Therefore, from  th e  supp ly  side, an  in te re s t ra te  rise  can  p ro d u ce  recessionary  
im pacts .
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An in te res t ra te  rise can  also have dem and  side im pacts , th ro u g h  a 
decline in dom estic absorp tion . In th e  context of a  ba lan ce  of p aym en ts  crisis, 
it m ay becom e n ecessary  to reduce  cu rren t acco u n t deficits by reducing  
dom estic absorp tion . If a  fixed exchange ra te  regime w ere to be m a in ta in ed , an  
im plosion in aggregate spend ing  can  be crea ted  th ro u g h  an  in te re s t ra te  hike 
(Sachs et al 1996a, an d  Tom ell 1999).
A high in te re s t ra te  is well know n for its adverse im pact on b an k s  
(Obstfeld an d  Rogoff 1995).6 It in c reases  liabilities, b u t b a n k  incom es need  no t 
rise due to inc reases  in  non-perform ing  loans. Moreover, stock  prices m ay 
decline as a  re su lt of the  w orsening of firm s’ balance sh ee ts  (M ishkin 1996). In 
effect, the quality  of b a n k  a sse ts  also decreases.
The con trac tio n ary  im pact of devaluation  m ay be b e s t u n d ers to o d  by 
em ploying a  dependen t-sm all-open  econom y fram ew ork.7 In th is  fram ew ork, 
exports tend  to be sluggish  in the sh o rt ru n  in respond ing  to devaluation  and , 
hence a  ba lance of p ay m en ts  ad ju s tm e n t com es m ain ly  from  an  im port 
com pression . The M arshall-L erner condition d ic ta tes th a t  th e  trad e  ba lance 
will im prove if, an d  only if, the  su m  of elasticities of im ports  an d  exports w ith 
re sp ec t to real exchange ra te  is g reater th a n  one. If th is  condition  is satisfied, 
devaluation  can  reduce  c u rre n t acco u n t deficits, lead ing  to an  im provem ent in 
the  balance of p aym ents .
The collapse in im ports will be due to reduction  in  dom estic  abso rp tion . 
In the  sh o rt ru n , a  nom inal devaluation  will lead to h igher dom estic  p rices for 
trad ab le  goods, reducing  real incom e.8 B ecause of th a t, dom estic  consum ption  
will decline. Moreover, it rises th e  b u rd en  of foreign deb ts, and , hence,
6 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue that in order to defend the fixed rate regime the 
Swedish authorities raised the overnight interest rate to 500 per cent in mid September 
1992. This ultra high interest rate, though short lived, led to a much weaker financial 
position for banks. When the attacks rebounded in mid November, the authorities 
failed to increase the interest rate even up to 20 per cent. Finally, the Swedish krona 
collapsed, accompanied by a severe banking crisis.
7 See Agenor and Montiel (1999) for extensive discussion of the contractionary impacts 
of devaluation in the context of an open-small-dependent economy framework.
8 Income effects of devaluation are well known; see Diaz-Alejandro (1965)
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depresses investm ent spending .9 If the consum ption-sm oothing phenom enon 
applies, the effect on investm ent will be more pronounced.
In the long run , there will be offsetting effects. A real depreciation will 
stim ulate exports. Therefore, the final im pact on o u tp u t will be am biguous. If 
the contraction in domestic absorption outweighs export expansion, aggregate 
ou tpu t will decline. It is known th a t devaluation will be contractionary, at least 
in the short run.
The adverse im pacts of devaluation and an in terest rate hike will be 
more pronounced if banking considerations are incorporated. Once the crisis 
sets in, the worsening of the economic situation  and  in firm s’ balance sheets 
can increase non-performing loans. This reduces the  effective loanable funds to 
be allocated to health ier firm s . 10 Because the ‘allocative efficiency’ of financial 
interm ediation is reduced, firms become credit constrained, which further 
w orsens the economic situa tion . * 11
The problem s will be multiplied when the crisis involves panic runs on 
b an k s . 12 The worsening economic situation m ay lead depositors to doubt the 
reliability of the financial position of banks. Because of limited fiscal 
resources, bank ru n s  may have to be financed by prin ting  money. But, this will 
lead to an exodus of domestic financial resources and  further exchange rate 
depreciation.
In sum , the banking sector needs to be incorporated explicitly in a 
macroeconomic model in order to better cap tu re  the transm ission  m echanism s 
of a financial. The BBM is useful analytical fram ework for th is purpose.
9 See the seminal work of Krugman and  Taylor (1978).
10 Some em phasise m oral hazard related loan contraction  (credit rationing). See for 
instance, Mankiw (1986).
11 The m ain function of banks is to mobilise funds to profitable activities (i.e. banks are 
better able to choose sound portfolios th an  individual-sm all-depositors). Thus 
accum ulation of non-perform ing loans restra ins th is function.
12 See M ishkin (1996) for a  delicate exposition of th is issue.
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1.3. Objectives
This research  focuses on the role of the banking sector in m aking the economy 
vulnerable to a  financial crisis and in propagating the crisis in the light of the 
Indonesian experience. The objectives are:
• To assess  w hether or not the banking industry  was weak before the crisis by 
analysing the structure , conduct and perform ance of the industry.
• To exam ine the consequences of a weak banking system  in m aking the 
economy vulnerable to a financial crisis by employing a bank-centred 
m acro-econom etric model.
• To shed light on the process of propagation of the crisis, with particular 
em phasis on transm ission  m echanism s provided by banking channels.
1.4. Outline of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows.
Part A: Introduction, Literature and Pre-crisis Indonesia, Chapters 1 to 3
C hapter 2 reviews the existing financial crisis literature. Three 
approaches are outlined, namely the balance of paym ents, financial fragility 
and twin crises approaches. The purpose is to draw  im portant lessons tha t 
may be relevant for explaining the Indonesian financial crisis.
C hapter 3 critically exam ines the developm ent of pre-crisis Indonesia’s 
m acroeconom y and banking sector. The purpose is to set the scene for further 
analysis in the subsequen t chapters. The chap ter s ta r ts  with a  discussion of 
m acroeconom ic and  banking policies from the 1970s to 1996, suggesting tha t 
during th is period policies moved towards a  more m arket friendly approach. 
The pre-crisis m acro economic developm ent seem s to have been robust, as 
indicated by high economic growth, relatively low ’ inflation, a  disciplined fiscal 
stance, and  relatively comfortable cu rren t account deficits. However, a  rapid
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build up of short-term  private debt and buoyant ‘volatile’ capital inflows may be 
viewed as seeding ‘vulnerabilities’ of the balance of paym ents to a  capital inflow 
reversal. A descriptive analysis gauges the m agnitude, direction, and  pattern  of 
the change in the struc tu re  of the banking sector. The trends indicate an 
increasing role for private banks. However, this was not accom panied by 
sounder banking practices, as indicated by frequent violations of prudential 
regulations and chronic borrowing from the central bank.
Part B: Microeconomic analyses, Chapters 4 and 5.
C hapter 4 develops an analytical framework (model) to assess w hether or 
not the banking sector is vulnerable to a  crisis. The purpose is to provide a 
theoretical foundation for empirical analysis carried out in the subsequent 
chapter. The model implies th a t pre-crisis conduct and  perform ance of a  bank 
affects its ability to w ithstand adverse shocks during the crisis. It is a  modified 
version of a  model developed by G uttentag and Herring (1984).
C hapter 5 assesses w hether or not the banking sector was prone to the 
financial crisis. Balance sheet d a ta  and Probit procedure are employed in the 
analysis. It is concluded th a t the banking sector w as indeed fragile before the 
crisis. The estim ates point to problem s of low capital, high loan growth, crony 
banks, foreign exchange liabilities, connected lending, liquidity m ism atch, and 
exposure to systemic risk.
Part C: Macroeconomic analyses, Chapter 6 to 10
C hapter 6 develops a  theoretical model from which macroeconomic 
in terrelations and transm ission  m echanism s can be drawn. The model is a 
revision of the BBM, and  modifications are imposed on (1) balance of paym ents 
equation, (2) dem and for reserve money, and (3) m onetary  reaction function. It 
is shown th a t the model is able to capture the possible causes as well as the 
transm ission  m echanism s for analysing the propagation of the crisis.
C hapter 7 d iscusses econometric procedures and  d a ta  employed in the 
macroeconom ic analyses. For estim ating the long-run equilibrium  conditions,
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the Phillips-Hansen procedure is adopted, due to its advantages in dealing with 
‘nu isance’ param eters and its ability to tackle statistical problem s associated 
with the use of small samples. For short-run dynamic analysis, im pulse 
response functions derived directly from a  vector error correction model are 
used. Sources, definitions and time series properties of the data  are also 
discussed.
C hapter 8 deals mainly with the estim ation of the long-run equilibrium 
condition implied by the model. Ten cointegrating vectors are estim ated and 
suggest several implications for further analysis. For instance, it is suggested 
th a t the im pact of an in terest rate rise will be more pronounced th an  tha t of 
devaluation, although devaluation itself tends to be contractionary.
C hapter 9 discusses the vulnerabilities of the economy in the run  up  to 
the crisis. It is shown th a t foreign exchange reserves were insufficient to cover 
liquid foreign liabilities and, therefore, the balance of paym ents was vulnerable 
to a sudden reversal of capital inflows. Moreover, an  in terest rate  rise could 
not be effectively used  for deterring speculative a ttacks because it weakens the 
banking system.
C hapter 10 examines the propagation of the crisis. Several im portant 
findings are highlighted. Currency depreciation led to a  contraction in domestic 
absorption and  improvement in the trade balance. However, the improvement 
came m ainly from an im port implosion ra ther th an  from export expansion. 
Increases in the in terest rate also reduced domestic absorption. Moreover, the 
im pacts were more pronounced on investm ent ra ther th an  on consum ption for 
both cases (i.e. in terest rate  increases and devaluation). It is also found th a t 
the increase in non-performing loans reduced ou tpu t through the reduction of 
loanable funds. Furtherm ore, an increase in perceived risk  about the health  of 
the banking system  induced bank  runs, leading to an increase in reserve money 
holding (hoarding) and capital outflows. It is argued th a t the b lanket guarantee 
provided by the authorities was not credible in preventing panic runs, because 
it was not accom panied by controls on capital outflows. In short, there is 
evidence regarding the role of the banking sector in propagating the crisis.
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C hap ter 11 concludes th e  analysis. It s ta r ts  w ith a  sum m ary  of the 
m ain  findings. Im plications are  draw n, m ain ly  to h ighlight several possible 
‘fixes’ for th e  crisis. It is argued  th a t fas t an d  effective b a n k  restruc tu ring , 
w ould be requ ired  for accelerating the  recovery. W eaknesses in th e  cu rren t 




The 1990s was characterised  by frequent and  d isastrous financial crises, 
notably the break  down of the European Exchange Rate M echanism  (ERM) in 
1992-1993, the Mexican crisis and subsequent Tequila effect’ in 1994-1995, 
the ongoing Asian crisis, and finally the R ussian and  Brazilian misery. The 
m ajor feature of the ERM crisis was the w ithdrawal of the British pound and 
Italian lira from the ERM, followed by currency and banking crises in Sweden, 
Norway and Finland. The debt, currency and subsequen t banking crisis in 
Mexico spilled over to Argentina and Brazil. The world was rocked by the Asian 
crisis, which began som ewhat innocuously with the collapse of the Thai baht, 
dragging down Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and  to some extent the 
Philippines. As the  Asian crisis was entering the peak, the R ussian rouble 
collapsed in August 1998. A few m onths later, Brazil joined the list of casualties 
when in Jan u a ry  1999 its ‘real’ peg was effectively b roken .1
A by-product of these crises h as been the burgeoning theoretical and
empirical literature th a t attem pts to search for possible causes and cures. And
yet, there do not seem  to be any definitive answ ers. A sceptical retrospect
perhaps best expressed by Rodrik (1998, p.58) that:
(A) sad com m entary on our understand ing  of w hat drives capital 
flows is th a t every crisis spaw ns a new generation of economic 
models. W hen a  new crisis hits, the previous generation of models 
is judged to have been inadequate.
1 Brazil is particularly interesting since it has been involved in almost every major 
crisis, the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the 1995 tequila effect, and the spill over 
from the Asian crisis.
At the risk of over generalising, differences am ong analysts may be 
traced through their basic approach, which can be divided into three strains, 
namely balance of paym ents, financial fragility, and the twin crises approach.
The balance of paym ents approach is, perhaps, the m ost popular and the 
existing models can be divided into three categories namely, first and second- 
generation models and capital account volatility models. The basic tra it of the 
first generation model is th a t it explains the genesis of financial crises in term s 
of government policies th a t damage the credibility of a  peg regime.2 This model 
was first introduced by Krugman (1979) and gained popularity due to its m erits 
in explaining the Latin American debacle of the early 1980s.
The second generation model offers the alternative view th a t a ttacks on a 
peg regime will succeed if the authorities perceive defending the peg to be more 
costly than  allowing the currency to float, m aking the a ttacks self-fulfilling. 
Defending the peg can become very costly, both politically and  economically, in 
an environm ent where unem ploym ent is high and the banking sector is weak. 
This line of analysis, first proposed by Obstfeld (1994), is believed to be relevant 
for explaining the ERM crisis.
The capital account volatility approach p u ts  the  blam e on increased 
financial integration and  short-term  volatile capital flows for creating a balance 
of paym ents crisis. It also stresses the role of self-fulfilling expectation and 
herding behaviour in the international capital m arket. The basic tenet of this 
view is th a t the surge in short-term  capital inflows to an  emerging m arket will 
be accom panied by increasing vulnerability in the balance of paym ents to a 
cessation of these inflows. This line of analysis is asserted  by Calvo (1998a) and 
Calvo and R einhart (1999), am ongst others.
The financial fragility approach stresses the role of dom estic financial 
system  in m aking the economy vulnerable to an  adverse m acroeconomic shock.
2 See Dooley (1997) for precise definition of the first generation model.
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The m ain argum ent is basically draw n from asym m etric information 
theory, in th a t the financial system breeds m oral hazard  and  adverse selection 
problem s, aggravating the effects of a  seemingly harm less shock, and 
subsequently  leading to a full blown economic crisis. This line of analysis was 
popularised by Mishkin (1996) in explaining financial crises in developing 
countries, especially the 1994-1995 Mexican debacle.3
The twin crises approach focuses on the links or causation  between 
currency  and  banking crises. Interest in th is approach  grew after the 
publication of a paper by Kaminsky and  Reinhart (1996).
This chapter provides a  brief review of these alternative approaches. The 
purpose is to draw im portant lessons th a t m ay be relevant in explaining the 
Indonesian financial crisis.
The rem ainder of this chapter is organised as  follows. Section 2.2 
highlights the various approaches to a  balance of paym ents crisis. Section 2.3 
d iscusses the financial fragility approach, which is mostly adapted from 
M ishkin (1996). Section 2.4 sheds light on the relevance of the twin crises 
literatu re  with an em phasis on the causal relationship  between banking and 
currency  crises.
2.2. Balance of payments approaches
2.2.1. The first generation model
The first generation model is possibly best defined as a  fram ework th a t provides 
the m echanism s for a  policy induced balance of paym ents crisis. In short, the 
governm ent adopts a  set of policies th a t are not consisten t with a  peg regime. 
Such policies include m onetisation of fiscal deficits (Krugman 1979) and an 
implicit or explicit guarantee on private (banks and cronies) liabilities (Dooley 
1997, and  Krugm an 1998). While there have been several modifications of the
3 The approach  can be viewed as a  revised version of the infam ous debt deflation theory 
due tö F isher (1933).
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m odel, the  d iscussion  will concen tra te  on th e  original K rugm an m odel, an d  the 
Dooley-Krugm an m odel.4
Krug man’s original model (KOM)
The lite ra tu re  m odeling foreign exchange a ttack s  began  w ith K rugm an (1979), 
who developed the  m ain  ideas ab o u t the  role of dom estic  cred it expansion  in 
collapsing a  peg regim e.5 In the  KOM, policy m a k e rs  com m it to m ain ta in in g  two 
policies; (1) fixed exchange ra te  regim e an d  (2) a  h igh  priority  expansionary  
policy th a t is in co n sis ten t w ith long-term  m a in ten a n ce  of th e  fixed ra te . The 
m odel show s th a t forw ard-looking sp ecu la to rs  will h a s te n  th e  b reak  dow n of a 
fixed exchange ra te  regim e w hich is in h e ren tly  u n su s ta in a b le , due to 
m onetisa tion  of an  expansionary  fiscal policy.
By assu m in g  o u tp u t to be c o n s ta n t w ith in  a  m onetary  fram ew ork, 
co n s ta n t m onetisa tion  of budget deficits will be d irectly  asso c ia ted  w ith foreign 
exchange reserves losses. The tw ist is th a t, to m a in ta in  th e  fixed ra te  regime, 
the  real m oney supp ly  needs to be fixed as well. The b ase  m oney h a s  two 
com ponents, foreign exchange reserves an d  dom estic  credit. P rin ting  m oney to 
finance b u d g e t deficits expands dom estic  c red it a n d  su b seq u en tly  crea tes 
excess supply  of base  m oney. R ational agen ts  will n o t be willing to hold  th is  
excess, leading to conversion of the  m oney to  foreign exchange, thereby  
reducing  reserves.6 If th is  p rocess occurs con stan tly , foreign exchange reserves 
will be ex h au sted , triggering a  collapse of th e  fixed ra te  regim e. B ecause 
dom estic cred it expansion  can  no longer be su p p o rted  by ru n n in g  down 
reserves, th e  cu rren cy  will be fully floated on th e  day  reserves fall to zero.
The m odel yields two im p o rtan t p red ic tions. F irst, foreign exchange 
reserves su p p o rt two conflicting policy objectives, lead ing  to  tw o-objectives/one
4 The modified versions of the first generation model include Flood and Garber (1984), 
Obstfeld (1984, 1986), Cumby and van-Wijnbergen (1989), Goldberg (1990), and Flood 
et dl (1996), amongst others.
5 Krugman adopted speculative attack mechanism on gold reserves proposed by Salant 
and Henderson (1978) where the government tries to fix the gold price.
6 Another way of understanding the loss of reserves is through the increase in current 
account deficits. Money expansion will create inflationary pressures, leading to real 
exchange rate appreciation and the demise of export competitiveness.
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tool problem. Second, constan t deterioration in the fundam entals may initiate 
and  susta in  dram atic attacks. Because the exchange rate will be floated on the 
day reserves fall to zero, subsequent deficits will be financed by inflation tax, 
implying a higher cost of holding domestic currency and a lower real in terest 
rate  on dom estic financial assets (Dooley 1997). Knowing this, agents will 
initiate a  ru n  on foreign exchange reserves, leading to an  inevitable collapse of 
the fixed rate  regime.
However the model has two limitations. First, it is assum ed th a t 
m aintaining the fixed rate regime is an inferior objective relative to a  high 
priority expansionary policy, th u s  ruling out the possibility of a  shift in policies 
to be consistent with the regime. Devaluation may become politically costly -  
e.g. the possibility of losing office imposes a  disincentive to devalue (Drazen and 
Masson 1994, am ong others). This problem is tackled by the second-generation 
model, in th a t the fixed rate regime will be defended, so long as it is less costly 
to do so, otherwise the currency will be floated.
Second, it is assum ed th a t deterioration in fundam entals is fully 
reflected in the demise of foreign exchange reserves. However, the sequence of 
a  fall in reserves followed by a  collapse of the exchange ra te  is rarely observed 
(Dooley 1997). Moreover, Flood et al (1996) find th a t sterilisation of capital 
outflows by runn ing  down reserves occurs during attacks, implying the attacks 
were not triggered by deteriorating reserves. Before an attack, a  boom in capital 
inflows may resu lt in an accum ulation of reserves. To stabilise the growth of 
base money, dom estic credit creation needs to be reduced, which contradicts 
the sequence implied by the model. This leads Dooley (1997) and  Krugman 
(1998) to revise the model by incorporating a  crisis sequence where a  boom in 
capital inflows precedes the crisis.7
7 Nonetheless, some empirical studies show th a t the collapse of a  fixed rate regime can 
be well predicted by the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. See for, instance, 
Cumby and van-W ijnbergen (1989) for the Argentinean case of the early 1980s.
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Dooley-Krugman model (DKM)
Due to dissatisfaction with the KOM, Dooley (1997) proposes a  government- 
insurance-driven crisis, which still subscribes to the policy conflicts in the 
KOM, bu t with a different sequence and m echanism . Similarly, Krugman 
(1998) offers a m oral-hazard-driven crisis, which surprisingly is alm ost identical 
to th a t of Dooley. Henceforth, this set of modeling will be referred to as the 
Dooley-Krugman model (DKM). Corsetti et dl (1999a and 1999b) provide a 
formal exposition of the model.
The main differences between the DKM and KOM are twofold. First, in 
the KOM, government is the only source of policy conflicts, while in the DKM 
the private sector is also involved. Second, the collapse of an  exchange rate 
regime is not the central issue in the DKM; it is only a  byproduct of the 
insurance scheme. These differences will be m ade clear in the following 
discussion.
DKM m aintains the policy conflicts in the background, where the 
government sets out two objectives: (1) the desire to give a  guarantee on private 
liabilities and (2) the desire to accum ulate reserve asse ts  as a form of self- 
insurance .8 By providing a guarantee the government is exposed to contingent 
liabilities, which can be large enough to generate a  crisis or to stim ulate an 
a ttack  on reserves. In order for a guarantee to be credible the government 
needs to accum ulate assets, which can be in the form of foreign exchange 
reserves.
A guarantee m ay be provided to banks, and  to preferred parties or 
cronies. For the shake of brevity, the discussion will concentrate on cronies. As 
usual, a  government guarantee is under-priced (or free), leading to moral 
hazard  problems. Cronies will tend to accum ulate debt-financed capital stock 
above the socially optimal level. As argued by Krugm an (1998), th is allows 
them  to maximise profits in the case of successful investm ent, and transfer
8 Dooley (1997) uses insurance as the keyword, while Krugm an (1998) uses guarantee. 
We will use insurance and  guarantee interchangeably.
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losses to the government in the case of failure. Moreover, projects with a  high 
re tu rn  bu t a low probability of success m ay be chosen. This moral hazard 
problem further burdens the government with potential losses.
Over accum ulation of capital stocks is m ade possible when a guarantee 
is credible. In other words, if the government initially has  sufficient financial 
resources to cover contingent liabilities, it elim inates any perceived risk 
attached by foreign creditors to the cronies .9 Because of this, the cronies will 
become highly leveraged. In effect, the country will enjoy capital inflows and an 
investm ent boom. So long as a  crisis does not erupt, the boom will be m anifest 
in the form of higher economic growth. In th is sense, a  guarantee may be driven 
by the motive of spurring economic perform ance.
The eruption of a  crisis is m arked by a  breakdow n of the guarantee 
schem e . 10 A crisis evolves in the sam e m anner as in the KOM, in th a t a 
deterioration in the fundam entals triggers the a ttacks. In the KOM, the 
constant depletion of foreign exchange reserves m akes the collapse of a  peg 
regime inevitable. In the DKM this need not be so. In the DKM, a deterioration 
in the fundam entals is captured by the growth of the contingent liabilities 
exceeding the growth of foreign exchange reserves. Hence, the KOM 
em phasises the absolute demise of the reserves, while the DKM stresses the 
relative demise of government assets com pared to liabilities.
A constant demise in the fundam entals will eventually m ake the 
guarantee unsusta inab le , i.e. liabilities will exceed asse ts. In Dooley’s term s 
th is  is referred to as the decline in the insu red  value, which constantly 
approaches zero. As in the KOM, attacks on foreign exchange reserves will 
occur on the day the insured value reaches zero, leading to the breakdown of 
the insurance scheme. In short, a  crisis evolves as follows: a  surge in capital 
inflows, an investm ent boom, increasing contingent liabilities, capital outflows 
and  finally the break  down of the insurance scheme. It should  be stressed  at
9 Dooley (1997) m aintains tha t the governm ent’s own net-w orth m inus the contingent 
liabilities has to be positive in the initial period in order for the guarantee to be credible.
10 Dooley and Krugman share identical view regarding the m echanism  leading to the 
crisis, though in different way/exposition.
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the ou tset th a t th is requires the assum ption th a t the governm ent is credit 
constrained, i.e. has limited access to foreign borrowings and  fu ture tax.
There are three lessons to be drawn from th is model. First, a  seemingly 
robust economic perform ance, i.e. high economic growth and investm ent, does 
not necessarily imply economic stability. This does not m ean th a t high growth 
is a bad thing. Rather, it is the way the growth is achieved and investm ents are 
financed th a t m atters in m aking a country vulnerable to a  financial crisis.
Second, steady increases in foreign exchange reserves associated with 
large private capital inflows do not necessarily reduce a  country’s vulnerability 
to a shift in private expectations (Dooley 1997). M easures comparing a 
governm ent’s net worth with its contingent liabilities are more appropriate. For 
instance, if a guarantee is given to or channelled through banks, a decline in 
the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to M l or M2 will indicate a  higher 
vulnerability.11 T "
Third, a  crisis m ay be accom panied by the collapse of a  peg regime, bu t 
the collapse itself is only a  symptom, not the underlying problem. The attack 
on the insurance  schem e will resu lt in capital outflows, which induce excess 
dem and for foreign exchange. Because of that, the peg regime cannot be 
m aintained.
In the context of the Asian crisis, Krugman (1998) and  Corsetti et al 
(1999b) argue th a t the  m oral hazard  problem is one of the key elem ents. Their 
argum ent is based on the  observation th a t crony capitalism  is an  acute problem 
in Korea, Thailand and  Indonesia. Close connections between conglomerates, 
banks, and  government officials is an indication th a t conglom erates and banks 
are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed.
11 See Stoker (1994), Sachs et al (1996), and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) for application 
of ratio of foreign reserves to M2.
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2.2.2. Second-generation models
Both the first and second-generation models are fundam entals-based  models, 
in th a t government decisions to hang on to or opt out of the exchange rate 
regime depends on the state  of the fundam entals. Perhaps the only real 
difference between these two models is in the form ulation of policy conflicts. 
The second-generation models have a more general set up, where policy m akers 
face a  decision dilemma: (1) defending a peg regime would impose costs in the 
form of loss of foreign exchange reserves adverse im pacts of an in terest rate 
hike, and (2) opting out of a  peg regime would also be costly (loss of political 
credibility, adverse im pacts of devaluation on the balance sheets of firms with 
currency m ism atch, etc.). Thus where there are dangers associated with either 
alternatives, policy m akers will opt for the least costly option. In short, in the 
second-generation models, there is always the option of choosing either 
alternative. However, note carefully th a t in the first-generation models 
alternative (1) is always inferior. In other words, first-generation models are a  
special case of the second-generation models where defending the peg regime is 
too costly.
The second-generation models commonly identify three s tates of 
fundam entals: sound, vulnerable (multiple equilibrium) and  very weak. If the 
fundam entals are sound (e.g. a  ‘rock solid’ banking  sector and  low 
unem ploym ent levels) it will no t be too costly to deter speculative a ttack  by 
m eans of engineering a  recession through an in terest ra te  hike. Moreover, with 
strong fundam entals, the a ttacks are unlikely to be prolonged, as agents soon 
realise th a t the probability of success is small. As a resu lt, the damage to the 
economy is likely to be very small, as in terest ra tes can be lowered after the 
a ttack  is defeated. Therefore, an  in terest ra te  hike is needed only to show th a t 
the authorities are determ ined to defend the peg.
In a  case where the fundam entals are very weak, a  peg regime will be 
abolished w hether or not it is attacked. For instance, after a  collapse of several 
major banks, or near bank  financial institu tions, the au thorities may be forced 
to step in to avoid a  loss of general public confidence in the financial industry.
23
If the collapse is followed by bank ru n s  and subsequen t capital flight, it may be 
difficult to control the money supply and hang on to the peg regime.
In the case of vulnerable sta tes where the fundam entals are neither 
particularly sound nor very weak, attacks on the currency can be self-fulfilling 
in tha t defending the peg regime tends to worsen the state  of fundam entals, 
increasing the probability of further successful a ttacks. Knowing this, agents 
will intensify the attacks, inducing fu rther complications. 12
It is often m entioned th a t second-generation models are those 
incorporating multiple equilibrium  or a  self-fulfilling m echanism . However, this 
is not quite correct. In fact, self-fulfilling attacks can be easily incorporated 
into the first generation model as in Obstfeld (1986).13 Multiple equilibrium 
arises due to non-regularities in private sector behaviour in response to either 
an observed deterioration of fundam entals or perceived potential risks (not 
necessarily verifiable), m aking the timing of attacks, and  the occurrence of a 
crisis, hardly predictable. This, in tu rn , em phasises the im portance of panics, 
herding behaviour, and credibility.14 However, several au thors, such  as Radelet 
and Sachs (1998a), have over em phasised the role of panic and shifts in public 
confidence and, th u s , underm ined the  role of fundam entals in m aking attacks 
easy or difficult to handle. In fact, the second-generation models illustrate  that, 
under strong fundam entals, panic are less likely to occur, while vulnerable and 
very weak fundam entals are likely to induce severe panic and  government 
responses are unlikely to be credible.
In the context of the Asian crisis, especially for Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia, m any subscribe to the second-generation models. For instance, 
Tornell (2000) and Raj an  and Sugem a (1999a, 1999b) em phasise the weak
12 See Obstfeld and Roggof (1995) for the Swedish case, where the au thorities withstood 
the a ttacks in the first round by increasing the in terest rate , b u t due to the weakened 
banking sector, could not afford to increase the in terest ra tes  again when the a ttacks 
were renewed.
13 See also Cavallari and Corsetti (1998) and Flood and Marion (2000).
14 Drazen and  M asson (1994) make distinctions between credibility of policies and 
credibility of policy m akers.
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banking sector’s role in an in terest rate  hike th a t lacked the credibility to stave 
off speculative attacks. A thukorala and Warr (1999), Corbett and  Vines (1999), 
and Goldstein (1998) also point to the weak financial system  as one of the 
sources of vulnerability.
2.2.3. Capital account approach
The Asian crisis shifted attention from the cu rren t account to the capital 
account as the  source of problem s.15 The IMF (1999) stresses th a t Asian 
countries suffer the ‘new breed of economic crisis’. Calvo (1998a) and Edwards 
(1999) also argue tha t Asian crisis countries had  either low (Indonesia) or high 
(Thailand and  Malaysia) current account deficits, m aking it difficult to justify 
the argum ent th a t the deficits were the m ain cau se .16 By contrast, large swings 
in capital inflows characterised alm ost all crisis episodes (Golfajn and Valdes 
1997, Calvo and  Reinhart 1999).
The capital account approach focuses on the volatility of private capital 
flows and  increasing global financial integration as the source of the 
problem s.17 Moreover, it stresses the difficulties in the ad justm ent process in 
the case of large capital inflow reversals which involve overshooting.18 In 
essence, th is  approach shifts the blame from cu rren t account or solvency 
issues to capital account or liquidity issues (Caballero and  K risnam urthy 1998, 
Yoshitomi and  Ohno 1999).
15 Edw ards (1999) shows th a t cu rren t account ratios have limited usefulness in 
determ ining a  coun try ’s financial health. See Calvo (1998a) for the irrelevance of 
cu rren t account and  solvency issues. Obstfeld and  Rogoff (1996) provide theoretical 
assessm en t as  to why solvency models tend to suggest higher ‘susta inable  level’ of 
cu rren t account deficits th an  actually observed am ongst developing countries.
16 Ades and  K aune (1997) suggest 4% and Milesi-Ferreti and  Razin (1996) suggest 5% 
of GDP th a t can  be considered to be a ‘dangerous’ level of CAD.
17 See Lopez-Meiza (1999) among others for an  extensive survey on the size and causes 
of increasing capital inflows to emerging m arkets.
18 Calvo (1998a) develops a  simple bu t powerful model to address the adverse effects of 
a sudden  stop of capital inflows.
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The m ain argum ent lies on the capital inflow s/crisis sequence, where 
w ithdrawal of foreign investm ent, and the exodus of domestic financial 
resources, precipitates a liquidity crisis. The subsequent devaluation, deep 
economic recession, and insolvency problems hitting banks and firms are all 
parts  of the painful ad justm ent process. There are four basic tenets tha t 
comprise th is  approach.
First, the surge in capital inflows and its determ inants may be analysed 
for identifying likely associated problems. Calvo (1998b) and Radelet and Sachs 
(1998b), am ongst others, em phasise th a t a  surge in capital inflows precedes 
financial crises. Several factors are responsible for th is surge in capital inflows, 
such  as liberalisation of the capital account and dom estic financial m arkets, a 
high dom estic in terest rate, a  low in terest rate in industrialised  countries, 
governm ent budget deficits, and the need to recycle cu rren t account surp luses 
in the new industria lised  countries.19 By identifying the causes of capital 
inflows, it becom es easier to identify the likely triggers of a  financial crisis. For 
instance, if capital inflows are stim ulated by in terest rate differentials, an 
increase in in ternational in terest rates can reverse the inflows.
Second, the  approach also highlights some adverse consequences of 
capital inflows, which can stim ulate a balance of paym ents vulnerability. Calvo 
et al (1993 and  1994) suggest two problems: (1) real exchange rate appreciation 
and  (2) ‘m isallocation’ of financial resources. Real exchange rate appreciation 
h as two effects; (a) it tends to worsen curren t account deficits and (b) the 
required depreciation becomes larger once a  crisis hits. A bank-lending boom 
m ay be partly  financed by capital inflows, and b anks may then  enter risky 
activities th a t reduce loan quality.
Third, the s tru c tu re  of capital inflows is also an im portant consideration. 
Short-term  portfolio capital is commonly considered to be more volatile than
19 See Calvo et al (1993), Lopez-Meiza (1999), and Griffith-Jones et al (2001) for 
comprehensive discussion on the causes of capital inflows.
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direct investm ent and official capital flows. As portfolios become more 
diversified internationally, the m arginal benefit from scrutinising single country 
fundam entals declines (Calvo and Mendoza 1996). In effect, small information 
distortions (e.g. devaluation elsewhere and unverified rum ours) may generate 
large-scale cross-border shifts in portfolio holdings. Moreover, liquidity 
m ism atch m ay increase vulnerability. Chang and Velasco (1998) extend the 
Diamond-Dybvig model within the context of an open economy, and  m aintain 
th a t panics can trigger a liquidity driven financial crash . The reason is that, 
because banks borrow short and lend long, they are exposed to liquidity 
m ism atch. In the context of international borrowing, any reluctance by foreign 
lenders to role over debts can cause both banking and  balance of paym ents 
crises. Ito (1999) and Goldstein (1998) argue tha t liquidity m ism atch was one 
of the problem s leading to the Asian crisis.
Fourth, the ad justm ent process to capital inflow reversal may be painful. 
Though currency depreciation will have some expansionary im pact through an 
im provem ent in exports, th is will not necessarily bypass the crisis, because 
firms with currency m ism atch will carry increased debt bu rden .20
2.3. Financial fragility approach
The financial fragility approach may be defined as a  school of thought th a t 
concentrates on the struc tu re  and  institu tional characters of the financial 
system  for explaining the sources of the problems. The m ain argum ents are 
based  on two basic elem ents. First, the financial s truc tu re  of firms and 
financial interm ediaries (banks hereafter) does m atter, in th a t it affects (real) 
economic perform ance. Unlike the real business cycle theory, financial shocks 
can  change the course of real economic activities. This is in contrast to the 
notion asserted  by Modigliani and Miller (1958) th a t finance is a  ‘veil’. Second,
20 Many of the Asian banks and firms carried currency mismatch problems in the run 
up to the crisis (see Goldstein 1998, Bank of Thailand 1998, among others)
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unlike commodity transactions, debt contracts involve two problems: (a) 
asym m etric information (the individual borrower knows more about her own 
business th an  the lender) and (b) incomplete contracts (lenders cannot control 
all aspects of the borrower’s behaviour).
2.3.1. Sources of banking fragility 
Forbearance of prudential regulations
As suggested by Mishkin (1996), in an asym m etric information 
environm ent it would be difficult for depositors to m onitor and discipline banks. 
In such  a  case, the authorities m u st ensure banks comply with prudential 
regulations. In other words, monitoring and exam ination of banks is delegated 
to the authorities.
Caprio (1997) suggests th a t authorities m ust take im m ediate corrective 
actions against non-compliance with p rudential regulations in order to prevent 
larger problem s of moral hazard. Non-compliance m u st be punished  and 
insolvent banks closed. Regulatory forbearance, th a t is allowing banks to keep 
operating as usual despite violation of regulations, can  encourage other banks 
to assum e th a t they will also not be subject to pun ishm en t for non-compliance. 
Keeping insolvent banks alive is even more dangerous, because the owners have 
noth ing  to lose in gambling with the banks.
However, there are three reasons why p ruden tia l regulations may not 
work. First, a  government facing with tax revenue constra in ts  may try  to avoid a 
large bank  from failing due to fear th a t closure m ay induce systemic banking 
failures. Thus, the owners will not expect to lose it, even though their bank  is 
insolvent. Adverse selection problem s faced by depositors are particularly  acute 
in countries tha t historically have weak banking system  and  where b an k s’ 
periodically published financial reports are not credible. Even closing down a 
relatively small bank  can trigger a  w idespread b an k  ru n  and  m assive capital 
flight. With the view th a t the paym ent system  and  credit m arket are dom inated 
by banks, authorities will be very cautious in deciding to close even a single
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bank. The disruption in the national paym ent system  will be very costly as it 
affects all o ther economic activities.
Second, a  principal-agent problem can arise when the agents th a t are 
au thorised  to supervise banks do not carry out the job as expected by their 
principal. Supervisors may allow minor violations of the regulations by banks 
in exchange for extraordinary income. Senior central bank  officials may not 
pun ish  problem atic banks as bank  failures m ay affect their career. Moreover, 
supervisors m ay be subject to pressure from politically well-connected bank 
owners.
Third, monitoring and exam ination of banks m ay not be supported by a 
sound  legal system. In a  weak and corrupt legal system , guilty parties may 
walk free w ithout punishm ent. In such  an environm ent, even looting is made 
possible.
High interest rate
There are various channels suggested in the credit literature regarding the 
transm ission  m echanism  of an increase in in terest ra tes. First, it increases the 
prem ium  on external finance for firms (Bernanke and Gertler 1990). The 
adverse effect of an increase in in terest ra tes on firms' balance sheets depends 
on the ir financial structure . The higher the leverage, the more severe the effect. 
Moreover, the in terest rate on short-term  loans is likely to be ad justed  more 
quickly th a n  on long-term loans. As external finance becom es more expensive, 
firms will reduce inventory and investm ent on fixed capital in the short run . In 
the longer ru n , it may affect ou tpu t and economic growth.
Second, banks' income may be reduced by increases in non-performing 
loans and  decreases in in terest ra te  m argins. Firms with a  low re tu rn  and high 
leverage m ay not be able to fully service bank  loans. Moreover, because deposit 
con tracts  are usually  shorter th an  loan contracts, deposit ra tes may be 
ad justed  more quickly than  loan rates. M onetary tightening increases 
com petition in the deposits m arket as liquidity dries up. On the other hand,
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banks may be cautious in increasing loan ra tes due to fear of non-performing 
loans. In the short run , banks' in terest income may decline.
Third, it can increase the fragility of the financial system  as it induces 
moral hazard and adverse selection. As shown by Stiglitz and  Weiss (1981), 
an increase in the in terest ra te  can deteriorate the mix of loan applicants, 
where potential applicants with good risk b u t low yield will be driven out of the 
loan m arket. Moreover, existing borrowers become more likely to take riskier 
projects as the value of liabilities increases.
Fourth, due to increases in moral hazard  and adverse selection problem s 
lenders may choose to ration credits (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). An exceptionally 
high in terest rate  m ay lead to a  financial collapse resulting  from a  severe 
reduction in loanable funds (Mankiw 1986). Because good risk  borrowers 
become more difficult to find, lenders may choose not to g rant loans a t all.
Increase in uncertainty
Aside from project-specific risk, there can also be unpredictable circum stances 
of a  d isastrous na tu re , which resu lt in re tu rn s  for investm ent a t m uch lower 
level th an  usual. U ncertainty may comprise problem s th a t are less frequently 
recurring and beyond the capacity of individual agents to solve, such  as social 
disorder, political turm oil, wars, and abrup t changes in m onetary policy regime.
U ncertainty h as  two implications for the financial m arket. First, unlike 
project specific risks, uncertain ty  is non-diversifiable, in the  sense th a t it 
cannot be elim inated by portfolio diversification. Second, uncerta in ty  may not 
be correctly priced by the  m arket in the form of risk  prem ium , especially during 
a tranquil period. Valuation of uncertain  events m ay be very subjective, 
because they cannot be inferred from history and, hence, subjective and 
objective probability m ay not converge. Moreover, competition may drive 
pruden t banks from the  m arket as those charging a  risk  prem ium  for low 
probability hazards can lose business to those ready to disregard such  risk  
(G uttentag and Herring 1984).
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Asset price deflation
Financial a sse ts  have two roles in the balance sheet of banks. First, they are 
often pa rt of the b an k ’s portfolio and, therefore, a  decline in asset price will 
directly reduce the book value of bank  assets. Second, they are often part of 
collateral and, therefore, the decline will reduce the credit w orthiness of 
borrowers. This can propagate moral hazard  on the p a rt of borrowers as their 
net worth decreases. Moreover, a  lower collateral value m eans th a t granting 
loans is risk ier for banks. In short, the decline in asse t price and the 
subsequen t squeeze of the book value of firms can increase financial m arket 
fragility (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988, Calomiris and H ubbard 1990).
Increased competition
An increase in com petition may increase the efficiency of banks. However, it 
m ay also resu lt in increased fragility in the banking system  through a decline in 
profitability, lower provision for risks, and loan expansion (Davies 1988, 1995). 
Increased com petition is likely to occur following a banking  deregulation which 
involves a  reduction in regulatory barriers of entry.
Increased competition may affect b a n k s ’ liabilities through the increase 
in deposit ra tes, reducing the spread between deposit and  loan rates. Higher 
deposit ra tes  will increase the quantity  of deposits, which then  have to be 
d istribu ted  to borrowers. However, competitive p ressu res and  th rea ts  of moral 
hazard  problem s may prevent banks from increasing loan rates. This may 
sharply  reduce profits and  provision for bad  loans, creating a  reduced ability to 
cushion  adverse shocks.
The th rea t from new en tran ts  and lower profitability can weaken the 
incum bents. Unlike new en tran ts, incum bents have to carry the burden  of non ­
perform ing loans from previous periods, bu t, with lower profits, are less able to 
m ake provision against fu ture losses.
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If banks compete to increase m arket share, the negative effects of 
competition will be more pronounced. Incum bents m ay become aggressive in 
, a ttem pts to strengthen  their position and drive the new en tran ts  out by m eans 
of predatory pricing. Increases in the volume of loans m ay be viewed as 
necessary  to offset the reduction in profit margin. However, th is also m eans 
th a t previous loan (quantity) rationing needs to be relaxed, which may entail 
increased risk (Davies 1995).
2.3.2. Financial crisis and its propagation
So far, we have surveyed the literature on sources of b an k  fragility. An increase 
in fragility m eans a  financial crisis can more easily erup t and  transm it to the 
rest of the economy. In this section, propagation process of financial crises is 
d iscussed.
M ishkin (1996) identifies several factors th a t can set the stage for a 
financial crisis in developing countries, nam ely a  deterioration in b an k s’ 
balance sheets, an increase in interest rates, a stock m arket crash , an  increase 
in uncertain ty , and an exchange rate collapse. These factors worsen adverse 
selection and  m oral hazard  problems and, consequently, lenders would be less 
willing to grant loans. As a  result, investm ent and aggregate economic activity 
will decline.
In effect, the dow nturn in economic activity can resu lt in a further 
deterioration in the balance sheets of firms and  banks. Some firms may 
become technically insolvent, and others m ay not be able to fully pay the 
in te rest a n d /o r  the principal. There are two options for b anks to deal with firm 
insolvency.
B anks may be willing to restruc tu re  the deb t in the  hope th a t the 
perform ance of firms will improve after the economy recovers. This m ay involve 
extending grace periods, transform ing short-term  into long-term  debts, a  debt 
to equity swap, and  granting concessionary in te rest ra tes  and  principal 
(haircut). However, because these firms are insolvent, m oral hazard  problems
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may increase, and default risks heighten. Moreover, if the num ber of creditors 
is large, there may be a  coordination problem. Some may prefer bankruptcy, 
while o thers may be willing to res tru c tu re  the debt. Some may allow the 
haircu t, others may prefer a  debt to equity swap.
An alternative resolution is through a formal bankruptcy  procedure. 
However, seizing the asse ts  of these firms can be costly and  time consum ing 
(Davies 1995). There may be legal problem s regarding the conditions under 
which a bankrup tcy  can be im posed by a  creditor. There may also be problems 
in determ ining the seniority of a  debt relative to others, i.e. which debt should 
be paid first and which asse ts  correspond to each creditor. Even if banks are 
able to seize the asse ts  of insolvent firms, a  further decline in asse t price will 
set in. Under a  d istressed economic situation, the sale of asse ts  can lead to a 
process fam ously known as F isher’s (1933) debt deflation process.
Both alternatives incur costs to banks and their capital may not be 
enough to cover these losses. Moreover, banks may not be able to shift funds 
from troubled to well perform ing firms. Thus, sound firms are likely to be credit 
constrained, m aking the crisis more persistent.
If banks can quickly sort out the problem s and recover bad debts, 
prolonged economic contraction and  debt deflation may be avoided. However, 
ano ther th rea t m ay set in. W ithin an  asym m etric inform ation environm ent, a 
deterioration in b a n k s’ balance sheets m ay lead depositors to cast doubts over 
bank  solvency. This, in tu rn , m ay trigger w idespread bank  runs, including 
ru n s  on sound  banks. Gorton (1988) m ain tains th a t bank  ru n s  are more likely 
to be observed when economic fundam entals weaken.
B ank ru n s  have two effects. First, because the central bank  functions as 
a  lender of last resort, it becom es more difficult to control the money supply. 
As the  money supply increases, a  fu rther currency depreciation may be difficult 
to prevent. Second, it reduces financial interm ediation and  loanable funds. 
This becom es more pronounced in the case of capital flight. In sum m ary, panic 
ru n s  complicate the crisis further.
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2.3.3. Application
The financial fragility approach has a  strong microeconomic foundation. 
However, its applications for assessing financial crises in developing countries 
are som ew hat limited. Comprehensive studies using  th is approach include 
M ishkin (1996) for the Mexican case, Hahm  and  Mishkin (1999) for the Korean 
case, and  Mishkin (1999) for the Asian case in general.
Perhaps the application of th is approach is ham pered by the fact th a t it 
requires a  careful assessm ent of the balance sheets of firms and banks. It is 
usually  difficult to obtain reliable and com parable balance sheet da ta  from 
developing countries. Because of tha t, m ost of the empirics are largely 
descriptive.
On the other hand, macro or aggregate level d a ta  m ost often give 
inconclusive results. For instance, Hill (1999) m ain tains th a t it is difficult to 
reach a  strong conclusion as to w hether Indonesian banks were weak before the 
crisis if one has to rely on aggregate level d a ta  only. This suggests the need to 
carry out a combined macro and micro level study. Indeed, th is thesis is in this 
direction.
2.4. Twin crises approach
The twin crises approach focuses on the interaction and  causalities between a 
banking  and  currency crisis. The term  ‘twin crises’ itself was popularised by 
Kaminsky and  R einhart (1996), though some earlier works also em phasised the 
links between the two crises, such  as Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Velasco (1987) and 
Miller (1996).
In identifying links and causalities, th is approach u ses  both the balance 
of paym ents and financial fragility approaches as the basis for theoretical 
reasoning. Note th a t the balance of paym ents approach does not ignore the role 
of a  ‘fragile financial system ’ in m aking a  country  susceptible to a  balance of 
paym ents crisis. Likewise, the financial fragility approach also acknowledges
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the im portance of balance of paym ents issues as one of the sources of 
problem s. They ju s t  give a different em phasis on the issue in question. Thus, 
the m ain contribution of the twin crises approach is som ew hat limited in 
sharpening  the focus of analysis, i.e. it p u ts  more weight on the potential links 
and  causalities.
2.4.1. Causality from banking crisis to balance of payments crisis
The em pirical findings of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996 and  1999) are m ost 
striking. They suggest th a t during the 1970s there seem ed to be no apparent 
causalities between a  currency and banking crises. However, during the 1980s 
and  1990s a banking  crisis most often preceded a currency crisis.21 Moreover, 
the peak of the banking crisis m ost often m aterialised after a  currency crash, 
suggesting a  vicious cycle once the twin crises erupt.
Theoretical literature also points to the sam e causality. For instance, 
Velasco (1987) and Miller (1996) argue th a t a  dom estic banking  crisis can lead 
to over expansion in base money, leading to the fam ous Krugm an (1979) 
balance of paym ents crisis. Confronted with a  banking crisis, the authorities 
m ay have to finance a bank bail out by printing money, leading to financial 
disinterm ediation or the so-called ‘internal d ra in ’. This, in tu rn , precipitates 
capital outflows or ‘external d rain ’, as further expansion of base m oney sets the 
stage for a  heightened inflation ra te .22
A banking crisis may not be fully realised by the  public. However, once 
the currency comes under attack, an in terest rate hike will no t be credible or 
effective in staving off the attacks (Obstfeld 1994, 1996, Sachs et al 1996, and 
Tornell 1999). A sharp  increase in the in terest rate  can fu rther complicate an 
already defunct banking system, making the probability of successful attacks 
higher.
21 Glick and  H utchinson (1999) find the same phenom ena.
22 The term s in ternal and  external drains are introduced by Miller (1996).
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Once the twin crises set in, devaluation and an in terest ra te  hike create 
additional havoc in the banking system. Mishkin (1996) and Goldstein (1998) 
argue th a t devaluation increases non-performing loans if either banks or firms 
suffer currency m ism atch. The decline in economic activities a ttribu ted  to an 
in terest ra te  rise also adds to the problem. In short, a  full-blown financial crisis 
occurs after the collapse of the exchange rate.
2.4.2. Causality from balance of payments crisis to banking crisis
A chain of causation  m ay ru n  from a balance of paym ents crisis to a  banking 
crisis. One may modify the first generation model a  la Krugm an (1979) to 
incorporate the effects on the banking system. Because the authorities 
continuously prin t money to cover budget deficits after the collapse of the fixed 
rate  regime, anticipated  inflation, currency depreciation and a  decline in the 
real in terest rate can induce bank  ru n s  and subsequen t capital flight. Because 
banks lend long b u t borrow short, the ru n s  may lead to a  break  down of the 
banking system .
Stoker (1994) em phasises th a t external factors, such  as an increase in 
foreign in terest ra tes, may precipitate capital outflows and  loss in foreign 
exchange reserves. In order to m aintain  the fixed ra te  regime, the loss in the 
reserves cannot be fully sterilised, leading to a  contraction in money supply and 
increase in dom estic in te rest rates. This, in tu rn , precipitates bankruptcies, 
bank  loan contraction, and  an increase in non-perform ing loans. Finally, bank  
balance sheets will deteriorate.
2.4.3. Contemporaneous twin crises
Another possibility is th a t banking and balance of paym ents crises erup t at 
about the sam e time, suggesting th a t they share the sam e common factors. For 
instance, Goldfajn and  Valdes (1997) and Chang and  Velasco (1999) em phasise 
the drying up  of in ternational credit as the trigger of the crises. Their models 
are basically an open economy extension of the fam ous Diamond and Dybvig
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(1984) liquidity crisis model, and suggest a  capital inflow/crisis sequence. The 
models may be described briefly as follows.
A substan tia l p a rt of bank  loans is financed by foreign borrowing. Thus 
a  surge in capital inflows, rapid accum ulation of foreign debts and a bank 
lending boom will characterise the pre-crisis period. A large swing in capital 
inflows may cause banking and balance of paym ents crises a t the same time, if 
foreign exchange reserves are insufficient. The swing may be triggered by 
adverse external shocks (e.g. a  rise in the in ternational in terest rate) or panics 
and herding behaviour on the p a rt of international creditors. As in Diamond 
and Dybvig (1984), bank  ru n s  cause a  liquidity shortage and therefore banks 
have to liquidate assets, i.e. a  credit crunch  occurs. At the sam e time, the 
proceeds from the ru n  are m anifested in the form of capital outflows, triggering 
a balance of paym ent crisis.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) relate the contem poraneous twin crises to 
an exchange rate based stabilisation program m e commonly observed in the 
Latin American region. This program m e typically leads to a  debt 
overhang/crisis sequence (Reinhart and  Vegh 1996). A consum ption boom may 
be financed by b an k  loans and foreign borrowings in the  early stage of the 
programme. Because the inflation ra te  ad justs  sluggishly to the international 
level, the real exchange rate h as to appreciate, leading to a  worsening in the 
cu rren t account. At some point, where the probability of exchange rate regime 
collapse is high enough, foreign lenders may opt to w ithdraw  from domestic 
banks, triggering the twin crises.
2.5. Concluding remarks
The literature has provided diverse accounts of the origin of financial crises. 
However, some ‘general co n sen su s’ regarding the Asian crisis may be inferred 
from the literature, as follows. First, the crisis is more likely to be associated 
with the boo m /b u st cycle of capital inflows, ra th e r th an  with cu rren t account 
and  insolvency issues. However, the underlying causes of the surge in capital 
inflows rem ains in dispute. One may subscribe to the moral hazard or the
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insurance hypothesis. O thers may pinpoint more conventional causes, such  as 
a high domestic in terest ra te  versus a  low foreign in terest rate, and capital 
account and  domestic financial m arket liberalisation.
Second, a  ‘weak’ banking system is a  key elem ent in m aking economies 
vulnerable to a financial crisis. This suggests th a t the financial fragility 
approach is especially relevant to uncover the underlying problem s. However, 
the application of such an approach as a  powerful analytical tool is ham pered 
by the fact th a t reliable d a ta  regarding the balance sheets of firms and banks 
are difficult to obtain and  are hardly com parable across countries. As an 
alternative to micro-level data, most analyses rely on macro-level da ta  as a 
proxy for m easuring banking  fragility. However, the u se  of such  d a ta  tends to 
give m ultiple in terpretations and, thus, is largely subjective in natu re . For 
instance, loan growth above 20 per cent m ay be in terpreted  as a  ‘dangerous’ 




The Macroeconomy and Banking Sector: 
Pre crisis analysis
3.1. Introduction
This chap ter assesses Indonesia’s macroeconomy and banking sector before the 
crisis. The purpose is to set the scene for more quantitative and  detailed 
analyses about the tw in crises addressed in the rest of the  thesis.
This chapter begins with a  discussion of m ajor economic policy shifts 
th a t contributed  to vigorous economic perform ance during  the last few decades. 
A d iscussion of m acroeconomic development is given in section 3.3. Major 
shifts in banking sector policies are discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 
d iscusses several positive im pacts of the banking reform in term s of physical 
developm ent of the banking sector, and the astonish ing  growth of deposits and 
loan mobilisation. Section 3.6 highlights several serious problem s th a t 
rem ained unresolved after the reforms and these m ay reflect the failure of the 
au thorities in disciplining the banks.
3.2. Major policy stances
The m acroeconom ic features of pre-crisis Indonesia were seemingly robust or a t 
least no t worrysome. Economic growth was strong, above 6 per cent, exports 
continued  to grow, foreign reserves accum ulated  steadily, capital inflows were 
buoyant, the in terest and  inflation ra tes were brought down, cu rren t account 
deficits were a t a  m anageable level, and  the fiscal budget was balanced. This 
relatively comfortable position m akes searching alternative causes of the crisis 
a  m ajor challenge.
The robustness of the economy was partly  due to macroeconomic policy 
orthodoxy, and increasing openness of the economy to both trade and capital 
flows. Beginning in the early 1980’s, the au thorities em barked on a series of 
economic reforms, m ainly aimed at reducing dependence on oil income, 
improving efficiency in resources allocation, enhancing the competitiveness of 
tradable sectors, and, more im portantly, susta in ing  high growth. Six policy 
stances stand  out, namely: an  open capital account regime, a  balanced budget 
principle, improved m onetary policy, a  flexible labour m arket, a  more outward 
oriented trade regime, exchange ra te  stability, and financial reforms.
An open capital account regime had  been adopted since 1970, together 
with the abolition of the multiple exchange rate system , and  long before the 
liberalisation of the trade regime and dom estic financial reforms. In this 
respect, Indonesia had, superficially at least, adopted its policy reforms in 
reverse order to th a t suggested in the sequencing literature (Hill 1996).1
However, it should be noted th a t the term  ‘open capital accoun t’, as often 
used  in the Indonesian policy debate, is som ew hat different from the common 
textbook definition. Capital outflows are absolutely unrestric ted , in the sense 
th a t there  is no requirem ent for reporting or obtaining a  perm it for taking funds 
out of the countiy, except for cash  (notes and  coins). However, until recently, 
some restrictions applied for capital inflows. For instance, foreign direct 
investm ents were not perm itted to areas included in the negative lists, such  as 
retail and  wholesale, media, and in land tran sp o rt services. Moreover, there 
were ceilings on foreign borrowings applied to dom estic banks and state 
enterprises. Given these features, it m ay be called as an  asymmetric open 
capital account regime.
A series m ajor trade reform s were enacted in the mid 1980s aimed a t 
improving com petitiveness of the tradable sector.2 This was initiated by 
substan tia l reductions in nom inal tariffs in 1985. The tariff range was reduced 
from 0-225 to 0-60 per cent, and m ost tariff ra tes  ranged from 5 to 25 per cent.
1 See Edwards (1984) and McKinnon (1991) for a general discussion of sequencing.
2 See Fane and Condon (1996) for an extensive discussion of Indonesian trade 
liberalisation.
40
The classification of tariff level was also simplified from 25 to 11 (Pangestu 
1996). Moreover, custom  operations relating to im ports and exports, which 
were heavily loaded with corruption and bureaucratic  inflexibility, were handed 
over to a  private Swiss surveying company, Societe Generale de Surveillance 
(SGS).
The exchange rate regime moved from a peg to a  som ewhat more flexible 
regime (quasi peg with alm ost constan t depreciation). From August 1971 to 
October 1978, the rupiah  was fixed against the US dollar a t Rp 415 per USD. 
The rup iah  was devalued by 50 per cent against the dollar, and gradually 
depreciated thereafter as the authorities moved toward a ‘dirty float’ regime. 
Two m ajor devaluations occurred later, in March 1983 (38.5 per cent) and in 
Septem ber 1986 (45 per cent). Although the official view regarding the 
exchange ra te  policy was th a t of a  m anaged float with reference to a basket of 
currencies, technically speaking, the currency was crawling-pegged to the 
dollar. W hen there were signs of balance of paym ents problem s, speculative 
a ttacks, and  a fall in oil revenue, the authorities reacted by devaluing the 
currency or tightening the money supply. However, from 1988 onward, the 
official view was th a t a  steady depreciation was preferable to further large 
devaluations, in the sense th a t it would create less adverse shocks to the 
economy and, perhaps, less speculative a ttacks (Cole and  Slade 1996). Then 
during the 1990s the currency was artificially depreciated by 4 to 5 per cent a  
year. Because the balance of paym ents experienced an  un in terrup ted  surplus 
during th a t period, free float would have alm ost certainly resulted  in an 
appreciation. The purpose of th is gradual depreciation was to promote export 
oriented industry  (Fane 1995).
The u se  of fiscal policy as a  m eans of ‘disciplining’ the central government 
was one of the m ain features of m acroeconom ic orthodoxy of the New Order. 
Fiscal budgets were kept in ‘balance’, and  long-term  overseas development 
assis tance  (ODA) was the only m eans of financing budget deficits, in order to 
avoid crowding out private investm ent. In the early 1980s, more than  50 per 
cent of governm ent revenue was generated from oil and  gas revenue. This was 
reversed in the 1990s, when the contribution of oil and  gas revenue declined to
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below 30 per cent. The increase in non-oil revenues was m ainly attributable to 
a series of tax reforms and rapid growth in the non-oil formal sectors.
In con trast to fiscal policy, prior to 1983 monetary policy was somewhat 
rudim entary  and undisciplined. This was the resu lt of financial repression, 
where strict controls on bank  lending and in terest ra tes  constrained the ability 
of banks to effectively mobilise loanable funds from non-governm ent sources. 
During the early 1980s, credit programmes sponsored by the central bank 
accounted for alm ost 40 per cent of total loans channelled by domestic 
commercial banks.
From 1983, m onetary policy stance moved toward indirect controls on 
m onetary aggregates, in place of credit ceilings and in terest ra te  control. The 
indirect in strum en ts  consisted of open m arket operations (OMO), discount 
window facilities, and reserve requirem ents.
The central bank  used  OMO to achieve its interm ediate objectives in 
term s of in te rest rates, exchange rate, and growth in m onetary aggregates on a 
daily basis. By affecting excess reserves and overnight ra tes, in terest ra tes on 
deposits and  loans would also be affected, thereby influencing the level of 
deposits and  loans toward the intended level. However, the effectiveness of this 
operation depended on the extent to which in ternational creditors were willing 
to supply funds. More specifically, if capital were perfectly mobile, OMO would 
not be effective, as deviation from the equilibrium  in te rest ra tes  would induce 
capital outflows or inflows.
There are two in strum ents used by the central bank  to affect liquidity in 
the system : SBI (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) or certificate issued  by the central 
bank, and  SBPU (Surat Berharga Pasar Uang) or m oney m arket security issued 
or endorsed by commercial banks. Selling SBIs and  reselling SBPUs reduces 
money supply, while re-buying SBIs and purchasing  SBPUs increases liquidity.
D iscount window facilities, consisting of d iscount windows I and II, were 
intended to help banks against liquidity m ism atch. The first discount window, 
with a  m atu rity  of no more than  14 days, was designed to provide funds for
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daily liquidity m anagem ent and to avoid erratic fluctuation in in ter-bank 
in terest ra tes. Banks could ad just liquidity by borrowing and lending in the 
in ter-bank money m arket, bu t sometimes in terest ra tes are too high, inducing 
costly funding. The second discount window, with a  m aturity  of no more than  
150 days, was designed to encourage banks in granting longer-term  loans. As 
the bulk  of deposits consisted of saving and time deposits, with 3 m onths 
m aturity  or less, banks naturally  faced a liquidity m ism atch when granting 
investm ent loans.
The central bank  could also affect the level of m onetary aggregates by 
setting reserve requirem ent a t its own discretion. B ut th is in strum ent was 
infrequently used  and  hardly variable. In 1988, the required reserve was 
reduced from 15 per cent of cu rren t liabilities, or effectively 10 to 11 per cent of 
th ird  party  liabilities, to 2 per cent of th ird party  liability. In February 1996, 
the required reserve was increased again to 3 per cent and  cash a t the central 
bank  was excluded from the definition of reserves, so th a t the effective required 
reserve was actually 3.3 per cent (Bird 1996). The required reserve was then 
increased again to 5 per cent in April 1997.
3.3. Macroeconomic development
This section aim s to show th a t the macroeconomy in the lead up  to the crisis 
was generally robust. Thus, a ttem pts to look for w eaknesses or vulnerability 
indicators using  the so-called macroeconomic fundam entals would resu lt in 
d isappointm ent. Exceptions, perhaps, were the rapid build up  of foreign debt 
and  the increasing share of short-term  private capital inflows in financing 
cu rren t account deficits, which m ade the balance of paym ents susceptible to 
the reversal of capital inflows. Because of tha t, our analyses will em phasise the 
balance of paym ents.
Pre-crisis Indonesia constantly  m aintained economic growth above the 
average developing country  level. The lowest growth perform ances were 2.3 
percent in 1982 and  2.5 percent in 1985 (see Table 3.1.). The decline in oil 
price and slower economic growth in the early and  mid 1980’s led to
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devaluations and m ajor economic reforms, especially in trade and finance. In 
the 1990’s, after the reforms, growth was susta ined  a t well above 6 percent. 
Com pared to other crisis countries, the economy was growing alm ost as rapidly 
as Thailand and Malaysia, and far more rapidly th an  the Philippines. In 1996, 
a year before the crisis, growth was faster th an  the other crisis countries, 
except for Malaysia (see Figure 3.1).













o /  n n D
Current
Account
1981 7.9 12.2 184.4 26.7 28.7 29.0 -0.6
1982 2.3 9.5 205.0 27.8 24.3 25.3 -5.6
1983 4.2 11.8 170.5 27.6 24.7 26.4 -7.4
1984 7.0 10.5 180.9 25.0 23.8 26.5 -2.1
1985 2.5 4.7 160.3 26.1 23.6 23.0 -2.2
1986 5.9 5.8 108.1 26.7 21.8 20.2 -4.9
1987 4.9 9.3 103.5 27.4 25.0 24.8 -2.8
1988 5.8 8.0 101.2 28.1 27.3 24.6 -1.6
1989 7.5 6.4 104.5 29.1 28.6 25.1 -1.1
1990 7.2 7.8 100.0 30.8 29.1 26.1 -2.6
1991 6.9 9.4 101.9 29.5 27.7 26.4 -3.3
1992 6.5 7.5 103.1 28.7 28.2 28.8 -2.0
1993 6.5 9.7 106.2 28.8 28.3 26.8 -1.3
1994 7.5 8.5 103.2 30.1 28.9 26.3 -1.6
1995 8.2 9.4 102.9 31.9 26.3 26.3 -3.2
1996 7.8 8.0 108.1 30.7 27.8 25.8 -3.4
Sources: Real exchange ra te  is taken  from JP  Morgan, while other variables are
from IMF, In ternational Financial S tatistics database.
The share of investm ent to GDP tended to increase from the mid 1980s 
to 1990. Because the bulk  of investm ent was m ainly financed by domestic 
savings, there m u st be a  direct relationship between developm ent in banking 
and  investm ent. In 1991 and 1992 there was a  slight decrease in the ratio of 
investm ent to GDP despite the increase in foreign direct investm ent, partly 
because of slower growth in loans from banks (see the discussion on banking 
developm ent, section 3.5). D uring th is period, the m oney supply was tightened 
and  banks had  to m eet the capital adequacy requirem ent. After the capital
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adequacy requirem ent was relaxed in 1993, bank  loans started  to grow strongly 
contributing to investm ent growth.
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics database.
Ever since the traum atic experience of hyperinflation in the mid 1960s, 
the Indonesian authorities had been obsessed with keeping the inflation rate 
u n d e r the two-digit level. Whenever inflation approached th is level, the alarm  
bell rang, and  preventive m easures would be taken  (Hill 1996). The authorities 
had  been able to transform  a  country with chronic inflation into a  relatively low 
inflation country, compared to m ost developing countries. Note, however, th a t 
Indonesia has never been able to m atch the record of the neighbouring low- 
inflation countries, notably Singapore, Thailand and M alaysia (McLeod 1997b).
Aversion to inflation sometimes led to overreaction by the authorities. 
For instance, due to the fear of economic over-heating and inflation th a t might 
be induced by high growth in lending, the au thorities reduced reserve money 
and  increased the in terest rate  alm ost w ithout notice to the banking com m unity
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in February 1991. This shock resulted  in a  weaker banking system , as the 
increase in in terest ra tes led to higher non-perform ing loans (Nasution 1994). 
In fact the m ost effective instrum ent for controlling bank  lending was the 
im position of the new capital adequacy requirem ent, and it was vindicated by 
the fact th a t growth in bank  lending did not improve significantly in 1992 and 
1993, after the reserve money was relaxed (see for example Cole and Slade 
1996). B ank lending geared up only after the CAR was relaxed in May 1993, 
and therefore the liquidity shock might have been unnecessary .
On the external front, the picture was mixed. Exports in goods and 
services continued to grow rapidly in the 1990s, owing to reform s in the mid to 
late 1980s. Moreover, the composition of exports changed, from a  heavy 
dom ination by oil export, to exports from labour intensive industries (see for 
example Basri 2001, am ong others).
The annual cu rren t account deficits were a t a  m anageable level in the 
years leading up  to the crisis (see Figure 3.2). In th is respect, Indonesia was in 
a better position th an  Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines. Ostry (1997) 
concluded th a t the cu rren t account of these countries was a t a  ‘su sta inab le’ 
level, m eaning th a t it was consistent with expected fu ture income. However, 
Goldstein (1998), am ongst others, m aintained th a t it was a t an alarm ing rate, 
especially in the case of Thailand. These two contrasting  views reflect the 
difficulties in determ ining the extent to which cu rren t account deficits can be 
regarded as m anageable or not.3 That is, the conclusion regarding the 
sustainability  of the cu rren t account largely depends on the analytical tools 
used. The former view em phasized the long-run capacity of the economy to 
finance the deficits, and  therefore tended to u n derra te  the potential short-run  
problem s created by the deficits. However, the la tte r view could not provide an 
accurate benchm ark  for determ ining the size of the deficits th a t could pose a 
problem. Thus the debates rem ained speculative in na tu re . It is also obviously 
im portant to analyse the way the deficits were created and  financed, and the 
use of the resources.
3 Edwards (1999) shows CADs are generally ‘misleading’ indicators of vulnerability.
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database.
In the 1970s and 1980s, cu rren t account deficits largely reflected the 
size of governm ent budget deficits (Montes 2001). Budget deficits were mostly 
financed with foreign borrowing. Over the period 1982-1996, deficits in services 
and  net transfers were the source of cu rren t account deficits, while trade 
balances were always positive. Thus, the deficits reflected paym ents on foreign 
services and in te rest on foreign debts, ra th e r th an  trade  deficits (see Table 3.2). 
Because the bu lk  of foreign debts were the governm ent’s, accum ulated  past 
budget deficits were also responsible for the p e rsisten t cu rren t account deficit 
during the later period.
In the 1990s, the way cu rren t account deficits were financed shifted from 
official to private sources, with private capital flows dom inating total capital 
inflows. Because net official capital flows had  been cu t significantly, the 
increase in foreign direct investm ent (FDI) was not enough to cover the growing 
cu rren t account deficits. Besides, FDI was also partly  responsible for the 
increase in capital goods im ports, despite its positive im pacts on exports.
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Table 3 .2 . Composition o f Balance o f Payment, 1982-1996 ($ million)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Trade Balances 1893 963 5707 5822 2458
Services and  Transfer (net) -7217 -7301 -7563 -7745 -6369
Current Account -5324 -6338 -1856 -1923 -3911
Foreign Direct Investm ent 225 292 222 310 258
Official Capital Flows 3668 3860 2918 1747 2618
Basic Balances -1431 -2186 1284 134 -1035
Private Portfolio 0 0 0 0 0
O ther Private 1729 1902 317 -275 1301
Net Error and  Omission -2151 468 -620 650 -1268
Overall balances -1853 184 981 509 -1002
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Trade Balances 4674 5678 6664 5352 4801
Services and  Transfer (net) -6772 -7075 -7772 -8340 -9061
Current Account -2098 -1397 -1108 -2988 -4260
Foreign Direct Investm ent 385 576 682 1093 1482
Official Capital Flows 2021 1908 2777 474 1299
Basic Balances 308 1087 2351 -1421 -1479
Private Portfolio 0 -98 0 0 0
O ther Private 1075 -169 -541 2928 2916
Net E rror and  Omission -753 -933 -1315 744 91
Overall balances 630 -113 495 2251 1528
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Trade Balances 7022 8231 7901 6533 5948
Services and  Transfer (net) -9802 -10337 -10694 -12964 -13611
Current Account -2780 -2106 -2793 -6431 -7663
Foreign Direct Investm ent 1777 2004 1500 3743 5594
Official Capital Flows 858 552 137 6 -663
Basic Balances -145 450 -1156 -2682 -2732
Private Portfolio 0 1805 3877 4100 5005
O ther Private 3494 1271 -1675 2410 911
Net Error and  Omission -1280 -2931 -262 -2255 1319
Overall balances 2069 595 784 1573 4503
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics D atabase.
The p ersisten t deficits in basic  balances (the cu rren t account balances 
p lus FDI and  ne t official capital flows) led to a  need for relying on short-term  
foreign capital inflows in the form of private portfolio and  debt-generating 
capital inflows. In term s of portfolio capital, Indonesia was a  latecomer, and 
only s tarted  to gear up  after 1993. However, the increase was trem endous and 
becam e the m ain source of capital inflows, peaking in 1996 a t a  value of 5 
billion dollars, com pared with zero in 1992. This buoyant portfolio inflows were
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attracted  by developm ent in the stock exchange, and  improved perceptions 
regarding regional economic prospects (Nasution 2001).
The boom of private capital inflows enabled Indonesia to enjoy an 
un in te rrup ted  balance of paym ents surp lus from 1989 to 1996, and reduced 
pressu re  on the government to negotiate larger foreign borrowings to finance 
cu rren t account deficits. This led to some criticism th a t the Indonesian budget 
principle represented  a purest form of the ‘Lawson Doctrine’, in th a t the 
government had  the  a ttitude the boom would never b u s t and  therefore it failed 
to restra in  fu rther private capital inflows (see Montes 2001 for a  detailed 
criticism).4 Although the critics had  a point, there were some restra in ts  in 
place. In 1991, the central bank  abandoned currency swap facilities inherited 
from the financial repression era. Ceilings on foreign borrowings of state  owned 
enterprises, s tate  and  private banks, and private firms related to government 
projects were in troduced in th a t year. In addition, new banking prudential 
regulations and  ceilings on credit growth were also introduced from 1991 to 
1996.
However, these m easures seemed inadequate to slow down private 
capital inflows for a t least six reasons. First, m onetary tightening in 1991, and 
sterilisation of the balance of paym ents surp lus th roughout the 1990s, was 
responsible for m ain tain ing  a  high in terest rate  differential in the order of about 
ten  percent. Second, the authorities had  practically no control on portfolio 
capital and, in fact, prom oted investm ent in shares traded  in the stock 
exchange. Third, non-bank private firms were not subject to ceilings on 
offshore borrowing, and did not report such  borrowing to the  authorities, 
m aking it difficult to monitor. Fourth, the stable exchange rate  policy 
encouraged firms operating in non-tradable sector to borrow offshore. Fifth, 
there was a  need to recycle the proceeds from the cu rren t account su rp lus th a t 
occurred in some of Asian newly industrialised  economies (Nasution 2001). 
Sixth, susta ined  high economic growth together with the fast growing 
conglom erations and  the close connection of m ost conglom erates to high- 
ranking  officials m ay have improved the credibility of these conglomerates.
4 Named after UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson.
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These in te rre la ted  six factors se t the  stage for large private firm s to seek  funds 
from foreign sources.
The effectiveness of ceilings on the  b a n k s ’ foreign borrow ing an d  on 
credit expansion  to control cap ital inflows w as u n d erm in ed  by the  ability of 
large firm s to obta in  cheaper offshore funds, e ither directly  th ro u g h  foreign 
b an k s  or indirectly  th ro u g h  the  dom estic stock  exchange. Moreover, the  
ceilings m ay  have res tra in ed  dom estic b an k s  from  re s tru c tu r in g  som e of the  
non-perform ing  loans inherited  from th e  cred it boom  in 1988 an d  1990, and  
from im proving their financial position  u s in g  cheaper foreign funds.
Table 3 .3 . Composition o f Foreign Debts, 1982-1996 (%)
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total: US$ million 25133 30229 32026 36715 42916
As % of GDP 26.5 35.4 36.6 42.1 53.7
C om position
S h ort-te rm 14.4 16.8 18.2 16.6 15.2
Long te rm 85.6 83.2 81.8 83.4 84.8
Public an d  publicly guaran teed 72.9 71.1 69.5 72.9 76.0
Private n o n -g u aran teed 12.7 12.1 12.3 10.4 8.8
Ratio of d eb t service to exports 18.1 18.8 21 .8 28.8 37.3
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total: US$ million 52495 54078 59402 69934 79548
As % of GDP 69.3 60.9 58.5 61.1 62.1
C om position
S hort-te rm 13.5 13.6 14.4 16.6 18.2
Long te rm 86.5 86.4 85.6 83.4 81.8
Public a n d  Publicly g u a ran teed 77.8 76.2 74.5 68.7 65.2
Private n o n -g u aran teed 8.7 10.3 11.0 14.7 16.6
Ratio of d eb t service to exports 37 .0 40.3 38.4 33.4 34.3
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total: US$ million 88002 89172 107824 124398 129033
As % of GDP 63.2 56.4 60.9 61.5 56.7
C om position
S h ort-te rm 20.5 20.2 18.0 20.9 25.0
Long te rm 79.5 79.8 82.0 79.1 75.0
Public an d  Publicly g u aran teed 61.0 64.1 59.3 52.5 46.6
Private n o n -g u aran teed 18.5 15.7 22.7 26.6 28.4
Ratio of d eb t service to exports 32.6 33.6 30.7 30.9 36.8
Source: W orld B ank, W orld D ebt Tables.
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The offshore borrowing spree enjoyed by dom estic private corporations 
changed the s tructu re  of foreign debts. The share of private foreign debts 
increased, from about 27 percent in 1988 to about 53 percent in 1996. The 
share of short-term  debts increased from only about 14 percent to 25 percent in 
the sam e period (see Table 3.3).
Did this development lead to an  increased vulnerability of the economy to 
a speculative attack? The answ er to th is question will be addressed in detail in 
C hapter 9. Needless to say, the debt to GDP and the debt service to export 
ratios m ight indicate th a t Indonesia was vulnerable to ‘credit rationing’ imposed 
by foreign creditors.
3.4. Major changes in banking policy
As in other sectors, Indonesia’s policy stance on banking has moved from 
extreme interventionist approaches toward more m arket friendly approaches. 
During the years prior to 1983, the banking sector suffered from heavy 
intervention by the central bank  and m ost of the characteristics of “financial 
repression” depicted by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) describes the 
situation very well (Hill 1996). Major banking reform s involved two stages. 
The first stage was in 1983, with the m ain aim to remove the controls on loans 
and  in terest rates. This was followed by more progressive reform in 1988 when 
the licence to establish  new banks and  b ranches was freed.
This section aim s to briefly d iscuss m ajor policy shifts in banking and 
the rationale behind them . The key policy changes are listed in Table 3.4. The 
im pact of banking deregulations will be d iscussed  in section 3.5. Problems in 
banking will be discussed in section 3.6.
3.4.1. Policy regime before 1983
Prior to 1983, the banking system  was characterised  by the dominance 
of state  banks, restricted competition and subsid ised  and controlled lending. 
State banks accounted for about 80 per cent of total asse ts  of the banking
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system. In terest ra tes and  lending were centrally controlled, and a considerable 
proportion of loans directed to favoured sectors and parties. There was 
practically no issuance of licence to open new banks.
Controls on bank  lending took various forms. Control on loan growth 
was in troduced  in 1974 as part of a range of counter inflation m easures (Arndt 
1974). However, controls were m uch more restrictive where the authorities 
could assign each single bank  to lend to a particu lar sector by setting detailed 
loan ceilings for each b an k  (Chant and Pangestu 1994). By doing so, the 
central b an k  discouraged competition in the loan m arket and  banks were forced 
to specialise in a particu lar segment. This was particularly  so for state banks, 
where each s ta te  bank  was restricted to operating in particu lar sectors. Private 
owned ban k s were m ainly concentrated in retail banking, while subsidiaries of 
foreign ban k s were specialised on the financing of trade and investm ents 
carried ou t by foreigners (Binhadi 1995).
Such discretionary loan ceilings were responsible for retarding banking 
perform ance. During the seventies, central bank  loans contributed 40 per cent 
of the loans from the  banking system , or half of the  loans issued  by state 
banks. To quote Arndt (1979, p. 115) the  system  developed:
....a t the  price of alm ost complete subordination of commercial 
b anks to d iscretionary central bank  control which deprived the 
com m ercial ban k s of any incentive to compete with one another 
for b u siness and  limited their opportunities to exercise skills or 
initiative in the allocation of bank credit. It was a  system  
inconsisten t w ith the proclaimed objective of the authorities to 
develop a  dynam ic financial m arket for development.
A very high reserves requirem ent was the legacy of the Old Order, and 
was continued by the Suharto  regime until 1977. B anks were required to hold 
reserves of a t least 30 per cent of cu rren t liabilities. At the end of 1977, the 
required reserve ratio was cu t to 15 per cent and the in terest rate  paid on 
excess reserve was reduced  from 10 to 6 per cent per annum . This reduction in 
reserve requirem ent could have induced lending spree. However, because loans 
were controlled, banks were im paired in utilising their full capacity to mobilise
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funds. As a  re su lt, th e  excess reserves increased  from  5 to 9 per cen t desp ite  
the  c u t in  the  in te re s t ra te  paid  on excess reserves (McLeod 1999).
Table 3 .4 . M ajor b a n k in g  po licy  reform s
D a tes Policy C h a n g es
1967 R e-opening of m ark e t to sm all n u m b e r of foreign b an k s  
following e ra  of b a n k  na tionaliza tions
April 1974 
D ecem ber 1977
Paym ent of in te res t on b a n k s ’ excess reserves
C u t in requ ired  reserves ratio  from  30%  to 15% an d  cu t 
in  excess reserves in te re s t ra te  from  10% p.a. to 6%
A ugust 1982 W ithdraw al of BI refinance for lower priority  s ta te  b an k  
loans
May 1983 In te re st ra te  on s ta te  b a n k s ’ six -m onth  tim e deposit ra te  
freed
J u n e  1983 Removal of contro ls on lending  by all b a n k s
All rem ain ing  tim e deposit in te re s t ra te  con tro ls on s ta te  
b a n k s  rem oved
S ep tem ber 1984
M ost loan p rogram m es relying on heavily subsid ized  
fu n d s  from BI d iscon tinued  (bu t sign ificant re laxations 
soon thereafte r, su ch  th a t  BI lend ing  to b a n k s  co n tinues  
to grow rapidly)
Limit im posed  on in te rb an k  borrow ing: 7.5%  of to tal 
fu n d s
A ugust 1985 
O ctober 1988
In te rb a n k  borrow ing lim it in c reased  to 15%
New em p h asis  on p ru d en tia l s ta n d a rd s  in  re la tion  to 
co n cen tra ted  lending
O pening of m ark e t to new  p rivate  dom estic  b a n k s  an d  
new  foreign jo in t-v en tu re  b an k s
B an k s p erm itted  to expand  b ra n c h  netw orks w ith 
m in im um  b u reau c ra tic  in terference
E asing  of req u irem en ts  for dom estic  b a n k s  to ob ta in  
foreign exchange licenses
All b ran ch e s  of b a n k s  w ith foreign exchange licenses 
p erm itted  to deal in  foreign exchange (ra th e r th a n  only 
p a rticu la r  b ran ch e s  previously)
R eduction  of requ ired  reserves ra tio  from  15% to 2%
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Table 3.4 . (continued)
D ates Policy C hanges
October 1988 Imposition of 15% withholding tax on deposit in terest
Removal of limit on in terbank borrowing
State enterprises perm itted to p u t deposits with non-state 
banks
March 1989
Banks perm itted to introduce savings deposit products of 
their own design
Removal of controls on b an k s’ borrowing overseas
Prudential standards widened to encom pass limits on 
foreign exchange exposure (net open position)
Jan u a ry  1990 Most rem aining subsidized loan program m es
discontinued
February 1991 Prudential standards widened to encom pass capital 
adequacy
1991 BI lending to banks begins to rebound  after falling 
significantly
November 1991 Reimposition of controls on b an k s’ borrowing overseas
February 1992 Foreigners perm itted to purchase  shares in domestic 
banks listed on the stock exchanges
State banks perm itted to list on the stock exchanges
D istinctions between ‘developm ent’, ‘savings’ and  ‘general’ 
(commercial) banks removed
New banking law gives government the  option of treating 
all banks (not ju s t state banks) as ‘agents of developm ent’
1995 Reimposition of de facto controls on b an k  lending
August 1995 Extension of central bank controls to bank  involvement 
with commercial paper issues
December 1995 Extension of central bank supervisory authority  to non­
bank  finance companies
February 1996 Increase in required reserves ratio, and  exclusion of cash 
from definition of ‘reserves’
Ju n e  1996 Tightening of licensing of new bank  b ranches
February 1997 Imposition of fines on banks which expand more rapidly 
th an  perm itted
April 1997 Further increase in required reserve ratio 
Tightening of prudential regulations
Source: Adapted from McLeod (1999)
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The loan m arket was also characterised by a dual system , in which one 
segm ent was subsidised by the authorities and  the o ther followed the m arket 
rate. Subsidised loans were directed to prom ote investm ent in favoured 
activities, such  as small-scale business, agricultural factor supply and services, 
and  governm ent sponsored projects. However, such  a  subsidy might not 
necessarily  improve investm ent as was intended, because the size of such a 
loan given to any borrowers had  to be limited in order to reduce arbitrage 
opportunities (McLeod, 1980). Moreover, such a loan schem e prom oted unfair 
com petition in which bribery and corruption becam e a culture, and loan 
defaults becam e more likely to occur because loan applications were not 
a ssessed  on the basis of soundness. In o ther words, the schem e promoted 
adverse selection problems.
Moral hazard  and adverse selection problem s becam e more pronounced, 
in the case of state  banks, with the establishm ent of two credit insurance 
in stitu tions (PT. Asuransi Kredit Indonesia and  Lembaga Jam inan Kredit 
Koperasij in 1973. One was to guarantee loans to sm all and  m edium  
enterprises, the o ther to guarantee loans to cooperatives. The problems were 
com pounded by the policy requiring state banks to h an d  over bad  loans to the 
Agency for Settlem ent of Debts to the State (BUPN). In other words, all bad 
loans, either produced by small or big enterprises or cooperatives, were to be 
resolved outside of the state banks. This m eant th a t b an k  officials had  little 
incentive to ensure  the repaym ent of loans. This led the state  banks to incur 
con tinuous and  su bstan tia l losses a t the expense of tax  payers. Cole and Slade 
(1996, p. 89), am ongst others, have observed that:
Despite the generous subsidies provided to the state  banks by 
virtue of the large spread between the in te rest ra te  paid on 
funds borrowed from B ank Indonesia and the ra te  charged to 
borrowers, even on preferential loans, the state  banks incurred 
continuing losses and had  to receive additional g ran ts of capital 
from the government to survive.
In sum m ary, the banking system was dom inated by poorly m anaged 
sta te  banks functioning m ainly as interm ediaries of subsidised funds. 
Gradually, the burden  of non-performing subsidised loans provided the im petus
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for m ajor banking reform in 1983. Moreover, private banks could not compete 
with the state  banks, as new entry, both in term s of branching and the 
estab lishm ent of new banks was restricted, and expansion of loans was 
centrally imposed by the authorities, thereby limiting their capacity to expand 
m arket share. Despite the fact th a t they paid higher in terest rates on deposit, 
private banks grew at alm ost the same pace as the state  banks during the 
period 1974 to 1982. From 1974 to 1978, the assets of private and state banks 
grew by 10.0 and 9.2 per cent per annum . Similarly, the growth rate  for 1978 
to 1982 was 13.8 and 14.6 per cent per annum , respectively.
3.4.2. Policy regime from 1983 to 1988
In Ju n e  1983, the authorities made major policy changes, ending the era 
of financial repression. There were three significant policy shifts in banking, 
nam ely a  cu t in subsidised loans, the removal of in terest rate controls, and the 
abolition of lending controls.
One of the motives for introducing these reform s was the immense 
burden  of bad  loans created from subsidised loan program m es. As McLeod 
(1999, p. 264-65) pointed out:
An im portant motivation was tha t experience with subsidised 
loan program m es had  been disappointing. There is little 
evidence to show th a t they had m uch effect on the course of 
s tru c tu ra l change on the economy. Moreover, it was clear th a t 
they had  become a prim ary focus of undesirable rent-seeking 
activity. Many of w hat are now enorm ous private sector 
conglom erates were heavy borrowers from state  banks, and 
were assisted  to grow very rapidly by the large -  b u t largely 
h idden -  subsidy elem ent in the loans they obtained. And 
countless borrowers large and small increased the size of then- 
subsidies m any tim es over by the simple expedient of failing to 
repay.
Moreover, the 1982 decline in oil income th rea tened  the fiscal position of 
the  central government. This triggered substan tia l p ressu res on the authorities 
to reform the financial sector as well as the trade regime in order to cu t fiscal 
leakages and to find new sources of tax and economic growth. A reduction of
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subsidised loans would help in reducing the fiscal burden. A num ber of such 
loans were d iscontinued and the proclaimed in tention was to control growth of 
the rem aining ones.
The curtailm ent of borrowing from the central bank  to state  banks m eant 
th a t the banks had  to compete in mobilising deposits. This required the 
removal of in terest rate  controls. Note tha t private banks had  always been free 
to set their own in terest rates. In May 1983, the time deposit ra tes in state 
banks with six-m onth m aturity  or more were freed. By Ju n e , all controls on 
deposit ra tes  were completely removed.
As d iscussed  earlier, stringent controls on bank  loans had  retarded 
competition am ongst the efficient banks, and a rapid expansion in deposit 
mobilization would require a  less restrictive loan allocation. Because of that, 
controls on lending were completely removed.
Despite these reforms, qualifications m u st still be m ade concerning the 
conduct of the state  banks. First, over the ensuing  five years state  banks 
continued to rely heavily on subsidised loans from the central bank  (Cole and 
Slade, 1996). After a  brief pause in 1983, the practice of cheap funds was 
re instated  un til 1988. The reason being th a t state  banks continued to suffer 
moral hazard  problem s inherited from the previous “financial repression” era. 
Thus, fu rther subsidies from the authorities were needed to cover the losses. 
However, as argued by McLeod (1999), this problem  could have been resolved if 
the banks grew more slowly. In other words, im provem ent in the quality of loan 
portfolio should  have been the main concern, by shifting loans from the 
previously un-profitable captive market.
Second, un til recently command lending was still the norm , as state  
bank officers could not set themselves free from political influences, thereby 
preventing these banks from seeking more reliable borrowers. Before 1983, 
where loan subsidies were given to a wide range of borrowers, the targets of 
such  program m es were publicly stated by the authorities. In the 1990s, 
conglom erates with close ties to the Suharto regime alm ost exclusively became 
the beneficiaries. In essence, there were no significant changes in loan quality.
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Rather the changes were in terms of the borrowers. During the nineties, 
concentrated  loans becam e fashionable (Nasution 1994).
4.4.3. Policy regime: 1988 - present
A more progressive banking reform package was introduced in October 
1988, and  is dubbed as PAKTO (Paket Oktober) or October Package. PAKTO 
consisted of eight m ain components:
♦> Market entry. In order to increase competition in and growth of the 
banking sector, and  to have more efficient resources allocation, licences 
to open new banks and branches were reopened. Moreover, the existing 
foreign banks were perm itted to open branches in six m ajor cities instead 
of ju s t  Jak a rta . Private banks were perm itted to open branches or su b ­
branches based  solely on business considerations with little guidance 
from the authorities. In addition, non-incum bent foreign banks were 
encouraged to form alliances with domestic banks, and these new joint 
venture banks were autom atically given licence to deal with foreign 
exchange transactions.
♦> Foreign exchange licence. Requirem ents to obtain  a  foreign exchange 
licence for private banks were relaxed. Moreover, all b ranches of banks 
th a t have been given this licence are perm itted to deal in foreign 
exchange transactions. Previously, the perm it w as limited to particular 
branches.
❖  Tax on deposit. A 15 per cent tax on deposit in te rest was introduced, the 
sam e as on capital gains from securities and  on in te rest paid on bonds.
❖  Reserve requirement. The required reserves ratio  was fu rther reduced 
from 15 per cent of current liabilities to only 2 per cent of total third 
party  liabilities. Note that, under the previous regulation, the required 
reserves ratio was applied to only two th ird s of time deposits in state 
banks and  to one th ird  in private banks. Therefore the effective rate was
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about 10-11 per cent of total th ird  party  liabilities (Cole and Slade, 
1996).
♦> Product differentiation. Banks were allowed to design savings deposits of 
their own, which previously were restricted  to two categories only: 
Tabanas and Taska, both are national saving program m es inherited from 
the seventies.
❖  State owned enterprises were perm itted to p u t their excess funds up to 
50 per cent in non-state owned banks and up  to 20 per cent in any 
single bank.
❖  Inter bank borrowing. The limit on in ter bank  borrowing was completely 
removed. Previously, a 15 per cent limit out of total asse ts  applied.
❖  Legal lending limit. Banks were perm itted to give loans up  to 20 per cent 
of capital to a  single borrower, up  to 50 per cent to a  group of borrowers, 
and up to 5 percent to com m issioners, shareholders and affiliates.
In addition, the authorities replaced the lim it on bank  borrowing 
overseas with the ‘net open position’ m easure  in  M arch 1989. Under th is  new 
regulation, banks with a  foreign exchange licence can bring in as m uch offshore 
funds as they want, providing they can loan m ost of those funds in the same 
currency.
Another im portant m arket-oriented reform was a  fu rther reduction of 
subsidised credit in Jan u a ry  1990. B ank Indonesia narrow ed the scope of the 
subsidised credit program  to four categories: rice production, m arketing and 
buffer stock, and  investm ent financing in less developed eastern  Indonesia. 
Moreover, the in terest ra tes on these program m es were brought closer to the 
m arket rates.
Surprisingly, these dram atic reforms were not preceded by the 
strengthening of prudential regulations and  recapitalisation of the existing 
problem atic banks. Note th a t m ost p rudential regulations were developed only 
as responses to problem s brought about by the reform. Because of that,
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Nasution (1994) called th is reverse sequencing. Prudential regulations and 
supervisions were rudim entary  previously, as the central bank  could easily 
watch and  intervene state  banks, which dom inated the banking system, and 
therefore the p ressure  to develop an oversight capacity for disciplining banks 
was relatively small (Cole and Slade 1996). The only prudential regulation 
brought into urgency was the legal lending limit. This reflected the fact th a t 
loan concentration in state  banks and conglomerate-owned banks was 
problematic.
A more cautious sequencing would have involved at least three initial 
actions; (1) strengthening prudential regulations and  oversight capacity, (2) 
recapitalisition and strengthening of problematic incum bents, (3) keeping the 
banking sector closed to new en tran ts during the transition  period (see Corbo 
and de Melo 1987, McKinnon 1991). W ithout th is proper sequencing, the 
incum bents were the m ost vulnerable to the heightened competition as they 
had to carry non-perform ing loans inherited from the pre-reform  period. 
Moreover, there is a  danger of over expansion obstructing prudential m easures 
am ongst the incum bents. For instance, Cole and  Slade (1996, p. 136) argued 
that:
As it tu rned  out, however, the banks th a t proved m ost 
vulnerable to the new, more competitive and  less protected 
environm ent were some of the older private banks and  the state 
banks. A num ber of the established private banks set out to 
expand their m arket share in 1989-1990 alm ost w ithout regard 
to cost. They opened new branches a t a  rapid  rate, initiated 
new deposit schem es offering both high in terest ra tes and 
attractive lottery schem es, sought foreign exchange licenses if 
they did not already have them  and rapidly expanded overseas 
operations, and expanded their loan and investm ent portfolios 
a t ra tes th a t precluded prudent evaluation. The new post- 
PAKTO banks, on the other hand, generally found it difficult to 
grow rapidly in the face of such competition. Given their limited 
deposit base, they had  to depend more heavily on their own 
capital to fund assets, which may have encouraged a  more 
cautious approach.
The explosive growth of loans and the potential associated problems 
subsequently  led the authorities to pu t m uch more em phasis on prudential 
regulations of the banking system. In the process of form ulating the PAKTO
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reforms, serious consideration was given to the possibility of developing new 
prudential regulations and oversight capacity th a t would prevent incum bents 
and new en tran ts  from irresponsible conduct. However, som ew hat surprisingly, 
the authorities only addressed the legal lending limit, and on-site evaluation 
and supervision of banks did not address asset quality a t all. For instance Cole 
and Slade (1996, p. 92) stressed that:
B ank Indonesia in late 1988 initiated a  m ajor effort to prepare 
new prudentia l regulations and improve its supervisory
capabilities, ..........  The system was in tended to identify
w eaknesses in policies, procedures, practices and  in ternal
controls of individual banking in stitu tions............... The early
w arning information system and even the follow-on 
exam inations did not address the issue of a sse ts  quality, which 
experienced exam iners generally consider as the m ost 
im portan t ingredient of a  sound banking system  and effective 
pruden tia l supervision.
The long overdue prudential regulations finally came up  on February 
1991, known as PAKFEB (Paket Februari) or February Package. The m ain 
features of th is regulatory package included:
❖  The im position of capital adequacy requirem ent in line with the BIS 
standard . All domestic banks had to comply with the required 8 per cent 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) within 33 m onths or by December 1993.
❖  The application of a  new rating system  for m easuring  bank  soundness 
and  as p a rt of a  new early warning information system .
❖  Prohibiting b anks from owning equity securities or giving loans to 
individuals or security companies for the purpose of security trading and 
holdings.
❖  Putting fu rther limits on the net open position of foreign exchange 
transactions.
The m ost im portant ingredient of th is regulation was the capital 
adequacy requirem ent. For m ost newly established post-PAKTO banks, it was 
easy to comply with the new CAR, partly due to the fact th a t they had  not been
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able to a ttra c t deposits, and therefore a  large portion of their a sse t portfolio was 
financed by their own capital. However, for large private banks, which 
previously had  experienced explosive growth, it was difficult to comply with this 
new regulation due to two reasons. First, as  a  resu lt of excessive loan 
expansion, they had  accum ulated a higher proportion of non-perform ing loans 
com pared to their competitors, the newly established banks. This m eant tha t 
risk  weighted asse ts  and the provision for classified asse ts  was m uch higher. 
Therefore the capital required to meet the s tandard  was also m uch higher. 
Second, their ability to raise capital was further ham pered  by a  severe liquidity 
squeeze known as the second ‘Sumarlin shock’.5 High in terest rates further 
depressed in terest m argins and profits and burdened  the provision for bad 
loans (Cole and Slade 1996).
The tight schedule to m eet the CAR requirem ent reduced loan growth to 
about 16 and  9 per cent in 1991 and 1992, from abou t 54 per cent in 1990. 
B anks tried to clean up  their loan portfolio, as non-perform ing loans and 
especially bad loans induced an additional burden  on the  required capital. For 
banks lacking capital, it was necessary to cu t back loans. This was particularly 
so in the case of private banks, where loan growth dropped to only 2 per cent in 
1992 from 88 per cent in 1990.
Realising th a t it was difficult for m ost banks to comply with a  7 per cent 
CAR by March 1993 and 8 per cent by December 1993, the authorities eased 
the CAR marginally. The risk  weighting on u n -u sed  credit lines and  on loans 
to state  owned enterprises was reduced from 100 to 50 per cent.
The enactm ent of banking law in 1992 fu rther streng thened  prudential 
constra in ts  on the banking system. The major elem ents of th is law were:
❖  Definition and  scope of bank  operation. A b an k  is defined as a  deposit 
taking and loan granting financial institu tion  and  o ther loan creating 
institu tions are prohibited from taking deposits. Moreover, the artificial 
and  ineffective division of bank sta tu s, i.e. savings, development and 
commercial banks, was abolished and uniform ed to commercial banks
5 Named after the Minister of Finance, at the time.
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only. Som ew hat disturbingly, all banks were now required to act as an 
agent o f developm ent in addition to acting as ordinary profit maximising 
entities. Previously, the agent of development function was solely carried 
by sta te  banks.
♦> Legal lending limit. According to this law, a  bank  is subject to legal 
lending lim its and  the central bank shall stipulate regulations concerning 
such  limits.
❖  Ownership. Private banks can issue shares in the stock exchange, and 
foreigners can buy up  to 49 per cent of the shares. However, state banks 
can only issue  sh ares  up to 49 per cent of total capital.
❖  Banking supervision. The law clearly defines the role of Bank Indonesia 
and  the D epartm ent of Finance for the supervision of banks and dealing 
with troubled  banks.
Following the  banking  law, the new legal lending limits were set in May 
1993. The limit is now simplified: loans to an individual or a  group of 
borrowers should  not exceed 20 per cent of bank  capital. For existing loans, 
banks were given an ad justm en t period up  to M arch 1997 to comply with the 
new limits.
3.5. Banking sector development
3.5.1. Expansion of the banking industry
After the freeing up  of ban k  licences in October 1988, the banking sector 
recorded aston ish ing  growth in term s of the num ber of banks and branches, 
and private b an k s contributed  m ost to the growth. Table 3.5 p resen ts the 
developm ent in the  n u m b er of banks and branches from 1981 to 1997.
Before 1998, there  was a decline in the num ber of private banks, while 
the num ber of state , regional development, join t venture, and  foreign banks 
rem ained constan t. The num ber of private banks dropped from 74 in 1981 to
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66 in 1988. Merger and acquisition was the m ain the policy adopted by the 
authorities to resolve problem atic banks, thereby tending to reduce the num ber 
of banks.
Between 1988 and 1994, some 129 new banks were established; 100 of 
these were private banks. This massive development increased competition, 
especially in deposit taking. Banks offered high in terest ra tes and a lottery 
schem e to a ttrac t deposits. As competition began to pu t p ressure  on the 
weaker banks, after 1994 the num ber of banks started  to decline. The num ber 
of private banks dropped from 166 in December 1994 to 160 in Ju n e  1997 due 
to the m erger of several banks.
The increase in the num ber of bank branches was even more explosive. 
From 1981 to 1988, the num ber of banks increased from 1,361 to 1,940, or 
only 82 new branches established every year. By contrast, since 1988 alm ost 
500 new branches have been established every year and by Ju n e  1997 there 
were 6,337 bank  branches, with 4,267 belonging to private banks.
3.5.2. Change in market structure
The deregulation in 1983 and 1988 altered the course of the banking sector 
tow ards a  greater role for private banks from the previous state  banks 
dom inated financial system. The growth in m obilisation of funds, which 
experienced a  declining trend  during the financial repression, era  gained 
m om entum  after the deregulation. Table 3.6 and 3.7 p resen t the development 
in b an k  deposits, and  loans.
Mobilization of deposits expanded rapidly, especially in 1983, 1989, and 
1990, where the growth ra te  was about 41.8%, 44.3%, and 51%, respectively. 
Growth slackened in 1991 and 1992 due to tight m onetary policy and the 
im position of tighter prudential regulations, especially the capital adequacy 
requirem ent. When the CAR was relaxed in May 1993, deposit-taking activities 
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Private banks were m ost aggressive in deposit accum ulation. In 1982, 
the share  of private banks in deposit mobilisation was only 10.7 per cent 
com pared to 76 per cent of the state banks. By Ju n e  1997, the situation 
reversed, with private banks holding 60.4 per cent of total deposits, while the 
share of the state banks dropped to 30.3 per cent. The share  of regional, joint 
venture and foreign banks tended to decline as well, b u t not as dram atically as 
th a t of the  state banks.
The success of private banks in attracting deposits w as attributable  to a 
num ber of factors, such as competitive in terest ra tes, rapid expansion in 
b ranch  networks, and better custom er services. Most of the private banks 
tended to offer higher deposit rates com plem ented with attractive lottery 
schem es and advertising. Moreover, they were able to develop better products 
and services for savings and  time deposits.
The greater ability of banks in mobilising deposits was consequently 
accom panied with a  rapid expansion in loan creation. Loan expansion was 
particularly  ‘excessive’ during 1989 and 1990, during  which the banking sector 
recorded its highest loan growth. In 1989, private b an k s recorded an alm ost 
unim aginable loan growth of about 95 per cent.
The high loan growth in these two years led the au thorities to be 
concerned about the possibility of economic overheating, and  its adverse im pact 
on inflation (Nasution 1995, among others). As d iscussed  earlier, the 
au thorities took h arsh  m easures by squeezing the  reserve money supply 
followed by enactm ent of stricter prudential regulations. Though the money 
supply w as soon relaxed, loan growth slackened un til 1994. It was difficult for 
banks to ad just to the capital adequacy requirem ent because of the burden  of 
non-perform ing loans created by the tight money policy.
In order to reverse the situation, the au thorities relaxed the capital 
adequacy requirem ent by changing the risk weights on several categories of 
bank  asse ts  in May 1993. As a result, the loans growth of private, jo in t venture 
and  foreign banks began to improve. However, s ta te  ban k s seem ed to take a 
more conservative direction up to the onset of the crisis, as indicated by their
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relatively lower loan growth. One of the reasons for th is was th a t they were 
less able to a ttra c t deposits, as indicated by their m uch slower deposit growth 
during th a t period.
As with deposits following the reforms, the private banks played a greater 
role in granting loans. In 1982 the private b anks’ share in loans was only 
about 9.4 per cent, bu t by Ju n e  1997 their share increased dram atically to 53.3 
per cent. On the other hand, the share of the state banks decreased sharply 
from 79.6 per cent to 34.7 per cent during that period.
It could perhaps be presum ed th a t the greater role of private banks 
should resu lt in more efficient resource allocation than  th a t which bureaucra ts  
in the state  b anks were able to achieve. However, despite the astonishing 
growth in lending, it h as to be recognised tha t the loan quality m ay not 
necessarily increase for two reasons. First, most of the large private banks are 
owned by the sam e conglomerates th a t used to borrow from the state  banks. 
Now they had  their own banks to borrow from. Experience in Latin American 
countries such  as Chile suggests this self-dealing practice, together with weak 
enforcem ent of pruden tia l regulations, can resu lt in poor loan quality, 
increasing the  fragility of the  banking system (Diaz-Alejandro 1985). Second, 
there is a sizeable literature th a t suggests loan quality w eakens as a  resu lt of a 
relatively high loan growth (see for example Sachs et. al. 1996). B anks may 
have to en ter new m arkets they are not familiar with. Moreover, loan growth 
may not be accom panied by an increase in the m anagerial skills of the bankers.
3.5.3. Financial deepening and asset holding
Banking reform s also changed the composition of financial asse t holdings in 
favour of in te rest yielding assets. Figure 3.3 depicts the developm ent in 
financial deepening as m easured  in the ratios of MO, M l, M2 to nom inal GDP.
The ratio  of reserve money to nominal GDP tended to decrease slightly 
from around  7-8 per cent in the 1970’s and early 1980’s to around  6 per cent in 
the 1990’s. The ratio  of M l to nominal GDP tended to stabilize a t around  10
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per cent after 1983. This suggests there was a  stable relationship between 
these two m onetary aggregates with the nom inal GDP. This perhaps explains 
the fact th a t MO and Ml are held for transaction  purposes and therefore the 
dem and for these two asse ts  is highly correlated with total nom inal output. 
Thus, it is no t surprising th a t the financial reforms had little im pact on these 
two assets.
The increase in the ratio of M2 to nom inal GDP accelerated following the 
1983 reform s, and was further accelerated by the 1988 reforms. The ratio was 
only abou t 19 per cent in 1983, and had  increased to 52 per cent by 1996. This 
suggests th a t the increase in real in terest ra tes and  access to banks had 
significant effects on the holdings of in terest yielding assets. In other words, 
the reform s increased the availability of loanable funds in the banking system, 
which is consisten t with the M cKinnon-Shaw hypothesis.





Sources: Indonesian Financial S tatistics, BI.
The com position of deposits also changed in favour of time and savings 
deposits, which offered higher in terest ra tes  th an  dem and deposits. In 1982,
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dem and deposits accounted for 51 per cent of total deposits. After the 
deregulations, this share dropped sharply and by 1996 was only 11 per cent.
3.6. Recent banking problems
Despite th is promising development, there were some potential negative 
im pacts of the banking liberalisation. Industrial organization theory suggests 
th a t the removal of barriers to entry may lower the franchise value of banks (see 
for instance, Davies 1995). This, together with inform ation asym m etry and 
increased competition, can heighten moral hazard  problem s, and  th u s  increase 
the fragility of the banking system (see Mishkin 1996 for a  detailed discussion 
on th is issue).
This section shed lights on the banking problem s and  their origin, mainly- 
based on the observations of existing literature and  m agazines. Unfortunately, 
it is h a rd  to find a quantitative study to investigate th is  problem. Most of the 
studies regarding the Indonesian financial sector focussed alm ost exclusively on 
the positive im pacts of the deregulation (see for example, Kenward 1997). To fill 
th is  gap, a  quantitative analysis is provided in C hapter 5, while th is  section 
highlights the problems qualitatively.
3.6.1. Ownership concentration
Following the reform in 1988, the cost of, and regulatory barriers to, 
establishing a  new bank declined significantly. Consequently, by 1994, there 
were a t least 27 conglomerates th a t owned two or m ore banks. For instance, 
the Salim group and the Lippo group each owned 7 banks, the Gajah Tunggal 
and  Panin groups each had  5 banks, and the Kalimanis, Dwima, H arapan, 
S inar Mas and Danam on groups each had 4 banks. Any corporate strategist 
would suggest th a t owning one large bank is generally more efficient th an  two 
or more small banks. And yet, up  to the onset of the crisis, m ergers tended to 
occur when the authorities persuaded them  to rescue weak banks, b u t not on 
the basis th a t mergers can improve efficiency.
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Interestingly, the authorities did not seem to realize the problems 
associated with dom ination by a  corporation or group in bank  ownership. 
These sam e conglomerates also built interlocking ownership in non-bank 
financial institu tions and non-fm ancial corporations, m aking it harder to 
control self-lending. Perhaps the attitude of the au thorities was th a t these 
groups could allocate loans better then  the officials of state  banks. However, 
as will be d iscussed later, these conglomerates tended to borrow from their own 
banks, disregarding the legal lending limits. Moreover, in several cases, banks 
were abused  for gambling. In other words, with the now greater role of private 
banks, the problem s were not actually solved bu t potentially shifted from state 
banks to private banks. Nasution (1995, p. 185), now the Acting Governor of 
Bank Indonesia, p u t these problem s as:
Through networks of ownership, ...... ,nearly all of the domestic
private banks were closely connected to large conglom erates
.....................  During the country’s period of financial repression,
the non-bank companies owned by the conglom erated grew 
rapidly because of the availability of subsidized credits from
state-ow ned b an k s ...............  Problems arise if less efficient
subsidiaries are carried by sales to other com panies in the 
group. Moreover, large firms may lose the flexibility necessary 
to continue to respond adequately to new challenges and 
changing business environm ents. The collapse of the large 
conglom erates -  PT Astra, PT Bentoel, and PT M antrust - in 
1990-1991, indicated th a t certain sectors w ithin the 
conglomerates could become burdensom e, in p a rt because of 
their strategy of being highly leveraged, which may have been 
suitable in the era of subsidized in terest ra tes  and  highly 
protected domestic m arkets b u t which is not suitable in the 
curren t period of deregulation.
It is im portant to note th a t even in developed countries, where banks are 
disciplined by m arket forces, regulators still keep an  eye on ownership 
concentration. For example, the US Federal Reserve p u ts  vigilance on the 
possibility of non-banking com panies owning or controlling banks (Diaz- 
Alejandro 1985). Similarly, the A ustralian authorities impose a  20 per cent 
limit on bank  shares owned by an individual, family, firm, or group (Cranston 
1997).
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3.6.2. Asymmetrie information and disclosure requirement
Banks are required to publish  financial reports covering balance sheets, 
profit and  loss statem ents, contingent liabilities and assets, com m itm ents and 
off balance sheet transactions every six m onths. However, depositors and 
creditors to banks can by no m eans know the exact quality of b an k s’ assets 
from these reports, even if the information is accurate. The report cannot 
accurately guide depositors in m easuring risks.
Moreover, there are indications th a t the inform ation may not always be 
accurate. For instance, prior to the Bank D uta and Bank Sum m a fiasco, these 
two banks had  reported fairly sound financial positions. Because of this, the 
public generally has no confidence in bank reports, as indicated by recurren t 
ru n s  on banks, often due to unverifiable rum ours. For instance, in Jan u a ry  
and  February 1993, a  mini ru n  h it several banks, including Bank Bali, one of 
the soundest. Interest ra tes cannot be used as a  benchm ark  for m easuring 
risks either, although problem atic banks tend to offer exceptionally high 
in terest rates. The problem  is th a t the larger banks tend to gain higher 
perceived reputation, and  therefore can offer lower in terest ra tes despite the 
reality th a t some of them  are actually relatively weak financially.
3.6.3. Lines of credit and evergreening
Most Indonesian banks grant loans on a  line o f credit basis, which m akes 
them  particularly  vulnerable to a  liquidity squeeze (Cole and  Slade 1996). The 
line of credit system  is very different from loans granted on a  project or fixed 
term  basis. Under the line of credit system, a  borrower can w ithdraw funds on 
an  over-draft basis up  to the m axim um  level set in the contract. As long as the 
ceiling is not reached, the borrower is not required to pay the in terest and 
principal. The supposed in terest paym ent is added increm entally to the 
principal. In other words, the loan is evergreen.
There are several w eaknesses in this system  th a t m ake banks 
vulnerable. First, the loans can appear to be performing, even if borrowers do
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not have the capacity to make repaym ents from their own cash flows. As long 
as the limit is not exceeded, borrowers can withdraw funds to pay the interest 
on old loans. Most often, the banks realise th a t these loans are doubtful or 
non-perform ing when the limit is exceeded and borrowers have difficulties 
m aking repaym ents. Second, in such a case the banks a  face difficult choice 
between fu rther extending the limit or realising the loans as non performing. In 
the former, the banks then  realise the interest income b u t a t the same time 
they may have to bear a higher default risk. In the latter, the banks have to 
m ake a loan losses provision which pu ts pressure on their capital position. In 
sum m ary, un d er the line of credit system, it is possible to m aintain  evergreen 
(bad) loans as long as the loans grow faster than  in terest rates. In a  macro 
perspective, a  period of lending boom is generally associated with an 
accum ulation of unrealised problematic loans. In other words, d a ta  on non­
perform ing loans tends to be under estimated. This is one of the reasons why 
m ost leading econom ists suggest tha t loan growth is a  proxy for banking 
fragility (see for example Sachs et. al. 1996).
3.6.4. Connected lending
The vulnerability caused by the line of credit system was fu rther aggravated by 
the fact th a t m ost of the large private banks were owned by conglomerates and 
th u s  tended to lend to themselves. Evergreening of problem atic loans was 
m ost likely to occur with those granted to affiliates, as the bank  m anagers were 
instruc ted  by owners to rescue affiliated companies first. The legal lending limit 
regulation did not seem to be an effective tool to control these ram pan t self­
lending tactics. Based on the published financial statem ents, which tended to 
u n d e r estim ate self-lending, by the beginning of 1995, 78 private banks had 
exceeded the limit, and several of them  had a ratio of connected lending to 
capital well above 300 per cent. At the onset of the currency crisis, 51 banks 
m ain tained  th is problem .6
6 The above figures are the author’s estimates based on published bank balance sheets.
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Loan concentration can increase the fragility of the banking  system  for 
two reasons. First, it gives false information to the au thorities regarding the 
true state  of the banking system  as problem loans are buried  in the line of 
credit schem es. As a result, the authorities are likely to m ake inappropriate 
policy responses, especially in a crisis situation. For instance, it is likely tha t 
the m onetary  authorities did not realise the danger of raising the in terest rate 
and squeezing base money in response to the speculative a ttack  in August 
1997. T hat th is may have been the case was indicated by fact th a t Dr. 
Soedradjad Djiwandono, the then  Governor of Bank Indonesia, published two 
consecutive colum ns in a  major daily new spaper, Kompas, on 20 and  21 May 
1997, sta ting  th a t four reputable in ternational institu tions, Merrill Lynch, 
Credit Lyonnaise, Bear Stem , and ING Barings regarded the Indonesian 
banking system  as fairly sound: rise and shine. His articles were supposed to 
counter criticism s m ade by dom estic observers concerning the hidden b u t 
explosive problem s in the banking system.
Second, concentrated lending reduces the scope for diversification of loan 
portfolios, m aking banks more vulnerable to adverse shocks. This is evident in 
the case of B ank Sum m a and others. The owner of B ank Sum m a speculated  in 
real esta te  and m ost of the loan portfolio was directed to finance this 
speculation. This bank was finally forced into liquidation in December 1991 
because the owner failed to sell the property.
3.6.5. Gambling and fraudulent transactions
Due to information asymm etry, banks are particu larly  prone to enter 
near gam bling transactions such as forward foreign exchange transactions. A 
risk-loving m anager can easily abuse depositors’ and  ow ners’ m oney for such 
transac tions since he or she will not bear the loss. This is known as the 
principal-agent problem. The classic example for Indonesia was the B ank D uta 
fiasco. The Vice President of the bank, who was subsequently  tried and  jailed, 
wras involved in foreign exchange speculation th a t caused  the ban k  to suffer 
losses am ounting to $420 million.
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Between 1993 and 1996, similar problems h it several banks such as 
Bank D harm ala, Lippo Bank, and Bank Internasional Indonesia. However, the 
losses involved were not so big, were never revealed to the public, and were 
wiped out by the injection of fresh capital. Again, in 1998, the banking 
com m unity was rocked with the announcem ent th a t B ank Ekspor Impor 
Indonesia, one of the state  banks, made losses of about $804 million due to 
forward exchange transactions. But this time the losses were caused more by 
the volatility in the value of the rupiah, than  by pure gambling motives.
Another area  susceptible to fraudulent conduct is commercial paper (CP) 
issued  or endorsed by banks. Again the problem is excessive abuse of the 
banks by the owners. In order to avoid the legal lending limit, banks can 
endorse CPs issued  by affiliated companies. Sometimes, th is can involve proxy 
com panies, which physically do not exist and are seemingly unrelated  to the 
banks b u t actually established by the owners of the bank  un d er somebody 
else’s nam e.7 The problem  is th a t CPs are issued  on a  short-term  basis, and 
used  to finance speculation and longer term  investm ents. Default occurs when 
speculations fail or investm ents cannot be liquidated except a t a  loss. As a 
result, repaym ent becomes the liability of the bank  endorsing the CPs.
One of the m any exam ples was the Bank Pacific case involving issuance 
of fake CPs for about Rp 2.2 trillion during 1996-1997. The proceeds from the 
CPs were used  to finance investm ents in the Singapore Stock Exchange, 
especially on property related shares (Infobank no. 229, Septem ber 1998). It 
tu rned  out th a t the CPs could not be repaid, and  the bank  was closed by the 
authorities in November 1997 together with the o ther 15 banks.
3.6.6. Regulatory weaknesses and forbearance
B ank as agent o f  development. According to the  1992 Banking Act, banks 
should also function as an  agent of development, m eaning th a t the authorities, 
a t their own discretion, can in s tru c t a  bank  to finance a  certain  type of activity.
7 In such  a case, the CPs are typically fake as they are not registered in B ank Indonesia 
and not rated by Pefindo, the official rating company.
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For instance, all banks are required to allocate 20 per cent of their loan 
portfolio to small and m edium  scale enterprises, a  ta sk  th a t has never been 
accom plished by any single bank  except by Bank Rakyat Indonesia, a state 
bank  traditionally specialising in ru ral finance. Lately, this function became a 
handicap for several banks as they could not optimise their financial resources. 
In the worst case, several state  and  private banks were instructed  to foster risky 
state-in itiated  projects, such  as the infamous ‘national car’ project, although 
the bulk  of the  funding came from the central bank.
Scoring system . Perhaps, the m ost ineffective supervisory device is the way the 
soundness of a bank  is evaluated. Bank soundness is calculated as the 
weighted average of bank  perform ance in five aspects generally known as 
CAMEL (capital, assets, m anagem ent, earnings, and liquidity). Based on the 
la test regulation, the weights applied to each elem ent are: capital 25%, asset 
quality 30%, m anagem ent 25%, earnings 10%, and liquidity 10%. As argued by 
Habir (1994), the m ain problem with this scoring system  is th a t a  bank  badly 
perform ing in one aspect, e.g. capital is negative, could still be ra ted  fairly 
so u n d ’ if it could accum ulate enough points in the other four aspects. It is 
more effective if such  a  bank  is rated fm so u n d ’ regardless of perform ance 
elsewhere (McLeod, 1999).
Political interference. State banks were heavily influenced by political 
interference in loan allocations. The banks were often instructed  to grant loans 
not only to the  so-called priority sectors such  as agriculture, and small scale 
enterprise, b u t also, more dangerously, to specific borrowers, notably politically 
connected conglom erates with dubious projects to which professional bankers 
would norm ally not be willing to grant loans, event for a  single cent. An inter- 
m inisterial investigation indicated that, by 1993, a  num ber of conglomerates 
had  obtained large loans from the state banks on which they paid neither the 
in terest nor the principal (Cole and Slade 1996). For instance, Bapindo 
(Indonesian Development Bank) had  issued loans am ounting to $650 million to 
the Golden Key group for petrochem ical p lants, due to p ressure  from Admiral 
Sudomo, the Coordinating M inister for Political Affairs and  National Security. It 
was revealed later th a t these loans were granted w ithout a  contract even having
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been signed, and m ost of the funds were diverted for other purposes (Infobank, 
April 1994).
Forbearance o f prudential regulation. The authorities have im planted 
sophisticated  prudential regulations to safeguard the banking system. But the 
problem  is not so m uch w hether the regulations are good or bad, b u t more to 
do with the im plem entation and enforcement (McLeod 1999, among others). In 
m any cases, serious violations of these regulations did not lead to punishm ent 
or fines, let alone cessation of bank operation. Serious pun ishm ent of owners 
and  m anagers was rarely observed; one exception was the Bank Sum m a fiasco 
where shareholders were required to bear all of the losses by surrendering one 
of their m ost successful business entities, the A stra International group. 
However, in m ost cases, the authorities tried to clean up  problem atic banks by 
forcing m ergers with other banks, or sales to o ther owners. As a  result, the 
problem s were not solved, ju s t transferred to o ther parties, and of course, the 
new owners expected preferential treatm ent and  financial help from the 
au thorities for assisting with sorting out the problem s. From 1992 to the 
beginning of 1997, a t least 8 banks were resolved th is way and m ost of the 
troubles caused by the expansion of credit to owners of the banks to finance 
projects in property (real estate) sector (Infobank, no. 211, Ju n e  1997). This 
included Bank Pertiwi in 1992, Bank Sam poerna and  Bank Susila Bakti in 
1993, B ank Continental in 1994, BIG Bank and  B ank Dwima in 1995, Bank 
Yama in 1996, and Bank Perniagaan in 1997.
This m ethod of dealing with the problem h ad  adverse consequences for the 
banking system:
❖  It tended to accum ulate problems, which m ight have been m anageable in 
a  non-crisis situation, making it more difficult to support problem atic 
banks in the wake of the crisis. The closing of the  16 banks in November 
1997 was vindication th a t this kind of approach could not be sustained.
❖  This ‘soft approach’ sent message to o ther banks th a t they would not 
receive harsh  treatm ent and penalties, therefore inducing larger moral 
hazard  problems.
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❖  In m ost cases, the central bank had to extend aid to ailing banks in the 
form of liquidity credit, which tended to jeopardize m onetary discipline. 
For instance, the new owner of Bank Arta Prima, the A rtha G raha group, 
adm itted tha t liquidity credit from the central ban k  was p a rt of the deal 
for the take over of the bank from the previous owner, Yayasan Kosgoro, 
and th a t w ithout th is credit the new owner found it unattractive to own 
the bank  (Infobank, Ju ly  1997).
3.6.7. Implications for money creation
This soft approach was actually the legacy of the pre-PAKTO period, where state 
banks were continuously recapitalised to wipe out losses. Unfortunately, the 
now greater roles of private banks did not lessen au tho rities , assistance to 
commercial banks. Figure 3.4 suggests an  increasing trend  of central bank 
claims on domestic banks during 1984 to 1990, m ostly in the form of credit 
program s and liquidity assistance. In 1990, as d iscussed  earlier, credit 
program s were cu t substantially  and this is indicated by a  drop in such  claims 
from Rp 17 trillion in mid 1990 to about Rp 12 trillion th roughout 1991. 
Throughout the period 1991-1994, the claims stabilised  a t around  Rp 13 
trillion, suggesting th a t the authorities were beginning to discipline themselves. 
However, from mid 1995, the claims accelerated again a t a  ra te  bigger th an  the 
pre-PAKTO period. By Ju n e  1997, central bank  claim s am ounted to Rp 23 
trillion -  more th an  half of reserve money and was by far the m ost im portant 
asse t of the central bank  after foreign exchange reserves.
The greater reliance on the private banks also changed the struc tu re  of 
borrowings from the central bank. In 1985, these borrowings were alm ost 
exclusively by the state banks (see Figure 3.5). However, following the tight 
m onetary policy of 1991, private banks began to become chronic borrowers 
from the central bank. By Ju n e  1997, alm ost half of the borrowing was by 
private banks and  the other half by state banks. However, th is did not m ean 
the state  banks becam e sounder. As will be m ade clear later, in C hapter 5, the
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Figure 3.4. Central bank claims to domestic commercial banks
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Figure 3.5 . Share of bank borrowings from the central bank
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Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
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state  banks rem ained the weakest group. These findings also indicate th a t the 
change in m arket structure , from state bank  dom ination to a  greater role of 
private banks, also shifted the problems to the private banks. Thus, the overall 
soundness of the banking system may not have been improving.
3.7. Concluding remarks
In sum m ary, Indonesia’s economic policies becam e more m arket friendly 
and  contributed to increasing openness and vigorous economic performance. 
However, three problems stand  out (1) persisten t deficits in basic balances, (2) 
the accum ulation and structu re  and foreign debts, and  (3) a  relatively weak 
banking sector. The first two problems were in terrelated  in th a t persistent 
cu rren t account deficits were largely created by in terest paym ents on foreign 
debts. Long-term capital flows were insufficient to cover the deficits and 
therefore short-term  capital flows were needed. This m ade the balance of 
paym ents vulnerable to an  interruption of short-term  foreign capital.
Impressive growth in the banking sector was not accom panied by an 
overall improvement in  b an k  soundness. D uring the  1990s, bo th  state and 
private banks continued to accum ulate serious problem s, which were buried by 
the reluctance of the authorities to be tough on b an k s breaking prudential 
regulations and, m ost importantly, by the optim ism  brought about by rapid 
economic growth.
These problems suggest th a t Indonesia m ight have been vulnerable to 
the so-called twin crises. The first two problem s are a  necessary  condition in 
th a t erosion of confidence on the part of foreign lenders and  investors can pu t 
heavy pressure on the foreign exchange m arket. The weak banking  sector is 
the sufficient condition, in th a t an in terest ra te  hike will no t be effective or 
credible because it can complicate the banking sector.
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Chapter 4
A  Framework for Analysing Banking Fragility
4.1. Introduction
In C hapter 3 we saw  th a t there were several problem s in the banking sector 
before the  crisis. This raises question regarding the role of these problem s in 
the origin and propagation of the crisis. In addressing th is issue, it is necessary  
to adopt both  micro and macroeconomic approaches. Moreover, theoretical 
modelling and  quantitative empirical analyses will be employed to provide more 
definitive answ ers.
This C hapter proposes a theoretical model for analysing banking fragility, 
while the empirical test of this model will be presented  in C hapter 5. The idea 
behind th is  model is th a t the resistance of a  bank  to the financial crisis will be 
determ ined by its p a s t performance and conduct. More specifically, a  b an k  th a t 
s tan d s  ready to ignore the possibility of a  crisis will be the m ost vulnerable. 
Because the crisis affects the balance sheet of b anks both  directly and 
indirectly, through the balance sheets of their debtors, a  bank  th a t anticipates 
a crisis will not select asset portfolios th a t could be adversely affected. For 
instance, bank  m anagers would avoid issuing foreign exchange loans to 
dom estic oriented firms.
It should be noted from the outset th a t the model proposed here focuses 
on the loan m arket, or the interrelationship between ban k s and  borrowers. The 
deposit m arket, or the interrelationship between banks and  depositors is 
abstrac ted  in the model and left for further research.
The res t of th is  chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 d iscusses 
firm s’ investm ent choices under uncertainty, followed by a  d iscussion on bank  
lending behaviour in section 4.3, while section 4.4 d iscusses the relevance of 
the model for empirical analysis.
4.2. Firms’ investment choices and uncertainty
Consider there are F firms where F is a big num ber and each firm needs one 
u n it of capital to be invested in certain productive activities. Firms invest at 
time 0, and harvest the yield a t time 1 (single period). There are two types of 
project, nam ely (1) a  crisis prone or risky project, denoted by R, and (2) a non­
crisis prone or safe project, denoted by S. A firm ’s choice regarding the project 
is private inform ation and, hence, a  lender cannot observe th is  choice, ex-ante. 
The choice can only be observed by other agents, ex-post, when the project is 
completed.
As in G utten tag  and Herring (1984), two s ta tes  of na tu re  can occur a t 
time 1, nam ely crisis (disaster) and non-crisis (normal). At period 0, the 
likelihood of a  crisis occurring at time 1 is unknow n. This is to capture the 
reality th a t m ost m ajor crises cannot be well predicted both in term s of timing 
or in the severity of the  crises.
In their original setting, Guttentag and Herring assum e th a t the ou tpu t 
of all firms will collapse to zero or near zero. This seem s to be an  unrealistic 
m etaphor of the real world for two reasons. First, in their model, the ability of 
firms and banks to resist the crisis does not correspond to their investm ent 
decisions or to p ruden t m easures they took in the  previous period. All firms 
will simply collapse and, therefore, the shield covering banks will have to come 
from the liquidation of collateral. In fact, the asse ts  portfolio of a  bank  can also 
determ ine bank  perform ance in a  crisis situation. In o ther words, a  better 
m etaphor is needed for capturing the effects of pre-crisis conduct and 
perform ance of a  ban k  in m aking it vulnerable. Second, even in a  m ajor crisis 
situation, there are some sectors th a t rem ain in  good shape. For instance, a 
severe crisis involving a  large devaluation may lead to a  collapse of domestic 
oriented firms with large exposure to foreign debt. On the other hand, export 
oriented firms can gain from th is situation. Therefore, the financial struc tu re  of 
firms does m atter in determ ining the im pact of the crisis.
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In order to resolve the above problems, the economic activities are 
specified in two types as outlined above; i.e., crisis prone and non-crisis prone 
projects. The crisis prone project will fail with certainty if a  crisis occurs in 
period 1. This is to capture two types of susceptibility. First, ou tpu t may be 
susceptible to an adverse macroeconomic shock. For instance, real estate, 
durable goods, and investm ent goods may be more vulnerable to contraction in 
aggregate dem and. Second, a  firm’s financial position m ay be vulnerable to a 
certain  type of shock. Firms with a currency m ism atch will be vulnerable to an 
unexpected devaluation, while firms with high leverage will be vulnerable to an 
in terest ra te  hike. In th is model, both types of vulnerability (output or 
financial) will be captured by the collapse in output. The reason is tha t the 
effect of an increase in costs or liabilities is parallel to a decline in output.
Suppose a  crisis does not occur a t time 1. The expected output of a 
crisis-prone project is:
Therefore, y s = y sP s .
Moreover, it is assum ed th a t y R > y s , y R > y s and  P R < P s . These 
assum ptions indicate th a t while project R  gives a  higher expected return , it is 
risk ier in a  norm al period.
N ature may also draw  from a  d isastrous distribution. In the case of a 
d isaste r or crisis, the o u tpu t of project R  will collapse to zero with certainty
(4 . 1)
with probability.. P R 
with probability.. 1 -  P R
In other words, y R = y RP ^ . The expected ou tpu t generated from a  non-crisis- 
prone (safe) project is:
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(probability equal to 1). On the other hand, the probability distribution of 
o u tp u t given by project S is unaffected by the crisis (equation (4.2)).
Because the probability of a  crisis occurring a t time 1 is unknown, the 
decision m ade by firms regarding project choice is entirely subjective. Let n } be
the subjective probability of firm j  as of period 0 th a t a  crisis will occur at period 
one. In order to m ake the analysis simple, th is subjective belief takes two 
extrem e values, 0 and  1. If k  = 0, firm j  absolutely believes th a t a  crisis will
not occur. This firm is called an im prudent firm, because it ignores the
possibility of a  crisis. On the other hand, if /zv = 1, firm j  believes th a t a  crisis
will occur with certainty. This firm is called a p ruden t firm .1
Let E F/( y k) be the subjective expected ou tpu t of an  im prudent firm. The 
superscrip t k  denotes which project is chosen, and  subscrip t FI indicates the 
firm is im pruden t [tTj =0) .  If a risky project is chosen, the subjective expected 
o u tp u t would be:
(4.3.a) E FI( y R) = y R = P Ry R
If a  safe project is chosen, the expected output would be:
(4.3.b) E n ( y s ) = y s =P sy s
Let E FP( y ‘) be the subjective expected ou tp u t of a  p ruden t firm. If a  
risky project is chosen, the subjective expected o u tpu t would be:
(4.4.a) E FP( y R) = 0
If a  safe project is chosen, the expected output would be:
1 In the real world, the distinction between a prudent and  an  im prudent firm would not 
be so extreme. For instance, a  firm may have a subjective belief equal to 0.5 while the 
other have a belief equal to 0.45. In other words, it is more realistic to assum e th a t the 
value will lie som ewhere between 0 and 1. However, th is can  lead to a  more 
complicated m athem atical solution. The objective here is to simplify the real world in
86
(4.4.b) EFP( y s ) = y s = P sy s
In order to specify which project is chosen by a particu lar type of firm, we 
need to specify the behaviour of firms regarding risk and re tu rn . It is assum ed 
th a t investm ent is financed by bank loan and, therefore, firms will have to pay 
in terest rate , r, a t time 1 when the project is completed. Moreover, because the 
two projects involve risk and efforts are required to produce ou tpu t, firm j  will 
choose project k  as long as it can give expected net income of no less than
P k p k. Note tha t, p k is necessarily positive in order to give incentive to firm s.* 2
Let Ej (NI )  be the expected income of firm j  choosing project k. Firm j will be
operating if, and only if, E k(NI) > P k p k .
The net income of firms is evaluated at its expected value. The subjective 
expected income for a  p rudent firm is:
(4.5) E fp(NI ) = P s {ys - \ ~ r LFP) > P sp s
where rFP is the in terest rate paid by a prudent firm. Note th a t for any given 
in terest rate , a  p ruden t firm will not select a  risky project because it is 
perceived to fail.
Proposition 1. All p ruden t firms will be willing to operate if, and  only if, 
E sfp(NI)  > P sp s > 0 o r r / p <j !s - l - / .
Proof :If rpp > y s — 1 -  p s, there is no incentive for the firm to operate. Because 
of tha t, in a  competitive m arket, the interest rate paid by the  firm m u st be equal 
to y s - 1 -  p s . This implies th a t any bank expecting p ru d en t firms to be 
applying for loans cannot set an interest rate exceeding — 1 -  p s .
order to clearly distinguish the implications of decisions made by prudent and 
imprudent (or less prudent) firms.
2 If it falls to zero or negative, firms will choose not to operate.
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The subjective net income for im prudent firms associated with a  safe 
project is:
(4.6.a) E%( NI ) = P 5(Fs -1  - 4 )  > Ps p s
If the firms take a  risky project, the subjective expected income is:
(4.6.b) E% {NI) = P R{ yR- 1 -  r Ln ) > P Rp R
Proposition 2. For any given in terest rate, im prudent firms will always prefer a 
crisis-prone project.
Proof. This is clear by com paring (4.6.a) and  (4.6.b). Because P Ry R > P Ry R and
P R (1 + ) < P s (1 + r^,) ,  then  E R, {NI) > E sFl {NI) for any given level of loan rate
charged to im prudent firms.
Therefore, the model suggests th a t perception or subjective belief 
regarding the fu ture state  of n a tu re  does influence decisions made by firms 
and, th u s , the vulnerability to a  crisis. For instance, in a  peg exchange rate 
regime, there m ay be some firms th a t perceive the  regime will no t collapse. 
Because of th a t, foreign borrowing w ithout a  hedge will be attractive, even if 
m ost of their revenue is denom inated in dom estic currency.
It may also be asked how decisions m ade by firms will affect the 
aggregate perform ance of an  economy. Let FI and  FP be the population of 
im prudent and  p ruden t firms, respectively, and  therefore F=FI+FP. In a  crisis 
situation, the aggregate ou tpu t will be equal to y s .F P . That is, the more 
p ruden t the firm, the less severe the  im pact of the crisis. In the real world, this 
will be equivalent to som ething like: the larger the foreign debt th a t are not 
hedged, the m ore vulnerable the economy to a  currency crisis.
Up to th is  point, the model h as cap tured  a  particu lar facet of the real 
world th a t the severity of a  crisis, or the ability of an economy to resist a  crisis, 
will depend on the share of total ou tp u t a ttached  to a  crisis prone activity. In a  
big recession, dom estic oriented sectors, such  as the property sector, will be
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h ard est hit, because they are prone to a  decline in domestic absorption. 
Moreover, the severity of the decline in domestic o u tpu t will depend on the 
share of such  sectors in total domestic outpu t before the crisis. On the other 
hand, such  sectors may be considered lucrative in a  boom period.
4.3. Bank lending decision
This section focuses on the decision problem s faced by banks arising 
from the uncerta in ty  of whether or not a  crisis will occur in the next period. 
Because the uncertain ty  has no probability distribution, banks cannot price it. 
Moreover, subjective perception will determine the lending decisions of a  bank.
If a  project succeeds, banks receive in terest and  principal on loans, bu t 
they receive nothing if it fail. For simplicity, the in terest ra te  on deposits is 
norm alized to zero. This is because the focus is on the relationship between 
banks and  firms.
B ank owners have to meet a certain am ount of equity capital (K) to 
establish  a bank. B anks collect deposits (D) as liabilities and  supply loans (L) to 
firms. Since liquidity is not the main concern, the reserve requirem ent is 
abstracted . The balance sheet of a bank can be s ta ted  simply as L = D + K. 
That is, the total loans of a bank are equal to its equity capital p lus deposits. In 
th is setting total loans are also equal to total assets.
The banking system  consists of B  banks with equal size and, therefore, 
the aggregate credit level can be simply stated  as B.L. It is assum ed th a t the 
size of a  b an k  is bigger than  a  firm. Because each firm needs one u n it of loan, 
a  ban k  will be able to issue loans to L firms.
The asym m etric information assum ption is m aintained. B anks cannot 
observe which project is chosen by a firm. However, banks know the 
probability d istribution  of each type of project. The ou tpu t of a  firm is also 
verifiable. Moreover, the num ber of firms taking up  risky and safe projects (FI 
and  FP) is also known.
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Like firms, each bank sets a  subjective probability regarding a crisis. A 
b an k  believing th a t a  crisis will not occur at time 1 is called an im prudent 
bank. There are BI im prudent banks, and the rest are considered p ruden t 
(.BP=B-B1).
4.3.1. Prudent bank
P rudent b anks believe th a t a  crisis will occur a t time 1. They perceive th a t 
im pruden t firms will not be able to repay their loans. Therefore, these banks 
will avoid giving loans to im prudent firms. However, because the choice of 
project is private information, they face difficulties in distinguishing pruden t 
from im pruden t firms.
Interest rate and information asymmetry
The m ain problem  faced by a prudent bank  is th a t it perceives th a t a 
crisis will occur a t time 1, and therefore it has to provide 100% provision for 
expected bad  loans resulting from the possible collapse of risky projects. If Fi is 
the share  of im pruden t firms in the total population of firms (Ff=FI/F), then  the 
probability th a t an  im prudent firm will be picked up  by a  p ruden t bank  is F/ . 
Therefore, the share of expected bad loans in th a t b a n k ’s portfolio is also Fi.
This h a s  two implications for the bank. First, there is no price 
m echanism  to elim inate the risk associated with risky projects, because the 
bank  perceives th a t im prudent firms will default. Therefore, the best approach 
for the ban k  is to avoid issuing loans to im prudent firms in the first place. This 
can be done th rough screening and monitoring. Second, because the  bank  h as 
to provide a  higher provision for bad loans and for the  cost of m onitoring and 
screening, the bank  will naturally  have a  higher cost s tru c tu re  th a n  its rival 
im pruden t bank. Therefore, p ruden t banks may not be competitive. In other 
words, p ru d en t b anks may be driven out of the m arket by banks th a t stand  
ready to disregard the  possibility of a  disaster (G uttentag and Herring 1984).
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In order to see the dilemma faced by pruden t banks, m oral hazard  and 
credit rationing phenom ena resulting from an increase in the in terest rate are 
used. Because the banks expect the crisis, subjective expected revenue will 
come from the loans allocated to prudent firms. The subjective expected net 
income of a  p ruden t bank at time 1 is:
(4.7) £ flp(M ) = ((fp(l + / i ) P s )-l)z,
where: EBP(NI) = subjective expected net income of a  p ru d en t bank  
Fp = the proportion of p rudent firms in the population 
rBP = loan rate charged by a p rudent bank
Equation (4.7) states th a t the subjective expected ne t income for a  p rudent 
bank consists of two com ponents. The first pa rt of the right h an d  side,
(f p(\ + rBP)Ps )L , is the revenue from loan repaym ents corresponding to p ruden t 
firms. Because the bank  expects a  crisis, only a  fraction of loans (F,,) is 
expected to be repaid. The second part of the right h an d  side, L, represents the 
cost of raising funds which consists of equity and deposits with zero in terest 
rate.
P rudent banks will issue loans as long as it is profitable to do so, 
Ebp(NI) > 0 . In the case of EBP(NI) < 0 , the banks will no t issue loans (credit 
rationing). Alternatively, in order to have a positive ne t income, the banks may 
increase the loan rate. However, if the in terest rate is too high, it m ay resu lt in 
a moral hazard  problem as safe projects may not be selected by firms.
Proposition 3. A p ruden t bank  will offer a low in terest ra te  so th a t 
\ + r^p + p s < y s and E kFP(NI)> P sp s .
Proof. If a  p ruden t bank  sets the interest rate  so th a t 1 + rBP + p s > EFP( y s ) and
E SFP(NI) < P sp s , then no p ruden t firm will apply for loans. In effect, the bank 
will not issue loans a t all because all loan applications will come from
91
im pruden t firms. Therefore, in order to m ake loans attractive for a  p rudent 
firm, the bank  has to set a  lower interest ra te  so th a t rBP < y s -1  -  p s .
Up to this point, the model has shown th a t p ruden t banks will issue 
loans as long as EBP(NI ) >0  and \ + rBP+ p s < y s . This has im portant 
im plications for m onetary policy. First, m onetary tightening can make the 
economy more vulnerable to a  financial crisis as the b a n k s ’ loan portfolio 
deteriorates. Second, in the m idst of the crisis, an  in te rest ra te  hike may resu lt 
in an increase in non-performing loans, due to w eakening in the financial 
positions of low-return b u t safe projects. Third, th is  model is also consistent 
with th a t of Mankiw (1986), who suggests th a t due to the fear of moral hazard 
problem s resulting  from an exceptional in terest hike, banks m ay not be willing 
to extend loans. Therefore, there may be a  severe contraction in the loan 
m arket following a m onetary tightening. In o ther words, a  financial contraction 
m ay resu lt in ou tpu t contraction.
Monitoring costs
In order to avoid extending loans to im pruden t firms, the p ruden t bank 
h as to screen loan applications and monitor the firm s so th a t only safe projects 
are selected by firms. However, screening and  m onitoring involves additional 
costs for the bank. Let m be the screening and  m onitoring costs, which 
hereafter will be called m onitoring costs.
It is assum ed tha t, through monitoring, the  b an k  can effectively control 
firms so th a t only safe projects are chosen. The subjective expected net income 
of the p ru d en t bank  now becomes:
(4.8) £ ä”f (W ) = (((l + ^ ) P s ) - l - m ) i
The ban k  will have an incentive to m onitor if, and  only if, E BP(NI) > EBP( NI ) , 
th a t is the expected re tu rn  from applying m onitoring exceeds the expected 
re tu rn  from not doing so. This suggests that:
92
(4.9) m <
That is, the higher the proportion of p ruden t firms in the population, the less 
incentive for banks to monitor.
Collateralised loans
Collateral h as  two functions. First, it provides a  cushion for banks in the case 
of firms failing to pay the loan. This is the m ost commonly known function of 
collateral. Second, and less known, it can be used  as a  screening device to 
avoid m oral hazard  (Bester and Helwig 1987).
However, collateral may not be effective in order to safeguard banks from 
failing. Liquidating collateral can take time and incur costs. Moreover, in a 
crisis situation  the value of assets tends to fall sharply (see, for example, Davies 
1995). F isher (1933) argues th a t the liquidation of asse ts  of insolvent firms 
during a  m ajor crisis can place fu rther p ressure  on the asse t price, leading to a  
vicious circle called the asse t deflation process.
For the  purpose of modelling, it is im portant to acknowledge the potential 
d isaster caused  by a  fall in asse t price during a  crisis episode. For simplicity, it 
is assum ed  th a t the value of collateral assets will fall to zero if a  crisis occurs. 
On the o ther hand, if no crisis occurs, the price of asse ts  is norm alized to one.
Because p ru d en t banks expect a  crisis to occur a t time 1, they would not 
rely on collateral to safeguard cash  flow. In other words, to ensure  the safety of 
loans, the  banks will em phasize loan quality ra ther th an  collateral through 
screening and  monitoring, as outlined above.
Up to th is point, the model has captured several im portan t behavioural 
characteristics of a  p ruden t bank. It sets in terest ra tes below the expected net 
re tu rn  of a  safe project, and  im plem ents screening and  m onitoring in order to 
reduce default risk. In sum m ary, it prefers safe projects even though they 
imply a lower expected re tu rn .
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4.3.2. Imprudent bank
Im prudent banks are defined as those tha t stand  ready to disregard the 
possibility of a  crisis. Because of that, these banks will be interested in 
financing risky projects. This is in contrast to p ruden t banks where safe 
projects dom inate their loan portfolio.
Proposition 4. Im prudent banks can set loan rates higher than  the loan rates 
set by p ru d en t banks, r > rpp.
Proof. Because y s P s < y RP R , it is possible to charge risky projects with a 
higher loan rate  so th a t (\ + rpp + p s )PS < y sP s < (\ +rPI + p R)PR < y RP R . 
Because P s > P R , then  rpp < r R , and y s < 1 + rPI < y R .
This implies th a t no p ru d en t firms will apply for loans. In other words, 
all loans from im prudent banks will be allocated to im prudent firms. Moreover, 
m onitoring and  collateral become irrelevant for im prudent banks because the 
in terest ra te  will effectively screen borrowers.
B ecause im prudent banks do not need to screen and m onitor borrowers, 
expected ne t income can be simply stated as:
(4.10) £ s;(W/) = (((1+ 4 )P R) - l ) i
By com paring (4.8) and (4.10), it is clear tha t profits of im prudent banks will be 
higher th an  th a t of p ruden t banks if a crisis does not occur.
Up to th is point, the model has specified different behavioural 
characteristics of im prudent banks. They tend to set a  higher in terest rate on 
loans, allowing risky projects to dominate their loan portfolio. Im prudent banks 
will specialise in financing risky projects, while p ruden t banks will prefer safe 
projects.
Moreover, in a  purely competitive deposit m arket, im prudent banks can 
drive the o ther banks out of the m arket by setting a  higher deposit rate. So far,
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it has been assum ed tha t banks pay no in terest on deposits. If th is assum ption 
is relaxed, it will become clear th a t p rudent banks cannot compete in the 
deposit m arket for two reasons. First, im prudent ban k s set higher loan rates 
so they will be able to offer higher deposit rates. Second, p ruden t banks have 
to pay m onitoring costs, which further lowers the deposit ra tes they can offer. 
However, the above implication may not apply if it is further assum ed tha t 
depositors are also divided into two groups, p ruden t and  im prudent depositors. 
This issue is left for further research.
4.4. Implications
4.4.1. Crisis and non-crisis scenario
Note th a t it has been assum ed that the objective (actual) probability of a  
crisis is not known. Because of this uncertain ty , firms and banks make 
investm ent decisions based entirely on their subjective belief. In this light, it 
can only be known which decision is right ex-post, w hen the state  of na tu re  is 
fully known at period 1, crisis or no-crisis.
W hen a  crisis occurs, the output of im prudent firm s will fall to zero and 
no paym ent will be made to banks. Thus im prudent b anks will collapse. On 
the other hand , pruden t firms and  banks will be unaffected by the crisis. In 
th is case, the expected re tu rn  of prudent firms an d  b anks is determ ined by 
equations (4.4.b) and (4.8), respectively.
It is im portan t to note th a t the susceptibility of the  economy to a  crisis 
does not only depend on decisions made by firms, as d iscussed  in section 4.2, 
b u t also on w hether bank decisions are pruden t or not. After all, it takes two to 
tango. To see th is clearly, consider the following two cases.
First, if all banks disregard the possibility of a  crisis, then  only risky 
projects will be financed. This is an extreme case of susceptibility where all 
banks and  firms are exposed to a  crisis. In th is case, b an k s and  firms become 
insolvent. Thus, there will be both a  real and financial sector crisis.
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Second, if all domestic banks are prudent, they will only issue loans to 
safe projects. Im prudent firms may be able to seek foreign loans, given th a t 
foreign creditors are not as p rudent as domestic banks. In this case, only 
im pruden t firms will collapse. Prudent firms and banks will rem ain unaffected 
by a crisis. Thus, there will be a less severe real sector crisis w ithout a 
financial sector crisis.
If a  crisis does not occur, im prudent firms and banks will perform better. 
The net income of im prudent firms is determined by equation (4.6.b) and th a t of 
p ruden t firms is determ ined by equation (4.4.b). Although rm > rBP, it m ust be
the case th a t EPI(NI) > E SFP(NI ). Otherwise, no firm would be willing to take a 
risky project.
The net income of pruden t and im prudent bank  w hen the crisis does not 
occur is described by equations (4.8) and (4.10), respectively. Comparing the 
two equations gives E BI(NI) > E BP(NI) . Thus, im prudent banks perform better.
4.4.2. Relevance for empirical studies
An em pirical te st of the model developed in th is chap ter will be undertaken  in 
the next chapter. Before proceeding to that exercise, it is im portan t to highlight 
several im plications th a t can be inferred from the model for the empirical 
analysis. Several qualifications should also be m ade due to oversimplification 
of the real world and  hence overstatem ent of the im plications of the model.
First, the model has simplified the complexity of real world into a  binary 
world, risky versus safe or p ruden t versus im prudent. In the real world, a 
continuum  of risk  can be observed, from projects with no risk  to absolutely 
risky projects. Thus, the term s crisis-prone and  non-crisis-prone projects 
should be in terpreted  cautiously in the empirics. It would be more realistic if 
vulnerability to a  crisis was defined in terms of relative exposure. For instance, 
the higher the  foreign debt accum ulated in the non-tradable sector, the more 
prone the sector to a  currency crisis.
96
Second, the model implies tha t the susceptibility of a  firm or a  bank  
depends on decisions m ade before a crisis. This is reflected in the terminology 
used  in the model, p ruden t versus im prudent firms or banks. For the empirics, 
th is should be interpreted as the performance of a  bank  (firm) during a  crisis 
will depend on its conduct and performance before the crisis. For instance, a 
bank th a t allows non-performing loans to be buried by m eans of “ever-greening” 
will be vulnerable to an in terest ra te  hike.
Third, the model implies th a t the severity of a crisis will depend on the 
proportion of firms and banks opting for crisis-prone projects. In other words, 
the bigger the problem s accum ulated in the real and  banking sector, the more 
vulnerable the economy.
Fourth, the model defines “crisis” in a broad m anner. In an  actual crisis 
situation, a  multiple adverse shocks may be observed like a  large currency 
devaluation, with a  sharp  fall in assets price, an  in terest rate hike and  bank  
runs. Therefore, it is necessary to specifically define bank  characteristics in 
relation to each shock. In other words, the term  “vulnerability” should 
correspond to a  specific shock.
Fifth, the term s ‘subjective choice/decision’ should not be overstated. 
This is ju s t  to simplify a  vast array of differences in expectation about the 
future s ta tes  of the economy am ongst different agents. Moreover, in m aking 
anticipations, a  set of ‘objective’ information m ay be used, b u t the sam e 
inform ation may be interpreted differently by different agents. For example, a  
boom in the asse t m arket may viewed as a  good thing. But it may also be 
perceived as an initial stage of an incoming collapse. Indeed, the model tries to 




Was The Banking Sector Weak Before The Crisis?: 
A post-mortem analysis
5.1. Introduction
The objectives of th is chapter are twofold: to provide an empirical test of 
the view th a t the banking sector was fragile, and  to determ ine the factors 
contributing to banking fragility by using individual bank  balance sheet data. In 
order to achieve these objectives, the perform ance of banks during the crisis is 
exam ined in relation to their conduct and perform ance before the crisis. In 
o ther words, a  test will be established to determ ine w hether b an k s’ financial 
position during the crisis can be explained by their pre-crisis characteristics.
This test is based on the model developed in C hapter 4, which suggests a 
definite relationship between the pre-crisis perform ance and  conduct of a bank 
with its ability to w ithstand  adverse shocks during a  crisis. If the model is 
supported  by the empirical analysis, there is a  solid basis  for explaining why 
policy responses during the crisis seem to have been ineffective in deterring 
currency speculation and  in minimizing the dam age to the economy. Moreover, 
a  w eak-banking sector tends to propagate a  currency crisis and  becomes a full­
blown economic and financial crisis, where the paym ent system  breaks down 
(Mishkin, 1996).
The implied hypothesis derived from the model m ay be described as 
follows. In considering a situation where all b anks face the sam e adverse 
macroeconom ic shocks, there is a  need to determ ine the factors characterising 
the ability of a  bank to w ithstand the shocks. A particu lar group of banks 
m ight have accum ulated  some sort of fragility before the crisis, so th a t the 
shock may have exposed their weaknesses. On the  o ther hand, if the data  
canno t confirm this hypothesis, it may be concluded th a t the shocks h it banks
random ly and  their p ast perform ance and conduct had  nothing to do with their 
ability to minimize the adverse impacts of the shocks on the ir financial position 
duripg the crisis. In other words, banks th a t succum bed were simply the 
unlucky victims of the crisis. Given this, it may be necessary  to look for other 
explanations for their insolvency, such as m acro-m onetary m anagem ent and 
the presence of deposit ru n s  during the crisis.
The rem ainder of this chapter is organised as follow. First, the empirical 
model and  econometric procedures are presented, followed by a d iscussion on 
variable definition and d a ta  sources. The key em pirical findings are then 
discussed  in the context of the structure, conduct, and  perform ance 
characteristics of the Indonesian banking system  in the lead up  to the crisis. 
The final section presents key inferences and policy im plications.
The em pirical framework used  to determine factors contributing  to banking 
fragility is a  “probit” or “norm it” model. 1 The regression model is specified as:
where y* is commonly known as a  “latent” variable. It is unobserved, and 
therefore is replaced by an observed dummy variable, y t , such  that:
A bank  is said to be solvent if it had a capital adequacy ratio  (CAR) equal to, or 
more than , zero during the crisis. A bank is said to be technically b an k ru p t if 
the CAR fell below zero. Because the shocks th a t occurred during  the crisis 
were so large, a bank  th a t m aintained its CAR above zero can  be called a
1 Probit and  logit models have been extensively used for charactering  the determ inants 
of as  well as predicting bank failures (see for example Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1999).





‘re s is ta n t’ bank. Therefore, the la ten t variable can be defined as ‘the ability to 
resist the crisis’.
The vector of explanatory variables, x.., represent the perform ance and 
conduct of a  b an k  during the pre-crisis period. If these pre-crisis indicators 
can significantly explain the variation in y *, it can be claimed statistically th a t 
x.j is detrim ental for bank  perform ance during the crisis. In o ther words, the
ability of a  bank  to resist the crisis was subject to its conduct and  perform ance 
during the pre-crisis period. Technically speaking, th is requires relatively small
error term s, ui , in the sense th a t the variation in y* mostly belongs to the 
variation in x ...
W here ui is so large, ß tj would not be significant and  it can be
statistically  claim ed th a t the variation in y t was largely due to variation in ut .
In other words, the crisis random ly hit any bank. Hence, bank  failures 
commonly observed during the crisis were not attribu tab le  to struc tu ra l 
w eaknesses of the  sector.
In order to accom m odate the above idea, the Probit estim ation technique 
is used. In Shazam , the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable, 
P(y=l), is described as:
(5.3) F {y‘ ) = F  A + 2 M
where F(.) rep resen ts the cum ulative norm al density function. The index y* is a 
linear function of x :J, b u t the probabilities are not; therefore, the  coefficient 
m u st be in terpreted  carefully.
The estim ation is done by maximising the value of the log likelihood 
function, which is defined as:
(5.4) L(ß) = Y \ P , Y \ { \ - P , )
_y,.=l _y,=0
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The maximization of equation (5.4) is accomplished by non-linear estim ation 
m ethods. Because it is a  concave function, it has a  unique solution and trial 
and  error procedures can s ta rt from any value.
The estim ated coefficients tell the effect of a  change in the explanatory 
variable on the index, y *, ra ther than  on the dependent variable, y . . The effect 
on the dependent variable can be computed as:
(5 -5) J p = f ( A * i > ,
where f(.) is the norm al density function. It is clear from equation (5.5) th a t the 
effect on the dependent variable is different for each observation.
Alternatively, the elasticity can be used, and is defined as:
(5.6)
dX„ f  * ^
' f  ßo+ZM
V 7=1
Since the elasticity is different for every observation, either elasticity a t m eans 
or weighted aggregate elasticity may be used. The elasticity a t m eans is defined 
as:
(5.7)
dx f  * N
' f  ß , + X ß j Z j
\ 7=1
The weighted aggregate elasticity is com puted as:
(5.8)
A te st of the null hypothesis th a t all ß i are zero can be carried out by using the 
log-likelihood as follows:
(5.9) LR = 2[L(ß)-L(0) \
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where L(0) is defined as:





where N is the num ber of observations and S is the num ber of successes 
observed [yt = 1).
Various R2 can be computed, and the m ost appealing one can be 
selected. The M addala R2 is com puted as:
(5.11) R"  =l-exp{2[L(0)-Z,(/7)]/Af}
The Cragg-Uhler R2 is defined as:
(5.12)
1 -  exp{2[/,(0) -  L(ß)\l N)  
l-exp{2L(0)/JV}
The McFadden R2 is:
(5.13) R 2uf = ! - [ ! ( / ? ) /£(0)]
The Chow R2 is:
(5.14) R2c Z,w,i O'. - y>?S,1,0, - y f
As an alternative to R2, a  prediction success table is used  to m easure the 
overall fit of the model. The table shows the num eric counts of predicted versus 
actual using the following decision rule. An observation i is predicted to be 
y t. = 0 if y* is less th an  zero or F (y *) is less th an  0.5. Otherwise the 
observation is predicted to be y t = 1. The table is constructed  as follows:
ACTUAL
0 1
PREDICTED 0 N il N12
1 N21 N22
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w here N i l  an d  N22 are  th e  n u m b e r of righ t p red ic tions, w h ilst N12 an d  N21 
are  th e  n u m b e r of false pred ictions.
5.3. Variable definition
The d ep en d en t variable is m e asu re d  a s  a  dum m y variable, w hich 
rep re sen ts  w h eth er or no t a  b a n k  w as solvent d u rin g  the  crisis period. A b a n k  
is said  to be solvent if it h ad  capital adequacy  ra tio  (CAR) equal to, or m ore 
th an , zero b ased  on the  re su lts  of due diligent exam ination  conducted  by IBRA 
in M arch 1999. The re s t of the  b a n k s  are  classified  as  insolvent, w hich 
inc ludes b a n k s  th a t  h ad  CAR less th a n  zero, an d  b a n k s  th a t  w ere liquidated, 
closed or ta k en  over by the  au th o rities  before S ep tem ber 1998. Note th a t  the  
CAR for b a n k s  liqu idated  an d  tak en  over is n o t available. It w as clearly s ta ted  
by th e  a u th o ritie s  th a t  b a n k  c losu res were m ain ly  d u e  to insolvency. It is no t 
clear w h eth er they  were inso lvent or no t w hen th e  b a n k s  w ere ta k en  over (BTO). 
However, b a sed  on ou r experim ent, th e  BTO’s are  b e s t su ited  to be inc luded  as 
inso lvent b a n k s .2 Note th a t if th e  CAR for all b a n k s  is know n, an  OLS 
estim ation  can  be ru n , in s tead  of a  Probit m odel.3
A vector of 21 exp lanatory  variab les is considered . V ariable n o ta tio n s  








a sse t grow th, average 1991-1996, (-) 
loan grow th, average 1991-1996, (-)
dum m y s ta tu s  of b an k , foreign exchange b a n k  =1, o th e rw iseO
ow nersh ip  concen tra tion , 1996, (-)
cost of ra is ing  funds, average 1994-96, (-)
equ ity  cap ita l to a sse ts  ratio , average 1994-96, (+)
ra tio  of connected  lend ing  to equ ity  cap ital, average 1994-96, (-)
2 Two separate regressions were run where the BTO’s are included in the insolvent 
group in the first regression and then as solvent banks in the second regression. It 
turns out tha t the first regression is the better predictor, in the sense that all of the 
BTO’s are predicted as insolvent.
3 A number of OLS regressions are run, but they are not satisfactory. The exclusion of 
liquidated and taken over banks reduces the number of observation to 103. Note that 
liquidated banks were the most fragile, thus the exclusion tends to underestimate the 
coefficients.
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DLLL dum m y of LLL, more than  20 per cent = 1, otherwise = 0, (-)
ROA re tu rn  on assets, average 1994-1996, (+)
ROE re tu rn  on equity, average 1994-1996, (+)
BPLAC placem ent with other bank, average 1994-1996, (-)
SECU security holding as percentage of total assets, average 1994-96, (-)
FASS foreign currency denom inated assets as percentage of total assets,
average 1994-96, (+/-)
FLIAB foreign currency denom inated liabilities as percentage of total
assets, average 1994-96, (-)
NOP net open position, FASS-FLIAB, average 1994-96, (+/-)
HI relative size of bank, 1996, (+/-)
LIQU ratio of liquid asse ts  to liquid liabilities, average 1994-96, (+)
RESR1 ratio of reserves to total deposits, average 1994-96, (+)
RESR2 ratio of reserves to total liabilities, average 1994-96, (+)
LDR loan to deposit ratio, average 1994-96, (-)
CRONY dum m y variable, bank  owned by a crony = 1, otherwise 0.
Assets growth (ASEG) and loan growth (CREG) are alternative proxy 
variables for asse t quality. Note tha t several au thors  have suggested th a t 
higher loan growth is a  robust proxy for a  deterioration of asse t quality of banks 
(see for example Sachs et.al. 1996, A thukorala and Warr 1999). B anks may 
not be able to build up  expertise to keep pace with the increasing need of credit 
appraisal. With a  higher loan growth, banks may have to enter a  new 
unfam iliar m arket. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to d istinguish good 
from bad risk  applicants, since it is easier for debtors to find new loans for 
servicing old loans. Therefore, with higher loan growth, non-perform ing loans 
tend to be underestim ated.
The variable STATUS identifies w hether a  given bank  has foreign 
exchange licence. Foreign exchange (forex) banks are likely to be more 
vulnerable to exchange ra te  shocks while non-forex banks are more sensitive to 
a  hike in the dom estic in terest rate. If the  coefficient on the STATUS is 
negative, the currency depreciation th a t occurred during the crisis had  a 
greater im pact on bank  insolvency than  an in terest rate hike.
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Ownership concentration (Cl) is m easured as the percentage of share 
capital owned by the largest owner.4 For instance, if two parties own a bank 
with 60 per cent and 40 per cent shares, then C l is 60 per cent. It is expected 
th a t banks with low C l will have better in ternal control, in the sense th a t 
abusive conduct by an owner may jeopardize the in terest of other owners, and 
therefore they will prevent th is from happening. This is not so, if all owners 
collectively abuse the bank.
Connected lending (LLL) is defined as loans issued  to parties or firms 
th a t are related to owners or m anagem ent of a  b an k  relative to equity capital.5 
As an alternative, a dum m y variable called DLLL can be used. For connected 
lending th a t exceeds the legal lending limit (LLL>20 per cent), DLLL is equal to 
one, otherwise it is zero. If the sign of the coefficient on LLL or DLLL is 
negative, it m ay be concluded th a t the quality of loans issued  to connected 
parties is inferior to th a t of other loans.
The cost of raising funds (TRF) is m easured as total in terest paym ents 
divided by total liabilities. There are two possible explanations why a bank has 
a  higher TRF. First, depositors and  lenders m ay perceive th a t the bank is 
riskier th a n  other banks, and  dem and a higher risk  prem ium . This ban k  may 
then  charge higher in terest ra tes to borrowers, so th a t it can pay a higher 
in terest ra tes to its depositors and  lenders. As argued by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), higher in terest ra tes  may resu lt in a  larger problem  of moral hazard. 
Second, the ban k  faces serious financial problems, so th a t it has to acquire 
extra  cash. For instance, non-perform ing loans m ay resu lt in an  interruption of 
cash  flow, m aking it difficult for the bank to service the w ithdrawal of deposits. 
In order to a ttrac t more deposits, and prevent withdrawal, the  bank  may decide 
to offer a higher in terest rate. In either case, a  higher TRF may reflect th a t 
depositors and  lenders face a  higher risk. Therefore, the sign on TRF is 
expected to be negative.
4 Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) find tha t there is strong relationship between 
ownership struc tu re  and bank risk  taking in the US.
5 Latin American experiences indicate th a t connected lending w as one of the key 
elem ents contributing to banking fragility (Diaz-Alejandro 1985)
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R eturn  on assets (ROA) is m easured as pre-tax ne t profit divided by total 
assets. Meanwhile, re turn  on equity (ROE) is defined as profit divided by equity 
capital. ROA and ROE are im portant in two respects. First, they provide a gross 
p icture of the overall performance of a bank  during the pre-crisis period. Some 
of the profit may be retained, and therefore provide a  cushion against an 
adverse shock. Second, a higher ROA may represen t be tter a sse ts  quality in 
the sense th a t the proportion of performing asse ts  m ay be higher or give a 
higher re tu rn . However, it could also m ean th a t the b an k  took riskier projects 
th a t give ex tra  profits before the crisis. Thus, the sign for the coefficient on ROA 
or ROE can be either positive or negative.
Placem ent on other bank  (BPLAC) is m easured  as total funds placed in 
o ther b anks as a  proportion of total assets.6 This m ay be an  approxim ation 
for contagious bank failure. Banks with higher BPLAC should  be more 
vulnerable to the failure of o ther banks. Although, it is not clear which bank 
the funds were allocated to, our intuitive guess is th a t m ost of the funds were 
allocated to problematic banks, or at least to banks with a  liquidity shortage. 
Since February  1998, such placem ent is fully guaran teed  by the  authorities. 
However, it was later revealed th a t it was difficult to w ithdraw  su ch  placem ents 
from b an k s th a t were liquidated or taken over by the governm ent.7 Therefore, 
such  placem ent still incurs a  risk for the creditors.
Security holding (SECU) is defined as total security  held by a  bank  as a 
percentage of total assets.8 It contains both safe and  risky asse ts . Safe assets 
include central bank certificates (SBI) and bonds issued  or guaranteed  by 
foreign governments. Risky assets include common stocks, m oney m arket 
securities (SBPU), and bonds issued  by firms, either dom estic or foreign. If the 
sign on SECU is negative, the value and quality of the  asse ts  m ay have declined 
during the crisis. In other words, the crash in the stock m arket and  the 
deflation in firm s’ assets adversely affected banks.
6 See Davis (1995, C hapter 5) for extensive theoretical d iscussion  on system ic risks.
7 A fam ous case is “ Baligate” where Bank Bali used politically connected parties to 
claim the fund from IBRA.
8 For the case of Japan , the fall in a sse t prices led to bank  failures (see for example 
Kanaya and  Woo 2000)
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Foreign exchange risk  in bank portfolios can be cap tured  in term s of 
three variables, nam ely foreign exchange asse ts  (FASS), foreign exchange 
liabilities (FLIAB) and the net open position (NOP).9 Theoretically, NOP is more 
appropriate to m easure the risk  since it m easures currency m ism atch. As 
alternatives to NOP, FLIAB or FASS can be used. The idea for using  FLIAB or 
FASS is tha t, given the big depreciation in the rup iah  during the crisis, the 
quality of b an k s’ asse ts  denom inated in foreign exchange may have 
deteriorated. In other words, even if banks were able to pass exchange rate 
risks to debtors, they still faced the risks indirectly due to the increase in non­
perform ing loans.
There are four widely u sed  indicators of liquidity m ism atch of banks, 
nam ely the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities (LIQU), reserves to deposits 
ratio (RESR1), reserves to total liabilities ratio (RESR2), and  loan to deposits 
ratio (LDR). In the absence of strong theoretical reasoning to prefer one over 
the o thers, s tatistical significance will be used to select the ‘b e s t’ indicator.
The CRONY variable is intended to capture w hether or not banks owned 
by cronies tended to be more vulnerable than  other banks. A “crony bank” is 
defined as a  b an k  owned by: (1) a  family m em ber of the  former President 
Soeharto, or (2) parties (either persons or companies) th a t were directly involved 
in business with family m em bers. Family m em bers include Soeharto himself, 
h is sons and  daughters, his wife, his grand children, h is bro thers and  sisters, 
his stepbrother and  sisters, his b ro th e rs /s is te rs  in law, and  his sons /d au g h te rs  
in law. Parties with direct business ties to family m em bers include persons and 
com panies such  as M uham m ad H asan (Kalimanis group), Eka Tjipta Widjaja 
(Sinar Mas Group), Prayogo Pangestu (Barito Pacific group), Salim group, Lippo 
group, Peter F G ontha, and S ubentra  group.
9 Goldstein (1998) argues that currency mismatch was an important factor 
characterising the East Asian financial crisis.
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5.4. Data sources
At the onset of the crisis, there were 160 private banks in Indonesia, 140 of 
these are covered in th is study. In 1996, the total asse ts  of these sample banks 
accounted for 98 per cent of the total assets of all private banks. There are 58 
banks in the sample th a t rem ain solvent, while the rest have been analysed as 
insolvent, closed or taken  over by the government.
The construction of the dependent variable is based on “due-diligent” 
resu lts  published by B ank Indonesia (BI) in March 1999. Banks th a t were 
taken  over or liquidated prior to September 1998 are treated as insolvent 
banks.
All explanatory variables are constructed from financial reports relating 
to individual banks, collected from a num ber of sources, including BI 
publications, Infobank database, and Bisnis Indonesia, the country’s leading 
daily b u siness new spaper. These data  reflect the financial posture and 
perform ance of individual banks during the period between 1991-1996.
Note th a t the empirical analysis covers private banks only. Foreign and 
jo in t venture banks are not included in the estim ation, because they are not 
subject to due diligence and  therefore there is no information regarding their 
solvency. Regional developm ent banks are also excluded from the estim ation, 
partly due to the lack of consistent financial data. It was difficult to obtain 
their financial reports for periods before 1995. The state banks were not 
included in the estim ation due to their poor perform ance both before and 
during the crisis period. Note th a t all of them  become insolvent during the 
crisis, indicating th a t they were the m ost vulnerable. The inclusion of these 
banks in the estim ation tended to ham per statistical properties of the model, 
presum ably  because they had  distinctive financial struc tu res com pared to 
private banks. Unfortunately, because there were only seven state banks, it is 
im possible to do a separate  estim ation. However, the fact th a t they all failed is 
a  proof th a t they were the m ost vulnerable, thereby negating the need to give 
fu rther statistical evidence.
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5.5. Model selection and statistical properties
This section presents the final results, mainly chosen based on the num ber of 
right prediction, R2, and t-ratio on each coefficient. The model selection 
procedure followed in arriving at these results is described as follows.
Step 1
There was a need to select or exclude red u n d an t explanatory variables. 
There are five cases for this: between ASEG and CREG, between LLL and DLLL, 
between ROA and ROE, between NOP, FASS and  FLIAB, and between LIQU, 
LDR, RESR1 and RESR2.
For the first case, between ASEG and CREG, CREG was finally selected, 
since it gives better predictive power to the model. In term  of significance level, 
both are significant a t 5 per cent level. Both variables are highly correlated 
with a  coefficient of correlation equal to 0.86.
For the second case, DLLL was selected instead  of LLL. DLLL gives a 
m uch higher rate  of right predictions and is significant a t 1 per cent level. On 
the o ther hand, LLL is only significant a t 20 per cent level. The problem with 
LLL is th a t the d a ta  range is too wide, between 0 per cent and  1,654 per cent. 
Thus, it is difficult to get a  robust estimate.
For the th ird  case, ROA is chosen. Although both ROA and ROE are 
only significant a t 20 per cent level, ROA was chosen because it improves the 
prediction perform ance of the model.
For the fourth case, FLIAB was chosen because it is superior in term s of 
prediction and t-ratio. NOP is not significant even a t 20 per cent level, so it was 
dropped out. Note th a t the net open position is one of the p rudential m easures 
preventing banks from taking excessive risks on foreign exchange positions, 
and  th u s  the variations across foreign exchange banks are relatively small. 
Because of that, it is not surprising tha t the coefficient attached  to NOP is not 
significant. FASS is highly correlated with FLIAB, where the coefficient of
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correlation is 0.968. Because of that, there is little difference in using  either of 
them . FLIAB is only marginally superior to FASS in term s of t-ratio and 
im provem ent in prediction. The former is also more appealing because it 
m easures the obligation to repay foreign exchange denom inated liabilities. 
Since alm ost all of the banks do not posses a currency m ism atch, it is the 
burden  of repaying the liabilities tha t can p u sh  the banks un d er in the case of 
increasing loan defaults due to a currency m ism atch on the p a rt of the b an k s’ 
borrowers.
For the fifth case, LIQU was used on the basis of a  better t-ratio. LIQU is 
significant a t 10 per cent level, while RESR1, RESR2, and LDR are only 
significant a t 20 per cent level.
Therefore, 8 variables were dropped from the model, namely, ASEG, LLL, 
ROE, NOP, FASS, LDR, RESR1 and RESR2. The model was then  estim ated and 
fu rther refined using the rem aining variables.
Step 2
There are now only 13 explanatory variables in the model. One of them , 
HI, was dropped because it is correlated with FLIAB. The exclusion of this 
variable increases the significance level of the other variables. FLIAB becomes 
insignificant when HI is included in the equation, which indicates a  colinearity 
problem. The coefficient correlation between FLIAB and  HI is 0.64. The value of 
LR-test for variable exclusion is 1.58, indicating th a t HI is insignificant and can 
be excluded from the model.
On the other hand , STATUS, C l, TRF, ROA and  SECU were not excluded 
from the model, even though they are not significant a t 10 per cent level. They 
were included because they improve the predictive power of the model. 
Therefore, there are now 12 explanatory variables in the final estim ation.
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Final Estimates
The fin a l resu lts  are p resented in  Table 5.1. In  o rder to fa c ilita te  in te rp re ta tio n  
o f the resu lts , the  average value o f each independen t va riab le  is presented in  
Table 5.2.
Table 5 .1 . D eterm inants o f  B ank ing  V u lne rab ility
V ariab le C oeffic ien t t-ra tio  # W eighted
E la s tic ity
CREG -1 .3096 -2 .5014  ** -0 .26621
STATUS -0 .3754 -0 .9288 -0 .08378
C l -0 .0096 -1.3671 -0 .26914
TRF -10 .1490 -1 .5728 -0 .64408
ECAR 6.4901 2 .1395 ** 0 .43936
DLLL -1 .3446 -4 .1492  * -0 .31559
ROA 19.9250 1.3467 0 .12336
SECU -3 .7014 -1 .2350 -0 .09119
BPLAC -1 .9205 -1 .6497  *** -0 .18220
LIQU 0.3703 1.8417 *** 0 .10581
FLIAB -5 .5043 -1 .9600  ** -0 .10950
CRONY -1.3461 -1 .9773  ** -0 .03976
CONSTANT 2.6734 2.0150 1.29360
LR -test * = 88 .6368  (x2, w ith  12 DF)
M adda la  R2 = 0 .4691
C ragg-U hler R2 = 0 .6317
M cFadden R2 = 0 .4664
Chow R2 = 0 .5180
P red ic tion  success tab le





# The level o f s ta tis tic a l s ig n ifica n t (two sided) o f the  regression coeffic ien t is 
denoted as: * 1 percen t, ** 5 percent, and  *** 10 percen t
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Table 5.2. Average value of explanatory variables for each group of banks
(%, unless otherwise indicated)




ASSETS (Rp billion) 2,295 394
LOANS (Rp billion) 1,613 258
ECAR 8.09 12.68
LLL 104.03 22.67












CRONY (num ber of bank) 20 2
Number of observations 82 58
The estim ated equation is statistically significant a t one per cent level in 
term s of the likelihood ratio (LR) test. Moreover, the num ber of right 
predictions is 120 out of 140 observations. In other words, the model 
incorrectly predicts only 20 observations. Four alternative R2 are presented in 
the table; they range between 0.46 and 0.63, which is quite high for a  cross- 
section regression of this nature. In sum , the resu lts  suggest a  strong
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relationship  between ban k s’ performance during the  crisis and  their 
perform ance and conduct prior to the crisis.
In term s of the standard  t-test, DLLL is significant a t 1 per cent level and 
CREG, ECAR, CRONY, and FLIAB are significant at 5 per cent level. BPLAC 
and  LIQU are significant at 10 per cent level. Less convincingly, perhaps, ROA, 
C l and  TRF are only significant at 20 per cent level.
5.6. Discussion
The coefficient of loan growth (CREG) has a  negative sign, indicating tha t 
banks with relatively higher loan growth possibly had  relatively weaker loan 
portfolios. As discussed, banks with high loan growth m ay no t have been able 
to build up  personnel competence for assessing loans and  appraising projects. 
Moreover, competitive pressures, following the deregulation in 1988, m ay have 
lowered b a n k s ’ profitability (Kenward, 1997). Faced with th is squeeze, banks 
m ight have had  to lower their costs and provision for bad  loans. At the same 
time, they m ight have had  to enter new areas they w'ere not familiar with, 
im posing higher loan risks.
From Table 5.2, it is clear tha t the credit growth of insolvent banks 
(50.99 per cent) was higher than  th a t of solvent bank (37.17 per cent). This is 
consisten t with the asse ts  growth of the two groups. Moreover, on average the 
size of insolvent banks is larger than  tha t of solvent banks. Average total assets 
for solvent and  insolvent banks are Rp 394 billion and  Rp 2,295 billion, 
respectively. In a  more competitive and less protected environm ent, larger 
banks expand more rapidly by opening new branches, a ttrac ting  new deposits, 
and  granting loans -often to themselves.
The coefficient on ROA is only significant at the 20 per cent significance 
level. There are two possible explanations as to why ROA fails to achieve 
statistical significance. First, this poor resu lt reflects the  problem  associated 
with the line of credit schem es, where loans were often buried  by fu rther rising 
loan ceilings. In such  a case, banks realise interest income from supposedly
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non-perform ing loans. However, when the crisis h it the banks, it was difficult 
for them  to extend the loans and loan losses had  to be realised. Second, high 
profitability can indicate either th a t a  bank  is sound or was taking large risks 
th a t were profitable in the pre-crisis period, b u t incurred large losses once the 
crisis hit. Therefore, it is not surprising  th a t ROA h as a  low t-ratio.
Solvent banks tend to have m uch higher equity capital (ECAR) than  
insolvent banks. The sign of the coefficient on ECAR is positive and the 
coefficient is significant a t 5 per cent level. This m eans th a t banks with a 
higher ratio  of equity capital to total a sse ts  were in a  better position to 
accom m odate deterioration in asse t quality during the crisis. Moreover, higher 
capital can prevent bank  owners from engaging in risky activities (see Fane 
1998, am ong others). As a  higher proportion of asse t portfolios is financed with 
equity capital, banks will be more cautious in selecting asse ts  mix. In essence, 
there is strong evidence th a t capital adequacy is one of the key determ inants of 
bank  soundness during the crisis.
The coefficient on the cost of raising funds (TRF) is negative, which 
suggests th a t banks with higher TRF were more vulnerable. However, the 
coefficient is only significant a t th e  20 per cent level, suggesting th a t there 
seem s to be no strong statistical ground for supporting the above view. There 
are several factors th a t m ay lead to th is insignificant coefficient.
First, weak banks may no t w ant to signal their financial risks through 
in terest ra tes  as it could trigger a  deposit run . Instead, they often offer lottery 
schem es as an  alternative to in terest ra tes (Pangestu 1996). Second, larger 
banks m ay have higher credibility for attracting  deposits due to their close link 
with the  centre of power and m ajor business conglom erates. As discussed, 
insolvent b an k s had  larger total asse ts. M arshall (1994) found th a t m ost of the 
larger private banks offered lower in te rest ra tes. Third, increasing deposit ra tes 
may a ttrac t retaliation from other banks. Note th a t in terest paym ents account 
for abou t 91 percent of the total cost of banks, on average, and  th u s  a  further 
increase would create fu rther problem s.
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Because risks are not reflected in the in terest rates, or not correctly 
priced, depositors and lenders suffer information asym m etry in tha t they 
cannot distinguish  weak from sound b an k s.10 Under such circum stances, the 
banking system  is prone to idiosyncratic runs. As d iscussed in section 3.6, 
unverified rum ours triggered ru n s  even on sound banks in several occasions.
The coefficient a ttached  to the liquidity ratio (LIQU) is significant at the 
10 per cent level, and  has the expected (positive) sign. Liquidity is im portant for 
preventing bank  failure for two reasons. First, a  large currency depreciation 
m ay resu lt in an  increase in non-performing loans which, in tu rn , may 
in te rrup t b a n k s’ cash  flow. Second, m ost of the private banks had been 
experiencing deposit ru n s  since December 1997. Because of these two factors, 
a  higher proportion of liquid assets may have provided a  cushion against 
liquidity shortage. Note th a t in the case of liquidity shortage, banks may seek 
liquidity from the in ter-bank  m arket or from the central bank. However, the 
in ter-bank  rate is usually  higher than  deposit rates, especially during a 
m onetary squeeze. For example, the in ter-bank rate  soared to 200 per cent in 
August 1997, following a  sharp  contraction in the money base. As a 
com parison, deposit ra tes were only in the range of 25 per cent to 40 per cent 
during th a t time. Moreover, the in terest ra te  charged for liquidity assistance 
from the central bank  is a t a  penalty rate and  th u s , utilising such liquidity 
facility would worsen the financial position of the bank. This is the reason why 
banks with higher liquidity tended to perform better during the crisis.
Note tha t, on average, the liquidity position of solvent banks is twice th a t 
of the insolvents. In other words, the former were m uch more able to avoid the 
cost resu lting  from the lack of liquidity. Moreover, banks with a  better liquidity 
position could benefit from the  hike in the in ter-bank rate.
As an  alternative to LIQU, the two reserve ratios, RESR1 and RESR2 
could be u sed  to analyse the  liquidity position of a  bank. However, RESR1 and 
RESR2 for solvent and  insolvent banks are very close. This may be the resu lt of
10 M arshall (1994), however, finds th a t risks may be reflected in the deposit rates. 
Interestingly, she does not take into account the fact th a t m ost large banks may have 
low quality loan portfolios, owing to loans granted to affiliates with low in terest rate.
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the reserve requirem ent imposed by the authorities, where the reserve ratio has 
to be a t least 5 per cent. Indeed, the value of RESR2 for both groups is close to 
the required reserve.
The coefficient on placem ents with o ther banks (BPLAC) is significant at 
the 10 per cent level with a negative sign. This implies th a t banks with higher 
BPLAC were more vulnerable to contagious bank  failure. In other words, banks 
were exposed to a  systemic crisis in the sense th a t the failure of one bank can 
induce the failure of others through the in ter-bank m arket. This is quite 
surprising, because such  placem ents have been fully guaranteed by the 
authorities since February 1997. Perhaps one explanation is th a t the 
Indonesian Banking R estructuring Agency (IBRA) faces difficulties in honouring 
in ter-bank claims partly due to the slow progress in disposing IBRA’s assets.
The coefficient attached to foreign exchange liabilities (FLIAB) is 
significant at the 5 per cent level with negative sign. In addition, the net open 
position (NOP) was not significant and, hence, was dropped from the equation. 
This suggests it was not currency m ism atches th a t led to insolvency, b u t 
deterioration in the quality of loans denom inated in foreign exchange, and the 
b u rden  in  foreign exchange liabilities. More specifically, b an k s were able to 
avoid direct exchange risk  by passing this risk  on to borrowers. Nevertheless, 
because the borrowers faced currency m ism atch, the banks still faced such risk 
indirectly. As will be discussed in C hapter 9, there is strong evidence th a t 
dom estic oriented activities such  as property and inland tran sp o rt sectors were 
exposed to currency risk.
The above inference is supported by the fact th a t the value of NOP for 
both  groups of banks is very close, and insolvent banks tend  to have m uch 
higher FASS and FLIAB. This suggests th a t currency depreciation affects 
banks through deterioration in the quality of loans denom inated in foreign
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currency. Given this problem, banks are a t risk  of paying liabilities 
denom inated in foreign exchange. In other words, foreign exchange liabilities 
represent the b an k ’s vulnerability to currency depreciation.
The variable STATUS, which indicates w hether a  ban k  has a foreign 
exchange licence or not, is statistically insignificant. This suggests it is not the 
s ta tu s  of the bank, b u t the extent of its foreign exchange liabilities th a t m akes 
it vulnerable to currency shock.
The dum m y of connected lending (DLLL) is the strongest explanatory 
variable, in the sense th a t it has the highest t-ratio. The coefficient carries a  
negative sign, supporting the hypothesis th a t m ost of the loans allocated to 
firms a n d /o r persons connected to bank  m anagem ent and  owners were low 
quality or risky. There are reasons for this to be the  case. First, dubious and 
risky projects m ight not pass the loan screening process if they were proposed 
to other banks. Second, connected lending resu lted  in relatively concentrated 
loan portfolios, m aking banks highly vulnerable to the  economic dow nturn. For 
instance, p ruden t banks would avoid high exposure to the property sector, 
although this sector was very lucrative during the boom period. Because of 
th a t, firms would have to go to their own b an k  to  finance such  investm ent. 
Third, banks were vulnerable to contagion resu lting  from the poor perform ance 
of firms within the group, because connected lending m ight not have been 
assessed  carefully. Fourth, the risks were often not properly priced. It is well 
known th a t banks gave concessionary loans to the ir own group (Agung 1997).
The robust resu lt for DLLL is not su rprising  given th a t m ost of the 
insolvent banks violated the legal lending limit. About 65 out of the 82 
insolvent banks violated the limit. In contrast, only 13 ou t of the 58 solvent 
banks violated the limit. Moreover, the degree of connected lending am ongst 
the solvent banks was m uch smaller, a t only 22.6 per cent of total equity. On 
the other hand, for the insolvent banks, such  lending was higher th an  total 
equity (104 per cent).
The coefficient on the variable C l is significant a t 20 per cent with a 
negative sign. Thus, there is weak statistical support for the hypothesis th a t
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banks with a  higher ownership concentration tend to have poorer performance. 
It was expected th a t a bank  m ajority shareholder tends to be less prudent, in 
the sense th a t the owner can direct the bank  to finance riskier activities. On 
the other hand when ownership is more diversified, other owners may prevent 
one of them  from risking the bank.
The dum m y variable CRONY is significant a t 5 per cent level with the 
expected (negative) sign. Banks owned by cronies tended to perform poorer 
during the crisis. The reasons are, first, the authorities m ight have difficulty in 
disciplining crony banks, due to strong political intervention. Even if they 
violated serious prudential regulations, the authorities were not able to penalise 
or close these banks. For instance, Bank Pacific, owned by the Sutowo family, 
was insolvent before the crisis b u t the authorities kept it alive until November 
1997. Second, and  more im portantly, these banks m ay have relied on implicit 
guarantees leading to excessive risk  taking in the lead up to the crisis.
Amongst 22 crony banks, only two are solvent, nam ely Bank M uam m alat 
and Bank Umum Tugu. One has been fully recapitalised by its owners, namely 
Bank Windu Kencana. Four banks have been taken over by the government, 
nam ely BCA, RSI bank , BUN, and  B ank  D uta. Another four were included in 
the recapitalisation program , nam ely Lippo Bank, BII, Bukopin, Bank Niaga, 
and  Bank Universal. The rest, m ostly sm all banks, have been liquidated.
The coefficient a ttached  to the security holding (SECU) variable h as the 
expected (negative) sign, b u t fails to achieve statistical significance even at the 
20 per cent level. Thus, the resu lt is a t best inconclusive with regards to the 
im pact of a  fall in asse t prices on bank  perform ance. Securities held by banks 
consist of both safe and risky securities. The in terest ra tes on SBIs -part of 
safe assets- increased during  the crisis and may have partly offset the fall in 
price of risky assets, such  as common stocks and private bonds. Thus, it is not 
surprising th a t SECU fails to achieve statistical significance.
The weighted elasticity will be used  for com paring the relative im portance 
across explanatory variables. In order to preserve conservatism , only variables 
th a t achieve two-sided 10 percent or one-sided 5 percent statistical significance
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level are considered. Moreover, because DLLL and CRONY are dummy- 
variables, they are not comparable to o ther variables. By comparing the 
weighted elasticities, the relative im portance of the variables can be ordered as 
follows: ECAR, CREG, BPLAC, FLIAB, and LIQU.
Amongst prudential m easures, capital adequacy (ECAR) is the most 
im portant b u t is also, perhaps, the m ost frequently violated. In August 1997, 
there were 50 banks th a t could not m eet 5 per cent capital adequacy ratio 
(Djiwandono 2000). Moreover, as of Ju n e  1997, six banks rem ained technically 
insolvent and the authorities seemed unable to find sufficient reason to close 
these banks.
Loan growth is the second m ost im portan t variable, suggesting a close 
association between high loan growth and  poorer loan quality. Though the 
authorities had  p u t an 18 percent limit on loan growth, m ost banks violated 
th is limit. From 1995 to Ju n e  1997, loan growths of private banks was about 
32 percent per annum . Even worse, the loans of 42 banks grew by more than  
50 percent per annum , 11 of which grew by more th an  100 percent.
Placem ent with o ther banks is the th ird  im portan t determ inant, which 
suggests th a t the guarantee given to th ird  party  liabilities is not effective for 
preventing systemic risks. As m entioned, IBRA is particularly  responsible for 
the very slow progress in honouring in ter-bank claims. The slow release of 
such  claims m ight have d isrupted the cash  flow of creditor banks.
Notably, the fourth im portant source of vulnerability is the level of 
foreign exchange liabilities. This is no t surprising  since the currency 
depreciated by about two th irds of its value between Ju ly  1997 and  Ju ly  1999. 
The depreciation contributed to the burden  of non-perform ing loans, especially 
those held by firms with currency m ism atch. This implies th a t the net open 
position regulation is not effective in protecting b anks from currency risks, 
un less foreign exchange liabilities are directed for financing export oriented 
activities.
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The fifth factor is the liquidity ratio. The b a n k s ’ cash  flow m ight be 
in terrupted  due to increasing bad loans and, m ost im portantly, panic ru n s  on 
deposits. Therefore, liquidation of current assets could prevent the banks from 
collapsing. However, th is does not suggest th a t banks should always m aintain 
large excess reserves.11 Rather, the balance between liquid asse ts  and liabilities 
should be m aintained more cautiously.
5.7. Conclusion and policy implications
This chapter h as exam ined the underlying problem s th a t m ade Indonesia’s 
banking sector vulnerable to the financial crisis, we conclude th a t the banking 
sector was indeed vulnerable. Some problems were associated with difficulties 
in the enforcem ent of prudential regulation. O thers were as consequences of 
domestic financial liberalization. In addition, cronyism was a  big problem.
Stricter prudential m easures are obviously required to prevent excessive 
risk taking, especially during a boom period following a  m ajor banking 
deregulation. The increase in competition may lead to a  su b stan tia l squeeze in 
profitability and, hence, a  b an k ’s ability to cover losses. A higher capital 
requirem ent may prevent banks from expanding loans excessively, which can 
drive the banks to risky activities. However, as argued by McLeod (1999), the 
problem s were not due to the lack of tight regulations, b u t more due to the lack 
of willingness to adhere to them.
In sum , the findings suggest th a t forbearance of pruden tia l regulation 
can incur high social costs. Thus, prom pt corrective actions are required for 
preventing a similar crisis in future.
11 McLeod (1999) finds that banks always maintain excess reserves, suggesting that the 
violation of reserve requirements is not the issue.
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C hapter 6
A Mundell-Fleming Version of Bernanke-Blinder Model
6.1. Introduction
This chapter presen ts a macroeconomic model w ithin which the 
in terrelationship between the banking sector and  the rest of the economy can 
be analysed. The model is an extension of the B ernanke-B linder model (BBM) 
where banks are explicitly incorporated.1 The adoption of the BBM was 
motivated by the need to incorporate the banking sector explicitly in a 
m acroeconomic model, in order to have a better framework for the role of banks 
in a  financial crisis. It truly reflects the credit view th a t the inclusion of banks 
as financial interm ediaries opens up  additional channels through which 
d istu rbances in financial m arkets affect commodity m arkets and  vice versa. 
Thus, the model provides the transm ission m echanism s of a  shock in a  certain 
macroeconom ic variable, by which the role of the  bank ing  sector in  the origin 
and  propagation of the crisis can be analysed system atically. In o ther words, 
th is chap ter presents a  theoretical foundation for the empirical analyses th a t 
will be carried out in C hapters 8 to 10.
There are two reasons to use  a  bank centred macroeconom ic model in 
favour of the traditional IS-LM framework. First, b anks are the m ain financial 
interm ediaries in developing countries. Therefore, replacing the bank  credit 
m arket with a  bond m arket in a  macroeconomic model seem s unrealistic. It is 
widely accepted th a t bank  loans are not a  perfect su b stitu te  for bonds. Thus, 
the inclusion of banks in the model will suggest different im plications regarding 
the way in which financial and commodity m arkets in teract. Second, there is
1 The BBM was typically a closed economy macroeconomic model. The open economy version of 
the model was first introduced by Spiegel (1995). However, Spiegel failed to make the 
distinction between the concept of ‘stock’ and “flow’ of foreign debts and therefore the model was 
misspecified.
virtual consensus th a t w eaknesses in the banking sector have contributed 
significantly to financial crises in East Asia as well as in other regions.2 Under 
a  fragile banking system, it would be difficult to stave off currency speculation 
by raising in terest rate  (Rajan and Sugem a 2000 and  2001). A large increase in 
in terest ra te  can worsen the already defunct banks through the increase in 
credit risk  and moral hazard  problem s (Mishkin 1996 and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995). Note th a t this aspect tends to be ignored in the conventional IS-LM 
approach. Third, the soundness or fragility of the banking sector should also 
be taken  into account for analysing the propagation of the crisis. There is 
ample evidence th a t banking sector problem s tend to worsen the economic 
situation  in the wake of the currency crisis. The IS-LM framework ignores these 
three considerations and th u s  is likely to yield m isleading inferences (Mankiw 
2000 ) .
The rest of th is chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the 
basic set-up of the model, and  the rest of the chap ter deals with the model’s 
implications. Section 6.3 d iscusses the implication of financial liberalisation on 
capital flows and in terest rates. Section 6.4 determ ines possible triggers of the 
crisis, and  how to model them  in the context of the cu rren t model. Section 6.5 
raises the issues of policy dilem m a brought about by a weak banking sector a t 
the onset of the crisis. Section 6.6 provides the ‘credit transm ission’ of the 
propagation of the crisis.
6.2. Basic set-up of the model
The model draws on B em anke and  Blinder (1988) and  Spiegel (1995) which 
explicitly incorporates the banking sector into the s tan d ard  Keynesian IS-LM 
framework. By relaxing the assum ption th a t bonds and  loans are perfect 
su bstitu tes , B em anke-B linder model (BBM) replaces the u su a l IS curve with 
the CC curve, which denotes a  sim ultaneous m arket clearing condition for 
commodities and credit m arkets. Moreover the LM (Liquidity-Money) curve is
2 See for example Goldstein (1998), am ong others.
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modified so th a t money dem and is determ ined by deposits. The set up  for the 
BP (Balance of Payments) curve is the same as in the M undell-Fleming model.
The model is characterised by five types of agents: households, firms, 
banks, the  government and foreigners. There are three dom estic financial 
asse ts , namely: currency (cash or reserves) (R), bank deposit (D), and  bond (B). 
Agents can  hold three financial assets, nam ely currency, bank  deposits, and 
bonds. D em and for those assets depends on in terest ra tes and  income. 
D em and for currency is positively dependent on income, b u t negatively 
dependent on in terest ra tes on bank deposits and bonds. Dem and for bank 
deposits is positively affected by interest ra tes on deposits, while the interest 
ra te  on bonds has a  negative impact. The im pact of in terest ra tes on household 
dem and for bonds is the reverse of tha t on the dem and for bank  deposits.
B ank deposits and bonds are assum ed to be imperfect substitu tes  from 
the househo lds’ point of view. Imperfect substitu tion  can arise because of 
inform ation asymm etry, as widely d iscussed in the credit m arket literature. 
H ouseholds, having incomplete information about firms, face adverse selection 
problem s, and  hence spread their financial asse t holdings between bonds and 
b an k  deposits, ra ther th a n  solely relying on th e  former.
Firm s are assum ed to produce uniform  ou tpu t and sell ou tpu t in a  
perfectly competitive m arket. Physical capital is financed by issuing bonds and 
obtain ing loans. Firm s’ dem and for bank loans is positively affected by the 
in te rest ra te  on bonds, and negatively by the in terest ra te  on loans. Meanwhile, 
the supply  of bonds is inversely related to the in terest on bonds and  positively 
related  to the in terest ra te  on loans.
An individual bank  h as three types of liabilities: deposits, borrowings 
from the  central bank, borrowings from foreign banks, and borrowings from 
o ther dom estic banks through a domestic in ter-bank  m arket. Borrowing from 
the  central bank  and from the inter-bank m arket occurs if the bank  lacks 
liquidity. B anks have an  inherent liquidity m ism atch, because they lend in the 
longer term  while acquiring th ird  party funds in the relatively short term. 
Borrowing from the central bank is possible, since it functions as a  lender of
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the last resort. Though they m atter for an  individual bank, in ter-bank 
borrowings sum  to zero in aggregate and, hence, do not affect the quantity  of 
th ird party  funds held in the whole banking system. However, they do have an 
im pact on the cost and income structure of individual banks, affecting lending 
and deposit ra tes of interest. On the assets side, banks have loans, bonds, and 
reserves. Loan supply and dem and for bonds depend on the in terest rates for 
both loans and  bonds.
Governm ent com prises two distinct entities, nam ely a fiscal authority  
(central government) and a m onetary authority (central bank). For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assum ed th a t the central government always keeps the budget 
strictly in balance; i.e. tax revenue is always equal to governm ent spending. 
This m eans th a t a  change in the budget has no im pact on m onetary aggregates. 
This assum ption  is necessary in order to focus on the interaction between the 
central bank  and  the rest of the economy. The central bank  acts as a  lender of 
the last resort for banks and holds two assets, nam ely foreign reserves and 
liquidity credits to banks. On the liability side, it has currency issued  to banks 
and households.
The economy is connected with the rest of the world th rough  the balance 
of paym ents, which has three components: capital account, cu rren t account, 
and  the change in foreign reserves. The curren t account h as  two com ponents: 
the trade balance, which is determ ined by income and  the real exchange rate, 
and  in terest paym ents on foreign borrowing .3 The capital account balance is 
determ ined by the foreign-domestic in terest ra te  differentials, expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate, and risk premium.
Since the  m ain purpose of this study is to analyse the Indonesian twin 
crises, it is necessary  to adopt the “credit view” as the basis for the analytical 
fram ew ork . 4 The original BBM is modified in four aspects.
3Trade balance here is defined to cover both balances in goods and services in the BOP 
accounting. Net transfers are assumed to be zero.
4 The credit view here is defined as a modeling approach that consider bank lending transmission 
mechanisms that affect economic performance.
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First, the balance of paym ents is modelled in term s of two behavioural 
equations, trade balance and capital inflow equations and one identity, th a t is, 
the balance of paym ents identity. In Spiegel's (1995) formulation, the 
distinction between net capital inflow and cum ulative foreign capital stock is 
not made. Consequently, his model is mis-specified. In the cu rren t model, net 
capital inflow (capital account balance) is a  function of in terest rate  differentials 
corrected for expected depreciation and risk prem ium . This ne t inflow is then 
added to the last period stock of foreign capital to form the cu rren t foreign 
capital stock, which also m easures the country's foreign indebtedness. With 
these modifications, our model is an open economy version of BBM.
Second, the money dem and is determ ined by two forces: the need of 
households to hold cash and  the size of bank liabilities, as banks are required 
to hold reserves as a  fraction of third party liabilities. Domestic deposits and 
foreign debt determ ine the size of bank reserves. Therefore, money dem and is 
driven by both domestic and  foreign in terest rates, and  reserve requirem ents.
Third, a bank  bail out function is introduced in order to capture 
m onetary consequences of worsening banking condition. Borrowing from the 
central ban k  is one of the determ inants of money supply (Mishkin 2000). This 
is indeed one of the m ain contributions to the modelling of the macroeconomics 
of banking.
Fourth, the feedback effects from the supply side of the economy are 
channelled through the change in equilibrium in commodity and  credit m arket. 
This is done because the curren t model is dem and-sided, a  typical 
characteristic of the Keynesian approach. However, it will be clear later th a t a  
supply side shock can be easily captured by the model within the curren t set 




Domestic absorption (At) consists of consum ption (Ct) and  investm ent (It). 
C onsum ption is defined as a function of income (Yt ), the real exchange rate (et ) 
m easured as the nom inal exchange rate  tim es foreign price divided by domestic 
price, and in terest ra tes on deposit (rtD ) and bond [rtB ):
(6.1) C, = C{r‘ ,rtD,et ,Y,)
+ + ± +
Note th a t the signs + and -  under the equation are the postu lated  signs of the 
partial derivatives. It is a  convention to assum e th a t the m arginal propensity to 
consum e is less than  unity. The effect of real exchange ra te  on consum ption 
can be either positive or negative. Because a  real depreciation increases prices 
of consum ption goods, it reduces real income and therefore h as a  negative effect 
on consum ption (income effect). However, it can also increase the dem and for 
dom estic goods as prices of dom estic goods become lower relative to imported 
goods (expenditure switching effect). Thus the net effect is am biguous; depends 
on the relative m agnitude of the expenditure switching and  income effects.
Investm ent is a  function of in terest ra tes  and  rea l exchange rate:
(6.2) I ,= I ( r , s ,r,L,e,)
±
where rtB is bond in terest ra te  and  is the lending rate. Investm ent will
decline w hen lending and bond ra tes increase, because the cost of hiring 
external funds increases. As in the case of consum ption, the effect of a real 
depreciation on investm ent is am biguous. However, firm s usually  have foreign 
debts and  therefore a  depreciation increase the burden  of such  debts in term s 
of dom estic currency. Because of tha t, the negative im pacts on investm ent may 
be more pronounced th an  th a t on consum ption.
By combining consum ption and  investm ent, we will have domestic 
absorption A t , can be simply written as:
(6.3) A,= C  + J = A(r,L,r,B,e ,,Y ,)
-  -  ±  +
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In the goods m arket, the domestic economy is linked with the rest of the 
world through trade. A net export function or the trade balance is introduced 
to capture this link:
(6.4) Tt =T{et J t )
+  -
Holding foreign countries’ income constant, the trade balance is a  function of 
the real exchange rate and domestic income. A real devaluation will improve 
trade through a reduction in im port and increase in export.
Aggregate dem and is the sum  of domestic absorption and  trade balance. 
Aggregate supply is equal to total output. Equating supply and  dem and yields:
(6.5) Y,=A,+T,
Total differentiation of (6.5) yields the usual IS curve in equation (6.6):
( 6 . 6 )
drB
r B
\ - A y - T y
<0
Note th a t the num erator is obviously negative and the denom inator is positive. 
T hus the IS curve is downward slopped in the Y - r B space.
6.2.2. Deposit and Loan Market
In order to m ake the model more tractable, it is usually  assum ed th a t 
banks will always accept deposit as m uch as the custom ers want. Thus the 
am ount of deposit will be determ ined solely by factors affecting the dem and for 
deposit. The dem and for deposit is defined as a function of deposit and  bond 
rates:
(6.7) D, = <pD{r?,r?)
+
where rfD is the deposit rate. Because bond is a  sub stitu te  for deposit,
increases in the bond rate  tend to lessen the willingness to hold deposit. Thus 
deposit is inversely affected by the bond rate.
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Assume th a t banks are required to hold reserves as a  fraction of deposit. 
If x is the reserve requirem ent, the total reserve held by the banks is equal to:
(6.8) R * = zD,
Thus the total funds (BFt ) available for bank loans (Lst ) and bonds (Bf)  is:
(6.9) BFt = { \ -T )D ,= L]+B ';
Let X be the share of funds allocated for loans, which is a  function of 
in terest rate  on both loans and  bonds. The supply of loans and b an k s’ dem and 
for bonds is therefore:
(6.10) L* = A,(rtL, r B) ( l - r  )Dt ; and
+  -  _
(6 .11) B; = [ \ - Ä ( r tL,rlB) ] ( \ - T ) D,
-  +  _
The dem and for loans is defined as follow:
(6.12) L° = LD(rtL,r,B,Y t )
-  +  +
O utput is included as an explanatory variable to capture  the dem and for 
transaction  balances and operating capital, which are likely to be correlated
with cu rren t output. The loan m arket will clear when L° = Ls . Hence the 
m arket equilibrium  is given by:
(6 . 13) Ld{rtL,rB,Yt) = A(rtL, r B)(1 -  r)D,
The right hand  side of equation (6.13) s ta tes the supply of bank  loan, 
which also depends on bank  deposits. Thus the equation states the 
equilibrium  condition between loan and deposit m arket sim ultaneously. 
Because of th a t (6.13) may be called as CD curve or credit-deposit curve. Next, 
we need to know the shape of the CD curve in the  Y - r B space. A total 
differentiation on (6.13) will yield:
(6.14)
(Ara <pD + A,(pDfB )(1 -  r) -  LPd 
t dL,y
<0
That is the CD curve is downward slopped in the Y - r B space.
128
6.2.3. The CC curve
A credit-commodity (CC) curve sum m arises equilibrium  conditions both in the 
goods and loan-deposit m arkets. It is a  com bination between the IS and CD 
curves. Since both IS and CD curves are downward slopped in the Y - r 8 
space, the CC curve m ust also downward slopped.
In order to integrate the two curves, we m u st rearrange equation (6.13) 
as:
(6.13a) rtL = (f){rB, rtD ,Yt,r, A, Dt ,L^)
where 0 B >O,  ^r >0,  ^ D>0 ,  ^r >0.  Combining equation (6.13a) and (6.5)
gives the so-called CC equation:
(6.15) Yt +






ArB + Â l (f
\ - ( A rL<f>Y + Ay + Ty)
<0
However, unlike the IS curve, it is also shifted by m onetary policy (z) and by 
credit-m arket shocks th a t affect either L° (.) and  A(.). Moreover, the im pact of 
a  real exchange rate depreciation is am biguous. If it is expansionary, the CC 
curve shifts rightward. Conversely, a  leftward shift indicates th a t the im pact is 
contractionary.
6.2.4. Money market and the LM curve
The m oney m arket is described by a  ra ther unconventional LM curve. In the 
Bem anke-B linder model, the money supply is form ulated in the context of 
money multiplier. However, th is seem s to be inadequate  since it ignores the 
role of 'cash' held outside the banking system  and  the  im portance of lender of 
the last resort function in the money supply process. Because of that, the 
specification of the LM curve adopted here som ew hat departs from the 
conventional one.
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There are two distinctive features entertained in the  model. First, the 
relationship  between broad and high-powered money is no t so straightforward 
like in the money m ultiplier model. If cash  held by households and excess 
reserve held by bank  is ignored, the money m ultiplier is simply the inverse of 
reserve requirem ent.5 In the current model, the dem and for money has two 
com ponents; (1) households' need to carry cash and  (2) banks' need to hold 
reserves.
Second, the supply of money is affected by central b an k 's  function as a  lender 
of the last resort for troubled commercial banks. It is a  custom ary th a t in the 
trad itional money supply modelling the effects of su ch  function is ignored. 
However, in an  adverse situation where m any banks face liquidity problem, the 
m oney supply could not be fully controlled by the central bank. Moreover, 
explicitly modelling of the last resort function is no t only im portant for 
und ers tan d in g  the money supply process, b u t also for indirectly m easuring the 
overall fitness of the banking sector.
The dem and for money is narrowly defined as reserve money (monetary 
base) held by households and banks. Banks' dem and for reserves equals to 
the requ ired  reserve (i) tim es the total deposit (D). The explanation for 
households holding a  non interest-bearing asset or cash  relates to transaction 
motives and  the existence of a  “liquidity in advance” constrain t. 6 Households' 
dem and for currency is formulated to a function of income and in terest 
ra tes  on deposit and  bond. More formally it can be s ta ted  as:
(6.17) R" =<pR(r;,r,DJ ,)
-  -  +
The positive relationship between currency dem and and  income arises because 
of two reasons. First, an  increase in income raises the w ealth of households 
(viz. assum ing  the m arginal propensity to consum e is less th an  one), and 
therefore induces the dem and for holding more asse ts , one of which is money. 
Second, it also increases the level of transaction th a t h a s  to be supported by
5 See Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Spiegel (1995) provide a straightforward formulation of 
money multiplier.
6 See Calvo and Vegh (1990) who develop the microfoundation of a broadly similar household 
setup (with three financial assets), assuming the existence of a liquidity in advance constraint.
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money. Holding money m eans th a t households sacrifice the opportunity to earn 
in terest paym ent from other assets. As interest ra tes increase, the opportunity 
cost of holding money rises, the dem and for money falls.
Combining (6.17) with (6.8) yields the total dem and for money:
(6.18) RD, = <pR(r,B,rlD,Y,) + rDt
That is the dem and for money is the sum  of household dem and for currency 
and  bank  dem and for reserve.
The governm ent monopolises the supply of money and it is sometime 
more convenient to assum e th a t the central bank h as complete control over the 
money supply. However, the central bank may not be able to fully control some 
fraction of it. For instance, in a fixed exchange ra te  regime the m onetary base 
does depend on the balance of payment, unless the central bank  can fully 
sterilise the m ovem ent in the net foreign assets (NFA). The other example 
would be the case w hen the central bank acts as a  lender of the last resort. In 
th is  case, holding other things constant, an increase of banks' borrowing from 
the central b an k  will eventually increase the money supply.
In the cu rren t model, the money supply is driven by three forces: ne t 
foreign asse ts  {NFA), bank  bail out (BO), and other ne t asse ts  (NOA). The u su a l 
disaggregation of m oney supply is net domestic asse ts  (NDA) and ne t foreign 
asse ts. Thus, NDA is broken down into two com ponents BO and NOA. More 
formally the  money supply is formulated as:
(6.19) RS, = NFA, + BO, + NOA,
The trea tm en t of NFA is relatively standard  in th a t the balance of 
paym ents is trea ted  as a  money supply shifter, ceteris paribus. As usual, a  
complete sterilisation m eans th a t the change in NFA is counter-balanced by the 
change in NOA in opposite direction, making the money supply constant.
NOA m ainly com prises net claims on the central government (fiscal 
authority) and on non-bank private entities. It was assum ed th a t the fiscal 
au thority  always keep the budget in balance and  hence the am ount of net
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claims on the central government is zero. In order to m ake the discussion 
simpler, it is assum ed th a t the am ount of net claims on non-bank private 
entities is fully determ ined by the central bank 's own discretion. In other 
words, the level of NOA is determ ined exogenously.
The third component, BO, is m eant to capture the effect of bank 
soundness (weaknesses) on money supply. BO is defined as commercial banks' 
borrowing from the central bank. As a lender of the last resort, the central 
bank  may provide "liquidity assistance" to d istressed  banks. In general, the 
help is given to illiquid b u t solvent banks.
The dem and for central bank  assistance by the banking system  is 
inversely correlated with bank  soundness. Thus it is necessary to identify 
factors affecting bank soundness. In C hapter 5, we have d iscussed the relevant 
factors from m icro-m anagerial perspective. Aside from that, macroeconomic 
variable can also affects bank  soundness (Hardy and  Pazarbasioglu, 1998 and 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). To com plem ent the previous work in C hapter 5, 
we may now concentrate on macroeconomic aspects affecting bank 
perform ance.
Focusing on the relationship between bank  soundness and m onetary 
movement, three macroeconomic variables are considered. It is postulated  th a t 
banking fragility is contem poraneously associated w ith falling GDP, increasing 
real in terest rate, and deteriorating real exchange rate. The reasons are as 
follows.
Economic dow nturn often resu lts in heightening banking problem s.7 
Facing a lower aggregate dem and, firms m ay have to lower production and 
increase stocks, which affect both cost s truc tu re  and  cashflow. Lower dem and 
can also m ean lower price levels, which together with higher cost depresses 
financial position of firms. This in tu rn  can  resu lt in a  higher level of non­
perform ing loans, in terrupting  banks' cash flow.
7 The effect of economic downturn on bank soundness is particularly well known. The saving on 
loan crisis of the 80's was triggered by the collapse in the real estate industry (FDIC 1997).
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Increases in the real in terest rate can affect ban k  soundness through two 
channels. First, as the cost of external capital increases, some firms with low 
re tu rn  may not be able to fully service bank  loans. Second, m oral hazard 
problem  may heighten, increasing the probability of loan default (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981).
Exchange rate depreciation im pacts on the banking sector through three 
channels. First, if banks have currency m ism atches, the increasing burden of 
liabilities dom inated in foreign currency can lead to financial loses. Second, 
even if they can pass the currency risk  to the borrowers, they m ay be exposed 
to the risk  indirectly through deterioration of loan quality. Firm s with earnings 
mainly denom inated in domestic currency b u t obtain loans denom inated in 
foreign currency may become insolvent. Third, given th a t depreciation 
adversely affects firms, moral hazard  problem s can heighten credit risks 
(Mishkin 1996).
Given th a t the central bank  stand  ready to help them  out, the dem and 
for ban k  bail out can be form ulated as follows:
(6.20) BO, = B{Y„r,L ,e„)
“  +  +
That is, a  decline in output, an increase in lending rate , and  a real depreciation 
are likely to produce adverse effects on the banking sector, and  therefore 
increase in the dem and for bailout. Combining (6.19) and  (6.20), the money 
supply can be written as:
(6 .21 ) RS, = NFA, + B(Y,,r,L ,e,) + NOA,
The equilibrium  condition in the money m arket is determ ined by the supply of 
and dem and for money. Equating the supply and  dem and yields:
(6.22) NFA, + B(Y,,rlL,e,) + NOA,=<p't(Y„rlD,r,B) + zD
Rozas-Suarez and Weisbord (1995) also find that banking problems worsened due to 
deterioration in economic condition for Columbian case.
133
Equation (6.22) represents an  LM curve and the slope of the curve can be 
checked by differentiating it with respect to Y  and r8:
(p R +  tD b — B L (f „ .
- J — ^ ---------- — u — — —  >  0
Py +  YDy ~~ By
In o ther words, the LM curve is upward sloped in Y - r8 space.
It should be stressed  at the outset th a t the inclusion of the bank  bailout 
function does not necessarily imply a fully endogenous money supply. This is 
because the central bank  still has two discretionary com ponents of the money 
supply, notably NFA and NOA .8 In other to fix the money supply, an  increase in 
BO  can be offset by reducing NOA by the sam e am ount.
However, in some cases where BO becomes very sensitive to the in terest 
rate, the  m onetary authority  is facing an impossible task: because the central 
bank  s tan d s ready to provide bail out money, a  m onetary austerity  policy will 
be imm ediately reversed as non-performing loans increase significantly.9 For 
instance, if B L « oo or BO  is alm ost perfectly sensitive to the change in in terest
rate, the LM curve become horizontal. In such  a  case, the m oney supply will be 
fully endogenous and neither money supply nor in terest ra te  can  be a  target of 
m onetary policy. In other words, monetary targeting losses its credibility.
(6.23)
drB
6.2.5. Balance of Payments and the BP Curve
The balance of paym ent h as  two components: cu rren t and  capital accounts. 
The cu rren t account balance is simply defined as the sum  of trade  balance and 
in terest paym ents:
(6.24) CA, = T ,+ r; K ' .
8 Under a peg regime, NFA affects money supply unless it is counterbalanced by NOA, implying 
that NOA is the only discretionary component.
9 Special thanks to an anonymous examiner for pointing out this.
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Where K* is total stock of foreign capital invested in the dom estic economy and 
rt = in ternational in terest ra tes (money m arket).10
Capital inflows are dictated by in terest differentials, and may therefore be 
w ritten as:
(6.25) K ; -  K\_, = A K ‘, = k(r,B -  r,' -  p, -  < , )  
where: p, = country risk  premium; and  n *+1= expected exchange rate
depreciation (assum ed zero henceforth, given the assum ption  of a credible fixed 
exchange rate, pre-crisis). Let a t = rtB - rt — p t -7Tet+x. As usual, assum e th a t
k^O , i.e. capital inflow is an increasing function of the spread  between 
domestic and  foreign in terest rates. Note, the supply curve is assum ed not to 
be perfectly elastic (k« is not infinite).
C urren t account deficit h as to be financed through capital inflow a n d /o r  
a  reduction in the level of reserves. The balance of paym ents is defined by:
(6.26) I, -r*K ] + AK*, = M * ,  = BP
That is, the cu rren t account balance plus capital inflow m u st equal the change 
in reserves (AR*,). It is custom ary to set the balance of paym ents equilibrium
to zero. Combining equations (6.24), (6.25) and  (6.26), a  balance of paym ents 
equation is obtained:
(6.27) T(Y„e,) = r; K ; - k ( a , )
As in the Mundell-Fleming model, th is equation characterises the balance of 
paym ents. A capital inflow will finance a  cu rren t account deficit and 
in ternational reserves change in line with net capital inflow over and above the 
cu rren t account deficit.
Equation (6.27) is called a  BP curve and  differentiating it with respect to 
Y  and r8 yields:
0 - r ,X(6.28) r dYt '
\ dr‘ J BP
>0
10 Spiegel treats foreign capital stock as net capital inflow
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In other words, the BP curve is positively sloped in r B - Y  space.
6.2.6. Graphical Illustration
Now th a t we have derived the CC, LM and BP curve, and they can be pu t 
together in one diagram  (Figure 6.1.) to produce a  model th a t enable us to 
determ ine both ou tpu t and the interest rate. Two points should be noted. First, 
the variable on the vertical axis is the bond m arket in terest rate. Second is the
m aintained assum ption  th a t (drtB / dYt)LM > (drB / d.Yt )BP .
The overall equilibrium is the intersection of the CC, LM and BP curves 
(Eo). The equilibrium  outpu t is Yo with the corresponding dom estic in terest rate 
at rbo. At th a t point the aggregate ou tpu t equals aggregate dem and (CC), 
quantity  of money dem anded equals the money supply and  the balance of 
paym ents equals zero. At any other point in the diagram , a t least one of these 
equilibrium  conditions is not satisfied, and m arket forces move the economy 
toward the equilibrium , point Eo.
Let u s  consider the case where the economy is not a t the general 
equilibrium , say at point A, which is on the LM curve b u t no t on the CC and BP 
curves. At th a t point, the cost of external capital is below the equilibrium  level, 
leading to higher dem and for bank  loans (for financing higher production 
levels). The supply of loans can only increase if in te rest rate increases. 
Moreover, because it bellows the BP curve, low dom estic in terest rate can 
induce capital outflow, which has to be financed by a  trade  surp lus. Because of 
tha t, the economy moves up along the LM curve, leading to higher in terest rate 
and o u tpu t levels (Eo).
If the economy is on the CC curve b u t off the  LM and  BP curves a t point 
B, it will also head  toward the equilibrium a t point Eo. At point B, even though 
the commodity and credit m arkets are at the equilibrium , b u t the in terest rate 
is too high. Because of th a t households will be willing to buy more bonds and
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p u t more deposits in banks. This eventually will decrease domestic interest 
ra tes and  induce more spending. In other words, the economy moves along the 
CC curve tow ards point Eo.
A nother example would be the case where the economy is on the BP 
curve b u t off the LM and CC curve. At point C, the balance of paym ents equals 
to zero, b u t the o u tpu t level is higher than  it should be. From households' 
point of view, a  higher o u tpu t requires a higher transaction  dem and for money. 
Com pared to the  in terest rate  suggested by the LM curve, the in terest rate at 
point C is lower th an  it should be, suggesting an  excess dem and for money. 
However, w ith a  higher ou tpu t level, the CC curve suggests th a t commodity and 
credit m arket will only clear a t a  lower interest rate. T hus point C suggest an 
excess supply of goods and  excess dem and for loans. Firms are unable to sell 
all their ou tpu t, and  unp lanned  inventory accum ulates, prom pting them  to cut 
production and  lower output. The decline in ou tpu t m eans th a t the dem and for 
money will also fall (closing the excess dem and for money). Finally, the 
economy h as  to move to Eo.
Figure 6.1. Overall equilibrium
rb
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The rem ainders of th is chapter make use of the model to examine a 
num ber of policy experim ents and exogenous shocks. It will be shown th a t the 
model is able to highlights several possible causes and the transm ission 
m echanism s involved in the propagation of a  financial crisis.
6.3. Triggers of the crisis
In th is section, it will be shown th a t the model is capable of 
accom m odating commonly posited hypotheses regarding the sources of a 
financial crisis. The key to understanding  these problem s is indeed the shift in 
the balance of paym ents equation. In other words, any factor th a t can resu lt in 
a  deterioration of the balance of payments could be a  good candidate for a 
trigger.
It is useful to d istinguish external and internal factors leading a currency 
crisis. In ternal factors include a weakening of the banking sector (Mishkin 
1996, Rajan and  Sugem a 1999), monetization of budget deficit (Krugman 1979), 
a  b u s t following a boom in investm ents or an asse ts  m arket crash  (Kindleberger 
1976, M ishkin 1996, Krugman 1998), and crony capitalism  (Krugman 1998). 
External factors include a  rise in developed countries’ in terest rates 
(Eichengreen 1999, McKibbin 1998), an increase in perceived risks or 
uncerta in ty  (Mishkin 1996, McKibbin and Martin 1998), an  ab ru p t slowdown in 
exports (Bank of Thailand 1998, Rajan, 1999), and  a  liquidity squeeze by 
in ternational creditors due to panic (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Chang and 
Velasco, 1998). The rem ainder of this section briefly d iscusses some of these 
factors.
6.3.1. Monetisation of fiscal deficits
Suppose th a t the central government constantly opts a  budget deficit policy and 
does not have any m eans to m eet the deficits except borrowing from the central 
bank. At the sam e time, a  peg exchange rate regime h as  to be m aintained. A 
m onetisation of budget deficits m eans an increase in net other asse ts  (NOA),
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one of th e  com ponents in the  m oney supply. Holding o the r th ings co nstan t, 
th is  will cau se  the LM curve to shift righ t (LMo to LMi, see Figure 6.2). This is 
no t co n s is te n t w ith the  peg regim e, and  therefore m onetary  expansion  will have 
to be s te rilised  by selling foreign exchange reserves (i.e. th e  increase  in  NOA is 
co u n te r b a lan ced  by a  reduction  in NFA by th e  sam e am o u n t as  suggested  by 
equation  (6.21)). As a  resu lt, th e  LM curve sh ifts back  to LMo an d  th e  level of 
reserve decreases. If th is  is done continuously , u ltim ate ly  m onetary  expansions 
can n o t be supp o rted  by the  reserves and  su b seq u en tly  th e  cu rren cy  h a s  to be 
floated.
Figure 6 .2 . Monetisation o f fiscal deficit
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T his idea  can  be ex tended , as  in Dooley (1997) an d  K rugm an (1998). If 
b a n k s  are  g u aran teed  by the  governm ent, loan  expansion  financed  by offshore 
fu n d s will re su lt in an  inc rease  in  the  im plicit fiscal b u rd en . W hen capital 
inflows reverse, or w hen firm s borrow ing from  b a n k s  default, th e  b a n k s ’ 
liabilities becom e the  governm ent’s. Faced w ith  th is  b u rd en , th e  governm ent 
m ay m onetise  a  b an k  bail out. S im ilar m ech an ism s also apply  to a  case  w hen 
cronies are  im plicitly g u aran teed , as  in K rugm an (1997) an d  C orsetti et.al. 
(1998).
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6.3.2. Rise in foreign interest rate
McKibbin (1998) and Eichengreen (1999) have em phasised th a t increases in 
developed countries’ in terest ra tes triggered a reversal of capital inflows in the 
E ast Asian region. While McKibbin pointed to the rise of US in terest rates in 
late March 1997, Eichengreen stressed the increase in short-term  in terest rates 
in Ja p a n  in the northern spring of 1997.
The effect of increasing international in terest ra tes is transla ted  as an 
upw ard shift of the BP curve (BPo to BPi, see Figure 6.3). This triggers capital 
outflows, which eventually reduce reserve money. Hence, both the LM and CC 
curves shift leftward, leading to both a  higher in terest ra te  and  lower output.
Figure 6 .3 . A rise in foreign interest rate
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6.3.3. Increase in uncertainty
Due to asym m etric information, foreign creditors may not be aware of the 
dom estic financial problem s (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). Domestic firms and 
banks th a t were eager to borrow abroad may have been those which were 
taking greater risks or financing poorer projects. This is consisten t with the 
view asserted  by the World Bank (1997, 1998) th a t capital inflows to the region 
tended to intensify for several years prior to the  crisis, despite strong 
indications of increased financial fragility. Moreover, Hermalin and  Rose (1999) 
propose two additional sources of risk in cross-border borrowing th a t are 
absen t in a  purely dom estic context: the risk th a t sovereign borrowers will 
default, and  the risk  of macroeconomic instability th a t stem s from the im pact of 
ne t capital flows on the m onetary system.
Assum ing th a t foreign lenders were not fully aware of these problems, 
capital inflows can easily tu rn  from bullish to bearish . New inform ation th a t 
leads creditors to reassess risk can trigger capital outflows and  currency crisis. 
As noted by B urnside e ta / . (1998), the collapse of the Thai financial system  
m ay have led creditors to suspect similar problems existed in o ther economies 
in the  region. Facing th is  possibility, they would have sought a  higher risk  
prem ium  a n d /o r  suddenly withdrawn their funds from these countries. In this 
model, the effect an  increase in risk  premium is sim ilar to th a t of an  increase in 
in ternational in terest ra tes (see Figure 6.3).
6.4. Policy responses to a speculative attack
W hatever the reason  for speculative attacks, a governm ent is faced with difficult 
choices. The likely governm ent response would be to increase in terest rates, 
sterilising m arket intervention, or immediately float the currency. Each of these 
alternatives will be examined.
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6.4.1. Interest rate hike
In order to fend off a  speculative attack, the government has to engineer an 
increase in domestic in terest rates, especially short-term  ra te s .11 There are two 
channels through which the balance of paym ents is affected. First, capital 
outflow can be prevented, as an increase in in terest ra tes can offset the 
increase in expected depreciation. Second, the increase in in terest rates reduces 
dom estic absorption, thereby improving the cu rren t account balance.
The hike can be engineered by reducing the money supply, altering the 
LM curve. The im pact of th is policy option can be captured  as a  leftward shift
dY.




suggesting a lower equilibrium  income for lower money supply. Through its 
im pact on banks' reserve, a reduction in money supply affect adversely the loan 
supply. The final outcome would be a  lower ou tpu t level b u t with a  higher 
in terest rate.
Under the conventional IS-LM framework, the  im pact is quite similar 
though no t exactly the sam e. The LM curve shifts leftward and  the final 
equilibrium  would be a  higher in terest rate bu t lower output. Compared to the 
CC-LM approach, the IS-LM framework is lack of banking channel of m onetary 
austerity . Thus, it tends to discount the severity of the im pact. Indeed, this is 
one of the reasons why the CC-LM approach is used  in th is study.
It is worth to highlight th a t banking consideration is im portant, not only 
for identifying the im pacts b u t also for assessing w hether m onetary tightening 
will be effective and credible. Some authors have raised the issue as follows.
11 Under a fixed exchange rate regime without bank bail out, capital outflows would naturally 
induce higher domestic interest rates. However, in a bank centred macroeconomic model, the 
impact of capital outflow on interest rates is ambiguous. Therefore, deterring speculative attack 
would require an interest rate increase.
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Figure 6.4. The impact o f an interest rate hike
1 BP I
D ue  to  its  a d v e rse  im p a c t on th e  econom y  th is  s tra te g y  m ay  n o t be
effective in  p re v e n tin g  c a p ita l outflow s. O bstfe ld  a n d  Rogoff (1995 , p .81)
s u m m a r is e  th e  p o ss ib le  ca lam ity  re su ltin g  from  a n  in te r e s t  r a te  h ik e  a s  follows:
S u c h  s h a rp  sp ik e s  in  in te re s t  ra te s , if s u s ta in e d  for a n y  len g th  of 
tim e , c a n  w re a k  havoc w ith  th e  b a n k in g  sy s te m , w h ic h  typ ica lly  
b o rro w s  s h o r t  a n d  le n d s  long. Over th e  lo n g e r  te rm , th e se  
u n a n tic ip a te d  in te re s t  ra te  r ise s  c a n  a lso  h av e  p ro fo u n d  nega tive  
effec ts on  in v e s tm e n t, u n e m p lo y m e n t, th e  g o v e rn m e n t b u d g e t 
defic it a n d  d o m es tic  d is tr ib u tio n  of incom e. A g o v e rn m e n t p ledge 
th a t  it  will igno re  s u c h  side  effects in d efin ite ly  to  d e fen d  th e  
e x c h an g e  ra te  is  n o t likely  to be  cred ib le . L ack  of c red ib ility , in  
tu rn ,  m a k e s  a  fixed ex ch an g e  ra te  m ore  v u ln e ra b le  to  sp e cu la tiv e  
a t ta c k s .
T hey  give a n  ex am ple  of a n  in te re s t  r a te  h ik e  t h a t  w a s  n o t  effective. O n 
S e p te m b e r  16, 1992, in  a n  a tte m p t to  s tave  off a  m a ss iv e  sp e cu la tiv e  a tta c k  on 
th e  S w ed ish  k ro n a , th e  R ik sb a n k  (Sw edish  c e n tra l  b a n k ) in c re a se d  th e  
o v e rn ig h t in te r e s t  r a te  to  500  p e rc e n t for fo u r d ay s . E v e n tu a lly , th e  R ik sb a n k  
s u c c e e d e d  in  d e fen d in g  th e  c u rre n c y  a n d  b ro u g h t do w n  th e  in te r e s t  ra te  w ith in
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a few weeks. However, this led to a  weaker banking sector th a t was less able to 
w ithstand  the next attack. Due to this shaky position, when the a ttack  later 
revived the Riskbank was unable to increase in terest rates, even above 20 
percent, and  consequently, on November 19 the peg had  to be abandoned.
O thers like Rajan and Sugema (2000 and 2001) identify the conditions 
under which an in terest rate hike would (not) be credible. They argue th a t there 
are three s ta tes of the banking system tha t can give rise to differences in the 
likely outcom es. First, if the banking sector is "near collapse" the peg will have 
no credibility, therefore the currency will be fully floated, regardless of w hether 
or not it is being attacked. In this circum stance, a  balance of paym ents crisis is 
a n a tu ra l consequence of a banking crisis and in terest ra te  policy would not be 
effective a t all.
Second, if the banking sector is "rock solid", the government h as  a  degree 
of freedom to increase in terest rates. By engineering a  recession, through a 
reduction in domestic absorption, the balance of paym ents can be sustained . It 
follows th a t the peg need not collapse. In the current model th is is equivalent 
dBO d llwith saying th a t ---- j -  ~ 0 and  — « 0 . T hat is the  banking  sector and the
drt drt
credit m arket is relatively unaffected by in terest rate. This also m eans th a t the 
cu rren t model collapses to the traditional IS-LM model (i.e. banking channels 
are no t relevant).
Third, if the banking sector is neither "rock solid", nor "near collapse", 
sustainability  of the peg depends on w hether or not the currency is being 
attacked. If the a ttack  is severe, in terest rates may need to increase sharply to 
prevent capital outflows. However, this can complicate the banking sector and 
th u s  precipitate an  expectation th a t the money supply will be relaxed. In other 
words, an  in terest rate hike may stim ulate further expected depreciation.
Since these three conditions have been discussed in a  quite detail in 
Rajan and Sugem a (2000 and 2001), there is no need to derive such  conditions
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under the cu rren t model. However, some of the consequences will be discussed 
further in section 6.5.
6.4.2. Sterilised interventions
If the authorities decide to cling to the peg while m inim ising the cost of 
increasing in terest rates, a  more likely scenario is th a t they will allow m onetary 
infusion into the financial m arket to replace the capital fleeing the country. For 
example, due to fears th a t increasing in terest rates would h u rt the financial 
system , from the second quarter of 1996, Bank of Thailand extended massive 
liquidity to ailing banks and  financial houses, resulting in a  decline in its 
in ternational reserves (World Bank 1998). Referring to Figure 6.5, this policy 
response can be shown by a  leftward shift of the BP curve, b u t holding the CC 
and LM curves fixed. Note tha t, if capital outflows are not sterilised, the CC 
and LM curves eventually have to shift leftward.
If th is policy stance is m aintained, in ternational reserves will continue to 
drain. Once reserves fall to a  low level, the exchange rate is vulnerable to a 
Krugman-type attack. Indeed, th is is a  varian t of the first-generation model as 
d iscussed  in section 2.2. Williamson (1999, p.20) has  noted th is problem for 
the Thai case:
The B ank of Thailand resisted  practically to its last dollar, 
w hereupon it bowed to the inevitable and let the b ah t float 
down. All th a t is terribly familiar, pretty  m uch like any other 
old-fashioned exchange rate crisis.
Based on the cu rren t model, it is easy to assess the feasibility of using 
th is strategy. This can be done by deriving a  statistic  th a t can m easure the 
adequacy of reserves to absorb a  negative h it in capital flows. The statistic is 
derived by following the procedure introduced in Jean e  (1997) and  Masson 
(1998).
It is convenient to assum e that, in the very short-run , say one m onth or 
one quarter, trade balances will stay  a t the cu rren t level, Tt=T. Thus, external 
im balances will truly reflect the shifts in capital flows. There are now two
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relevant aspects of the expected devaluation: the m agnitude of the devaluation 
and the probability of devaluation (p t ) . The capital account (equation 6.25) is
form ulated by a  linear function as follows:
(6.25') AK, = a 0 + a x{r, -r* -rp ,  - p tn t )
Substitu ting  th is into the balance of paym ents equation (eq. 6.27) yields:
(6.26') ARl =T(Yl,el) + r*Kt + aQ+ax(rt - r' - rPl - p,7ut )
stating th a t foreign exchange reserves should be enough to cover the existing 
cu rren t account deficit and potential capital outflow. It follows th a t several 
indicators, such  as the ratio of the current account to reserves, the stock of 
volatile foreign-capital to reserves, the debt service to reserves, the total debt to 
reserves, and  im ports to reserves, should indicate a  gross picture of balance of 
paym ents vulnerability. Moreover, the ratio of M2 to reserves would capture 
the possibility of capital flight resulting from panic am ongst domestic 
depositors. These ratios m ight be called reserves adequacy ratios.
The collapse of the peg will occur a t time t+1, if the reserves hit a  certain 
m inim um  level:
^,+i -  K
By letting bt =T  + r*B + a 0 + a x (rt -  r* - r p t) + Rl+l -  R , and  a 2 = a x7rt , the 
probability of the collapse of the peg can be defined as:
(6.29) p t -  Probt(Z>/+1 - a 2p, <0)
Suppose th a t (f{ = Elbl , the forecast error can be defined as £t = bt -  (j)l , and is 
assum ed to be i.i.d. with zero m ean and constan t variance, <j2. The cumulative 
d istribution  function for bt can be used  to form ulate expected depreciation as:
p, = ? M i P ,  - 0 , )
As both the left and right hand  side of the above equation h as pt, and  therefore 
a  m ultiple solution is possible. As in Jeane  (1997), a critical value may be 
defined as:
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where n  is a  n a tu ra l num ber. A multiple solution can be found if z>l,  and this 
provides an  appealing condition under which a balance of paym ents 
equilibrium  can easily flip from a "good" to "bad" equilibrium . If the balance of 
paym ents and  reserves level exhibit the possibility of having multiple 
equilibrium , a  balance of paym ents crisis m ay easily e ru p t and the reserves are 
of no use  for preventing the crisis.
M ason (1998) introduces another statistic such that:
The above statistic  can be used  to calculate the critical values for the 
fundam ental:
(f — a {F{{w) -  ow
(f = a lFl(-w)  + ow
The fundam ental can be evaluated as follows:
(a) crisis zone (deficient reserves): (f>̂ (f>
(b) sufficient reserves: (f > (f)
(c) m ultiple equilibrium: (f) <<f <(j)
The crisis zone (a) implies th a t a  balance of paym ents crisis can  occur w ithout a 
speculative attack. A balance of paym ents is said to be fundam entally  sound if 
criterion (b) is satisfied, m eaning th a t a  negative shock on the balance of 
paym ents can  be tackled w ithout adjusting the exchange rate. A currency 
a ttack  m ay lead to a  crisis if the fundam ental is within the m ultiple equilibrium  
zone.
The above resu lts  can also be derived from the  conventional IS-LM 
model. T hus both IS-LM and CC-LM approaches provide the sam e inferences 
for the case of sterilised intervention. This is because the level of foreign
(6.31)
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reserves is the only relevant variable for restoring the equilibrium  in both 
models.
6.4.3. Floating the currency
The last choice immediately after an attack would be to float the currency. This 
is usually  the case for countries with a weak banking system  or a  low level of 
reserves. As discussed, under a  weak banking system  an in terest ra te  hike may 
not be credible to deter speculative attacks. Moreover, defending the currency 
requires sufficient reserves.
A float m eans th a t the government lets the m arket decide the value of 
the currency. If a float is adopted when the m arket is bullish, the currency will 
appreciate. However, if the currency is floated am id speculative pressure , the 
likely resu lt is depreciation. Expected devaluation set by speculators will be 
reflected in depreciation th a t occurs immediately after the float.
Equation (6.25) suggests th a t an increase in expected depreciation 
a n d /o r  risk  perception can induce capital outflows if the dom estic in terest rate 
is not raised. These outflows have to be financed by improving the current 
account balance (equation 6.27). Since foreign in terest ra tes are assum ed 
constant, th is  requires im provem ent in the trade balance. In a  dependent- 
sm all-open economy, th is  should mainly come from a  reduction in im ports. In 
other words, domestic absorption will need to contract, and  such  a  contraction 
can be obtained through a real devaluation/depreciation.
The effects of a  real devaluation can be cap tured  through the shifts in 
the CC and  LM curves.12 The LM curve will shift to the left-hand side because 
of two reasons: increase in price level and a higher dem and for money. An 
increase in price, as a resu lt of a  higher import price, reduces the real money 
balance. In a  crisis situation  where bank collapses and  stock price fall are
12 In the IS-LM approach, the LM curve does not shift in response to currency depreciation.
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expected, m oney is often viewed as one of the safest assets, increasing the 
dem and for m oney.13
The effects of currency depreciation on credit and  commodity m arket can 
be either expansionary or contractionary. It will be contractionary if the income 
effect is bigger th an  the substitu tion  effect of devaluation. The im pact on export 
is definitely expansionary, given th a t export boom can be facilitated by trade 
financing th rough the banking system. However, if the  banking system  become 
paralysed the full impact on export m ay not be attainable.
The banking channel is so im portant in differing the final effects of 
depreciation. Under the IS-LM framework, it is implicitly assum ed th a t such an 
expansion is no t constrained by the situation in credit m arket. Because of that, 
holding the LM curve constant, the shift of the IS curve to the right lead a 
higher o u tp u t a t the final equilibrium. Thus, ignoring the banking channel may 
lead to overstatem ent of the possible favourable im pact.
Non-performing loans may increase, leading to a  contraction in the credit 
m arket (see section 6.6 for further discussion). The dry up  of loanable funds 
from the banking  system m eans less productive activities th a t can be 
supported. Thus, unlike the IS-LM approach, ra th e r th a n  shifting rightward, 
the CC curve m ay shift leftward.
Moreover, a  float and the subsequent devaluation m ay create panic
(Calvo and  Mendoza 1996, Sachs et al. 1996, Goldstein 1998). Given th a t the
peg prior to the crisis was credible, m ost foreign debt was probably unhedged.
Goldstein (1998) describes this as:
In Indonesia, the m ain problem was currency m ism atching on the 
p a rt of corporations. Once the value of the ru p iah  could no longer 
be assu red , and even more so after the currency  was floated, 
belated  efforts by Indonesian corporations to hedge their large 
sh o rt foreign-currency position in the m arket helped to fuel the 
ru p ia h ’s decline. And, as the rup iah  fell, its adverse effect on the 
debt bu rden  of firms only acted to sap m arket confidence and  to 
stoke the  currency’s further decline. In South  Korea, too, the 
rollover of short-term  foreign-currency-denom inated debt -th is
13 This issue will be further d iscussed in section 6.5.
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tim e on the part of banks- eventually becam e the action-forcing
event of th a t crisis.
In sum m ary, the adoption of a float can induce two problem s. The 
ensuing  devaluation can be contractionary in the short-run . Moreover, the 
induced panic can resu lt in the exchange rate over shooting.
6.5. Propagation of a crisis
The propagation of a financial crisis is discussed in th is section. It will be 
shown th a t the model can provide a  useful system atic analytical framework for 
analysing the propagation of the crisis. Three issues will be discussed.
First, the crisis causes deterioration in the balance sheet of firms which, 
in tu rn , can  resu lt in higher non-performing loans. In order to m ain tain  their 
capital position, banks may have to reduce loans, possibly leading to a  further 
contraction in output.
Second, the crisis may lead depositors and  creditors to cast doubt on the 
reliability of the financial position of the banks. This m ay trigger a  bank  run, 
which forces the banks to liquidate their assets. As a  resu lt, capital outflows 
and  fu rther ou tpu t contraction will be observed.
Third, in order to prevent a  breakdown of the financial system , the 
au thorities may provide a  blanket guarantee. However, if foreign exchange 
reserves are insufficient or capital controls are no t im posed, th is  m ay lead 
agents to cas t doubt over the ability of the au thorities to control the money 
supply. In other words, such a guarantee may not be credible.
6.5.1. Increase in non-performing loans
Following an  in terest rate hike and devaluation, there will be some feedback 
effect from firms to banks. Some firms may be unab le  to repay bank 
loans,w hich, in tu rn , increase the non-performing loans (NPLs) of banks and 
the need for greater loan loss provision. Note th a t the model is a  Keynesian or
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dem and-sided model and, therefore, is unable to capture the effects of 
devaluation and in terest ra tes on the supply side of the economy. However, 
these effects m ay be incorporated exogenously into the model, through the 
supply of loans w ithout m uch difficulty.
Let r] be the proportion of loans tha t become non-perform ing during the 
first round  of the crisis. Given this, the capacity of the banking sector to grant 
fu rther loans will decline and, therefore, the supply of loans (eq. 6.10) now 
becomes:
(6.10”) Ls = X(rtL, r,s )(1 -  r - rj)BFt
The above represen tation  suggests tha t the effect of non-perform ing loans on 
the loan supply will be the sam e as tha t of the reserve requirem ent (r).  






In other words, the increase in non-performing loans fu rther reduces aggregate 
o u tpu t and  therefore tends to propagate the crisis.
B ecause firms become ‘credit rationed’, the NPLs will generate a  negative 
feed back  effect to ou tpu t, described as follows. As NPLs rise, the provision for 
bad loans will also increase, which in turn , weakens the capital position of 
banks. If new capital is ha rd  to get -  and of course th is is particularly  so in a  
crisis situation  - banks will reduce loans in order to m aintain  the prescribed 
CAR. If the  in te rest rate is already high, a  reduction in loans m ay be necessaiy  
to m inim ise losses arising from moral hazard problem s.14 Because loans are 
cut, investm ent spending and  ou tpu t will decline. Note th a t this conclusion will 
apply only if firms have limited access to the bond m arket.
14 Mankiw (1986) stresses that high interest rates can result in severe credit rationing, collapsing 
output.
151
6.5.2. Increase in banking fragility
An adverse macroeconom ic condition can induce banking fragility, making it 
harder for depositors to separate sound from weak banks (Mishkin 1996). This 
‘screening problem ’ m akes them  less willing to deposit and lend to banks. 
Moreover, because banks are interconnected, through the in ter-bank money 
m arket, there is a  real possibility of a systemic crisis.
B ank panic is more likely to occur when balance sheets of banks is weak 
(Postlewaite and  Vives 1987). Therefore, in a  crisis situation, ru n s  on deposits 
are more likely to be observed. Moreover, because of the increasing systemic 
risk, the ru n s  may also h it sound banks, implying a pure  Diamond-Dybvig type 
run .
In our model, th is can be captured through an increase in risk premium. 
So far, the risk  prem ium  only affects capital flows, in th a t the increase in the 
prem ium  can lead to a  reduction in capital inflows. In the following discussion, 
we will exam ine the risk  prem ium  relations specifically to the banking sector.
Consider a  situation  where domestic depositors and  foreign creditors cast 
doubt over the soundness of the banking system. This m ay trigger a bank ru n  
and  subsequen t capital outflows. A ru n  on deposits will be referred to as 
internal bleeding, while the corresponding capital outflow is called external 
bleeding.15 The process m ay be described as follows.
Depositors and creditors pull out from the dom estic banking system, 
holding more reserve money. Because the increase in reserve money holdings 
carries a  higher risk of currency depreciation, some proportion will be converted 
into foreign exchange denom inated assets, triggering capital outflows. In this 
context, there  are two sources of the balance of paym ents problem. First, 
foreign creditors pull ou t funds from the domestic economy. Second, domestic 
agents transfer dom estic financial resources to foreign m arkets.
15 The concept is akin to internal and external drains suggested by Miller (1996). ‘Bleeding’ is 
used here to have a stronger expression of the problem.
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In order to see the im pact of the run , two scenarios are considered. 
First, it is assum ed th a t the authorities will not bail out the banks and, 
therefore, equation (6.20) is not operative in the model. In such a case, banks 
will face a  liquidity shortage and may have to liquidate curren t assets and 
reduce loans. This will be assessed in th is sub-section. Second, we will 
consider a  situation where the authorities fully bail ou t the banks, implying 
th a t the reserve money supply will increase. This second case will be discussed 
in the next subsection.
In the curren t model, it is clear from equation (6.25) th a t kp , or the first
derivative of capital inflows with respect to risk  prem ium , is negative. In other 
words, the external bleeding will push  the BP curve upw ard (see Figure 6.5). 
In order to model the in ternal bleeding, equations (6.7) and (6.17) need to be 
modified as follows:
(6.7-) £>*=<Z>£V , r , \ y ,  ,P,,)
+  -  +  -
(6 .17’) R? =<pR{r,D,r,B,7, ,p , ,)
+ +
Equation (6.7’) states th a t the increase in risk  prem ium  (banking fragility) will 
reduce deposit holdings. Consequently, reserve money will be preferred (eq. 
6 .17 ’) and  some of the funds will be converted into foreign asse ts  (eq. 6.25). 
The fact th a t the dem and for reserve money will increase is to capture the 
possibility th a t some depositors do not have access to international financial 
asse ts.
The effect of the drains on ou tpu t can be traced through the LM and CC 







That is, the LM curve will shift leftward, indicating a  higher dem and for reserve 
money. The effect operating through the commodity-credit m arkets will be:
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(6 .34) A rL<!>pT
1 “ (ArL0Y + Ay +Ty )
<0
That is, the CC curve will shift leftward, also indicating a  contraction in loans 
granted by the banks.
Figure 6.5. The effects of bank run and capital outflows
The final im pact will be a t point Ei, with the corresponding ou tpu t Yi 
and  in te rest rate r,b. The final im pact on o u tp u t will definitely be 
contractionary, mainly from the drying up  of bank  loans. The effect on the 
dom estic in terest rate, however, is am biguous. If the shift in the LM and BP 
curves is larger than  the shift in the CC curve, the dom estic in te rest rate will 
rise, otherw ise it will fall. However, in the very short-run , as the money m arket 
ad justs  faster th an  the commodity m arket, in terest ra tes will need to increase.
Note th a t the discussion, so far, assum es the au thorities do not finance 
the deposit run . Thus, if the ru n  is severe, it may lead to a  breakdown of the
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financial system. In order to avoid this, the authorities may need to provide a 
b lanket guarantee. The question is w hether or not th is guarantee will be 
effective and credible? This issue will be analysed in the following subsection.
6.5.3. Increase in reserve money
Because the government is now assum ed to provide a  b lanket guarantee, the 
bailout function is reintroduce and  modified as:
(6.201 BO,=B(Y„rlL,e„p,)
+ + +
That is the bail ou t will increase as the risk prem ium  increases. The bailout 
has two functions. First, it satisfies the increasing need for holding reserve 
money, as dictated by equation (6 .1 7 ’). As a result, the money supply will 
increase, shifting back the LM curve from LMi toward LMo (see Figure 6.5 ). 
Second, it reduces the needs for banks to liquidate their assets, enabling them  
to continue extending loans. This is associated with the  shift of the CC curve 
from CCi toward CCo.
Interestingly, the guarantee may not resu lt in a  shift of the BP curve 
back to BPo, unless the authorities adopt capital controls or have enough 
foreign exchange reserves to sterilise capital outflows. An effective capital 
control can reduce the extent of capital outflows, although it may also prevent 
capital inflows. Sterilisation of capital outflows can prevent the exchange rate 
from depreciating further. In effect, capital controls and  active sterilisation will 
shift the B P curve to BPo.
W ithout capital controls or sufficient foreign exchange reserves, the 
guarantee m ay not be credible. The idea is that, although the guarantee may 
be able to elim inate risk  perception, it may also raise doubts over the ability of 
the au thorities to m anage the money supply. A full guarantee m eans th a t all 
bank  liabilities become the governments, implying th a t the government h as  to 
show the public it h as sufficient resources to finance the deficit. In the short 
run , available resources will be in the form of liquid foreign exchange reserves,
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as it will be difficult to divert the current year fiscal budget. Because of that, 
the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money (M2) becomes relevant for 
m easuring  the capacity to meet contingent .liabilities. If reserves are 
insufficient, prin ting  money will induce expected depreciation, triggering capital 
outflows. In other words, the doubt over the capacity to sterilise the increase in 
money supply can trigger a  ru n  on deposits and subsequen t capital outflows. 
Therefore, with insufficient reserves, the blanket guarantee is unlikely to be 
credible. In such  a case, we will observe the following sequence of events: ru n s  
on deposits, loss of control over the money supply, capital outflows and further 
exchange ra te  depreciation.
If foreign exchange reserves are insufficient, the authorities have to 
resort to strict capital (outflows) control. Fully effective capital controls can 
prevent external drain, dim inishing the opportunity to benefit from transferring 
asse ts  abroad. In effect, th is will reduce the desire to ru n  on deposits, 
implying th a t the guarantee is credible.
In sum m ary, a  b lanket guarantee alone m ay be neither credible nor 
effective in preventing bank  runs. It needs to be backed up by either sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves or very strict capital controls. As will be d iscussed in 
C hapter 10, th is helps in explaining severe ru n s  in the presence of such 
guarantee.
6.6. Concluding remarks
In th is chapter, a  ban k  centred open-economy m acroeconomic model was 
developed in order to provide a  framework for analysing rigorously the role of 
the banking sector in the origin and propagation of the  crisis. The model comes 
up  with three key postu lates.
First, the conditions of the banks alter aggregate economic activities. 
The inclusion of banking  channels in the model leads to different inferences 
com pared to the traditional IS-LM model. The interaction between banks and 
the rest of the economy is captured  through changes in the CC and LM curves.
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Second, with a  weak banking sector it is very difficult to defend an 
exchange ra te  peg by m eans of an interest rate hike. The reason is th a t the 
hike tends to aggravate the banking sector w eakness, m aking the probability of 
a  successful a ttack  higher. In other words, an in terest ra te  hike will be neither 
effective nor credible.
Third, a  weak banking sector is likely to play a  significant role in 
propagating the  crisis through loan contraction a n d /o r  expansion of reserve 
money. The increase in non-performing loans and  bank  ru n s  may lead to 
contraction in the loan m arket and, consequently, a  decline in aggregate 
economic activities. Moreover, even if a blanket guarantee is provided, it may 
not be credible in preventing bank  runs and subsequen t capital outflows if it is 
not accom panied by active sterilisation an d /o r capital control. Thus bank 
runs, capital outflows, sharp  exchange rate depreciation and  large output 
contraction will probably still occur in the presence of such  guarantee.
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Chapter 7
Econometric Procedures and Data
7.1. Introduction
Econometric procedures, da ta  sources and time series properties of d a ta  series 
will be d iscussed  in this chapter. In order to carry out the em pirics of the 
theoretical model th a t was developed in C hapter 6, time series econometric 
procedures will be employed. Long-run param eters will be estim ated using  the 
so-called cointegrating regressions. The estim ated coefficients rep resen t stable 
or equilibrium  relationships am ongst macroeconomic variables specified in the 
theoretical model. For the short-run  dynamic analyses, im pulse response 
functions will be derived from a vector error correction (VEC) model. In order to 
have fully specified short-run  dynamic equations, the long-run estim ates will be 
im posed on the  VEC.
Section 7.2 d iscusses the  derivation of VEC from a  vector autoregression 
(VAR). In order to estim ate the VEC, a two-step regression procedure will be 
employed. Because the efficiency of the regression is ham pered  by small- 
sample problem s, several s tru c tu ra l restrictions are im posed to reduce the 
num ber of param eters and colinearity problems, and  increase the  degree of 
freedom.
Section 7.3 d iscusses the procedure for estim ating the  long-run 
coefficients. The fully modified OLS method suggested by Phillips and  Hansen 
(1991) is u sed  in estim ating the steady state  relations. This technique is 
particularly  powerful for small sam ple size.
Section 7.4 d iscusses various cointegration tests  th a t will be u sed  to test 
the presence of long-run relationships am ongst macroeconomic variables. In
order to minimise the risk  of over rejecting/accepting the presence of 
cointegration, we adopt two different null hypotheses: no cointegration (Phillips- 
Perron test) and  cointegration (Durbin-W atson and J l-P a rk  tests).
Section 7.5 highlights the procedure for deriving im pulse response 
functions (IRF) from the VEC. An IRF m easures the dynam ics effects of a 
particu lar shock on the variables included in the VEC. These functions will be 
extensively u sed  in Chapters 9 and 10.
Sections 7.6 and 7.7 describe sources, definitions, and time series 
properties of the data. Before estim ating cointegrating relationships, it is 
required to specify the d a ta  generating processes. If the da ta  series are 
integrated of degree one (1(1)), the VAR will need to be estim ated in the form of 
VEC. If however the data  are stationary  or 1(0) series, the VAR in level would be 
robust and  efficient.
7.2. Vector error correction model
A vector error correction (VEC) can be derived directly from a  vector 
autoregression (VAR) involving non-stationary  variables (Engle and  Granger 
1987). The concept of the error correction m echanism  was introduced by 
Phillips (1957) and Sargan (1964). The idea is very simple: a  proportion of the 
disequilibrium  from one period is corrected in the next period. For example, 
the inflation ra te  in one period m ay depend upon the degree of excess dem and 
in the  previous period.
The derivation of the vector error correction (VEC) here is based on a 
theorem  by Jo h an sen  (1988). Let {Zt } be a  p-th  order of VAR and Zt = {h: X}', 
where Y is a  vector of endogenous variables and X is a  vector of exogenous 
variables. The VAR representation of Z, can be stated  as:
(7.1) Z, = £ n iZ,_l +tryw, + a0 +£,
J=1
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where st is a  gaussian  error term , and wt is a  vector of stationary  variables.
Theorem: A vector time series Z, has an error correction representation if it can 
be expressed as:
(7.2) AZ, = ^ j TiAZl_i + nzt_p + i//ywt + a0 + s t
1=1
where T(. = - I  + FI, + ....+  I l i (z=l,2, ,p -1)
n = -(i-n ,- . . . . - U p) = a ß
( £  > 
ö y t , an = V , n =T O , r  = ( r y ‘
y
'  u
^ , o  y L o  J 1 1 S x i  y
There are two ways of estim ating regression (7.2). First, Jo h an sen  suggested a 
unified m axim um  likelihood procedure by which a  and ß  are obtained by 
decom posing m atrix  n. Second, Engle and  Granger (1987) proposed th a t a 
two-step estim ation using cointegrating regression be employed and then 
the estim ated residual, be imposed to the above regression. In this 
study, the  Engle-Granger procedure is adopted, b u t with two modifications.
The modified two-step estim ation procedure can be described as follows. 
First, to estim ate the long-run coefficients ß  using the fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS) procedure suggested by Phillips and  H ansen (1990). Second, the 
estim ated residuals from FMOLS are then  im posed on a  system  of equations as 
suggested in equation (7.2), by applying a  Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) procedure. Under th is procedure, the generalised least squares (GLS) is 
applied to increase the efficiency of the estim ation by utilising the information 
contained in  the  correlation between d istu rbances th a t impinge on each of the 
re la tionships th a t comprise the system.
Two restrictions are imposed on the estim ation of the VEC: (1) on the 
long-run coefficients [ß), and (2) on the coefficients of lagged first difference 
variables in the VEC (FI). The theoretical model suggests th a t ß  is not a full 
ran k  m atrix, in th a t there are only 10 cointegrating vectors representing linear
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com binations of 20 variables included in the system. The vectors are specified 
as: (1) dem and for reserve money, (2) bank bail out function, (3) dem and for 
ru p iah  deposit, (4) dem and for foreign exchange deposits, (5) dem and for bank 
loans, (6) consum ption function, (7) investm ent function, (8) export supply, (9) 
im port dem and, and (10) capital flow function. The restrictions im posed on the 
vectors -som e of the coefficients are set to zero as implied by the theoretical 
model- are presented in Table 7.1.
Because of the small sample size, the inclusion of all lagged first 
difference variables in each equation in the VEC would reduce the degree of 
freedom and  efficiency of estim ates significantly. In order to solve th is problem 
the procedure suggested by In and Sugema (1995) is followed, in th a t the model 
is divided into several blocks. The criteria for determ ining which variable is 
included in each block should be based on the theoretical model. The theory 
suggests three blocks, namely LM, CC, and BP blocks, and each corresponds to 
the LM, CC, and BP curves.
The LM block aims to capture the dynam ics of the money m arket. It 
contains two equations explaining the dem and for reserve money and  bank  bail 
ou t function. All variables characterising these equations are included in the 
LM block, nam ely GDP, reserve money, rup iah  deposit rate, dollar deposit rate, 
bond rate , lending rate, exchange rate, and bank  bailou t.1
The CC block represents the dynamics of the commodity and  credit 
m arkets, and  contains five equations explaining dem and for rup iah  deposits, 
dem and for foreign exchange deposits, dem and for ban k  loans, consum ption 
function and  investm ent function. The variables included in the CC block are 
GDP, ru p iah  deposit, foreign exchange deposit, ban k  loan, consum ption, 
investm ent, rup iah  deposit rate, dollar deposit rate, bond rate, lending rate, and 
real exchange rate.
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3
The BP block captures the dynamics of the balance of paym ents. It 
contains three cointegrating vectors characterising export supply, import 
dem and, and  capital flow function. The variables included are (non-oil) export, 
im port, real exchange rate, GDP, export capacity index, ne t capital flows, 
nom inal domestic lending rate, and nominal foreign lending rate.
In doing this, the num ber of lagged variables can  be reduced 
significantly. For instance, only 8 variables are included in the BP block, 
instead  of 20 variables as in the original unrestric ted  VEC.
In the estim ation, all blocks are estim ated together using  a  SUR 
procedure. Thus there are 20 equations in the system , as in the  unrestricted  
VEC. However, some of the lagged-first-difference variables are set to zero in 
each equation in the system , i.e., variables th a t do no t belongs to the 
corresponding blocks are restricted. The restrictions im posed to the full model 
are presented in Table 7.2.
7.3. Phillips-Hansen procedure
In order to estim ate the long ru n  coefficients, which reflect stable relationships 
am ongst macroeconomic variables as suggested by the  model developed in 
C hapter 3, we employ FMOLS developed by Phillips and  H ansen (1990). The 
Phillips-Hansen procedure relies on sem i-param etric b ias corrections, which 
remove nu isance param eters ham pering statistical inference of estim ates 
obtained using  simple OLS. The param eters estim ated using  th is  procedure 
are, therefore, both asym ptotically unbiased  and valid, and  asym ptotic t- 
sta tistic  for the param eters can be derived from the corrected covariance 
m atrix. Moreover, this procedure is particularly powerful for sm all sample 
estim ations.2
2 Inders (1993) provides a  useful sim ulation-based com parison of th is and other 
cointegrating techniques. Phillips and  Hansen (1990) and  Phillips and  Loretan (1991) 
show th a t FMOLS work effectively for sample sizes as small as 50.
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Either the simple OLS based estim ation procedure suggested by Engle 
and Granger (1987) or the maximum-likelihood m ethods advocated by 
Jo h an sen  (1988) could have been used. The main problem  with the Engle- 
Granger procedure is th a t the OLS estim ator has an asym ptotic distribution, 
which is non-norm al and affected by nuisance param eters. This m eans the 
s tandard  t-sta tistics will not be valid asymptotically. On the o ther hand , the 
FMOLS corrects the estim ates for both endogeneity and  nu isance param eters, 
so th a t the t-sta tistics follow the standard  norm al distribution.
Unlike other cointegration procedures, Jo h an sen ’s m ethod integrates 
both the long ru n  and short run  dynamic in a  unified fashion. Moreover, this 
m ethod can determ ine the num ber of cointegrating vectors. However, the 
sm all-sam ple properties of this method are still unknow n and often resu lt in 
hardly interpretable coefficients. Recent applications of this procedure have 
resu lted  in a t least two practical problems (Hall 1990). First, both the trace and 
determ inant test statistics used  to determ ine the num ber of cointegrating 
relationships, and the estim ates of the long ru n  coefficients, are very sensitive 
to the choice of the lag length imposed in the initial VAR. The second problem 
is th a t severe multi-collinearity may appear between some of the variables, 
especially when dealing with VAR of a  reasonable size. This, in tu rn , m akes the 
point estim ates of the long ru n  coefficients even more sensitive to the choice of 
lag length.
The Phillips-Hansen procedure may be presented in a  bivariate fashion 
as in Baneijee et.al (1993).3 Let the variable y u and  y 2t be generated by:
(7.3) y„  + m „  + u
(7.4) y *  =  y  2i-i +  u2,
The innovation vector defined as w, = )' and  h as m ean vector and
covariance m atrix given by (0,0)' and E , respectively. Note th a t when uu and
3 A brief and digestible discussion on th is procedure can be found in Banerjee et.al 
(1993) section 7.7. However, it contains several serious m athem atical faults, and 
therefore one needs to refer back to Phillips and H ansen (1990).
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u2l are autocorrelated and intercorrelated, the regression in (7.3), w ithout using 
any information about (7.4), can yield a biased estim ate of ß , even in a fairly 
large sample. Park and Phillips (1988) offer a  full-system  m axim um  likelihood 
estim ation to correct the bias. Alternatively, Phillips and H ansen (1990) 
propose a  sem i-param etric correction applied to single-equation estim ation in 
order to have m edian-unbiased and  asymptotically norm al estim ates.
The sem i-param etric correction is done firstly by decomposing the long 
ru n  covariance m atrix Q as follows:
(7.5) Q — £ + A + A'
and defines
(7.6) A = £ + A
The fully modified least-squares estim ators of ß  is;
(7.7)
where y* = y u -  AI2Q ‘> 2,
= A
1
The standard  error can be obtained such th a t
f  T V1
(02=n; i>2,
f=l  J
where Qj" = Q n -Q ^ 2Q 2;!
Finally the normally d istributed  t-statistic  can be derived as:
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In order to correct the estim ates for endogeneity and nuisance 
param eters, it is necessary to determ ine A and for th is study the ‘Parzen 
window’ is used  as the weight for uk. Note th a t the optimal num ber of
truncation  lags k  involved in the window is chosen such th a t it provides the 
D urbin-W atson statistic closest to 2 to minimise the autocorrelation problem.
In order to test the stationarity  of the residual from the first step 
regression, three different cointegration tests  are employed, nam ely PP (Phillips- 
Perron), CRDW (cointegrating regression Durbin-W atson), J1 (Park’s semi- 
param etric) tests. The first te st has the null of non stationarity, while the last 
two tests  have the null of stationarity. By employing cointegration tests  with 
different null hypotheses, the error of over rejecting or accepting the presence of 
cointegration can be minimised. Note th a t the  last tests  tend to minimise the 
error of rejecting cointegration.
The CRDW statistic, as suggested by Sargan and  Bhargava (1983) is :
where wf+ is the residual from the fully modified cointegrating regression. Thus
nuisance param eters have mostly been removed from the com putation of 
CRDW. If the OLS is simply used  to estim ate the long ru n  coefficient, CRDW 
will be biased in favour of accepting the hypothesis of cointegration (Baneijee 
et.al 1993).
The J1 statistic  developed by Park (1991) h as  specifically been built to 
accom pany the FMOLS. The test is very straightforw ard and  involves two
7.4. Cointegration tests
T
(7.8) CRDW  = — r
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nested  regressions. The first regression is the FMOLS, as outlined in the 
previous section and, from this regression, we can obtain the residual sum  of 
squares defined as RSS1. In the second regression, the FMOLS is augm ented 
with a  num ber of time trend polynomials and gives RSS2. The test statistic  can 
then  be derived as:
(7.9) J 1 RSS\ -  RSS2n;
This sta tistic  h as asymptotic distribution of %(n), where n is the num ber of time 
trend  polynom ials included in the second regression.
As an  alternative to the above two tests, the PP test which has  the null of 
no cointegration is also employed. The test is carried out by regressing the first 
difference of residual of the FMOLS on the lagged value of the residual, such  
that:
(7.10) Aw,+ = a ,u ^  +v,
As in SHAZAM, the Newey and West (1987) m ethod is used  to construct an  
estim ate of the error variance from (7.7):
i7-11) 7 Z v<2
f = l ^  5  = 1 / = 5  + l
where w(s,l) is a  window with l truncation lag and SHAZAM defmes the window 
as:
w(s,/) 1 -57+T
Then the  t-s ta tistic  on a„ can be constructed using  the corrected error variance 
as in (7.11).
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7.5. Impulse Response Analysis
The purpose of the impulse response analysis (IRA) is to trace the effect on the 
system  of an  exogenous shock to a  given variable in the system . The effect of 
any unexpected shock to the system can be traced in term s of deviations of the 
shocked time paths from the expected time path  given by the model. This 
technique is quite useful in certain types of policy and  sensitivity analyses. The 
procedure to obtain an impulse response function from a VEC can be outlined 
as follows.
A ssum es th a t n  is not a  full-rank matrix, the solution of (7.2) involves 
common stochastic trends, and is given by:
(7.12) Z, = Z 0 +C(1 ) S ,+C*(L) (h , -K)
where ht -  i/Avt + ut
t
s , = Y jui > t= l>2 >3 ’........
/ = i
C(Z,) = C(1) + (1-L )C *(Z )
C * ( 0  = X  C'U 
1=0
Note th a t L is the one period lag operator, and C* m atrices are obtained 
recursively from:
(7.13) c;=c.o, +.... +c;_p®p
for i= l,2 ,...., with C*0 = I - C ( l ) ,  and C* = 0  for i<0. Matrix C( 1) can be obtained 
directly such  that:
(7.14) C (l)n  = 0 = n c ( i)
The m atrices, 3>, can be obtained from coefficient m atrices such  that:
o , = i - n  + r,
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!= 1 ,2 ...... ,p -l®,=r,-r,
«*, = -L-.
Let At = C(l) + C*, and based  on (6.4) and (6.5) Ai can be obtained 
recursively as:
(7.15) Ai =Ai_l0 , .+ .........+ Ai_p® p, for i= l,2 ,......
where A0 = I , lim A{ = C (l), and  At = 0 for i<0.
Let £  be the covariance m atrix of the innovation, £t , and cr be the
com ponent of the matrix. For a  shock in variable i, it is necessary  to define the 
size of the shock and an lXm m atrix, et = (0,....,1....,0) where the i-th component 
of the m atrix  is set to 1, while o ther com ponents are set to zero. The size of the 
shock is usually  set such  th a t öi = J o v". The corresponding generalised 
im pulse responses a t time T+N are given by:
(7.16) GIt (ßjZ' , N) =
where i=l,2,..m ; j= l,2 , ..,r and N = l,2 ,......
7.6. Data sources and variable definitions
The da ta  series used  in the empirical analyses are gathered from three 
sources; the Central Agency of Statistic (BPS) for national account data, 
Indonesian Financial S tatistics (Bank Indonesia) for m onetary and banking 
data, and  International Financial S tatistics (IMF) for capital flows. The da ta  are 
quarterly  and cover the period from 1984:Q1 to 1997:Q2. All da ta  are 
transform ed into real term s except for the capital flows.
National account d a ta  used  are GDP, consum ption, investm ent, export 
and  im ports. Each of these variables has its own deflator, and the real 
variables are defined as the nom inal values divided by the corresponding
170
deflator. Financial aggregates used are reserve money, total deposit, and bank 
loans. CPI is used  to deflate these variables.
Four in terest rates are used; deposit rate, lending rate, bond rate, and 
LIBOR rates. The deposit rate is defined as the weighted average of time 
deposit rates, where the weights are the share of each category of time deposits 
with respect to the total time deposit. The lending ra te  is the weighted average 
of in terest rates on loans for investment and working capital. The LIBOR rate  is 
the simple average of deposit rates with m aturity  of no t more th an  12 m onths. 
The bond rate used  is the SBI (central bank certificate) rate.
For deposit and lending rates, the real in terest ra te  are defined as the 
nom inal in terest rate  m inus the annualised inflation ra te  during the following 
three m onths. For the LIBOR rate, the real in terest ra te  is defined as the 
nom inal ra te  m inus annualised inflation plus the annualised  depreciation rate 
of the currency during the following three m onths. T hus the real LIBOR rate 
represen ts the real income for holding dollar deposits in rup iah  term s.
The real exchange rate is a trade-weighted index of Indonesia against its 
ten  m ajor trading partners. The countries included in the calculation are 
Jap a n , USA, Singapore, South Korea, Germany, Taiwan, China, Australia, 
N etherlands, and  United Kingdom. Following Edw ards [1989], the wholesale 
price index (WPI) of those countries is used as a  proxy for P* and  Indonesia’s 
consum er price index (CPI) is used as the domestic price.
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Table 7 .3 . V ariable D efinition an d  Sources
Variable D efinition
Real GDP Nom inal GDP deflated by GDP deflator; C B S
Real Money
Real R upiah  D eposit
Real Foreign 
E xchange D eposit
S tock of reserve m oney deflated by CPI; B I
Stock of ru p ia h  deposit deflated by CPI; B I
Stock of deposit denom inated  in  foreign cu rrency  
deflated  by CPI (sta ted  in  US$); B I
Real B ank  Loan Total b a n k  loans to private secto r deflated by CPI; B I
Real C onsum ption The su m  of nom inal governm ent an d  private 
co nsum ption  deflated by consum ption  deflator: C B S
Real Investm ent The su m  of n om inal governm ent an d  private 
investm en t deflated  by investm en t deflator; C B S
Real E xports 
Real Im ports 
Real B ank  B ailout
V alue of non-oil export divided by its p rice index; C B S
V alue of to ta l im port divided by its  price index; C B S
B ank  borrow ing from  th e  cen tra l b a n k  deflated  by CPI; 
B I
Real R upiah  D eposit 
Rate
W eighted average of in te re s t ra te s  on 1 to 12 m o n th  
ru p ia h  deposit co rrected  for the  ac tu a l inflation ra te  of 
th e  following q u arte r; B I
Real Bond Rate Sim ple average of in te re s t ra te s  on cen tra l b a n k  
certificate (SBI)corrected for th e  inflation ra te  of the  
su b se q u e n t quarte r; B I
Real Lending Rate W eighted average of in te re s t ra te s  on w orking cap ital 
an d  investm en t loans co rrected  for th e  inflation ra te  of 
the  su b se q u e n t q u arte r; B I
Real E xchange Rate Nom inal exchange ra te  tim es world price divided by 
dom estic  price. The w orld price is defined a s  a  trade- 
w eighted index  of w holesale p rices (WPI) of In d o n es ia ’s 
te n  m ajor trad in g  p a r tn e rs  (Jap an , USA, S ingapore, 
S o u th  Korea, G erm any, Taiw an, C hina, A ustralia , 
N etherlands, an d  U nited  Kingdom). D om estic price is 
th e  co n su m er price index  (CPI); IFS
C apital Flow
Regional C apital 
Flow
N om inal n e t cap ita l inflows; B I
The su m  of n om inal n e t cap ital flows to th e  th ree  
neighbouring  coun tries: The Philippines, M alaysia an d  
T hailand; IFS
LIBOR Rate Sim ple average of US $ London In ter-B ank  Offered 
Rate; IFS
E xport C apacity M anufac tu ring  p roduction  index  (proxy); C B S
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The use of official da ta  from Central B ureau of S tatistics (CBS), Bank 
Indonesia (BI), and International Financial S tatistic (IKS) is due to two reasons. 
First, the data  are easily obtained from official publication and databases. Thus 
error in da ta  can be crosschecked with other sources. Second, official da ta  are 
usually  standardised in accordance with a  certain  in ternational convention. 
Although, there may be some doubts over the quality of the data, a t least they 
are the best th a t are available.
Testing the quality of da ta  is beyond the scope th is study. Data 
published by CBS and BI are the most widely u sed  for analysing Indonesian 
macroeconomic. However, this does not imply th a t the quality of the d a ta  can 
be taken  for granted. In particular, the quality of d a ta  on capital flows is 
questionable. It is widely known th a t there is no requirem ent for residents and 
foreigners to report their cross border financial transac tions to the m onetary 
authority . Consequently, the authority did not have accurate  records on total 
private foreign debts and private capital flows. Thus, econom etric estim ation on 
the determ inant of net capital inflow may not be ro b u st due to th is  da ta  quality 
constrain t.
7. 7. Time series properties of the data
Prior to the estim ations of the model, univariate te sts  are conducted to examine 
the time series properties of the data  series which follow Dickey and  Fuller 
(1979 and 1981), Phillips (1987) and Perron (1988). The augm ented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test is used  in order to cap ture  possible high order of 
autocorrelation processes. The num ber of lags included in the estim ation is 
determ ined by Swartz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and  Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). The Phillips-Perron (PP) test removes nu isance param eters by employing 
non-param etric modification on the error variance. The tests  are applied to 
both  the level and first difference of the series.
The resu lts are presented in Table 7.4. Both ADF and PP tests  confirm 
th a t all series are non-stationer in the level and sta tioner in the first difference, 
except the real exchange rate. While ADF confirms th a t the real exchange rate
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is an  1(1) process, PP indicates tha t it m ight be an  1(0) process. However, if the 
10 per cen t significant level is used, PP also suggests th a t the variable is non­
stationary . In sum , the tests suggest th a t the d a ta  generating process relating 
to all variables are integrated of degree one. Therefore, VEC is the appropriate 
procedure for estim ating the model. On the  o ther hand, VAR in the first 
difference cannot be u sed  because it is misspecified.
Table 7 .4 . Unit Root Tests
Level F irst D ifference
Variable ADF PP ADF PP
GDP -2.79 -0.63 -4.15 -12.50
Money -2.45 -3.17 -3.96 -10.94
R upiah Deposit -1.68 -2.03 -3.54 -9.59
Foreign Exchange Deposit -2.79 -2.78 -5.29 -10.40
B ank Loan -1.28 -0.80 -4.07 -4.72
C onsum ption -1.68 -1.00 -5.23 -9.35
Investm ent -1.80 -1.81 -5.19 -9.81
Exports (non-oil) -2.14 -2.12 -4.43 -12.57
Im ports -3.07 -3.16 -4.15 -9.73
B ank Bailout -2.63 -2.50 -4.17 -9.39
R upiah Deposit Rate -2.49 -2.54 -4.97 -7.04
Bond Rate -3.08 -3.02 -5.51 -11.92
Lending Rate -2.69 -2.71 -5.47 -7.41
Dollar D eposit Rate -1.76 -3.17 -4.04 -7.94
Real Exchange Rate -3.18 -3.46 -9.39 -9.09
C apital Flow -2.23 -2.55 -6.06 -7.47
Regional Capital Flow -1.33 -2.38 -4.03 -11.98
Nominal Lending Rate -3.27 -3.26 -3.89 -7.62
Nominal LIBOR Rate -1.62 -1.73 -3.79 -6.77
Export Capacity -3.29 -1.12 -3.95 10.54





After developing a  theoretical model in C hapter 6 and presenting econometric 
procedures in  C hapter 7, the empirical analyses will be presented in th is and 
the next two chapters. By employing cointegrating regression, th is chapter 
d iscusses the  interrelationships am ongst macroeconomic variables as 
suggested by the model. Based on these estim ates, the long-run transm ission  
m echanism s can be derived, characterising perm anent ad justm ent process to a 
m acroeconom ic shock.
The res t of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 d iscusses the 
determ inan ts of dom estic absorption. Section 8.3 discusses the regression 
resu lts  for the dem and for deposit and bank  loans. Section 8.4 highlights the 
determ inan t of money dem and and supply. This is followed by a  discussion of 
the determ inan ts of the trade and capital account balances. Throughout the 
chapter, the  estim ates will be interpreted in conjunction with the state  of the 
m acroeconom y before the crisis. This chapter closes with a  discussion on the 
relevance of the estim ates for analysing the ad justm ent process and  policy 
responses during  the crisis.
8.2. Domestic absorption
8.2.1. Consumption function
In th is  subsection, a  cointegrating regression is estim ated to explain 
consum ption. Real consum ption is defined as the sum  of private and 
governm ent consum ption deflated by the consum er price index. The
explanatory variables are real GDP, real exchange ra te  and real deposit rate. All 
variables are transform ed into log form, except for the in terest rate.
Table 8.1 presents the estim ated consum ption function. All 
cointegration tests  suggest th a t consum ption is a  stable function of GDP, the 
real exchange rate  and real deposit rate. The overall fit of the model is 
satisfactory in term s of high value of R2 and significant F-test.
Table 8 .1 . Estimates for consumption function
E xp la n a to ry  Variables C oefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 0.9273 33.6628
Real deposit ra te -0.0070 -0.0516
Log of real exchange rate -0.2405 -3.7038
C onstan t 1.5654 4.4740
Sta tistica l Properties
R2 = 0.958 F = 404.490 CRDW = 1.854
PP (t) = -7.051 PP (Z) = -41.602 Park’s J  1(0,3) = 1.659
Consum ption is relatively more sensitive to a  change in real GDP th an  to 
the o ther variables. In other words, GDP is the m ain determ inant of 
consum ption. The elasticity of consum ption with respect to GDP is 0.93.
The coefficient attached  to the real exchange ra te  suggests th a t for every 
one per cent of real depreciation in the currency, consum ption will fall by 0.24 
per cent. Since the real exchange rate  m easures the relative price between 
tradable and  non-tradable goods, depreciation should reduce consum ption of 
tradable goods. However, since the elasticity is small, consum ption would not 
be m uch  affected by devaluation. The effect of a  real devaluation on 
consum ption is channelled through the fall in real wages, as devaluation affects 
the aggregate price level (Krugman and Taylor 1976).
There is no strong evidence tha t a  change in the in terest ra te  affects 
consum ption. The coefficient of the in terest ra te  is very small and is
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statistically  insignificant. The results seem to suggest th a t the negative effect on 
consum ption of higher in terest rate is counterbalanced by its positive income 
effect.
8.2.2. Investment function
To shed  light on the investm ent function, we employ cointegrating regression 
with real investm ent as the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
are: real investm ent, real GDP, real exchange rate, real lending ra te  and real 
bond rate. The resu lts  are presented in Table 8.2. All cointegration tests 
strongly confirm a stable relationship characterising the investm ent function.
The elasticity of investm ent with respect to GDP is slightly higher than  
one (1.03), suggesting a higher rate of growth of investm ent com pared to the 
growth in GDP. This is not surprising, since the sam ple period of the 
estim ation is characterised  by high capital inflow, especially during the 
nineties. Moreover, banking liberalisation helped in increasing the availability 
of loanable funds.
Table 8.2. Regression results characterising investment function
E xplanatory V ariables Coefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 1.0331 12.9400
Real lending rate -1.6200 -1.8953
Real bond rate -0.1300 -0.0258
Log of real exchange rate -0.2968 -2.0311
C onstan t -0.0795 -0.4249
Statistica l Properties
R2 = 0.9817 F = 1408.229 CRDW = 1.287
PP (t) = -5.224 PP (Z) = -38.766 P ark’s J  1(0,3) = 1.756
Investm ent is elastic with respect to the real exchange ra te  b u t the 
m agnitude of the coefficient is higher than  the elasticity of consum ption to the
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real exchange rate. This suggests that, in the case of devaluation, a  reduction 
in dom estic absorption will come mainly from a fall in investm ent ra ther than  in 
consum ption. In other words, firms, or the production side of the economy, are 
more responsive to the shock in real exchange rate. This implies th a t the 
reduction in im ports would be from investm ent related im ports, such  as capital 
goods and raw m aterials. Moreover, the negative im pact of devaluation on 
investm ent may also be pronounced through the burden  created from foreign 
exchange denom inated debts (see for example Krugman and  Taylor 1976).
The estim ated coefficient of the real bond rate  is statistically 
insignificant. This may be due to the fact th a t the bond m arket is still relatively 
rudim entary  in Indonesia. Note tha t total bonds registered and  rated  by 
Pefmdo -  the official rating com pany - were only about Rp 6 trillion, compared 
with Rp 329 trillion of bank  loans, at the onset of the crisis (Infobank , Ju ly  
1999). In other words, the credit m arket is bank  dom inated.
The coefficient a ttached  to the real lending ra te  suggests th a t a  one per 
cent increase in the ra te  will reduce investm ent by 1.6 per cent, indicating th a t 
investm ent is more responsive to the change in the real lending ra te  than  to the 
o ther variables. This implies th a t firms are responsive to the change in real 
in terest rate. As argued by Bem anke and Gertler (1990), a  rise in the interest 
ra te  can induce a  higher prem ium  of hiring external capital, and  therefore firms 
will reduce investm ent. This is particularly so if firms are highly leveraged by 
banks. As discussed  in section 3.5, the ratio of bank  loans to GDP was 
trending upw ard. Thus, it is not surprising th a t investm ent is very sensitive to 
the in terest rate.
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8.3. Deposit and loan markets
8.3.1. Demand for deposits
Depositors can hold either rup iah  or foreign exchange denom inated deposits in 
foreign exchange banks, b u t only rup iah  deposits in banks w ithout a  foreign 
exchange licence. In the following estim ations, the dem and for rupiah  and 
foreign exchange deposits will be estim ated separately for two reasons. First, 
foreign exchange deposits account for about 25 to 30 per cent of total deposits 
and, therefore, depreciation in the currency can significantly affect the total 
value of deposits. Second, the in terest ra tes attached  to these deposits are 
different from those attached  to other deposits, and therefore m ust represent a  
different m enu of risk and  re tu rns. Moreover, not all depositors have access to 
foreign exchange deposits, especially in rem ote areas. There may also be some 
depositors who are not fully aware of the exchange ra te  risk  affecting their 
financial wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to assum e th a t these two types of 
deposit are not perfect sub stitu tes  for each other.
Demand for rupiah deposit
In the  following regression, the log of real rup iah  deposit is treated  as the 
dependent variable. The real deposit is defined as the sum  of time, saving and 
dem and rupiah  deposits deflated by the consum er price index.1 The 
explanatory variables are real rup iah  deposit rate, real bond rate, real dollar 
deposit rate, and log of real GDP. Real in terest ra tes used  are in ‘proportionate 
form s’.2 In order to capture the im pact of the PAKTO, the log of the num ber of 
ban k  branches is included in the regression. A dum m y variable representing 
the change in reserve requirem ent which takes a  value one for 1984:1-1988:3
1 Note that demand deposits are interest-yielding assets and therefore cannot be treated as if 
they were non-interest yielding assets like reserve money. Treating demand deposit and 
reserve money as one group (Ml) in a regression was attempted, but the results of the 
regression are unsatisfactory.
2 This implies the coefficients on interest rates are only ‘approximate’ estimates of elasticities.
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and  zero for the other quarters is also included to capture possible overall shift 
in the level of deposit holdings independently of the explanatory variables 
considered.3
The resu lts  are presented in Table 8.3. Phillips-Perron, CRDW, J1  tests 
support the existence of cointegration, suggesting a stable long-run relationship 
between dependent and explanatory variables.
The coefficient on real GDP suggests tha t a  one per cent increase in GDP 
bring about a  2 per cent increase in the dem and, suggesting a  persisten t 
financial deepening. In other words, deposits tend to grow faster th an  GDP. 
This finding is consistent with the notion discussed in section 3.5.3 th a t the 
ratio of deposits to GDP increased persistently during the pre-crisis period (see 
Figure 3.3).
Table 8.3. The dem and for real rupiah deposits
E xp lana tory  Variables Coefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 2.1258 19.1206
Real rupiah  deposit rate 1.0900 3.4541
Real bond rate -0.1900 -1.6041
Real dollar deposit rate -0.1100 -2.6301
Log of num ber of bank  branch 0.0116 3.3618
Dummy of reserve requirem ent -0.2340 -4.0801
C onstant -4.5603 -7.1880
S ta tistica l Properties
R2 = 0.993 F = 1951 .124 CRDW = 2.070
PP (t) = -6.969 PP (Z) = -62.099 Park’s J1 (0 ,3) = 2.326
The coefficient on real deposit rate suggests th a t a  one per cent increase 
in the in terest ra te  can bring about an increase of the  sam e m agnitude in
3 Note that the reserve requirement was reduced from 15 per cent of total current liabilities to 2 
per cent of third parties liabilities on October 1988.
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dem and for rup iah  deposits. The increase in the  deposit holdings may be 
generated partly from the reduction in holdings of o ther financial a sse ts  such 
as reserve money and bonds.
The estim ated coefficient relating to the bond rate  indicates th a t a  one 
per cent increase in the bond rate would reduce the dem and for rup iah  deposits 
by about 0.2 per cent. The low value of this coefficient and  its t-ratio  suggests 
th a t bonds are imperfect substitu tes for rup iah  deposits, and  th u s  the 
assum ption  im posed in the model is confirmed by th is  finding. In o ther words, 
the traditional view th a t financial m arkets can be analysed as two groups, 
money and bond m arket is not supported by th is finding. Therefore, a  three 
financial asse t m arket approach as assum ed by th is model is more appropriate.
Since three financial assets are considered, according to W alras law, it is 
only necessary  to determ ine equilibrium condition in two asse ts  m arkets. 
Technically speaking, it is sufficient to estim ate equations regarding reserve 
money and deposit m arkets in order to analyse overall equilibrium  in the 
financial m arket. In other words, it is not necessary  to estim ate equations 
regarding the determ inants of dem and for, and supply of, bonds.
The estim ated coefficient on the real dollar deposit ra te  suggests th a t a  
one per cent increase in the dollar rate would reduce dem and for rupiah  
deposits by only about 0.1 per cent. This also m eans th a t the two deposits are 
not perfect substitu te  for each other. As noted earlier, no t all b an k  custom ers 
have access to foreign exchange denominated deposits, preventing them  from 
holding such  deposits even if the yields become m ore attractive.
The expansion in bank branch networks seem s to induce higher dem and 
for deposits. A one per cent increase in the num ber of ban k  b ranches, on 
average, leads to a  0.01 per cent increase in the dem and for rupiah  
denom inated deposits.
The increase in required reserves tends to reduce b an k  profitability and 
therefore depress in terest ra tes on deposits, leading to a  reduction in deposit 
holdings. In line with th is expectation, the coefficient on the  dum m y variable
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is negative. Therefore, the reserve requirem ent can be used  as a  policy 
instrum en t to affect banking activities.
Demand for real foreign exchange deposits
In the following regression, real foreign exchange deposits are treated  as a 
dependent variable while the independent variables are the sam e as for the 
dem and for rup iah  deposits. The estim ated resu lts  are p resented  in Table 8.4. 
Various cointegration tests  suggest the presence of cointegration characterising
C
the dem and for foreign exchange deposits.
The elasticity of the dem and for foreign exchange deposits with respect to 
real GDP is about 1.6, suggesting th a t deposits tend  to grow faster th an  GDP. 
Caution should be used  since GDP is denom inated in dom estic currency, while 
th is  deposit is denom inated in US dollars.
Table 8 .4 . The dem and for real foreign exchange deposits
E xp la n a to ry  Variables C oefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 1.6396 11.3514
Real rup iah  deposit rate -0.2200 -0.5610
Real bond rate -0.4800 -1.6470
Real dollar deposit ra te 2.5000 2.4853
Log of num ber of ban k  branch 0.0068 1.5695
Dummy of reserve requirem ent -0.1336 -1.8482
C onstant -7.3903 -15.5220
Sta tistica l Properties 
R2 = 0.950 F =193.848
PP (t) = -4.910 PP (Z) = -31.386
CRDW = 1.225 
P ark ’s J  1(0,3) = 4.282
The coefficient a ttached  to the real rup iah  deposit ra te  is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests th a t the dem and for real foreign exchange deposits 
is relatively unaffected by the rupiah  deposit rate. One explanation could be
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th a t the holders of foreign exchange deposits m aintain  these deposits fixed, 
regardless of rup iah  deposit rates, in order to avoid unexpected devaluation. In 
o ther words, the deposits are held for precautionary purposes, or to reduce 
exchange rate risk. Note that, from observations on published in terest rates 
being offered from a  num ber of banks from mid 1996 to mid 1997, the in terest 
ra te  differential between the rupiah and dollar rate  was about 7 to 8 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the depreciation of the currency was about 4 to 5 per cent a  year. 
Thus, there is strong evidence of a ‘peso problem ’: depositors are re luc tan t to 
reduce dollar deposits, although home currency deposits offer more attractive 
income, like it is the case in m any Latin American countries. Note tha t, unlike 
ru p iah  deposit holders, all holders of foreign exchange deposits have free access 
to rup iah  denom inated deposits.
The coefficient attached to the real bond rate  is negative. The low value 
of the coefficient suggests th a t bonds are no t a  perfect su b stitu te  for foreign 
exchange deposits. But, unlike the coefficient on the rup iah  deposit rate, its t- 
ratio is only significant a t 20 per cent level. If foreign exchange deposits are 
purely m aintained to avoid an exchange ra te  risk, they m u st also be unaffected 
by the bond rate. Because a  20 per cent significance level is relatively low, the 
coefficient m ay be treated  as insignificant. Therefore the  ‘peso problem ’ holds. 
Alternatively, it m ay be interpreted th a t some portion of foreign exchange 
deposits m ay be ready to be converted to rup iah  denom inated bonds with short 
m aturity , say below one m onth, in a  hit and  ru n  m anner. Note th a t time 
deposits have a t least one-m onth m aturity, and  therefore provide less flexible 
conversion of assets.
The coefficient a ttached  to the dollar deposit ra te  is positive and  suggests 
th a t a  one per cent increase in the rate can  induce about a  2.5 per cent 
increase in dollar deposit holdings. Since the  LIBOR dollar ra te  is u sed  as a  
proxy for the dollar rate  offered by domestic banks, th is  resu lt also implicitly 
suggests th a t the dollar ra te  is affected by the  LIBOR rate. In o ther words, 
foreign exchange deposits are offered by dom estic banks in order to a ttrac t 
deposits th a t would have otherwise been invested abroad.
183
The coefficients attached to the num ber of bank  branches and the 
dum m y of required reserves on dem and for foreign exchange deposits are 
sm aller in m agnitude than  those observed in regression for the dem ands for 
ru p iah  deposits. This implies th a t the im pact of PAKTO is less pronounced in 
the dem and for foreign exchange deposits. In o ther words, expansion in 
banking  netw orks had more im pact on deposit m obilization in the remote or 
less u rb a n  areas. Alternatively, the sources of growth for banks comes from 
depositors who are not aware of foreign exchange risk  or do not have access to 
foreign exchange deposits.
8.3.2 Demand for bank loans
To shed  light on the determ inants of dem and for real bank  loans, a 
cointegrating regression is carried out with real ban k  loans as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables are real lending rate , real bond rate, and 
real GDP. As for the dem ands for deposits the dum m y variable and  the num ber 
of b an k  b ranches are also included.
The resu lts  of cointegrating regression are p resen ted  in Table 8.5. All 
cointegration tests  strongly support a  stable relationship between dem and for 
ban k  loans an d  the explanatory variables.
Table 8.5. The demand for real bank loans
E xplan atory Variables Coefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 3.4684 16.3201
Real lending rate -1.0600 1.9576
Real bond ra te 0.0600 0.0657
Log of n u m ber of bank  branch 0.0216 3.3033
Dum m y of reserve requirem ent -0.4316 -4.0404
C onstan t -9.8065 -8.3490
S ta tistica l Properties
R2 = 0.9811 F = 261.454
PP (t) = -6.711 PP (Z) = -57.918
CRDW = 1.667 
P ark ’s J1 (0 ,3) = 7.098
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The resu lts  suggest a stable relationship between real GDP and demand 
for real b an k  loans. One per cent increase in real GDP will generate a 3.5 per 
cent increase in dem and for bank loans. This is consisten t with the notion 
d iscussed  earlier th a t there is a  tendency for firms to become more leveraged by 
banks. In o ther words, the ratio of bank loans to GDP tends to increase over 
time.
The estim ated coefficient suggests th a t a  one per cent increase in the real 
loan ra te  will be followed by a 1.1 per cent reduction in dem and for loans. 
Some projects which were previously marginally bankable m ay choose not to 
apply for loans, therefore reducing the dem and. Moreover, projects with a 
higher re tu rn  m ay also reduce external financing, as the higher cost of capital 
tends to reduce profitability.
The estim ated coefficient on the real bond rate  is relatively small and 
insignificant. This confirms the assum ption th a t bonds are not perfect 
su b s titu te s  for bank  loans. This has great relevance for policy purposes, in tha t 
firms are generally credit constrained, as they cannot shift from one financial 
source to the  other. In other words, there is a  strong segm entation of financial 
m arkets  and  therefore the authorities can design in strum en ts  specifically 
affecting each.
8.4. Money Market
8.4.1. Demand for reserve money
To shed  light on the determ inants of dem and for reserve money, a  cointegrating 
regression is employed, with real reserve money as the dependent variable. The 
explanatory  variables used  in the estim ation are real GDP, real deposit rates 
and  real bond rates. The latter two variables capture the opportunity  cost of 
holding money. Real money and real GDP are expressed in log term s. A dummy 
variable represen ting  the change in reserve requirem ent and  the num ber of 
b an k  b ran ch es  are included in the regression. All variables are transform ed into
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log forms, except for in terest rates which are stated  in proportionate form and, 
of course, the dummy variables.
The regression resu lts are reported in Table 8.6. The Phillips-Perron 
non-param etric test confirms tha t the error term  is stationary. This is also 
supported  by the CRDW test and the J1 Park’s test. In sum m ary, the 
regression resu lts  support the view th a t there is a  stable relationship  between 
dem and for real reserve money and real GDP, real deposit ra tes, real bond 
ra tes, num ber of bank branches and the dum m y variable.
Table 8.6. The demand for reserve money, 1984:Q1-1997:Q2
Explanatory Variables Coefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 1.0090 18.3957
Real deposit rate -0.5400 -1.8714
Real bond rate 0.1800 4.2771
Log of num ber of bank branch -0.0106 -4.4629
Dum m y of required reserves 0.2119 5.4731
Statistical Properties
R2 = 0.924 F = 123.852 CRDW = 1.948
PP (t) = -7.329 PP (Z) = -51.997 P ark’s J  1(0,3) = 4.425
The resu lt suggests th a t the elasticity of dem and for reserve money with 
respect to GDP is very close to one, which m eans m oney holding will increase 
proportionally with the increase in GDP. It seem s th a t the  dem and for money is 
driven predom inantly by the transaction  motive.
The resu lts  suggest th a t a one per cent increase in the  deposit rate will 
reduce the dem and for reserve money by about 0.54 per cent. Reserve money 
is a  non-in terest bearing financial asset. Therefore, an  increase in the  deposit 
ra te  would induce higher opportunity costs. An increase in the deposit rate 
reduces the dem and for real money.
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As for the deposit rate, the model expects the  coefficient on the real bond 
ra te  to be negative, m eaning th a t an increase in th is ra te  will increase the 
dem and for bonds and will thereby reduce dem and for o ther financial assets, 
including reserve money. Surprisingly, the estim ated coefficient is positive and 
significant, although the m agnitude is relatively sm all a t 0.18.
The liberalisation in 1988 increased the n u m ber of banks and bank 
b ranches, and  therefore should have an impact on the com position of financial 
a sse ts  held. This development can increase people’s access to banks in term s 
of interm ediation of savings and investm ent, as well as in term s of 
interm ediation of commercial transactions. Therefore, it is expected th a t the 
increase in the num ber of branches will reduce the need to hold reserve money, 
as the  function of money both as storage of values and  conduits of transaction 
can  be be tte r replaced by banking services. In o ther words, the  coefficient on 
the  num ber of bank  branches is expected to be negative. As expected, the 
estim ated  coefficient is in fact negative and suggests th a t a  one per cent 
increase in the num ber of bank branches tends to reduce the dem and for 
reserve m oney by 0.016 per cent. It seems th a t im provem ent in access to 
b an k s can  increase transactions interm ediated by banks, and  thereby reduce 
the  function of reserve money. In other words, the  economy becomes less 
m oney intensive and more bank  intensive. However, the  m agnitude of the 
coefficient is relatively small, indicating th a t b an k  services are not perfect 
su b stitu tes  for money. This is consistent with the  finding d iscussed  in section 
3.5.3 th a t there  was a  small drop in the ratio of reserve m oney to GDP after the 
PAKTO, and  th is ratio stabilised thereafter (see Figure 3.3).
Increase in b an k s’ reserve requirem ent should  increase the dem and for 
reserve money, as banks are forced to hold m ore reserves and, more 
im portantly, banks may have to lower deposit ra tes. Note th a t, based on the 
previous finding, a  lower deposit rate can increase reserve m oney dem and, as 
the  opportunity  cost of holding money becomes lower. Therefore, the expected 
coefficient on the dum m y variable is positive. The regression resu lt is consistent 
with th is  hypothesis.
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8.4.2. Bank Bail Out
The change in reserve money supply can be decom posed into two parts, the 
change in ne t domestic assets (NDA) and net foreign asse ts  (NFA). In this su b ­
section, the  largest component of NDA will be d iscussed , nam ely bank  bail out. 
Note th a t the term  bail out is broadly defined as com m ercial borrowing from the 
cen tral bank. During the pre-crisis period, it partly reflects the size of liquidity 
ass is tan ce  from the central bank to troubled banks. It also includes “credit 
p rogram s” sponsored by the central bank with a  subsid ised  in terest rate, such  
as sm all-scale credit schemes and credit to preferred projects like the national 
car project. However, as argued by Nasution (1995), these  schem es tended to 
be associated  with poor loan quality and induced banking  fragility. Therefore, it 
m ight be a  good proxy variable for m easuring the “fragility” of dom estic banks.
The m ain  focus of this sub-section is to identify the  determ inants of the 
dem and  for b an k  bail out. In order to facilitate th is, a  cointegrating regression 
is employed w ith the  bail out as a  dependent variable. The bail ou t is m easured 
in  real term s, th a t is borrowing from the central b an k  deflated by the  consum er 
price index. Four explanatory variables are included in the  estim ation, namely 
real lending rate , real exchange rate, real GDP and  a  dum m y variable 
represen ting  banking  liberalisation. As usual, all variables are transform ed into 
log form, except the real interest rate and dum m y variable.
The estim ation results are presented in Table 8.7. All cointegration tests  
suggest a  stable relationship between the real bail o u t and  real lending rate, 
real exchange rate, and real GDP. This suggests th a t borrowings from the 
cen tral b an k  m ay indeed reflect the fragility of the bank ing  system.
The resu lts  for the real lending rate variable implies th a t an  increase in 
the  in te rest ra te  deteriorates bank performance and  therefore induce a  higher 
dem and  for bail out. A one per cent increase in  the  real lending ra te  can 
increase the  dem and for bail out by 1.2 per cent. This implies th a t, following a  
m onetary  tightening, banks may experience higher non-perform ing loans. As 
argued by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), this deterioration in the  asse t quality may
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come from two factors. First, low yielding b u t safer projects m ay not be able to 
honour the loan. Second, the loan portfolio will be dom inated by risky projects, 
which can eventually lead to a  higher default risk.
Table 8 .7 . The demand for real bail out
E x p la n a to r y  V a r ia b le s  C o e ffic ie n t T -ra tio
Log of real GDP -0.3965 -4.2432
Real lending rate 1.2011 2.5649
Log of real exchange rate 0.9665 4.3798
Liberalisation dum m y 0.1131 2.0630
C onstant 0.0511 0.2739
S ta t is t ic a l  P ro p e r tie s
R2 = 0.944 F = 170.892 CRDW = 1.574
PP (t) = -4.841 PP (Z) = -32.448 P ark ’s J  1(0,3) = 1.319
Since a  hike in the in terest rate can induce a  h igher dem and for bail out, 
the increase in liquidity injection to banks tends to jeopard ise the purpose of 
m onetary tightening. Thus there will be a  need to counter balance the 
injection. One m ethod of doing th is is through the release of foreign reserves. 
In o ther words, quite contraiy to the conventional wisdom, an  in terest rate  hike 
can precipitate capital outflows. The other m ethod is by counter balancing the 
injection with o ther com ponents of NDA, such as the  sale of dom estic securities 
held by the central bank.
The coefficient on the real exchange ra te  is positive and  close to one, 
suggesting th a t a  bail out is also highly responsive to changes in the real 
exchange rate. Currency devaluation seem s to w orsen the  balance sheet of 
banks. Devaluation would become a  problem  if there  were a  currency 
m ism atch problem, either on the part of banks or firms. As shown in C hapter 
5, banks do not possess such a m ism atch in the  sense th a t asse ts  and 
liabilities denom inated in foreign currency are well balanced. Thus the 
problem  should be on the p a rt of firms. In o ther words, b an k s are exposed to
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an  indirect currency risk. This issue will be discussed in detail later in C hapter 
9.
Com paring the m agnitudes of the coefficients on the real in terest rate 
and  real exchange ra te  m ay be of in terest for policy purposes. As d iscussed in 
C hapter 6, in the wake of speculative attacks, policy m akers are confronted 
with two hard  choices; defending the currency by increasing the domestic 
in terest ra tes or allowing the currency to devalue. The finding here suggests an 
in te rest ra te  hike would be more costly for the banking sector. In the case of 
an  in terest ra te  hike, all firms will be affected. On the o ther hand , only firms 
operating in the non-tradable sector with a  currency m ism atch will be h it hard  
by devaluation. This is probably the reason why bank  borrowing with the 
central b an k  is m ore sensitive to in terest ra tes  th an  to a  real devaluation.
The coefficient a ttached  to real GDP suggests a  negative relationship 
between b an k  bail ou t and  GDP. A one per cent decline in real GDP can cause 
a  0.4 per cent increase in real bank  bail out. In o ther words, a  negative shock 
in dom estic o u tp u t can worsen the financial position of banks. Therefore, a 
shock in real activities can affect the financial sector.
The coefficient on the dum m y variable is positive and  significant b u t 
relatively small. Thus, it may be in terpreted  th a t following the liberalisation in 
1988, the banking  sector becam e m arginally more fragile. The possible trade­
off between efficiency and  safety resulting  from liberalisation h a s  been a  m ain 
concern in the  literatu re  applying industria l organisation theory to financial 
sector analysis (see for example Davies 1991). However, the finding here 
suggests th a t the increase in fragility of the banking sector is relatively small.
Finally, we have shown th a t the bail ou t function assum ed in the model 
is supported  by the  data. Thus, ignoring th is  factor as one of the  determ inant 
of money supply can  seriously jeopardise the ability of the model to replicate 
the actual m acroeconom ic conditions. Thus, the traditional IS-LM modelling 
approach can be taken  for granted. Indeed, the in troduction of the bail out 
function is a  m eans to revise the traditional approach.
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8.5. Balance of payments
8.5.1. Trade functions
The economy is linked with the rest of the world through trade and  capital 
movement. In th is subsection, import and export functions will be estim ated. 
Capital transaction  will be discussed in the next subsection.
The export function represents non-oil export only. Oil exports are 
excluded since they are primarily determined exogenously th rough  quota by 
OPEC.4 We used  a ‘reduced’ form export equation with world income, real 
exchange rate, and export supply capacity as the explanatory variables.5
The resu lts  are reported in Table 8.8. Note th a t the coefficient of the 
world income variable is statistically insignificant. A nested  te s t done on th is 
variable also suggested th a t it does not add to the explanatory power of the 
regression over and  above the other two variables. This resu lt is consisten t with 
the findings of the recent literature on the determ inants of trade  flows, which 
suggests th a t exports from developing countries are supply, ra th e r th an  
dem and, determ ined.6 World income was therefore om itted in the final 
estim ation.
The final resu lts  are shown in Table 8.9. It is worth m entioning th a t the 
restricted  regression improves statistical properties of the estim ated coefficients 
as shown by stronger t-ratios.
4 When oil exports are included, the estimation result is very unsatisfactory. It appears that total 
real exports are negatively related to the real exchange rate and world GDP.
5 World income is measured as trade-weighted GDP of OECD countries. For the export supply 
capacity, manufacturing production index is used as a proxy.
6 See for instance, Athukorala and Riedel (1996) and the works cited therein.
191
Table 8.8. The non-oil export function (unrestricted regression)
E xp lana tory  Variables C oefficient T-ratio
Log of real exchange rate 0.9943 2.4406
Log of world GDP 1.2586 0.8188
Log of capacity index 0.9221 3.5905
C onstant -0.0174 -0.0.670
Sta tistica l Properties
R2 = 0.961 F = 441.006 CRDW = 1.976
PP (t) = -7.394 PP (Z) = -55.102 P ark ’s J  1(0,3) = 7.194
Table 8 .9 . The non-oil export function (restricted regression)
E xp lana tory  Variables C oefficient T-ratio
Log of real exchange rate 1.3281 5.0304
Log of capacity index 1.1196 15.8520
C onstant -0.1025 -2.4419
Sta tistica l Properties
R2 = 0.967 F * 813.117 CRDW = 1.899
PP (t) = 6.408 PP (Z) = 49.439 P ark ’s J  1(0,3) = 6.003
The elasticity of non-oil exports with respect to the  real exchange ra te  is 
1.32, suggesting th a t non-oil export is elastic with respect to devaluation. Since 
oil exports are exogenously determined by OPEC, following a  real devaluation 
the im provem ent in total export will be solely determ ined by non-oil exports.
The coefficient attached to the capacity index suggests th a t a  one per 
cent increase in capacity leads to 1.12 per cent in export volume. This m eans 
th a t the removal of domestic obstacles ham pering production and  investm ent 
can improve export. In other words, competition policies are critical for export 
development.
192
The other factor influencing trade balance is the dem and for imports, 
which is a  function of real domestic GDP and real exchange rate. The 
regression resu lts  for dem and for im ports are presented in Table 8.10. All 
cointegration tests consistently support the stability of the function 
characterising  dem and for imports. Moreover, all coefficients are significant.
The elasticity of total im ports with respect to dom estic GDP is bigger 
th a n  one, suggesting th a t total im ports are responsive to changes in GDP. A 
one per cent increase in real GDP will increase im ports by 1.2 per cent.
The coefficient attached to the real exchange ra te  is negative, and th u s  a  
real devaluation will reduce im ports. There are three channels th a t may 
explain the  decline in imports. First, devaluation increases the domestic price 
of im ported goods, leading to substitu tion  of im ported goods by dom estic goods. 
Second, devaluation reduces real income, leading to overall com pression in 
dom estic absorption. Third, devaluation increases the  foreign debt burden, 
causing  a  decline in investment.
Table 8 .10 . The import dem and function
E xp la n a to ry  Variables C oefficient T-ratio
Log of real GDP 1.2181 16.1043
Log of real exchange rate -1.8857 -11.4592
C onstan t 0.0849 2.5490
S ta tis tica l Properties
R2 = 0.983 F = 1584.052 CRDW = 1.763
PP (t) = -6.373 PP (Z) = -52.155 Park’s J  1(0,3) = 4.747
B ased on the estim ates on the cointegrating vectors, the M arshall- 
Lem ers condition can be derived directly. In order to have a  balance of trade 
im provem ent following a devaluation, the condition requires th a t the  sum  of the 
absolu te value of the elasticity of im ports and  exports with respect to the real 
exchange ra te  should be bigger th an  one. Because, the export function does 
no t incorporate oil exports, it will be assum ed th a t oil exports are not affected
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by the  change in real exchange rate. Even if the elasticity of non-oil export is 
no t considered, according to the results, the M arshal-Lem ers condition is 
satisfied for Indonesia. Therefore, there is convincing evidence th a t the trade 
balance will improve following a real devaluation. However, since the elasticity 
of im ports is bigger than  th a t of exports, the im provem ent would come mainly 
from an im port compression.
8.5.2. Capital flows
The determ inants of capital flows will be estim ated in th is  subsection. Note 
th a t the model in Chapter 6 suggests th a t capital inflow is a  function of the 
in te rest ra te  differential between domestic and in ternational m arkets. Since the 
dom estic financial m arket is bank dominated, an average of the  bank-lending 
ra te  is used  to represent the domestic in terest ra te . The corresponding 
in ternational in terest rate used is the average LIBOR borrowing rate.
There is a  large body of literature suggesting th a t capital flows are a 
regional phenom ena, in the sense th a t countries in a  p articu la r region tend to 
experience a  similar pattern  of capital influx (see for exam ple World Bank 
1995, among others). Capital inflows started  to flood in  to the  South East 
Asian region from 1989 (Lopez-Meija, 1998). In order to incorporate the 
regional effect, total net private capital inflows to the region are included as an 
additional explanatory variable. This variable is called regional private capital 
flows. The Philippines and Thailand are chosen to rep resen t the region. 
M alaysia is excluded due to lack of quarterly data. Singapore is also excluded, 
because of its peculiarity as a  financial centre.
Government capital flows are not included, since they are determ ined 
exogenously by negotiations with donor countries. Hence, the estim ates deal 
only with private capital movement. Including governm ent capital flows was 
attem pted, b u t the coefficient on interest rate differentials is negative.
Unlike other regressions, all variables are m ain ta ined  in their original 
forms. Because some of the observations are negative, logarithmic
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transform ation is not possible. The results of the regression are presented in 
Table 8.11. All cointegration tests  strongly support the conclusion th a t the 
error term  is stationary. Moreover, the estim ated coefficients are highly 
significant.
It should be noted tha t the ‘goodness of fit’ of the model is modest, as 
indicated by the value of R2. However, the residual stationarity  is supported 
by CRDW, J l ,  and  PP tests. T hus the coefficients can  be in terpreted  as long­
term  elasticities.
Table 8 .11 . Determinants o f private capital flow s
Explanatory variables Coefficient T-ratio Elasticity
In terest ra te  differential 







R2 = 0.6818 
PP (Z) =-46.5280
Statistical properties 
F-test = 71.5800 
PP (t) = -5.8383
CRDW = 
J l(0 ,3 ) =
1.5359
0.5586
The estim ated coefficient on regional private capital flow is positive and 
highly significant, suggesting th a t Indonesia and  o ther countries in the region 
share  common trends in capital flows. Foreign investors m ay perceive these 
countries as sharing  similar investm ent opportunity, risk  and  re tu rn . If this is 
true , each country is exposed to possible regional contagion caused  by a  shift in 
perception on the p a rt of investors regarding the regional investm ent risk.
The coefficient attached to the in terest ra te  differential is positive and 
suggests th a t a  one per cent increase in the in terest differential would increase 
capital inflow by 2.2 per cent. Though this seem s to suggest th a t capital flows 
are relatively responsive to in terest differentials, th is  is far from suggesting 
perfect capital mobility. The resu lt is quite surprising, since Indonesia is well 
known for its long established open capital account regime. There are two 
possible explanations.
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First, as discussed in Chapter 3, in Indonesia capital outflows are not 
restricted , although some restrictions on capital inflows are in place. The 
period included in the estim ation mostly represents positive net capital inflow, 
an d  th a t th is net inflow could have been bigger if the restrictions were 
abandoned. In other words, these restrictions may have prevented a larger 
capital inflow response to the change in interest differential. Thus, if capital 
inflows were not restricted the estimated coefficient should  have been bigger.
Second, the in terest rate differential is not corrected for risk  premium, 
and , th u s , the ‘true  coefficient’ is under estim ated. B ecause the prem ium  is 
difficult to estim ate, it is assum ed constant. This suggests th a t our estim ates 
should  be interpreted with caution. Further refinem ent is needed, and th is is 
left for fu rther research.
8.6. Implications for policies and macroeconomic adjustment
So far, the econometric estim ation has provided rich inform ation regarding the 
in terrela tionships between macroeconomic variables. Few variables are 
insignificant and  one coefficient has an unexpected sign (i.e. the coefficient of 
real bond ra te  in the dem and for reserve money equation). Nevertheless, the 
overall perform ance of the model seems satisfactory in term s of facilitating a 
rigorous quantitative analysis regarding m acroeconomic relations during the 
pre crisis period.
It should be noted from the outset th a t the  estim ated coefficients 
p resen ted  in th is chapter are the long-run coefficients representing stable 
re la tionships am ong the variables in question. The dynam ic sho rt-run  analysis 
will be d iscussed  in C hapters 9 and 10 by using  im pulse response analysis. 
This subsection addresses the possible im pact of certain  policy scenarios 
during  the  crisis period inferred from the long-run coefficients. Moreover, in 
order to avoid repetition, the analysis presented here  will be qualitative in 
n a tu re , ju s t  to give a  sense th a t the estim ates are relevant for explaining the 
crisis.
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There are two possible policy responses to an  unexpected reversal of 
capital inflows, with different implications for the macroeconom ic ad justm ent 
process. Suppose there is an unexpected shift in perception about country risk 
on the p a rt of investors. Investors will require a higher dom estic in terest rate to 
offset th a t risk. If the domestic interest rate  is not increased, there  will be a  
capital inflow reversal or even capital outflows, which can th en  trigger currency 
and  balance of paym ent crises. The question would be: which policy response 
is feasible?
8.6.1. Interest rate hike
The m ain purpose of an interest hike in a  crisis context is to prevent the 
collapse of the currency and deterioration in the balance of paym ents. There 
are three m ethods of adjusting domestic in terest ra tes  while fixing the currency. 
First, the authorities can proactively stim ulate an  increase in  the domestic 
in terest ra te  by increasing the rates on governm ent bonds or central bank 
certificates. The money supply will contract and , therefore, private in terest 
ra tes  will rise as well. Second, if the authorities do nothing, capital outflows 
will trigger an  increase in domestic in terest rates, since the  outflows reduce 
loanable funds in  the  credit m arket. Third, the  central b a n k  can directly reduce 
money supply by selling reserves a n d /o r  ne t o ther asse ts  (NOA). The 
ad justm en t process implied by these three strategies will be sim ilar, since they 
resu lt in an  in terest rate hike. W hat will happen to the economy?
First, dom estic absorption, in particu lar investm ent, will decline. Note 
th a t investm ent is more responsive than  consum ption to the  change in in terest 
rate. Because absorption falls, imports will decline, inducing an  improvement 
in the trade balance. Thus, capital outflows are financed by an  implosion in 
dom estic absorption.
A qualification should be made regarding how fast investm ent will ad just 
to an  in terest ra te  hike. If it ad justs slowly, in terest ra tes  will need to overshoot 
in the very short ru n  to prevent larger capital outflows. This will be discussed 
fu rther in C hapter 9.
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Second, an in terest rate hike will increase the dem and for bail out as it 
leads to higher non-performing loans. Since the central ban k  functions as a 
lender of the  last resort, it has to help out the dom estic banks. However, this 
m eans the central bank  may lose control over the money supply as the supply 
is now endogenously determ ined. Controlling the money supply by fixing the 
NDA would require a  further increase in the in terest rate, inducing further 
problem s for the banking sector. If this problem is known by speculators, they 
will fu rther intensify speculative a ttacks on the currency as the probability of 
successful a ttacks becomes larger under a  w eaker banking  sector. To avoid 
th is  problem, the authorities have to reduce the NFA to accom m odate the 
increase in the NDA. However, th is can lead to a  typical first generation 
balance of paym ents crisis. Therefore, the central ban k  m ay face an 
im possible task: the m om ent a  m onetary austerity  m easure  is taken , it may 
have to be reversed as it weakens the domestic banks. The problem  is th a t 
in te rest ra te  hike is not consistent with the possible m onetary expansion 
implied by increasing need to bail out banks.
8.6.2. Real devaluation
The alternative ad justm ent process to accom m odate capital outflows is through 
a  real devaluation. Since the M arshall-Lem er condition is satisfied, it is 
possible to offset capital outflows by improving the trade balance th rough a  real 
devaluation. As discussed, an  improvement in the trade balance will mainly 
come from an im port implosion, since im ports are m ore sensitive th a n  exports 
to a  change in the real exchange rate.
However, a  qualification should be m ade regarding the  speed of 
ad ju stm en t of the trade balance to a devaluation. If the  im provem ent in the 
trade balance is instan taneous, the overall positive im pact of the  devaluation 
will be gained quickly. However, if the trade balance ad justm en t is sluggish, 
the exchange ra te  will overshoot. In order to avoid overshooting, the authority 
will have to be willing to intervene in the exchange m arket by selling foreign 
reserves. This issue will be discussed further in C hapter 10.
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Chapter 9
The Onset of the Crisis
9.1. Introduction
This chapter argues tha t two problems stand out in the ru n  up  to the  crisis, 
nam ely balance of paym ents and banking sector problem s. The former 
determ ined the severity of the exchange m arket p ressure , while the second 
m ade it difficult for the authorities to defend the exchange rate. Therefore, the 
country was vulnerable to the twin crises.
The rapid build up and changing structu re  of foreign debts, and the 
surge of short-term  capital inflows over several years in the lead-up to the crisis 
can be in terpreted  as a process of breeding problem s th a t m ade the country 
more susceptible to a  sudden capital outflow. As d iscussed  in C hapter 3, total 
foreign debts increased from 26 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 57 per cent in 1996. 
Moreover, private and short-term  debts became more dom inant. The way the 
curren t account deficits was financed also changed, from long-term  official 
sources in the 1980s to a m uch higher proportion of short-term  private sources 
by the 1990s.
However, a  susceptible balance of paym ents is only a  necessary  condition 
for the crisis to happen. The sufficient condition is th a t there should be 
significant forces on the domestic front constraining policy responses from 
being effective and credible. It will be shown th a t a weak banking sector is the 
sufficient condition. That the banking sector was vulnerable to a  financial 
crisis was shown in detail in Chapter 5. As shown by the  model developed in 
C hapter 6, a  sharp  rise in the interest rate  can fu rther complicate an  already 
defunct banking sector, making the likelihood of a  successful a ttack  higher. In 
th is chapter, such  implications will be further analysed in the context of 
macroeconomic vulnerability at the onset of the crisis.
The structu re  of th is chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 sheds lights on 
the chronology of the initial crisis, covering the period from 1 Ju ly  to 31 October 
1997. The purpose of th is section is to identify sequence of events and policy 
responses in order to set the scene for fu rther analysis in the subsequent 
sections.
In section 9.3, it will be argued th a t the balance of paym ents was 
vulnerable to capital inflow reversal, in th a t the drying up of international 
liquidity would make it difficult to service foreign liabilities. Several factors th a t 
contributed to th is problem will be highlighted, such  as the build up  of current 
foreign liabilities and unhedged foreign debts.
Section 9.4 highlights the extent of p ressu re  in the foreign exchange 
m arket by employing a m arket pressure index. In addition, the issue of 
contagion and the crisis trigger will also be d iscussed.
Section 9.5 analyses the extent of capital inflow reversal as one of the 
problem s contributing to the balance of paym ents crisis. Im pulse response 
functions are used  to trace the factors triggering the reversal.
The ineffectiveness of an  in terest ra te  hike is d iscussed  in section 9.6. 
Using an im pulse response function, it will be shown th a t an  exceptional rise in 
the in terest rate  could lead to a  weaker banking  system . Because of this, the 
in terest rate  hike was not credible in deterring foreign exchange attacks.
9.2. Chronology of the initial crisis
This section highlights the events and policy responses the occurred in the first 
round  of the crisis, between Ju ly  and October 1997. This period h as several 
distinctive features com pared with the period following the closure of 16 private 
b anks (1 November 1997). Policy responses initially followed the standard  
textbook style, which included widening the  intervention band, floating the 
exchange rate, increasing the in terest ra tes and  tightening fiscal and  m onetary 
stances. However, after November 1997, policy responses were less certain and 
tended to complicate the situation. Because of large credit creation needed to
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support troubled banks and firms, money supply was not properly controlled. 
Moreover, the hesitancy in implementing the IMF supported  reform packages 
m ay have sent confusing signals to the m arket.
The socio-political environment rem ained m anageable in the run  up to 
the  crisis, with President Suharto seeming to have a strong grip on the country. 
S tuden t p ro tests in several cities were apparently  under control. In the latter 
period (post November 1997), political issues m ade the country  more volatile. A 
num ber of events occurred, most notably deterioration of the P resident’s health, 
the  appointm ent of Dr. Habibie as Vice President, larger and more frequent 
s tu d en t protests, ethnic violence against Chinese com m unity, the CBS fiasco, 
the  appointm ent of President Suharto 's family m em ber and  cronies in cabinet, 
and, finally his decision to step down. The social and political upheaval tha t 
w ent hand  in hand  with the economic d istress m ade the calam ity of the crisis 
unpreceden ted  and tragic.
The Asian crisis formally began in Thailand on 2 Ju ly  1997. The baht 
w as floated and currency speculation swiftly h it the region. Every country in the 
region was tested. Malaysia and the Philippines were am ongst the first to 
experience speculative pressure, quickly followed by Indonesia and South 
Korea. Even the two financial centres, Hong Kong and Singapore, were 
attacked .
On 12 July , as a precautionary m easure, BI widened the intervention 
b an d  from 8% to 12%. At tha t time, there was a tendency for the rupiah to 
move toward the upper band, i.e. to depreciate. Before the collapse of the baht, 
the  exchange ra te  tended to move toward the lower band  (see Figure 9.1). The 
difficulties in m aintaining the crawling peg came to a  head  on 21 Ju ly  when the 
exchange ra te  fell from Rp 2,540 to Rp 2,700 within a  few hours. This pushed 
the  au thorities to step into the forward m arket by pouring $500 million to 
stabilize the currency. This caused the rup iah  to strengthen  tem porarily to 
around  Rp 2,600 during the last week of th a t m onth.
However, the problem was far from over, and the rup iah  began to slide 
down again in the first week of August. By the second week, the upper band
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had  already been crossed. A further intervention was m ade, pouring another 
$500 million into the forward m arket on August 13, b u t th is time the exchange 
rate  stubbornly continued to depreciate.




30-Dec-96 l-M ar-97 l-M ay-97 l-Jul-97 31-Aug-97 31-Oct-97
Source: adapted from McLeod (1997).
The failure of the intervention led the authorities to reassess the strategy. 
As has  been shown by the Thai and M alaysian experience, currency 
intervention in the forward and spot m arkets was not effective in deterring 
speculative attacks. On August 14, the government finally abandoned the peg 
and  let the m arket determ ine the value of the currency. Moreover, to 
accom pany the float and to avoid exchange ra te  overshooting, the authorities 
announced the intention to tighten m onetary conditions by increasing in terest 
ra tes and  reducing the central b an k ’s purchase of SBPUs.
The free float was widely acclaimed by both Indonesian econom ists and 
the international community. The IMF deputy m anaging director, Stanley 
Fischer, said a float regime would enhance the m onetary stance, which was
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aim ed at sustaining high growth (Jakarta Post, 16 A ugust 1997; cf. Lindblad, 
1997).
Figure 9 .2 . The Jakarta Stock Price Index, July-October 1997 (July 1997 =100)
31-Jul-97l-Jul-97 30-Aug-97 29-Oct-9729-Sep-97
Source: Jak a rta  Stock Exchange
Nevertheless, m arket reaction was negative. On A ugust 15, the exchange 
ra te  touched Rp 2,900 and the stock m arket slid to 617 from over 700 at the 
beginning of the m onth. This indicated th a t both  debtors exposed to unhedged 
foreign currency denom inated liabilities, and  foreign investors holding domestic 
asse ts , were nervous. Foreign investors held about 30 per cent of domestic 
stocks in the Jak a rta  Stock Exchange (JSE) a t th a t time. The sale of liquid 
equities by foreign investors may have contributed  to the  persisten t fall in the 
stock m arket index since the first week of August. The long-standing stability 
of the  value of the rupiah  made hedging seemingly unnecessary . The float 
m ean t debtors were exposed to a  higher exchange risk, as the authorities could 
no longer guard the value of the rupiah. From an  individual debtor perspective, 
it becam e necessary to reduce this risk by buying foreign exchange earlier in 
the  forward m arket. However, the ru sh  into the  exchange m arket pushed the 
currency down further, creating the prospect of an  even greater exchange loss.
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On 16 August, in his annual “State of the Nation” address, the President 
stressed  th a t tight m onetary policy would be tem porarily continued until the 
m arket calmed and the rupiah reached a new equilibrium . He also urged the 
business com m unity to m ake a contribution by postponing low priority projects 
and  finding safer and steadier ways of funding.
As part of the stabilization, the in terest ra te  on SBI was increased from 
15% to 30% on 19 August. State enterprises were requested  to buy SBI, an 
in s tru m en t to reduce money supply, and the  purchase  of SBPU by Bank 
Indonesia was stopped temporarily. As a resu lt, reserve money decreased from 
Rp 46 trillion in the previous m onth to Rp 33 trillion by the end of August. The 
in terest ra te  on one-m onth deposits increased to 40%, on average, and  for a  few 
ho u rs  the overnight the JIBOR (Jakarta  Inter B ank Offered Rate) ra tes touched 
200% (Lindblad 1997).
The m onetary tightening was not welcomed by the  m arket. The exchange 
ra te  and  stock m arket index strengthened from 19 to 21 August, b u t weakened 
again afterwards. The business community becam e concerned about the health  
of dom estic banks and the availability of b an k  loans. The banking system 
began to face liquidity problems, and  a  fierce in terest ra te  war developed 
am ongst banks. On August 25, foreign banks increased deposit ra tes to 25 per 
cent. In response, domestic banks increased deposit ra tes  to 30 per cent on the 
following day. Several banks had to increase their ra tes  to in excess of 40 per 
cent. On 3 September, due to m ounting p ressu re  from the business 
com m unity and the President, BI agreed to cu t the SBI ra tes back  to around 20 
per cent and  to cautiously relax the money supply. 1 However, th is step did not 
prevent m arket ra tes from increasing. During Septem ber and  October 1997,
1 Criticism of the tight money policy came mainly from the business community, and their 
criticism was widely echoed by the press. On various occasions during the last week of August 
and the first week of September, the President called for a speedy end to this policy without 
consulting the Governor of the central bank and Minister of Finance. The voice of the president 
was presented by State Secretary, Minister of Investment, Minister of Housing, and 
Coordinating Minister of Production and Distribution. This was a sign that the business lobby 
had affected the President. Later, the Governor complained that the President preferred to 
discuss monetary matters with other cabinet members than with him.
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dom estic banks suffered severe losses due to negative spreads. The weighted 
average of deposit rates was higher than  th a t of lending ra tes. 2
At th a t time, the exact adverse-impact of the in te rest rate hike on the 
banking system  was not publicly known. The press only obtained the 
inform ation th a t the central bank had been injecting liquidity of around $500 
million to several troubled banks at the end of A ugust (Kom pas, 2 8 /8 /9 7 ). 
However, the  damage was very clear several m onths la ter when the d a ta  from BI 
published. Commercial b anks’ borrowing from the central bank  had  increased 
to Rp 19.4 trillion by the end of August from Rp 14.5 trillion in the previous 
m onth. During the following m onths, th is liquidity injection continued to 
increase a t a  very alarming rate. During Septem ber, October, and November 
1997, the borrowing was recorded to be about Rp 23.9 trillion, Rp 27.9 trillion, 
and  Rp 33.2 trillion, respectively.
Soesastro and Basri (1998, p. 9) described the s ituation  as:
An ‘overshoot’ in the interest rate rise, through tightening of liquidity 
by the Indonesian m onetary authority, w as perhaps responsible for 
the severe financial crisis th a t ensued. The tight money immediately 
exposed the country’s weak financial and  banking  system s. Soon BI 
had  to supply banks facing liquidity problem s with funds to help 
them  out.
In order to overcome the crisis, the governm ent announced  a reform 
package on 16 September. The objectives of the  package were to stabilize the 
currency, reduce the current account deficit, consolidate the fiscal budget, and 
streng then  the banking and corporate sectors. These objectives were to be 
achieved through several m easures, including gradually loosening the money 
supply; cutting  SBI rates; reducing fuel subsidies; postponing several mega 
projects like the Jak a rta  Tower and Sum atra-M alaysia bridge; providing export 
incentives such as pre-shipm ent credits; and increasing  the tax on consum er 
and  luxury goods to cut imports. In order to s treng then  the  banking sector, the
2 By the end of August, several bankers had complained that their banks made losses because of 
negative spreads and new loans would not be able to be issued if the tight money was not ended 
quickly, as they had to retain more funds for paying higher interest rates on deposits (Bisnis 
Indonesia, 26 August 1997).
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governm ent announced th a t state banks would be merged, and insolvent 
private banks closed. This statem ent implicitly indicated th a t both state and 
private banks might have been adversely affected by the tight m onetary policy.
M arket reaction was not enthusiastic to the announcem ent of the reform 
package. Both the exchange rate and the stock m arket index continued to 
weaken. By the end of September, the exchange ra te  was about Rp 3,300 per 
dollar, or 30% depreciated from the July  value. Domestic firms were reported 
to have difficulties in servicing foreign debts. Domestic banks and firms were 
dow ngraded by international rating agencies. Trade financing from foreign 
b an k s also becam e a  problem. Foreign creditors’ refusal to accept letters of 
credit issued  by domestic banks was freaxuently being reported in the press.
The wild movement in the exchange rate created uncertain ties regarding
the fu tu re  course of the economy. The government seem ed powerless to combat
the  speculation. Pessimistic and confusing predictions worsened already weak
b u sin ess  confidence. The press and domestic econom ists were not helping.
McLeod (1997, p. 36) described this situation as:
[w]ildly pessim istic predictions abound, seemingly lacking any 
sem blance of analytical rigor. The m edia seem  only too ready to 
devote headlines to any ‘expert’ willing to outbid the previous m ost 
dire prediction for the exchange rate or the im pact on Indonesia’s 
economic growth.
On 8 October, the government finally decided to seek assistance  from the 
IMF. The President seemed hesitan t to call the IMF in. However, since his 
economic team  was arguing th a t international assistance  m ight restore 
confidence, he found no other way. Professor Widjojo N itisastro, one of the 
economic architects of the Suharto regime, was assigned to lead negotiations 
w ith the IMF.
Ironically, positive m arket reaction to the announcem ent lasted  only one 
day. On the following day the rupiah strengthened, b u t then  steadily 
depreciated again, although this time the fluctuation of the exchange rate was 
no t as sharp  as before. This pattern  continued un til the first week of 
December.
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After a m arathon negotiation, the government finally reached agreem ent 
with the IMF on 31 October. It involved a surprisingly large $43 billion rescue 
package, including $5 billion from the liquidation of Indonesia’s foreign assets. 
No detailed reform program was disclosed, however. A s tru c tu ra l reform 
program  was outlined as follows:
• Financial sector: reforming the banking system, and fu rther developing the 
capital m arket. State banks would be merged, b u t no detailed information 
was provided as to which banks would be merged and  w hen or how this 
would be done.
• Real sector: accelerating trade liberalization by reducing export taxes and 
im port tariffs for chemical, metal and agricultural products. The national 
car project was to adhere to the decision made by the WTO.
• M onetary policy: in order to achieve exchange rate stability, a  m onthly target 
of money supply would be set in accordance with net foreign asse ts.
• Fiscal policy: in order to consolidate fiscal policy, off budget financing would 
be elim inated, including the financing of strategic industries  and the 
reforestation program. Privatisation of state  en terprises, including state 
banks, was to be accelerated.
Following the announcem ent of the rescue package, the ru p iah  improved 
to Rp 3 ,4 0 0 /$  b u t weakened again over the next few days. It was not clear 
w hether the improvement was due to the announcem ent or to concerted 
intervention by Indonesia, Jap an  and Singapore. It was reported th a t Jap an  
and  Singapore had  bought rupiah  in the forward m arket to help Indonesia. 
Though stubbornly depreciating throughout November, the exchange rate  did 
not fluctuate wildly.
Following a widespread bank run , the rup iah  tended to behave wildly 
from the first week of December on. This m atter will be d iscussed  in detail in 
C hapter 10 (the propagation of the crisis).
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9.3. Balance of payments vulnerability
This section discusses the factors tha t can m ake the balance of paym ents 
susceptible to a currency crisis. Three problems stand  out, nam ely the build 
up of foreign debts, reserve deficiency to cover liquid foreign liabilities, and 
currency m ism atch.
9.3.1. Foreign-debt service problem
In 1996, Indonesia had the highest ratio of foreign debt to GDP compared 
with the o ther Asian crisis countries (see Figure 9.3). Perhaps, a  good 
benchm ark would be the Latin American countries th a t had  experienced debt 
crisis in 1980s. With Malaysia as an exception, the E ast Asian crisis countries 
tended to have higher debt ratios compared with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. Based on this, there seemed reason to believe th a t the  E ast Asian 
countries m ight have suffered some kind of vulnerability to a  debt crisis. 
However, th is should be interpreted very cautiously, because Indonesia’s debt 
level was already high since the late 1980s, and  yet the crisis did not occur at 
th a t time. 3
Note tha t, except for the Chilean case, the Latin American debacle 
originated from the accum ulation of governm ent borrowing from foreign 
commercial banks and financial houses and the subsequen t reluctance of these 
creditors to fu rther extend loans.4 A lesson can be learned from this 
experience: unlike foreign borrowing from bilateral or m ultilateral donors, 
borrowing from commercial creditors is subject to shifts in confidence. This 
may partly explain why Indonesia was not h it by the crisis in the late 1980’s, 
when the debt to GDP and debt service to export ratios peaked. 5 At th a t time, 
the bulk of the debt was government debt and it w as therefore easier to
3 Most empirical work to determine “sustainable debt” suggest a  m uch higher debt to 
GDP ratio th an  was actually observed in developing countries. For instance, a  
macroeconomic sim ulation done by Blanchard (1986) indicated th a t a  debt to GDP ratio 
about 60 per cent could be considered sustainable for Brazil.
4 See Edwards (1995), among others.
5 See Table 3.3 in section 3.3 (page 50)
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negotiate for further extensions of the loans from the donor. Government 
commercial borrowings were relatively small. However, in the lead up  to the 
Asian crisis, the proportion of private debt was already high and th u s  ‘credit 
rationing’ im posed by commercial creditors could destabilize the balance of 
paym ents.
Figure 9.3. Total foreign debts to GDP ratio, (%)
ilippines





Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.
Indonesia’s debt service ratio (debt repaym ents and  in terest paym ents 
relative to total export) was higher than  the other Asian countries b u t lower 
th an  the Latin American countries (see Figure 9.4). It is clear from the figure 
tha t, in the early 1980s, the Latin American countries had  difficulties in 
servicing their debt, as indicated by the high ratio of debt service to export, 
especially Brazil. By contrast, the East Asian countries had  a lower debt 
service ratio, despite the high foreign debt to GDP ratio. One of the reasons was 
th a t the Asian countries were m uch more export oriented.
Based on these two ratios, it can be concluded th a t Indonesia in 1996 
was in a  relatively better position than  the Latin American countries, b u t was
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relatively more vulnerable than  the o ther Asian countries. Therefore, in the 
case of foreign capital inflows slackening, it was going to be more difficult for 
Indonesia to ad just the balance of paym ents com pared to the other Asian 
countries.






Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.
9.3.2. Liquid foreign liabilities
An alternative way to m easure balance of paym ents vulnerability is the ratio of 
liquid foreign liabilities to total foreign exchange reserves.6 The idea is th a t in 
the case of a  slow down in capital inflows, the excess dem and of foreign 
exchange is more likely to be created by these liabilities, and  if exchange rate  
depreciation is to be avoided th is excess will need to be m et by runn ing  down 
foreign exchange reserves. In this study, liquid foreign liabilities consist of
6 This ratio has been used in Athukorala (1999) and Athukorala and Warr (1999).
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cu rren t foreign liabilities and cumulative foreign portfolio investm ent. The 
cu rren t liabilities are defined as liabilities th a t are due within one year and 
consist of short-term  debt and interest paym ents on foreign debt. Most 
portfolio inflows are in term s of investm ents in traded shares and bonds and 
therefore can be very liquid. Moreover, the dollar re tu rn  on these investm ents 
will depend on the value of the exchange rate. Expectations of devaluation may 
precipitate panic sales of domestic shares and bonds.
Table 9 .1 . Indonesia: Composition o f Liquid Foreign Liabilities ($ billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Cum ulative Portfolio Investment 0.5 0.5 0.4 2.2 6.1 10.2 15.2
C urren t Liabilities 21.6 26.0 30.5 32.1 33.7 42.4 53.7
Short-term  debts (%) 54 56 59 56 58 61 60
Debt Service (%) 46 44 41 44 42 39 40
Total Liquid Liabilities 22.1 26.5 30.9 34.3 39.8 52.6 68.9
As % of foreign reserves 255 255 269 275 299 353 355
Sources: World Debt Tables and International Financial Statistics
Table 9.1 reports the composition of liquid foreign liabilities. The ratio 
of liquid foreign liabilities to total foreign exchange reserves showed an 
increasing trend  during seven years prior to the crisis. The bulk  of these 
liabilities came from short-term  debts, and th is  indicates the vulnerability of the 
country  to a  sudden credit rationing by foreign lenders. Note th a t over 7 years 
prior to the crisis, the sustainability of Indonesia’s balance of paym ents was 
highly dependent on the willingness of foreign lenders to roll over short-term  
debts and  on continuing large portfolio capital inflows. This was probably a  
safe assum ption  in th a t period, because there were no external or internal 
shocks to shake the confidence of foreign creditors. However, it also m eant th a t 
a  liquidity crisis could have erupted at any time.
It is striking th a t the liquidity ratio of Indonesia and  Korea in 1996 was 
very close to th a t of Latin America (average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico) in 1981. Moreover, as seen in Figure 9.5, Indonesia, Korea, and Latin 
America exhibited persisten t increases in the ratio several years prior to the
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crises. On the other hand, the Philippines was able to reduce the ratio to a 
lower level. The ratio for Thailand and Malaysia was alm ost stable through 
time. Surprisingly, Malaysia should not have had a liquidity  problem ’ as its 
ratio was less than  one, and yet the country was swept into the crisis. This 
suggests th a t the crises were more th an  ju s t a liquidity crisis. As A thukorala 
(2000) and  Soros (1998) m aintain the m ain problem with M alaysia was the 
weak banking sector. Indeed, the Asian crisis first erup ted  after the crash  of 
several quasi-bank finance houses in Thailand. As will be argued in section 
9.6, a  weak banking sector made it difficult to deter currency a ttacks and 
prevent a  reversal of capital inflows.







Sources: World Debt Tables and International Financial S tatistics
Nevertheless, a  liquidity problem seem s to have been an  im portan t factor 
in aggravating currency attacks in Indonesia and  Korea.7 This was particularly 
tru e  in explaining the extent of exchange ra te  depreciation experienced by
7 Calvo and Goldstein (1996) showed th a t a  sim ilar liquidity problem  m ade Mexico more 
vulnerable th an  its neighbours to currency a ttacks in 1994.
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Indonesia in the later stage. Note that Indonesia was the worst case in term s of 
currency depreciation. On the other hand, although showing the worst liquidity 
m ism atch, Korea avoided a m uch larger depreciation because foreign debts 
were restructu red  and rescheduled m uch earlier th an  Indonesia.
In the model, the effects of liquidity m ism atch are channelled through 
expected depreciation. A higher m ism atch will induce a  larger excess dem and 
for foreign exchange when capital inflows slacken, therefore inducing a larger 
expected depreciation. In effect, this will induce a fu rther reduction in capital 
inflows, as the credit worthiness of domestic firms is downgraded and portfolio 
investm ents in domestic shares become less attractive for foreign investors.
9.3 .3. Currency mismatch
Another im portant factor th a t can aggravate a ttacks on the currency is 
the need for domestic corporations to m eet their unhedged foreign liabilities. 
This refers to the currency m ism atch problem. This occurs if m ost revenue is 
denom inated in domestic currencies whilst liabilities m u st be paid in foreign 
currency. Goldstein (1998), am ongst others, suggests th a t currency m ism atch 
on the  p a rt of corporations was one of the m ain problem s in Indonesia.
There are two possible effects of currency m ism atch. First, if lenders 
expect a  currency crisis to occur, credit rationing is likely to be imposed on 
firm s with currency mismatch. This sudden rationing can m ake the 
expectation self-fulfilling, as debtors ru sh  into the foreign exchange m arket. 
Second, once the crisis occurs, it become very difficult to recover, because 
currency depreciation m akes it harder to meet the liabilities (Mishkin 1996).
Due to difficulties in obtaining official data, the debt s tru c tu re  of 164 
corporations listed on the Jak a rta  Stock Exchange is u sed  as a  sample. By 
Ju n e  1997, the total foreign debt of these corporations accounted for $ 20.4 
billion, or about one third of the Indonesia’s private foreign debt. Their 
financial reports contain detailed information regarding size, creditors, 
denom ination, type, interest rates and m aturity  of the debts. They also report 
hedge transactions, and other foreign exchange com m itm ents.
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Table 9 .2 . Foreign debts and hedge (June 1997)
Sector Foreign Debts Hedged Debts
(% of total assets) (% of foreign debts)
Domestic oriented 56.0 5.3
Im port Competing 10.7 6.6
Export Oriented 32.7 0.2
NBFI 14.0 47.0
Source: calculated from raw d a ta  obtained from J a k a r ta  Stock Exchange
Table 9.2 presents the proportion of hedged foreign deb ts of 164 (non 
bank) com panies listed on the Jak a rta  Stock Exchange. The com panies are 
grouped into four categories, domestic m arket oriented, im port competing, 
export oriented, and non-bank financial institu tions. N on-bank financial 
in stitu tions include insurance, factoring, leasing, portfolio m anagers, and 
venture capital. Domestic m arket oriented com panies consist of com panies 
producing non-tradable goods and services. These include real estate  and 
properties, retail (super market) and re s tau ran t chains, in land transport 
industry  (taxies and toll roads), and hotels. The res t of the com panies are 
classified into im port competing and export oriented industries  by using Pit’s 
(1981) form ulae.8
The above table shows th a t dom estic-m arket oriented firms were the 
m ost vulnerable to an exchange rate depreciation. They had  the h ighest level of 
foreign debt, with m ost revenue denom inated in dom estic currency. Moreover, 
the proportion of hedged debts is only 5.28%. These com panies are likely to be 
affected by exchange rate depreciation from two fronts. B ecause asse ts  and 
revenue are denom inated in domestic currency, debt principal and in terest 
paym ents will increase. In addition, revenues are likely to fall as a  resu lt of the 
contractionary  im pact of depreciation on aggregate expenditure. For these 
reasons, there are strong grounds to suggest th a t panic buying of foreign 
exchange m ost likely occurred am ongst these firms.
8 The formulae says th a t if the index is less th an  zero, the sector is classified as an 
export oriented industry; greater th an  zero b u t less th an  0.8 is im port competing 
industry  otherwise; and greater than  0.8 is non-com peting (domestic oriented) industry. 
The index is form ulated as follows: t= (im ports-exports)/(production+im ports-exports).
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Export oriented firms have the second largest proportion of foreign debts 
and  the sm allest share of hedged debts. However, since m ost revenue is 
denom inated in foreign currency, the increase in the dom estic value of foreign 
debt can be offset by the increase in revenue. This is called a  n a tu ra l hedge.
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) seem  to have been more prudent. 
Foreign borrowing was m oderate and the share of hedged debts the largest. 
Most of the hedges come from currency swap transac tions, which are common 
practice am ongst financial institutions.
Im port competing industry  had the sm allest foreign debt. This is 
som ew hat surprising, b u t m ay be explained by low credit w orthiness of firms 
operating in the industry. Such an  industry  was probably not as lucrative as 
the property sector. Therefore, foreign creditors lim ited the loans only for 
im ports of interm ediate and capital goods. Note th a t, based  on inspection of 
the ir financial statem ents, foreign debt was m ainly for trade financing.
The fact th a t domestic m arket oriented firm s are am ongst the m ost 
leveraged by foreign creditors raises an in teresting  question. For export 
oriented industries, it can be regarded as p ruden t if m ost debt is denom inated 
in foreign currency, as they are covered by a  ‘n a tu ra l’ hedge. However, for 
dom estic m arket oriented firms, currency m ism atches can be a  big problem. 
There are three possible explanations for a  high level of foreign debts owed by 
these com panies. First, they are operating in the m ost lucrative activities, i.e. 
high re tu rn s  and  quick yields such as the property sector. Second, the stability 
of the exchange rate  over a  long period m ade foreign borrowing appear as safe 
as dom estic borrowing. Third, the high in terest ra te  differential m ade foreign 
borrowing appear to be cheaper.
Figure 9.6 depicts the effective in terest ra te  m argin betw een domestic 
and  foreign borrowing. For domestic borrowing, the  ra te  for working capital 
loans is used. For foreign borrowing rate, we select S ingapore’s in ter-bank  rate  
for US dollars with a  3 m onth m aturity  plus 2.74 per cent prem ium . Note th a t 
based  on the d a ta  from he J a k a rta  Stock Exchange, the  in te rest ra tes  charged
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are tied to the Singapore ra tes plus 2.74 per cent prem ium .9 We also ad just the 
Singapore rate to allow for the ex post depreciation of the Rupiah against the 
US dollar for each period.10 In effect, th is m easures the rup iah  equivalent of 
in te rest paym ent on the loans denom inated in US dollars.
Figure 9 .6 . Effective Interest Rate Spread B etw een Domestic 
and Offshore Borrowing, 1990-1997
Domestic Borrowing Rate
Effective Foreign Borrowing Rate
Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan-
Source: CEIC d a ta  base, Hong Kong
As seen in Figure 9.6, there was a  wide m argin betw een the domestic 
in te rest rate and  effective foreign in terest rate, m aking foreign borrowing more 
attractive. The average m argin was about 9.8 per cent, with a  standard  
deviation of about 3.7 per cent. The high m argin indicated  th a t offshore loans 
were cheaper, while the low s tan d ard  deviation m ean t th a t hedging was 
unattractive. In o ther words, there were incentives to borrow offshore, and
9 The 2.74 per cent premium was the simple average premium. The premium charged 
actually varies from 2 to 5 per cent, depending who is borrowing from whom.
10 This depreciation figure is calculated from quarterly exchange rate data for each 
period.
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disincentives to hedge. This might partly explain why borrowing was largely 
unhedged.
In sum m ary, in the lead-up to the crisis there were m ounting liquidity 
and  currency m ism atches, m aking the economy vulnerable to a speculative 
a ttack . Moreover, they may also be detrim ental a t the onset of the crisis, in 
th a t the excess dem and for foreign exchange is more likely to be produced by 
larger m ism atches. In the following section, a  m easure of the excess dem and 
will be introduced.
9.4. Foreign exchange market pressure
9.4.1. Market Pressure Index
The crisis began with a  severe a ttack  on the currency, soon after the Thai b ah t 
collapsed in Ju ly  1997. The fierce a ttacks th a t continued to occur in the 
following m onths were the biggest challenge for the authorities in m aintain ing a 
stable m onetary stance.
In order to m easure the intensity of currency a ttacks, the well known 
‘m arket p ressu re  index’ (MPI), proposed by Girton and  Roper (1977), will be 
u se d .11 The idea is th a t excess dem and for foreign exchange may be 
accom m odated through three different channels: depreciation, a  fall in foreign 
exchange reserves, and an increase in the dom estic in terest rate. Following the 
a ttacks, the currency may be allowed to depreciate or devalue. Alternatively, 
the excess dem and may be m et by runn ing  down foreign exchange reserves or 
staved off by increasing the domestic in terest rate. Therefore, there are three 
im portan t variables for m easuring the severity of exchange m arket pressure: 
the changes in exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, and dom estic in terest 
ra tes relative to in ternational in terest rates.
The MPI is defined as:
(9.1) MPI, = ß rAe, + ß 2.&R, +ß,A(i, -»,*)
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where: Ae, = percentage change in the nom inal exchange rate,
ARt = percentage change in foreign exchange reserves, 12 
A(/, - /* )  = percentage change in the in terest rate differential, and 
/? is the weight for each variable.
Note th a t it is crucial to determ ine the appropriate weights, as the volatility of 
one variable may dom inate the fluctuation in the index. To avoid th is problem, 
s tandard  deviations are used as the weights. The index is constructed  for the 
period covering Jan u a ry  1992 to December 1998. However, the standard  
deviations are estim ated for the period up  to Ju n e  1997. In so doing, the 
fluctuations in the index during the crisis are m easured relatives to pre-crisis 
fluctuations. The estim ated index is presented in Figure 9.7.
As seen in Figure 9.7, the pre-crisis period was characterised  by a 
relatively tranquil situation. The relatively stable index indicates th a t there was 
no significant m arket pressure, either indicating excess dem and for, or, excess 
supply of, foreign exchange. As has been m entioned, the au thorities had 
successfully m aintained the exchange ra te  within the intervention band. 
Moreover, the m onetary m anagem ent had seemed not too distressful, since the 
1990s were characterised by ample capital inflows. Though the exchange rate 
tended to h it the lower bands -  indicating pressure for appreciation -  the index 
showed th a t the p ressure  was relatively sm all.13
The m arket pressure became unusually  high between Ju ly  and 
Septem ber 1997. A spike in the index occurred in A ugust 1997, which 
coincided with the adoption of the floating exchange ra te  regime. After it was 
floated, the movement of the exchange ra te  was barely predictable. Aside from 
several w eaknesses suffered by the banking sector, the severity of the attack 
m ight be partly responsible for the difficulties faced by the au thorities in 
defending the currency in August 1997. Note th a t the index showed th a t
11 This index has  been used widely, because of its simplicity. See, for example, 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) for its application to currency crises.
12 As in Girton and  Roper, the reserves are m easured relative to narrow m oney (Ml).
13 This was probably the result of active sterilisations.
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m arket p ressure  in th a t m onth was about 27 tim es higher th an  the average 
p ressu re  during the pre-crisis period.
Figure 9 .7 . Market Pressure Index, January 1992-December 1998
-10  ^
M arket p ressu re  intensified again, between December 1997 and 
February 1998, and  between April and Ju ly  1998. The former coincided with 
panic ru n s  on several private banks after the liquidation of 16 banks. The later 
p ressu res reflected the political turmoil and  social u n re s t during th a t period. 
This will be d iscussed in C hapter 10, where the propagation of the crisis is 
analysed.
9.4.2. Trigger and regional contagion
The years leading up  to the crisis may be viewed as an  ‘incubation period’ of 
balance of paym ents vulnerability, in th a t the  crisis could have occurred any 
time. As suggested by the MPI, the crisis did not occur earlier possibly, 
because of the absence of a  severe attack. Because of tha t, the issue of 
contagion becomes relevant.
M asson (1998) defines contagion ra th e r strictly, th a t is a crisis in one 
country  can lead to a similar crisis in another country, which does not have any
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direct economic linkages or share similar economic fundam entals. However, in 
th is  study, contagion is defined rather loosely to include pure contagion, spill 
over, w ake-up call and capital m arket in terdependency.14 Regardless of which 
definition of contagion is a more meaningful explanation, our model trea ts  the 
effects of contagion through three channels, nam ely regional capital flows, risk 
prem ium , and expected depreciation.
Aside from country specific factors, an excess supply of capital in 
developed and newly industrialised countries may also have been driving the 
capital inflows to the region. In other words, the inflows m ay be driven by the 
need to dam pen excess supply by employing lucrative opportunities in the 
emerging m arkets. On the dem and side, there m ay be different factors driving 
developing countries to borrow. For instance, in the  late 1970s the need to 
recycle the proceeds from the oil boom led to a  lending boom to Latin American 
countries. Yet, each country in the region seemed to have a  different reason  to 
borrow overseas. In Brazil and Argentina the borrowing was largely driven by 
the need to finance budget deficits, while in Chile it w as the conglom erates th a t 
borrowed (Edwards 1995). For the Asian case in the 1990s, m ost of the foreign 
loans were granted to domestic banks in South Korea and Thailand. In 
Indonesia, it was the non-bank corporations th a t borrowed, and th is  m ay have 
been due to the restrictions on bank borrowing. In o ther words, the excess 
supply in capital will always find its way to developing countries, as long as 
they can offer attractive re tu rn s .15
This has im portant implications for the case of capital inflow reversal. 
First, any factor affecting capital inflows, to the  region in particu lar, and  to 
emerging m arkets in general, would have affected the  size of capital inflows to 
Indonesia as well. For instance, Eichengreen (1999) em phasises an  anticipated 
rise in Jap an ese  short term  in terest ra te  in the n o rthern  spring of 1997 as 
being the trigger to the fall in capital inflows to the  region; while McKibbin
14 For the different definition of contagion, please refer to Chapter 2, section 2.5.
15 As discussed in section 8.4, there is a strong statistical evidence suggesting that 
capital flows to Indonesia are strongly correlated with the flows to the region. If this is 
true, then the reversal of capital inflows will also be affected by the events in the region.
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(1998) stresses the role of the US in terest ra te  hike in late March 1997, and the 
subsequen t drop in the US stock m arket. As a resu lt, the collapse of the Thai 
b ah t was only the first in a series of foreign exchange collapses in the region. In 
o ther words, an interest rate hike in the developed countries was a common 
trigger of the balance of paym ents crisis in the region. 16
Second, the same episode of capital inflows m ight have been translated  
into a  sim ilar pattern  of booms in investm ent and  consum ption across the 
region. Then, when the b u st occurred in  Thailand, foreigners would have cast 
doubt on the sustainability of the boom in the o ther countries of the region. In 
o ther words, the perceived risk  a ttached  to Indonesia would increase. 
Consequently, ra ther than  waiting for a  sim ilar b u s t, they m ight have opted for 
an  early exit which then triggered a ru n  on foreign exchange reserves. Note 
th a t our theoretical model suggests an  increase in risk  prem ium  will provoke a 
fall in capital inflows (see section 9.5. for empirical applications).
Third, after the collapse of the Thai bah t, o ther currencies may have 
been tested, and  this could have precipitated excess dem and for foreign 
exchange reserves. In th is case, the a ttacks m ay have been purely idiosyncratic 
in th a t they were independent of the coun tries’ fu n d am en ta ls .17 The attacks 
m ay also represent herding and  Diamond-Dybvig a ttacks, in th a t, because 
o ther investors are expected to opt for an early exit, every investor jum ps into 
the  queue as early as possible, with an  expectation th a t the currency will need 
to depreciate if foreign exchange reserves are not sufficient to m eet the excess 
dem and for foreign exchange. 18 The problem  is th a t money m anagers do not 
have a  coordinating device th a t can produce collective attacks. Therefore, they 
need some kind of signal th a t can  affect their perception regarding the 
probability of an exchange ra te  collapse. A crisis in ano ther country  may act as 
a  coordinating device for money m anagers to a ttack  other currencies, in th a t it
Indeed the model suggests th a t the fall in capital inflows to the region will cause a fall 
in capital inflows to Indonesia as well (see section 9.5).
16 Calvo et al. (1994 and 1996) have em phasized sim ilar view for the cause of capital 
inflows reversal characterising the ‘tequila effects’.
17 This w as shown by the fact th a t countries with ‘strong’ fundam entals such as 
Singapore were also attacked.
18 McLeod (1997) and Radelet and Sachs (1997) asserted  th is  ‘panic ru n ’ hypothesis.
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can cast doubt over the reliability of m onetary stances in these countries 
(Tornell 1999). If the fundam entals of the other countries are not so strong, 
they may also be swept into a balance of paym ents crisis. Indeed, our model 
suggests th a t an  increase in expected depreciation can lead to a reversal in 
capital inflows (see section 9.5 for empirical application).
9.5. Capital Inflow Reversal
The exceptional spike of the MPI at the onset of the crisis reflects the excess 
dem and for foreign exchange stem m ing from the need to shift funds out of the 
country. A negative swing in capital inflows will be tran sla ted  into a  fall in 
foreign reserves and  exchange rate depreciation, if the in te rest ra te  hike cannot 
prevent it. Indeed, such a swing is a  common phenom enon of both the Asian 
and  Latin American crises (see Figure 9.8). It is in teresting to note th a t the 
largest swing occurred in Thailand and Indonesia, the  two worst affected 
countries.
The purpose of this section is to trace the possible causes of such  a 
swing by employing the so-called im pulse response function. The idea is th a t 
the responsiveness of capital flows to different shocks m ay reveal some 
differences. The model introduces four shocks which m ay affect capital inflows 
to Indonesia, namely shocks on regional capital flows, expected depreciation, 
risk  prem ium , and  the domestic and  in ternational in terest ra te .19 The following 
discussion will sim ulate the effects of these four shocks.




where: Az = (AK*',AK*R,e,Ar,Ar*) and z = (K*',K*R, r - r * ) , 
K* is capital inflows to Indonesia,
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K R is capital inflows to the region
r and r are domestic and international in terest ra tes, and 
e is expected depreciation.
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Note: Right hand  scale is for Thailand, while the  left h an d  scale is for the 
o ther countries.
Source: IMF, International Financial S tatistics
Because expected depreciation is an  1(0) process, it does not en ter the 
long-run cointegrating vector. 20 Moreover, the risk  prem ium  is not included 
because it is assum ed to be constant during the pre-crisis period.21 However, 
it will be clear later th a t the shock (increase) in the risk  prem ium  can be 
im posed directly in the simulation.
19 See C hapter 7 for variable definition.
20 In our model, the expected depreciation is estim ated as the ac tual th ree-m onth  ahead  
depreciation, implying a perfect foresight.
21 It is assum ed constant, because it is difficult to m easure  the prem ium .
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Based on the above specification, sim ulations are done to obtain impulse 
response functions. Note tha t the sim ulation procedures applied here are 
different from the procedure applied to the full model sim ulation outlined in 
section 7.5. The idea is tha t the effects of a shock have to be accommodated 
through the change in capital account balances or the  level of foreign exchange 
reserves level while m aintaining other dom estic equilibrium  conditions 
unchanged. In other words, the vulnerability of capital account balances and 
foreign exchange reserves to a  certain shock is going to be assessed. Thus, the 
sim ulations are not intended to replicate the actual capital inflows reversal.
In order to do this, the VEC specified in equation (9.2) is estim ated. In 
each sim ulation several strict assum ptions are im posed so th a t the equilibrium 
in the dom estic economy rem ains unchanged. The first sim ulation outlined 
below involves a negative shock in regional capital flows, and  the sim ulation is 
in tended to m easure the effect of slackening global capital flows to the region.
There are three strict assum ptions im posed in the sim ulation for 
obtaining im pulse response functions to the shock on regional capital flows. 
First, the foreign in terest rate is assum ed to be constan t, in the sense th a t it is 
not affected by the shock. Second, the domestic in te rest ra te  is assum ed to be 
constan t, which m eans th a t domestic financial m arkets  are unaffected by the 
shock. 22 This assum ption is needed to see the effect of regional contagion 
purely transla ted  to the change in capital flows. In o ther words, the change in 
capital flows will be fully accommodated by the change in foreign exchange 
reserves. The first and second assum ptions imply th a t the in terest rate 
differential now consists only of expected depreciation. Third, the equilibrium  in 
the re s t of the economy is unaffected by the change in the  reserves. This is 
needed to contain the effect of the decline of reserves in public confidence th a t
22 If the dom estic in terest rate  were to be affected by the shock, a  sim ulation on the full 
model is required. However, it has not been not specified as  yet how the authorities 
and  dom estic agents would respond to the shock.
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may otherwise resu lt in a ru n  on the reserves, in the sense of Krugman
( 1979).23
In effect, by imposing these three assum ptions, it is only necessary to 
consider three variables in the sim ulation namely: capital flows to the region 
and Indonesia, and  expected depreciation of the rupiah . Because very restrictive 
assum ptions are imposed, the results should be in terpreted  with great caution. 
It should  be stressed  from the outset th a t these assum ptions may resu lt in the 
effects are being under estim ated. Nevertheless, the purpose is to assess the 
potential effects, and  the actual ones
Figure 9.9. Generalised impulse response functions to a negative (one standard 
deviation) shock in regional capital inflows.
23 A panic ru n  on foreign exchange reserves is generally a  non-linear process, which is 
conditional on the probability of an  exchange rate collapse. In order to incorporate this 
in the model it is necessary to employ a rational expectation model which involves a 
tedious m athem atical and statistical m anipulation, even in a  very simple m onetary 
model. This is avoided by imposing the third assum ption.
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As seen in Figure 9.9, a negative one stan d ard  deviation shock in 
regional capital inflows will cause a  decline in capital inflows to Indonesia. Note 
th a t one s tandard  deviation in the regional capital inflow is equal to $ 684 
million. The biggest effects are predicted to occur in the th ird  quarter, where 
capital inflows to Indonesia dive to m inus $ 427 million. The im pact will 
stabilise after 16 quarters at around m inus $ 295 million. Therefore, in the 
long ru n , and holding every thing else constan t, the shock will have a 
perm anent effect on Indonesia’s capital flows. This finding suggests th a t there 
are em pirical grounds for supporting the view th a t the swing in capital inflows 
to Indonesia th a t occurred during the crisis m ight have been the effect of 
regional contagion.
The second sim ulation shows the effects of an  increase in expected 
depreciation on capital flows. The collapse of the Thai b ah t m ight have also 
directly affected the credibility of Indonesia’s crawling peg, in th a t it induced 
speculative a ttacks on Indonesia’s currency. Moreover, currency m ism atch and 
high level liquid foreign liabilities might breed some sort of balance of paym ents 
vulnerability, in th a t the change in expectations regarding the  value of the 
exchange ra te  could have generated excess dem and for foreign exchange. 
Figure 9.10 depicts the im pulse response function of capital inflows to the 
shock (increase) in expected depreciation.
The figure suggests th a t a one stan d ard  deviation increase in expected 
depreciation can lead to an instan taneous decrease in capital inflows of around 
$ 140 million. For the subsequent 18 quarters, the function shows some 
volatility. Nevertheless, it is always negative. After th a t, it stabilises a t around 
m inus $ 65 million. This finding suggests th a t a  change in expected 
depreciation th a t may be provoked by a crisis elsewhere can induce a fall in 
capital inflows.
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Figure 9 .10 . Impulse response function of capital inflows to one standard 
deviation shock on expected depreciation
Quarters
Capital inflow to Indonesia
-100
In the th ird sim ulation, the effects of an  increase in the foreign interest 
ra te  on capital flows will be assessed. McKibbin (1998) and Eichengreen (1999) 
em phasize the role of the increase in the in terest ra te  in developed countries as 
the  trigger for the Asian crisis. In th is model, the in ternational in te rest rate is 
trea ted  as an  exogenous variable in tha t, a lthough the shock in th a t variable 
affects the other variables, there is no feed back  effect from the other variables. 
After the shock, the international in terest ra te  evolves based on its historical 
value.
Figure 9.11 dem onstrates the effect of a  one standard  deviation increase 
in the in ternational in terest rate on capital inflows. It suggests th a t the largest 
swing will occur in quarter 0 (instan taneous effect) and quarter 1. After that, 
capital inflows show some volatility, b u t the effect is still negative. The 
in s tan tan eo u s effect is a  decline in capital inflow of about $ 315 million. The 
effect stabilises a t around m inus $ 150 million, after 18 quarters.
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Figure 9 .11 . Impulse response function of capital inflows to one standard 
deviation shock in the foreign interest rate
Quarters
-100
It can be concluded th a t an increase in the in ternational in terest rate 
tends to reduce capital inflows. Therefore, there are empirical grounds to believe 
th a t an increase in the international in terest ra te  was one of the possible 
triggers for the crisis.
In the fourth sim ulation, the effects of the increase in perceived risk will 
be analysed. McKibbin and Martin (1998) m aintained th a t th is factor is the key 
to understand ing  the reversal of capital inflows to the  region. However, there 
are two technical difficulties in doing the sim ulation.
First, due to m easurem ent difficulties the risk  prem ium  is not included 
in the empirical estim ation. However, the theoretical model suggests th a t the 
effect of the change in the risk  prem ium  would be sim ilar to th a t of the change 
in the foreign in terest rate. Therefore, in the following sim ulation it will be 
assum ed th a t the instan taneous effect of the shock in the risk  prem ium  is the 
sam e as th a t of the shock in the foreign in terest rate. After the shock, the
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prem ium  is assum ed to be constant or perm anent. In addition, the shock is 
assum ed not to affect the foreign interest rate.
The second difficulty is in m easuring the change in the risk premium. 
McKibbin and Martin (1998) use the change in the ex-post nom inal in terest rate 
differential. However, th is approach tends to underestim ate  the prem ium , since 
the increase in the domestic interest ra te  did not effectively prevent capital 
outflows. Theoretically, the increase in risk prem ium  will be fully offset by the 
increase in the domestic in terest rate  if, and only if, capital inflows stay a t the 
initial equlibrium. Because the change in risk  prem ium  is unknow n, an 
arb itrary  value of 5 per cent is taken.
Figure 9.12 reports the im pulse response function of capital inflows to 
the 5 per cent increase in risk premium. The im pulse response function may 
be interpreted as follows. A 5 per cent increase in perceived country risk will 
cause a  $ 574 million contem poraneous decline in  capital inflows. Over the 
long-run, the decline will stabilise a t around $ 229 million. This suggests th a t 
the capital inflow is indeed responsive to such a shock.
However, th is resu lt should be in terpreted  very cautiously, since the 
effects of the change in perceived risk is naturally  non-linear. Meanwhile, the 
model is linear and will therefore tend to un d ers ta te  the effects. For instance, a 
15 per cent increase in the perceived risk  should totally wipe out the 
com parative advantage of investing in domestic bonds and  therefore induce 
m assive capital outflows. 24 The model will in fact only predict an  instan taneous 
fall in capital inflows of $ 1.72 billion.
Although the model is not able to capture  the non-linear effects, there is 
ano ther way to in terpret the results. The m arket p ressu re  index suggests th a t 
the p ressu re  a t the onset of the crisis was about 27 tim es higher th an  th a t 
before the crisis. If it is assum ed th a t the p ressu re  was solely due to the 
increase in risk perception, the MPI suggests a  striking jum p  in perceptions. 
Note th a t based on the financial statem ents of firms listed on the Ja k a r ta  Stock
24 Note that the nominal interest differential before the crisis was only 9.45 per cent, on 
average.
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Exchange the risk prem ium  was at least 2 per cent. Multiplying th is num ber 
by 27 would suggest tha t the perceived risk jum ps from a t least 2 per cent to 54 
per cent. If this is correct, a  50 per cent increase in the risk  would be 
transla ted  (linearly) as a  $ 5.7 billion instan taneous decline, and  $ 2.3 billion 
perm anent decline in capital inflows. This is a relatively large swing in capital 
inflows. This leads to the belief th a t the risk prem ium  story is a  good candidate 
for explaining the surge in capital outflows. There are some factors th a t may 
fu rther provoke the risk, such as a  weak banking sector, and  political 
uncertain ty . The role of a  weak banking sector will be d iscussed  shortly in the 
next section.
Figure 9.12. Impulse response function of capital inflows to a five per cent




The sim ulation has so far provided consisten t predictions regarding the 
responsiveness of capital inflows to the changes in perceived risk, expected 
depreciation, the in ternational in terest ra te  and regional capital inflows. 
However, since the model cannot decompose the contribution of each of these 
factors to the reversal of capital inflows, it is difficult to undertake  a  counter 
factual sim ulation.
230
9.6. Ineffectiveness of an interest rate hike
In th is section, the (in)effectiveness of a  rise in in te rest ra te  in defending the 
crawling peg and for preventing capital outflows will be assessed . This will rely 
on the  im pulse response analysis. The im pacts of an  in te rest ra te  hike and an 
exchange rate  depreciation on the banking sector will be assessed  for a 
com parison.
As suggested by Tomell (1999), the au thorities can  choose three policy 
options in responding to exchange rate a ttacks and  in m eeting the excess 
dem and for foreign exchange, namely: (1) ru n n in g  down foreign exchange 
reserves, (2) increasing interest rates, and (3) devaluing the currency. In the 
previous section, it was shown that, in the ru n  up  to the  crisis, liquid foreign 
liabilities were already m uch higher th an  foreign exchange reserves, which 
suggests th a t reserves were inadequate. Moreover, as d iscussed  in section 9.2, 
the authorities had  already poured about $ 1 billion to intervene in the m arket 
w ithout any success. Thus, there were technically only two options available to 
the authorities.
For the second option, the idea is th a t an  increase in expected 
depreciation and perceived country risk can be offset by an  increase in the 
dom estic in terest ra te  in order to m aintain  the existing capital account 
equilibrium . However, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), am ongst o thers, m aintain 
th a t th is  strategy can only work effectively if the banking  sector can  resist the 
adverse im pacts of an increase in the in terest rate. Indeed, the model suggests 
tha t, in the case of a  weak banking sector, an  in te rest ra te  hike will be 
ineffective as it can further complicate the baking problem s. Non-performing 
loans m ay increase and the in terest margin decreases, which m ay lead to an 
in terruption  in the b an k s’ cash flow. Because the central b an k  functions as a 
lender of the last resort, it may have to extend liquidity assis tance  to assis t the 
commercial banks. It may be difficult for the au thorities to m anage the money 
supply if the banking problems are already complicated.
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If the th ird  option is chosen, the ad ju stm en t process is channelled 
th rough the cu rren t account balance. In o ther words, a  reversal of capital 
inflows is financed by inverting the current account balance from negative to 
positive. This can be done through a real devaluation, by which im ports can be 
reduced and exports improved.
The analysis applied here will be based  on the sim ulation on the full 
model solution as described in section 7.5. Though it is possible to d iscuss the 
economy wide effects, these will be reserved for C hapter 10 (propagation of the 
crisis). For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to d iscuss the effects on 
the banking  sector.
Two shocks will be given to the system . First, a  ten  per cent nominal 
exchange rate  depreciation is imposed in order to analyse the im pacts on the 
banking  sector if the authorities opt to offset a  deterioration in the capital 
account balance by improving the curren t account balance. Second, as an 
alternative, the in terest rate may be raised to offset the increase in expected 
depreciation and  country risks. In order to m ake it com parable, the interest 
rate shock is also ten per cent. The idea is th a t, if expected depreciation, or the 
risk, increases by ten per cent, then a ten per cent increase in the in terest rate 
should be sufficient to offset it, given th a t an  increase in th a t in terest rate does 
not provoke a  fu rther increase in expected depreciation or risks. However, as 
will be shown later, an in terest rate increase cannot fully offset the expected 
depreciation.
The final resu lts  of the sim ulation are depicted in Figure 9.13. The 
effects of the shock are m easured in term s of liquidity assistance extended by 
the central bank  to the domestic commercial b anks (BLBI). As discussed in 
section 8.5, BLBI is an aggregate proxy for m easuring  banking  fragility.
The contem poraneous effect of a ten per cent exchange ra te  depreciation 
is a  10.5 per cent increase in the BLBI. The dem and for BLBI then  shows a 
fluctuation up  to the n in th  quarter, and stabilises a t around 4.9 per cent 
thereafter. This suggests th a t exchange ra te  depreciation does impose a  cost on 
the banking  sector. Even without the aggregate balance sheets d a ta  of
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dom estic corporations, it is worth linking th is finding with the currency 
m ism atch problems discussed in section 9.3. Some firms operating in the non 
tradab le  sector and possessing currency m ism atch may get caught by the 
depreciation and find it difficult to service debts. Consequently, these firms are 
likely to generate non-performing loans. Note th a t banks do not possess 
currency m ism atch, and therefore the effect of depreciation is indirectly 
channelled through firm s’ balance sheets. 25
Figure 9 .13 . Impulse response function of bank bail out to a 10 per cent 
increase in the interest rate and exchange rate.
BLBI's responses to a 10% interest rate
v  10  -
BLBI's responses to a 10% depreciation
Quarters
The im pact of a  ten per cent interest ra te  increase will be a  4.5 per cent 
in s tan tan eo u s increase in BLBI. After that, BLBI increases sharply to 16.5 per 
cent and  stabilises a t around 10.9 per cent. This m eans th a t the costs of the 
in terest rate hike imposed on the banking sector are sm aller in the shorter 
term , b u t higher in the longer term. This finding is in con trast to the 
hypothesis asserted  by Fischer (1997), th a t for m ost developing countries 
devaluation is more costly than  an in terest ra te  hike.
25 See empirical results in Chapter 5
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The fact th a t an interest rate hike is more costly can perhaps be 
explained by its effects on firm s’ and b an k s’ balance sheets. Note tha t 
devaluation only h u rts  firms with currency m ism atch and, a t the sam e time, 
induces an expansionary impact on export-oriented sectors. On the other 
hand, an  in terest rate hike will h u rt all firms and banks. If the lending rate is 
fully ad justed , default risks and moral hazard problem s m ay increase. To 
reduce these problems, banks may not fully ad just the  lending ra tes in the 
sam e proportion as deposit rates. However, th is will reduce the in terest rate 
m argin. Either way, banks will be the ultim ate victims.
This finding has an im portant policy implication. An in terest rate  hike 
does weaken the banking sector more than  an exchange ra te  depreciation. If 
th is is anticipated by agents, they may persist with attacking  the currency, 
because the probability of a  successful a ttack  becom es higher in the weaker 
banking environment. In effect, the hike m ay not be credible, in th a t 
depreciation cannot be prevented. In order to assess  th is possibility, we provide 
an im pulse response function of the nom inal depreciation to the shock in 
expected depreciation and increase in the in terest rate. The resu lt is depicted 
in Figure 9.14.
The idea of the sim ulation is th a t the au thorities will react by increasing 
the nom inal in terest rate by 10 per cent to counter the  increase in expected 
depreciation of the same percentage points. If the in te rest ra te  hike is credible, 
the currency will not depreciate, or a t least, it should quickly converge to the 
initial value. From the sim ulation result, currency depreciation cannot be 
prevented un less the in terest rate increase is large. The currency can be 
prevented from depreciating in the curren t quarter only. Then it depreciates by 
8.8 per cent in the first quarter, before stabilising a t a round  7.9 per cent. This 
indicates th a t a  ten per cent increase in the in terest ra te  can only offset about a 
2.1 per cent expected depreciation. Thus, the hike is not credible.
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Figure 9 .14 . Impulse response function of the exchange rate to a ten per cent 
shock the in interest rate and expected depreciation
Quarter
9.7. Concluding remarks
The s ta te  of the Indonesian economy in the ru n  up  to the  crisis indeed 
displayed a  balance of paym ents vulnerability. This is indicated  by the high 
ratio of debt service to total exports, the deficiency of foreign exchange reserves 
to cover liquid foreign liabilities, and currency m ism atch. The sustainability  of 
the balance of paym ents largely depended on the continuation  of capital 
inflows. In short, the balance of paym ents was susceptible to a  reversal of 
capital inflows.
The fact th a t the crisis did not occur earlier suggests the  need to identify 
the trigger. The m arket p ressure  index dem onstrates th a t there was no 
significant excess dem and for foreign exchange th a t could have swept the 
country  into a  balance of paym ents crisis before Ju ly  1997. However, the index
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indicates th a t m arket p ressure  during August 1997 was 27 tim es higher than  
the average p ressure  before the crisis, and so far, w as the  largest challenge to 
the au thorities in m aintaining the crawling peg. Four different triggers were 
identified, namely the slow down of capital inflows to the South  E ast Asian 
region, and  the increases in the expected depreciation, the  perceived risk and 
the foreign in terest rate.
The collapse of the exchange rate and the surge of capital outflows could 
have been prevented by increasing the domestic in te rest rate. However, the 
effectiveness of such  policy was ham pered by a fragile bank ing  sector. Because 
the banking  sector was weak, the hike was not feasible or credible. As we have 
em phasized, th is inference is invariant to the fact th a t the  banking  sector was 
not the m ain debtor of foreign borrowing.
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Chapter 10
Propagation of the Crisis
10.1. Introduction
This chap ter d iscuss the propagation of the crisis with particu lar em phasis on 
the role of the banking sector. The purpose is twofold:
❖  To highlight several features characterising the deepening of the crisis, 
such  as m onetary expansion, large depreciation, high inflation, export 
and  im port com pression, and banking sector collapse.
❖  To examine interactions am ongst m acroeconom ic variables tha t 
contributes to the severity of the crisis.
The rem ainder of th is chap ter is organised as follows. Section 10.2 is the 
chronicle of the deepening crisis, which began with the liquidation of 16 banks 
on 1 November 1997. Section 10.3 describes ban k  panics and loss of monetary 
control. Section 10.4 analyses key features of the  m acroeconom ic adjustm ent 
process during the height of the crisis. Section 10.5 d iscusses transm ission 
m echanism s for the propagation of the crisis, and  section 10.6 concludes.
10.2. Chronology
This subsection highlights several im portant events th a t occurred following the 
liquidation of 16 banks. These include increased political instability, bank 
runs, social un rest, and the collapse of the Soeharto regime. The list of events 
is p resen ted  in Table 10.1. The purpose is to set the scene for the further 
analysis th a t follows.
Table 10.1. A Chronology o f the Crisis Propagation, November 1997-July 1999
Date Event
1997
1 November Bank resolution package announced; 16 private banks 
closed; limited deposit insurance for the depositors
5 November 
Mid-December
Three-year Stand-By Arrangem ent with IMF approved
Deposit ru n s  on banks, totalled for about half of banking 
system  assets.
1998
15 Jan u a ry  
26 Jan u a ry
Second IM F-supported program  announced.
Indonesian Bank R estructuring Agency (IBRA) established 
and blanket guarantee announced.
M id-February President Suharto re-elected. D oubts about future of financial 
sector program  grow stronger am id political uncertainty. 
Rupiah depreciates further and currency board is debated.
4 April 
Mid-May
IBRA closes 7 banks and takes over 7 others.
W idespread riots, rupiah depreciates, deposit ru n s  intensify, 
and  Bank Indonesia m ust provide liquidity.
21 May 
29 May 
5 Ju n e
President Suharto steps down 
A m ajor private bank taken over by IBRA
International lenders and Indonesian com panies agree on 
corporate debt rescheduling (only in principle)
M id-July 
23 Septem ber
Authorities allow m arket-determ ined in te rest ra tes on SB1
Indonesia’s bilateral external debt to official creditors 
refinanced
30 Septem ber Bank Mandiri created through m erger of four largest state- 
owned banks. Plans announced for jo in t government-private 
sector recapitalisation of private banks.
6 October Amended Banking Law passed, which included strengthening 
of IBRA
1999 
13 March Government closes 38 private b anks and IBRA takes over 7 
others. Eligibility of 9 private banks for jo in t recapitalisation 
with government announced.
21 April
30 Ju n e  
5 Ju ly
31 Ju ly
Closure of one joint-venture bank  
Eight private banks recapitalised
Government announces plan for resolution of IBRA banks 
Legal m erger of com ponent banks of B ank Madiri
Source: Adapted from Lindgren et al (2000)
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Between November 1997 and Jan u a ry  1998, serious problems became 
evident, creating economic and political uncertain ty . For instance Hill (1999, p. 
9) describes the situation as:
Over this period, Indonesia’s economic and  political situation 
deteriorated sharply. The bank closures of November 1 triggered 
widespread uncertainty; backtracking on key reform s to preserve 
the Soeharto family interests was evident; ....and  Soeharto was 
very ill for a  week in early December (at one stage rum ours of his 
death  began to circulate). Indonesia then  began to p a rt company 
with other East Asian crisis economies, as its currency and stock 
m arket plum m eted to new lows and its financial system  virtually 
ceased to function. The government also began to lose control of 
the money supply, and hence inflationary p ressu res quickly 
surfaced. Jan u ary  1998 was a  truly dreadful m onth, with a  series
of devastating events..... , which pushed  the rup iah  to as low as
17,000 (that is, one-seventh of its pre-crisis level).
Jan u a ry  to April 1998 could be called a  period of w asted opportunities. 
There were some sign of (minor) improvement and  optimism. The exchange rate 
and stock price index began to strengthen a  little, b u t were still very volatile. 
However, th is was spoiled by uncertain  policy response, and lack of 
com m itm ent for major economic reforms. The President toyed with the 
controversial currency board system (CBS), violated the LOI with the IMF, and 
dism issed the Governor of BI. Moreover, the m arket seriously doubted the 
resolve for major economic reform, as the P resident’s eldest daughter, Tu tu t, 
and h is crony, Bob Hasan, were included in the new cabinet.
In May 1998, the situation was chaotic, and  law and  order practically 
non-existent. S tudent protests became frequent and  larger. After the shooting 
of s tu d en ts  a t Trisakti University, a  m ajor J a k a r ta  cam pus, s tuden ts  occupied 
the Parliam ent, and looting and social violence followed. Many wealthy ethnic 
Chinese and expatriates escaped the country. The political crisis culm inated 
when after 32 years in complete com m and of the country  the President finally 
stepped down on 22 May 1998. On the sam e day, Dr. Habibie was installed as 
the th ird  President of the republic.
M arket confidence in the new president was weak. Between mid Ju n e  
and Ju ly  1998, the rupiah stayed a t above the 14,000 levels, and then
239
gradually strengthened. The political situation continued to be hostile, partly 
owing to the fact th a t Habibie was seen as being p art of Soeharto’s circle.
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The th ird  President survived his first 100 days in office, and some 
optim ism  sprouted. The economic team  u n d er the  coordinating m inister of 
economic and  finance, G inandjar K artasasm ita, appeared to be pragm atic and 
cooperative with the Fund. The currency reached the 7,000 levels on 21 
October 1998 and then  seemed to stabilise around  7,500 and  8,000.
However, the economy continued to slum p until December 1998. In the 
last quarte r of 1998 the GDP contracted by 17 per cent com pared with a  year 
earlier.
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10.3. Monetary expansion and bank panic
10.3.1. Bank panic and guarantee
The process leading to the deepening of the crisis began with the inability of the 
au thorides to control money supply. Indonesia’s base money began to increase 
rem arkably from December 1997, following a  series of b an k  ru n s , which were 
probably triggered by the closure of 16 banks in November. Unlike Indonesia, 
the other crisis countries m anaged the money supply very well (see Figure 
10.2). In th is regard, Indonesia is the exception which m ay help explain the 
calam ity th a t followed. For instance Hill (1999, p.33) rightly described the 
situation as:
(t)he crisis began to feed on itself. In addition to the m ounting 
political uncertainty, the loss of m onetary control contributed  to
rapidly increasing inflation and the collapse of the ru p ia h .........,
the expansion of base money can be linked both  directly to bank  
bail-outs (among which the well-connected were well-treated) and 
more generally to a  sense of panic on the p a rt of the  m onetary 
authorities. Monetary policy m anagem ent was com plicated not 
only by the financial and political crisis b u t also by the  exchange 
ra te  crisis. Indonesian residents switched increasingly to foreign 
currency deposits (which are legal), th u s  com plicating the  ta sk  of
money supply targeting............Indonesia was w ithout parallel
am ong the crisis economies. Despite large currency 
depreciations, the other economies kept the  m oney supply firmly 
u n d er control, and inflation to single digit levels in both  1997 and 
1998.
The problem was th a t the authorities had  to bail ou t troubled banks. 
The bail ou t took two forms; liquidity support and  b lanket guarantee. By 
providing an  overdraft facility against the central bank, liquidity support aims 
to stabilise b an k s’ day-to-day cash flow and  prevent a  sudden  b reak  down of 
the banking system. The support is referred to BLBI (B antuan Likuiditas Bank 
Indonesia, or liquidity support from Bank Indonesia) and  an  extension of KLBI 
(Kredit Likuiditas Bank Indonesia, or liquidity credit from B ank Indonesia). 
Lindgren et al (2000) estim ated th a t by Ju n e  1998 the size of such  support was
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about Rp 170 trillion, or about 17 per cent of GDP.1 This can be compared to 
the December 1997 figure of only about Rp 60 trillion.
Figure 10.2. Trends in reserve money in the crisis countries 








Jun-97 Dec-97 Jun-98 Dec-98 Jun-99
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics database.
Due to panic runs, a blanket guarantee was announced  on 26 Jan u ary  
1998. Such a guarantee was intended to restore public confidence in the 
banking system , and conserve the stability of the paym ent system. This 
involved a com m itm ent by the government to h o nour b a n k s’ th ird  party 
liabilities, excluding liabilities to shareholders, subordinated  debts, and 
insiders’ deposits.2 By the end of 1999, the b lanket guaran tee totalled about Rp 
54 trillion.
The m ain idea for providing a bail out is to short circuit the vicious circle 
between panic ru n s  and increased banking fragility. A deterioration in banking
1 The latest estimate for the figure is Rp 165 trillion (Detik.com, 23 August 2000).
2 Insiders include bank owners, managers, and affiliates.
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conditions can induce panic runs, which fu rther worsen b a n k s ’ financial 
positions. If ru n s  can be prevented, further com plications can also be avoided, 
and banking problems can be worked out more easily. Moreover, liquidity 
support can reduce systemic risks (i.e. a bank  fails because ano ther fails to 
service in ter-bank liabilities).
The ru n s  on private domestic banks began after the liquidation 16 banks 
in November 1997. There were some problems in the process of liquidation tha t 
induced panic. These problems were:
❖  Larger depositors were not protected against losses associated  with bank 
closure. Only deposits of not more th an  Rp 20 million were fully saved 
by the government. Although this protection covered over 91 per cent of 
depositors, it only covered 20 per cent of total deposits (Lindgren 2000). 
The problem was th a t larger depositors were am ongst those who were 
aware of foreign exchange risk and whose capital was mobile (i.e. they 
had  more access to offshore transactions). Given th is, panic m ight have 
not only been induced by increased banking  fragility, b u t also by 
anticipated currency depreciation. In effect, b an k  ru n s  would induce 
capital flight.
❖  There was no assurance from the authorities th a t more b anks would not 
be closed. This, and the lack of full guarantee, induced a  perception 
(especially am ongst larger depositors) th a t they  were facing further 
losses.3
❖  The criteria for the closures were not sufficiently clarified to the public, 
and it was widely known tha t several o ther b an k s were also insolvent. 
Prior to the liquidation, irresponsible parties circulated  lists of 48 to 56 
banks under consideration for closure. Though they included different 
lists of banks, the 16 banks were apparently  included in alm ost all lists, 
fuelling the perception th a t the lists contained some tru th  (i.e. more 
banks were considered, bu t for various reasons only 16 were finally 
closed).
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♦> The credibility of the initial intention (i.e. disciplining banks) was spoiled 
by perm itting Bambang Trihatmodjo -  one of the P resident’s sons and 
the owner of one of the liquidated banks, B ank Androm eda -  to acquire 
a m ajor share in Bank Alfa. This may have precipitated the perception 
th a t policies to resolve the crisis would be subord inated  by a desire to 
protect the ‘family’.
In short, the liquidation was not able to restore public confidence, and may 
have even provoked the subsequent runs. Moreover, there are two other 
factors th a t can help explain the panic:
❖  Depositors had  ‘painful’ memories regarding ban k  closure, due to the 
losses incurred by the liquidation of Bank Sum a several years earlier. 
Small depositors were fully honoured, b u t the procedure to claim the 
deposits was complicated. Moreover, the liquidation of asse ts  was very 
slow’ and  highly politicised, creating uncertain ty  for larger depositors.
❖  A substan tia l num ber of depositors m ight have been aware of the 
incom ing problems in the private banks after the  b reak  out of the crisis. 
Figure 10.3 suggests tha t the share of deposits in private b anks declined 
from August 1997. This is in contrast to the pre-crisis trend , where the 
share  of private banks tended to increase while th a t of state  banks 
tended to steadily decrease.3 4 This suggests there was a  tendency to 
reduce funds allocated to private banks as a  precautionary  step to 
m inim ise potential risks (i.e., a  flight to safety). In effect, the November 
closures were a vindication th a t their perceptions had  been correct. After 
tha t, depositors began to withdraw in large am ounts, m ost of which was 
re-deposited in state and foreign banks. The share  of deposits in state 
banks increased from 33 per cent in October 1997 to 46 per cent in Ju n e  
1998. D uring the same period, the share of foreign banks increased from 
8 to 17 per cent. Meanwhile, the private b a n k s ’ share  decreased from 57 
to 25 per cent.
3 See also Lane et al. (1999) on this issue.
4 See section 3 .5  for detailed discussion  about the pre-crisis development.
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Figure 10.3. The share o f deposits in private state and foreign banks , 
1996-1999 (% o f total deposits)
Private Banks
State Banks
Foreign Banks ___ '
Jan-96 Jul-96 Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99
Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
In order to restore public confidence, a  b lanket guarantee was then  
introduced in Jan u a ry  1998. As seen in Figure 10.3 the guarantee could not 
recover the loss of confidence in private banks. Through to Ju ly  1998, the 
private b an k s’ share  continued to decline. However, it is safe to say th a t bank 
ru n s  could have been even more severe w ithout th is guarantee. There are four 
factors th a t w eakened the guarantee’s credibility and effectiveness.
First, the economic crisis began to feed on the political crisis and social 
un rest, increasing the perceived country risk. Hill (1999, p.19) describes this 
as:
(T)here are frequent m edia and anecdotal reports of dislocation, 
hardsh ip  and  violence among local com m unities and  families. The 
state  of law and order and order certainly appears to have 
deteriorated markedly. Crime is reported to be rising sharply.
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....... Looting of containers in the ports, factories and  shops is
souring the commercial environm ent........... The dom inant ethnic
Chinese business com m unity continues to be a prim e target, b u t 
they are by no m eans the only ones. No doubt rising poverty and 
unem ploym ent have been a factor in all this. Political paybacks 
have been another factor in the equation, as those who felt 
m istreated  by officialdom during the Soeharto era  have sought to 
level the score.
The economic, political and social crises culm inated in May 1998, with 
w idespread riots. S tuden ts flooded the streets and occupied the parliam ent 
building, dem anding the end of the regime. B ank ru n s  intensified, the rupiah 
continued to depreciate, wealthy ethnic Chinese fled the country, and finally, 
President Soeharto stepped down.
Second, dom estic agents may have anticipated increased banking 
fragility and  its im plications for real economic activities and  government 
budgets. If th is is so, an anticipation of a  possible breakdow n of the banking 
system  would lead agents to cast doubt on the ability of the governm ent to 
carry contingent liabilities, i.e. a  guarantee m eans b an k s’ liabilities become the 
governm ent’s. Large depreciation and  high in terest ra tes  m ay have induced 
such anticipation. The subsequent w ithdraw als of deposits, which led to 
m onetary expansion, continued currency depreciation, and  capital flight, made 
such expectations self-fulfilling.
Third, the guarantee was not accom panied by strict control on capital 
outflows. As d iscussed in section 9.3, a t the  onset of the crisis foreign 
exchange reserves were not sufficient to cover liquid foreign liabilities. The 
explicit guarantee entails a  fu rther burden  on the balance of paym ents as 
deposit w ithdraw als can be readily transla ted  into capital flight. As of 
December 1997, M2 was about five tim es foreign exchange reserves, suggesting 
a deficiency of liquid asse ts  to cover contingent liabilities.5 B ecause of this, the 
deposit guarantee was not credible. At the height of the financial and  political 
crisis, the issue of capital (outflow) control becam e relevant, because it provided 
two functions: (1) elim inating the benefit of transferring  financial resources
5 Calvo and  Mendoza (1996) em phasise the potential sudden  collapse in  M2, not the 
size of M2 per se.
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abroad, and  (2) increasing the cost of hoarding cash. These can reduce the 
willingness to w ithdraw deposits. If the proceeds from bank  ru n s  cannot be 
transferred  abroad, agents m ust hoard money or spend it. This induces 
inflationary pressure, increasing the cost of holding money. If this were 
anticipated , some depositors would ra ther not m ake runs.
Fourth, the guarantee may have induced moral hazard  problems: some 
b anks m ight have increased the ‘be t’ in order to recover existing losses. For 
instance, before its collapse Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (BDNI), one of the 
private b anks notorious for its poor m anagem ent, was involved in foreign 
exchange transactions (mainly in the form of ‘m argin trad ing’) with Bank Bali. 
The claim s on BDNI from these transactions were estim ated to be Rp 598 billion 
(Kompas, 16 A ugust 1999). The bank  was finally closed on 4 April 1998.
10.3.2. Interest rate hike
Because the guarantee was not credible and liquidity support continued, 
the m anagem ent of money supply becam e increasingly complicated. It should 
have been possible to prevent expansion in reserve money by increasing interest 
rates. The authorities did increase the in terest rate in March 1998, and this 
was continued until May 1999 (see Figure 10.4). The one-m onth SBI rate 
increased from 22 to 45 per cent in March 1998, and reached a  peak in August 
(70 per cent).6 The average one-m onth deposit rate  also increased, b u t the loan 
ra te  (working capital loan) was not fully ad justed  to the sam e extent as the 
deposit rate.
Even with th is u ltra  high in terest rate, money stubbornly increased until 
Ju ly  1998. It did stabilise after tha t, b u t did not reverse to the extent achieved 
in the o ther crisis countries (see Figure 10.2). In other words, the in terest rate 
hike failed to reduce the money supply.
6 SBIs (Bank Indonesia Certificates) are issued to reduce money supply.
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Figure 10.4. Interest rates, 1997-1999 (%)
One month SBI rates
One month deposit rates
Loan rates: Working Capital
Jun-98 Dec-99Jun-97 Dec-97 Dec-98 Jun-99
Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
The im pact of such a hike on banks was costly. B anks could not fully 
ad ju st their lending rates as high as deposit ra tes, due to the fear of n o n ­
perform ing loans. They could have increased lending ra tes, b u t no one could 
afford to pay back the loans. On the other hand, banks had  to compete against 
each other to a ttract deposits and m aintain existing ones. In effect, banks 
suffered a negative net-in terest margin.
Figure 10.5 presents the spread between average lending and deposit 
rates. The average lending ra tes are calculated as a  weighted average of ra tes 
charged on working capital and  investm ent loans. The average deposit ra tes 
are a weighted average of time deposit rates with a  m atu rity  of between 1 and 
24 m onths. The figure shows th a t banks suffered negative spreads for about 16 
m onths, from February 1998 to May 1999. This was in addition to the  previous 
negative spread th a t occurred during Septem ber and October 1997, which was 
the resu lt of the tight money policy introduced in A ugust 1997. For about 8 
m onths, the negative spread was above 15 per cent. It peaked in Septem ber 
1998 at about -  24 per cent.
248
Figure 10.5. The spread between lending and deposit rates (%)
Jun-97 Sep-97 Dec-97 Mar-98 Jun-98 Sep-98 Dec-98 Mar-99 Jun-99 Sep-99 Dec-99
Source: Calculated from Indonesian Financial Statistics, BI.
It is fair to say the high in terest rate  policy fu rther w eakened an already 
defunct banking system. It directly induced fu rther losses for banks, and 
consequently increased the need for bail out (see the discussion in section 9.6 
on the effect of the in terest ra te  rise on bank bail out). Because of this, it was 
not effective in reducing the money supply.
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10.4. Macroeconomic Adjustment
10.4.1. Inflationary pressure and real exchange rate
Because it was difficult to control reserve money, the resu lts  were entirely 
expected: further currency depreciation and heightened inflation. During the 
tum u ltu o u s days of Jan u a ry  1998, the exchange ra te  broke the 10,000 and 
15,000 psychological levels on the 8 th and 23rd of th a t m onth  (see Figure 10.1). 
Between February and April 1998, the exchange ra te  strengthened to around 
the 8,000 levels. However, political uncertain ty , social u n re s t and  the bank 
ru n s  th a t occurred in May 1998, pushed  the currency down. The exchange 
ra te  touched its lowest level of 16,000 on 17 Ju n e  1998. The exchange rate 
collapse w as partly due to the exodus of wealthy ethnic Chinese following 
violence against them. As political and social tensions declined, m onetary 
stabilisation became easier. From October 1998, the  exchange ra te  stabilised 
a t around  8,000, and this was m aintained th roughout 1999.
Money expansion and the large exchange ra te  depreciation increased the 
inflation ra te  during 1998. As seen in Figure 10.6, the  inflation ra te  soared to 
82 per cent by September 1998. The inflation ra te  for the whole year was 
about 57 per cent, or about 8 tim es the pre-crisis inflation rate. This high 
inflation ra te  was caused not only by m onetary expansion and  exchange rate 
depreciation, b u t was com pounded by the increase in food prices. A severe 
drought in 1997 caused by the ‘El Nino’ effect decreased food production.
The relatively uncontrolled money supply led Indonesia’s inflation to 
depart from the other crisis countries. Malaysia, which was able to exercise 
m onetary tightening, h as been able to m ain tain  the inflation ra te  below 7 per 
cent, and  its 1998 inflation rate  was only 5.3 per cent, the lowest am ongst the 
crisis countries. Although their inflation ra te  exceeded the two-digit level for 
several m onths, Thailand and the Philippines’ 1998 inflation ra tes  rem ained 
ju s t  below 10 per cent. Korea was also able to achieve a  relatively low inflation 
ra te  of 7.5 per cent.
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Despite its large currency depreciation, Indonesia’s real exchange rate 
was alm ost a t par with the other crisis coun tries’ in m id 1999 (see Figure 10.7). 
The large real depreciation th a t occurred betw een A ugust 1997 and  Jan u ary  
1998 m ade the country twice as competitive as its neighbours. From July  
1998, the inflation rate  heightened, which led to a  sh arp  real appreciation and 
loss of competitiveness. One year later, Indonesia w as as competitive as 
Malaysia and  the Philippines. This stresses th a t inflation m anagem ent is 
im portan t to m aintaining competitiveness of tradab le  goods. As will be 
d iscussed  later in section 10.5, a  defunct banking  system  w asted the gain tha t 
could have been obtained from the real depreciation th a t occurred in 1998.
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10.4.2. Output and expenditure
A com bination of high in terest rates and large depreciation caused  GDP to 
sh rink  sharply  in 1998, by 13.4 per cent. Note tha t, in 1997, Indonesia was 
still able to m ain tain  positive growth of about 4.7 per cent. The biggest 
contraction occurred in the fourth quarter of 1998, w hen o u tpu t was about 18 
per cent lower th an  the sam e quarter of previous year. O u tpu t continued to 
decline by 8 per cent in the first quarter of 1999, and then  began to grow slowly 
b u t steadily. The second quarter of th a t year recorded positive growth for the 
first time, and  GDP for the whole of 1999 was ju s t  0.3 per cent above the 1998 
level. Growth for the first sem ester of 2000 was ju s t  about 4 per cent, 
confirming th a t a  recovery is now underway.
Com pared to the other four crisis countries, Indonesia’s recession was by 
far the w orst (see Figure 10.8). The closest m atch  was Thailand, where output 
sh ran k  by more th an  10 per cent in 1998. However, th is  country  experienced
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recession earlier, from the second quarter of 1997. Adding the 2 per cent 
contraction in 1997, Thailand was almost as bad as Indonesia. The Philippines 
perform ed far better than  the others, with a GDP contraction of about 1 per 
cent in 1998.
In term s of recovery, Indonesia was approxim ately one quarter behind 
the other crisis countries. The fastest recovery h as been recorded by South 
Korea (10 per cent growth in 1999). Malaysia is catching up, with growth for the 
whole of 1999 of ju s t below 6 per cent. M alaysia’s growth ra te  for the first 
sem ester of 2000 was about 9 percent. It seems th a t for these two countries 
the signs of recovery are particularly strong. Thailand’s growth in 1999, and in 
the first sem ester of 2000, was ju s t above 4 and 5 per cent. The Philippines’ 
growth exceeded the 3 per cent level in 1999, and, considering the  lower level of 
pre-crisis growth (compared with the others), it is probably safe to assum e th a t 
pre-crisis growth can again be achieved. Though its pre-crisis perform ance was 
better, Indonesia is still catching up to the Philippines’ post-crisis growth level. 
Therefore, it is clear th a t the Indonesian recovery is slower th an  the others.





Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics database.
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Amongst the com ponents of domestic absorption, investm ent spending 
was by far the most adversely affected (see Table 10.2). A djustm ent in 
investm ent occurred by reduction in both change in stocks and  fixed capital 
form ation, b u t the former was adjusted more quickly and  drastically.7 Total 
investm ent spending in 1998 fell by about 46 per cent from the 1997 level. The 
1998 drop in government spending (15 per cent in real terms) also added to 
contractionary  pressures. Surprisingly, household consum ption fell by only 2 
per cent during  th a t year. In effect, domestic absorption sh ran k  by 17 per cent, 
or about 4 per cent more than  ou tpu t contraction.
In 1999, while investm ent continued to decline, governm ent and  private 
consum ption began to pick up. Total consum ption increased by 0.5 per cent 
in th a t year, giving marginal relief to the economy. Thus, the positive growth in 
GDP was driven by consum ption.
In the first sem ester of 2000, ou tpu t growth was also largely driven by 
consum ption. During th is period, consum ption increased by abou t 3 per cent. 
Fixed capital formation began to grow but, because the change in stocks was 
still negative, a  positive investm ent level has not yet emerged.
Exports and imports began to fall sharply in the fourth quarte r of 1998, 
b u t the fall in im ports was larger. For the whole of 1998, exports m aintained a 
vigorous growth of about 11 percent, then collapsed m assively by 32 per cent in
1999, before growing strongly again (by 21 per cent) in the first sem ester of
2000. Im port growth was inverted from 15 per cent in 1997 to m inus 5 per 
cent in 1998. It further collapsed by 41 per cent in 1999. The im ports level in 
the first quarter of 1999 was ju s t about 46 per cent of the previous year.
7 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) emphasise that the change in stocks is most responsive 
to a contractionary shock.
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Table 10.2. National Account, 1997-200 
(1993 prices Rp trillion, figures in italics are indices 1996=100)
97ql 97q2 97q3 97q4 98ql 98q2 98q3
H ousehold  consum ption 66.2 67.5 68.2 72.0 69.2 68.5 63.8
102 104 105 111 107 105 98
G overnm ent consum ption 8.3 7.1 7.7 8.6 7.1 6.6 6.2
105 90 97 108 90 84 79
G ross fixed cap ita l form ation 34.2 35.4 36.3 33 .8 25 .4 22.0 22.9
106 110 113 105 79 69 71
C hange in  stock 3.4 1.5 -0 .2 2.7 -1.0 -5.9 -2 .5
358 157 -17 282 -101 -624 -267
E xports of goods & services 25.0 29.0 31.7 35 .5 39.3 35.3 38.9
89 103 113 126 140 126 139
Im ports of goods & services 31.6 33.2 33.7 41.3 39.0 36.1 35.2
104 109 111 135 128 119 115
GDP 105.4 107.3 110.1 111.3 101.1 90.4 94.1
102 104 106 107 98 8 7 91
98q4 99ql 99q2 99q3 99q4 OOql G0q2
H ousehold  consum ption 66.4 66.8 67.1 67.4 67.8 68.5 68.8
102 103 103 104 104 106 106
G overnm ent consum ption 6.9 6.8 7.3 6.2 6.7 7.0 7.5
87 86 92 78 84 89 94
G ross fixed cap ita l form ation 19.7 18.5 18.0 18.1 20.3 21.1 21.8
61 5 7 56 56 63 66 68
C hange in  stock -1.7 -1.4 -0.1 -0 .8 -4.2 -5.6 -6.5
-175 -152 -13 -86 -446 -591 -681
E xports of goods & services 21.2 22.2 22.1 24 .0 23.8 26.1 27.4
75 79 79 86 85 93 98
Im ports of goods & services 22.1 18.9 20.5 19.8 19.3 19.8 21.3
73 62 67 65 63 65 70
GDP 90.4 94.0 93.8 95.1 95.1 97.4 97.7
87 91 91 92 92 94 94
Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
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Since the real exchange rate was favourable for exports, it is surprising 
th a t they experienced a plunge before bouncing back. Hill (2000) pu ts the 
blam e on several factors: cancelled export orders owing to supply uncertain ties, 
com panies had  difficulties in obtaining trade finance, shipping bottlenecks 
following the sharp  fall in imports, supply d isruptions caused  by localised 
outbreaks of looting and poor law and order, and the reduced presence of (the 
more export-oriented) MNCs.
The fact th a t the import implosion was larger th an  the contraction in 
dom estic absorption suggests expenditure switching from im portables to 
domestically produced goods. This phenom enon is a  common effect of 
devaluation. Because importables became more expensive, the ir share in 
consum ption and investm ent spending decreased (see Figure 10.9). In the last 
quarter of 1998, the share of imports in dom estic absorption fell massively, 
from 39 to 24 per cent. From there on, it stabilised a t a round  22 per cent.
Figure 10.9. Expenditure Switching:
Share o f Imports in Total Domestic Absorptions (%)
97ql 97q2 97q3 97q4 98ql 98q2 98q3 98q4 99ql 99q2 99q3 99q4 OOql 00q2
Source: Calculated from CEIC database, Hong Kong
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10.4.3. Balance of payments
With the surge in capital outflows, it became increasingly difficult to avoid a 
full-blown crisis. Between the last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 
2000, the exodus of private financial resources am ounted to about $ 34 billion, 
alm ost half of which was in the first two quarters  of th a t period (see Table 
10.3).8 The $34 billion figure is equivalent to total private capital inflows during 
the four years leading up to the crisis. Capital outflow pressure  was particularly  
m assive in the first quarter of 1998, causing the balance of paym ents to record 
an  historic lowest level (deficits of around $17 billion).
Around 86 per cent of the outflows was due to ‘short-term ’ private 
capital. The m ain com ponent of th is capital is classified as ‘o ther investm ent’ 
(56 per cent), which suggests a  large fraction of dom estic residen ts’ financial 
resources were being transferred  abroad. The rest of the short-term  capital 
consists of portfolio capital (32 per cent) and  bank  liabilities (12 per cent). The 
massive exodus of mobile capital is not surprising  given the panic of 1997 and 
the political chaos and social u n res t of 1998.
Although the m agnitude is m uch sm aller th an  the mobile capital flight, a  
continuous negative FD1 flows for five sem esters rep resen ts  far deeper 
problems. Hill (2000 p.15) p u t th is as:
(W)hat is in some respects more worrying still is the trend  in FDI, 
which responds to longer-term  and  more sober assessm en ts  of an  
econom y’s prospects. Here Indonesia is a  complete outlier am ong 
the five E ast Asian crisis economies. From being the largest 
recipient of FDI in 1996, and nearly so in 1997, it is estim ated to 
have been the only one to experience a  ne t outflow in 1998. The 
con trast with the two other economies u n d er an  IMF crisis 
program  is particularly  noticeable, since FDI inflows to both 
alm ost doubled. They underline again th a t Indonesia’s situation  
is m uch  more precarious, th a t E ast Asia’s large cash-rich  
‘C hinese’ investors (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) are 
sh u nn ing  Indonesia, and  th a t its recovery will be m uch slower.
8 The $34 billion figure excludes errors and om issions.
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Table 10 .3 . Composition o f Balance o f Payments, 1997:Q2-2000:Q1 ($ billion)
97Q2 97Q3 97Q4 98Q1
Exports 14.7 14.4 14.2 12.8
Imports -11.3 -12.2 -11.3 -8.0
Merchandise Trade Balance 3.5 2.2 3.0 4.8
Services (net) -4.6 -3.6 -3.2 -3.8
Current Account -1.1 -1.4 -0.2 1.0
Direct Investm ent 1.3 1.4 -0.3 -0.5
Official Capital 0.4 -0.2 3.2 0.9
Basic Balances 0.5 -0.2 2.6 1.4
Short-term  private capital 0.6 0.6 -8.3 -6.6
Errors and Omissions 0.1 -1.0 2.5 -12.2
Overall Balance 1.2 -0.6 -3.1 -17.4
Memo item:
Capital Account Balance 2.2 1.8 -5.4 -6.2
98Q2 98Q3 98Q4 99Q1
Exports 13.2 13.5 10.9 10.8
Imports -8.2 -8.4 -7.3 -6.8
Merchandise Trade Balance 5.0 5.1 3.5 4.0
Services (net) -4.3 -3.4 -2.9 -2.5
Current Account 0.7 1.7 0.7 1.5
Direct Investm ent 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Official Capital 2.2 3.3 3.6 3.5
Basic Balances 3.3 4.8 4.2 4.7
Short-term  private capital -1.4 -3.5 -2.0 -2.6
Errors and  Om issions 0.2 0.7 1.0 -0.1
Overall Balance 2.1 1.9 3.2 2.0
Memo item:
Capital Account Balance 1.2 -0.4 1.5 0.6
99Q2 99Q3 99Q4 00Q1
Exports 12.4 14.3 13.8 15.1
Imports -7.9 -7.9 -8.0 -8.8
Merchandise Trade Balance 4.5 6.3 5.8 6.3
Services (net) -3.6 -4.5 -4.3 -4.4
Current Account 0.9 1.9 1.5 1.9
Direct Investm ent -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -1.5
Official Capital 1.2 0.6 0.1 1.3
Basic Balances 1.2 1.8 0.7 1.7
Short-term  private capital -1.2 -2.0 -1.4 -0.5
Errors and  Omissions 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.6
Overall Balance 0.8 0.4 0.2 2.8
Memo item:
Capital Account Balance -0.8 -2.1 -2.2 -0.7
Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
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A round 58 per cent of these private capital outflows was offset by the net 
official capital inflows, and these included p a rt of the IMF bail out program.9 
The F und  itself contributed only half of these official capital inflows. It is fair to 
say th a t if the bail out package had been more quickly d isbursed  the pressure 
on the balance of paym ents could have been lessened. Hence, exchange rate 
overshooting and its adverse consequences could have been avoided. The slow 
release of the package was partly caused  by difficulties in m eeting the 
conditionality requirem ents and the re luctance of the Soeharto regime to 
im plem ent the program.
A nother im portant source of financing of capital flight is the 
im provem ent in curren t account balances owing to an  im port compression 
ra ther th an  an exports expansion. The cu rren t account was quickly inverted 
from historically always being negative to a  positive figure (above $ 1 billion) in 
the first quarter of 1998. Thereafter, positive balances were m aintained. 
However, as discussed, export perform ance h a s  been som ew hat disappointing, 
a t least un til 2000, and here also Indonesia’s record was poorer th an  th a t of the 
o ther crisis countries. In nominal dollar term s, exports began to decline from 
the end of 1997, before strengthening again a t the  end of 1999. Some 60 per 
cent of the decline was due to the sharp  oil price decline (Hill 2000).
10.4.4. Banking sector
The banking  sector problem was part cause and  p a rt consequence of the fact 
th a t the recession was so deep. The sector w as by far the w orst h it by the 
crisis. The sector’s value added sh rank  by 65 per cent in the la st quarter of 
1998, which coincided with the largest contraction of the GDP. For the whole of 
1998, the sector recorded an average contraction  of about 38 per cent, or 
alm ost three tim es th a t of the average contraction in o ther sectors. While GDP 
began to show marginal positive growth in  1999, the banking system  was still
9 The IMF sponsored program consist of a  $43 billion financial support from the Fund 
($10 billion), the World Bank ($4.5 billion), IDB ($3.5 billion), J a p a n  ($5 billion), 
Singapore ($5 billion), the US ($3 billion), M alaysia ($1 billion), A ustralia ($1 billion), 
B runei ($1.2 billion), Indonesia itself ($5 billion), and  the rest was from China and Hong 
Kong SAR. See Soesatro and Basri (1998) for a  detailed d iscussion  on the program.
259
paralysed by m inus 16 per cent growth. But, in the year 2000, it grew faster 
th an  GDP. This suggests th a t growth in the real sector is crucial for a  banking 
recovery. But the converse is also true: the health  of the sector will be a key 
factor for assuring  sustainable recovery of real activities. This will be further 
elaborated on in the next section.
The problem is tha t the banking sector had  to cope with increased non­
perform ing loans (Figure 10.10). NPLs increased sharply in 1998, and  peaked 
in the first quarter of 1999, a t about six tim es th a t of the pre-crisis level. In the 
following quarters, it dropped to around  40 per cent. However, the drop was a 
resu lt of the fact th a t bad loans were transferred  to IBRA. Thus the actual 
figure is, in fact, higher.
Figure 10.10. Non-performing loans, 1997-99 (% of total loans)
97q2 97q3 97q4 98q l 98q2 98q3 98q4 9 9 q l 99q2 99q3 99q4
Source: BI
With m ounting NPLs, banks had  to shoulder steep financial losses and 
their cash  flow was severely disrupted. In a  crisis situation, it w as difficult to 
seek fresh capital for covering these losses. As a  resu lt, from Jan u a ry  1997, 
bank  equity capital declined sharply (Figure 10.11). The ratio of bank  capital 
to total asse ts  recorded its lowest level in February  and  M arch 1999, when the 
ratio was about m inus 40 per cent. After th a t the ratio improved markedly, bu t 
was still negative. However, th is im provem ent was not due to injection of new
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capital by the owners or new investors. Bad loans were transferred  to IBRA and 
replaced by illiquid government bonds (see Figure 10.11 on claim s on central 
government). The movement on claims on the central governm ent m irrors the 
im provem ent in b an k s’ capital position. Therefore, the financial position of 
b an k s looks better than  it actually is.
.As discussed in C hapters 3 and 5, most m ajor private banks were owned 
by conglom erates and committed to self-lending. The sam e conglom erates were 
also heavily exposed to foreign borrowing, and also h it severely by the crisis. 
B ecause of tha t, they did not have sufficient financial resources to fully 
recapitalised their banks. Likewise, the central governm ent was also budget 
constrained  and could not inject fresh capital in to both  the ailing state  and 
private banks. All state banks were insolvent and  m ost affected by the crisis 
relative to other banks.
Recapitalising banks with government bonds h a s  two im portant 
consequences. First, bad loans taken out from private and  state  b anks will not 
be fully recovered. The value of such assets is usually  m uch lower than  the 
book value. Moreover, selling assets in a crisis s itua tion  is difficult, un less the 
governm ent is ready to accept a very low price. However, waiting for a  better 
economic situation can be even more costly. U nder a  weak and  corrupt 
institu tional setting, asse ts  are prone to looting and  ‘collusive’ pricing. The 
governm ent is already well known for its inability to safeguard its assets. The 
fact th a t alm ost every year the state banks need injections from the government 
rep resen ts poor institutional capacity to m aintain public assets.
Second, aside from the above-mentioned potential loss, the  in terest on 
the bonds will p u t massive pressure on the budget. For instance, in 2000 the 
in terest paym ent will be about Rp 38 trillion, or about 4 % of GDP. In year 
2001, it is estim ated to be around Rp 56 trillion, or about 19 per cent of the 
total (planned) government budget.
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Figure 10.11. Deterioration o f ba n ks’financial position, 1997-2000
(% o f total assets)
Claims to Central Goyermont
Borrowinc from BT
Dec-99Dec-97 Jun-98 Jun-00
Source: BI, Indonesian Financial Statistics.
By the end of 1999, it is estim ated th a t the governm ent bonds needed to 
bail ou t and recapitalise domestic banks is a round  Rp 621 trillion, or about 51 
per cent of GDP in fiscal year 1999/2000 (Fane 2000).10 Note th a t th is figure 
does not include in terest paym ent on the bonds. A year ago, the estim ate was 
only Rp 166 trillion, which suggests the banking  sector deteriorated rapidly 
(Cameron 1999).
With bad loans taken  care of by the governm ent, the  effective commercial 
loans issued  by banks declined sharply (Figure 10.12). The pre-crisis level of 
loans to GDP ratio was around  53 per cent and, un til m id 1998, it continued to 
increase, with the trend  sim ilar to the pre-crisis one. After th a t, the ratio began
10 The latest estim ate for the figure is Rp 654 trillion (Detikcom, 5 October 2000). See 
Fane (2000) Table 9, for detailed estim ates for 1999.
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to decline and, by Septem ber 1998, it was already lower th an  the pre-crisis 
level. By March 1999, the ratio was ju s t about 41 per cent. This suggests tha t 
loan contraction was bigger than  output compression. The sharp  fall to 24 per 
cent th a t occurred in mid 1999 was due to the fact th a t bad loans were taken 
over by IBRA. By mid 2000, the ratio was ju s t  about 19 per cent, which is 
sim ilar to th a t in the early 1980s.
Figure 10.12 suggests th a t banks have been incapacitated  by NPLs. 
The pre-crisis tendency was th a t loans and deposits tended to move closely 
together, and  th is was m aintained until mid 1998. Because b anks m ade losses 
and owners did not inject new capital, loanable funds were u sed  to service 
deposits. Note th a t household consum ption did not fall as sharply  as output, 
suggesting th a t households utilised their savings to sm ooth consum ption when 
income was falling. With high interest ra tes, there w as a  windfall for 
depositors, enabling them  to susta in  consum ption.
By mid 2000, the gap between deposits and  loans w as abou t 37 per cent 
of GDP. This gap m easures implosion in the loan m arket and  the b an k s’ 
burden  to service liabilities. With almost half of total bank  asse ts  held by IBRA, 
in terest earnings from government bonds becam e the m ajor source of bank 
incom e.11 B anks are allowed to sell off some of the bonds so th a t the proceeds 
can be utilised  to issue new loans. However, the m arket was not so responsive, 
partly owing to the low in terest rates offered. The m arket dem anded a heavy 
discount, b u t this m eans b an k s’ assets and  capital would be reduced 
significantly. The bonds are practically illiquid.
In order to m ake investm ent bonds attractive, the governm ent can 
increase the in terest rate. However, the governm ent is budget constrained, 
owing to the slow progress m ade by IBRA in selling off the assets. For the fiscal 
year 2000, IBRA’s target is to dispose of around Rp 18.9 trillion of assets, bu t 
by Septem ber only Rp 7.7 trillion had been raised. The rem aining Rp 11.2 
trillion was to be m et by divesting shares in B ank C entral Asia, Bank Niaga, 
Bank Internasional Indonesia, Bank Universal, and  several other big
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com panies. However, the sale of the first two banks w as postponed until 2001, 
due to the weak responses from the m arket. Note tha t, even if IBRA can meet 
the target, the target itself is far lower than the total value of the bonds plus the 
in terest. Because of that, the government will be very cautious in raising the 
in terest rate.
Figure 10 .12 . Financial Disintermediation, 1997-2000 (% o f nominal GDP)
Deposits to GDP ratio
Loan to GDP ratio
Sep-97 Mar-98 Sep-98 Mar-99 Sep-99 Mar-00Mar-97
Source: Indonesian Financial Statistics, BI
Because the bonds are illiquid and IBRA’s progress in disposing of the 
assets is very slow, the loan to GDP ratio is unlikely to improve m uch  in the 
near fu ture. The low level of effective loans will certainly affect the  speed of 
economic recovery. Unless firms regain the credibility of foreign creditors, they 
are likely to be credit constrained in expanding production capacity, or utilising 
the existing capacity. Relatively healthy firms m ay have to rely on self- 
fmancing from retained earnings. The problem is th a t b anks lose the allocative 
efficiency of shifting funds around productive investm ent. B anks cannot 
effectively utilise funds trapped in NPLs.




So far, the discussion in the last few sections h as been generally descriptive, yet 
three issues rem ain to be addressed more rigorously. First, it is still not 
completely clear w hether the in terest ra te  rise or devaluation contributed m ost 
to the contraction of economic activities. It was highlighted in section 9.6 th a t 
an in terest hike could be more costly th an  devaluation to the banking sector. 
However it is also im portant to assess the effect of the two shocks on the real 
sector.
Second, a  devaluation generally stim ulates exports. The elastic 
estim ates reported in C hapter 8 suggests th a t a  one per cent real depreciation 
brings about 1.33 per cent increase in non-oil exports. However, as discussed 
in 10.4.2, there was export com pression from 1998. Therefore, there is a  need 
to look for possible sources of disruption in exports, such  as the dry up  of trade 
credits owing to the banking sector collapse.
Third, there is a  need to assess the role of bank  restructu ring  in 
susta in ing  and accelerating economic recovery. It w as argued in the previous 
section th a t revitalization of the credit m arket would be critical for the recovery. 
The purpose in  th is  section is to te s t th is  view.
All these issues will be analysed by using  im pulse response functions 
(IRFs). The sim ulation procedure to obtain the IRFs was set out in section 7.4, 
which is a  full model solution for the im pacts of a  particu lar shock. By using 
th is technique, the effect of any unexpected shock to the system  can be traced 
through deviations of the shocked time p a th s  from the  ‘expected time p a th ’ 
given by the model.
It should be stressed  from the ou tset th a t IRFs m easure  deviations from 
the original trend. For instance, a  shock in the real exchange rate  m ay cause 
consum ption to decline by 1 percent from its time path , and  not from actual 
consum ption. If curren t consum ption is 100 and  expected consum ption in the 
next quarter is 105, the fall is not from 100 b u t from 105. In o ther words,
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consum ption in the next quarter still increases, b u t by less then  it would have 
w ithout the shock.
However, the procedure applied here has one “default lim itation”. Since 
the cointegrating relationships are imposed in the model, the effect of a  shock is 
treated  to be perm anen t.12 Consequently, the resu lts should be in terpreted  
cautiously, as they cannot make a distinction between transitionary  and 
perm anent effects.
In order to reduce the risk of overstating the effects of a  shock, the 
resu lts  will be interpreted som ewhat qualitatively. More specifically, the focus 
will be on the directions of the effects (increase or decrease), and  on the  relative 
m agnitude (larger or sm aller relative to others), b u t not on the  exact m agnitude. 
The purpose here is not to replicate the actual crisis, b u t to draw  some 
im portant inferences in a  qualitative m anner.
10.5.1. Impacts of devaluation
As indicated by the  MPI, Indonesia experienced unexpected shocks on the 
foreign exchange m arket throughout the crisis period. The purpose of the 
following sim ulation is to analyse the  im pacts of a  real depreciation on 
consum ption, investm ent, output, exports and im ports. The shock given to the 
system  is a one standard  deviation of the real exchange rate, or about a  3.7 per 
cent depreciation. The IRFs are presented in Figure 10.13.
In term s of directions, they suggest th a t a  real devaluation will cause 
declines in consum ption, investm ent, ou tput, and  im ports, and  an  increase in 
exports. There is a  need to compare these resu lts  with the actua l situation 
discussed in section 10.4, in order to analyse the role of devaluation in the 
decline of real economic activity.
Among the com ponents of dom estic absorption, the im pact on 
investm ent is more pronounced th an  on consum ption. Therefore, it is not
12 See Park  (1991) an d  P ark  an d  Ogaki (1990) for th is  issue.
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surprising  th a t the decline in investm ent during the crisis was far bigger (Table 
10.2). In other words, there is statistical evidence th a t devaluation tends to 
reduce domestic absorption, which is especially transm itted  through the 
collapse in investm ent spending. Because of th a t, the supply side of the 
economy would be the m ost affected. This m ay also explain why NPLs 
increased. The burden of foreign exchange denom inated debts increased, 
leading to firm s’ insolvency. This also suggests th a t a  revival in investm ent 
spending will be vital for accelerating and  susta in ing  economic recovery. 
However, as discussed, the recovery h as so far been consum ption driven. 
Because the banking sector is still paralysed, dom estic investm ent is likely to 
be credit constrained. It follows th a t successful b an k  restruc tu ring  is a m ust 
for durable, long-term recovery.
Figure 10.13. Impulse Response Functions to a One Standard Deviation
Shock on Real Depreciation
Exports
0 .5%





As seen in Figure 10.13, ou tpu t tends to decline persistently , which 
suggests th a t the offset effect of export expansion is lower th an  contraction in 
consum ption and investm ent. W hether devaluation is contractionary in the
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long ru n  is still debated .13 However, it is safe to say it is contactionary in the 
sho rt ru n . In addition, the fall in ou tpu t is also lower than  th a t in consum ption, 
which is not consistent with the stylised fact discussed in section 10.4.2. 
However, it will be argued shortly th a t the larger actual fall in GDP was caused 
by an exports implosion.
IRF predicts an export expansion, while the actual d a ta  suggest a 
contraction. Note th a t exports are actually non-oil exports, b u t will ju s t be 
called exports. The model is consistent with the theoretical literature tha t 
devaluation can generate exports, which are in tu rn  im portan t in offsetting the 
decline in domestic absorption. Thus, there should be some circum stantial 
factors other th an  the devaluation th a t caused exports to weaken. Such factors 
include the drying up of trade credit, owing to the collapse of the banking 
sector, and supply disruptions caused by looting, social violence and  political 
tu rbu lence. In the model, the effect of the collapse of the banking sector and 
supply  disruptions can be captured by a negative shock on the export capacity 
index. The breakdown in the domestic loan m arket m ight affect the  availability 
of trade  financing for exporters from domestic banks. It m ight also have been 
difficult to find new creditors (e.g., foreign banks), because of the high 
uncerta in ty  during the crisis. In effect, because of credit constrain ts, the 
capacity to export declined. In other words, the effect of a  loan implosion will 
be the sam e as th a t for a  supply disruption.
Figure 10.14 displays the effect of a  negative one stan d ard  deviation 
shock of capacity index on exports. It shows a  decline in exports, and  therefore 
there  is statistical evidence th a t the collapse of the banking  sector and supply 
d isrup tions had  reduced exports. It follows th a t the severe o u tpu t contraction 
in 1998 m ay have been due in part to the disruption of export oriented firms.
13 Edw ards (1986) m aintains th a t devaluation has small contractionary effect in the 
short run , b u t is neutral in the long run. However, Sheehey (1986) claim s th a t it can be 
contractionary in both cases.
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Figure 10.14. Impulse Response Function of Exports to a Negative One Standard
Deviation Shock on Capacity Index.
Q uarters
Q -8%
If th is finding is correct, it shows th a t the collapse of the banking sector 
had propagated the crisis. This supports the view asserted  by Hill (2000) tha t 
the poor export performance was the resu lt in p a rt of a  paralysed domestic 
credit m arket. Since the revival of exports will offset the large contraction in 
investm ent, bank restructuring  is a key to the recovery.
As seen in Figure 10.13, the worst im pact of the devaluation was on 
imports. With exports under performing, im provem ent in the trade balance 
mainly came from an im ports implosion.
Because the import reduction coincided with the fall in investm ent, it can 
be inferred th a t the decrease in investm ent related  im ports was bigger than  th a t 
in consum ption related ones. As seen in Figure 10.15, it is clear th a t a  sharp  
and  more persistent decline occurred in the im ports of capital goods and raw 
m aterials. By mid 2000, im ports of capital goods were only about 20 per cent of 
their pre-crisis level. To a lesser extent, the im ports of raw  m aterials were 
about 42 per cent lower than  the pre-crisis level. Im ports of consum ption goods 
decreased from mid 1997 to March 1998, before increasing again with some
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erratic fluctuation. This suggests th a t firms were affected the m ost by 
devaluation and economic contraction, and the ad ju stm en t took the form of a 
severe reduction in capital goods spending. The reduction in imported raw 
m aterials may be partly attributed to the decline in exports.
Figure 10.15. Trends in Major Import Items, 1997-2000 
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10.5.2. Impacts of interest rate hikes
The other source of economic contraction is an in te rest ra te  rise. As discussed, 
in terest ra tes were increased twice: in August 1997 and  in M arch 1998. The 
former was m eant to deter the speculative a ttack , while the la tte r was to 
stabilise the money supply. In the following sim ulation, a  (positive) one 
standard  deviation shock on the SBI rate is given to the model. Note th a t the 
SBI rate  is a  policy instrum ent to affect the o ther m arket ra tes. The IRFs are 
presented in Figure 10.16.
270
Figure 10.16. Impulse Response Functions of a One Standard 





As seen in Figure 10.16, investm ent is worst affected by an  in terest hike, 
suggesting th a t the economy adjusts mainly through investm ent compression. 
An increase in in terest rate raises the cost of external financing, thereby 
reducing the incentive to invest.
It is interesting to compare the im pacts of a  devaluation and  in terest rate  
rise on investm ent.14 Note th a t a  one standard  deviation shock on devaluation 
is about 3.7 per cent, while th a t on the in terest ra te  is 2.7 per cent. To m ake a 
com parison, the effects of an  in terest rate hike need to be m ultiplied by 3.7 and 
then  divided by 2.7. By doing this, it is clear th a t the contractionary  effect of 
an  in terest ra te  hike is larger than  tha t of a  devaluation.15 This m ay be due to 
the  fact th a t in terest ra tes increases have wider ram ification on the economy
14 The com parison is better facilitated by a Monte Carlo sim ulation, by which standard  
errors of each IRF can be obtained. Hence statistical te sts  can be inferred precisely. 
However, due to time limitation, such simulation was not carried out.
15 However, such  com parison is only plausible in the case that depreciation is triggered 
by expected depreciation and that the interest rate rise can offset such  expectation  
w ithout further com plicates the banking sector. The com parison does not apply for the 
case of heightened-risk perception that lead to a currency collapse.
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operating through financial interm ediaries, while a devaluation mainly affects 
firms with currency mismatch.
The im pact of the interest rate on ou tp u t is also contractionary, bu t less 
pronounced than  th a t on investment. Com pared to the effect of a devaluation, 
the effect of the interest rate hike is deeper in the first three quarters. 
Thereafter, the effects are almost equal. Therefore, for the short run, an 
in terest rate hike is more costly. However, this does no t hold for the longer 
term.
The effect on consum ption is quite unexpected. The IRF shows th a t an 
in terest ra te  rise tends to increase consum ption both  in the  short and long run. 
It is possible to argue th a t a  windfall from the in te rest on deposits and bonds 
can stim ulate consum ption in the short run . However, a  continuous increase 
in consum ption needs to be supported by an increase in income and  output. 
This is not consistent with the fact th a t the IRF shows a  persisten t fall in 
ou tpu t in the long run. Therefore, the resu lts  should  be in terpreted  for the 
short ru n  im pacts.
The fact tha t a higher in terest rate  can lead to lower investm ent and 
ou tpu t has im portant implications for economic recovery. A relatively low 
in terest rate will be favourable for economic growth, as th is  can  give relief to 
d istressed firms. However, in an open capital account regime, th is  may induce 
capital outflows, making it difficult to stabilise the exchange rate. Therefore, 
some form of capital outflow control m ay be needed to stim ulate recovery.
10.5.3. Feedback effect from the banking sector
It is im portant to analyse the im pact of a paralysed banking  sector on real 
economic activity. Because of high NPLs, b anks are constrained  in shifting 
funds from less productive activities to m ore productive ones. Therefore, even 
health ier firms can become credit constrained. In order to assess th is 
possibility, a  shock on loan supply will be given to the system . NPL m eans
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some fraction of the loans become unproductive and  hence the  effect of an 
increase in NPLs would be similar to a  decline in loan supply.
A one stan d ard  deviation shock on bank loans is equal to 3.6 per cent 
change in loan supply. Therefore, when a negative shock is given, it is assum ed 
th a t bank  loans decrease by th a t am ount. The exact corresponding am ount of 
NPLs is not specified, as it is difficult to have sufficient tim e series d a ta  on 
NPLs. Figure 10.17 presents the effect on outpu t of an  increase in NPLs.
Figure 10.17. Impulse Response Function of 
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In general, it can be said th a t an increase in  NPLs causes a  decline in 
output. In o ther words, the weakening in b a n k s’ balance sheets can induce 
further deterioration in real sector. Thus, a  weak banking  system  tends to 
propagate the crisis.
This finding also suggests th a t recovering a sse ts  trapped  in NPLs can 
revive b an k s’ capacity to extend loans. As discussed, IBRA m ade slow progress 
in restructu ring  and selling assets. Because of th is, firm s were still credit 
constrained, and  it is not surprising th a t Indonesia’s recovery lagged behind the 
o ther crisis countries in the region
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10.6. Concluding remarks
The analysis in th is chapter has several key findings. First, there is evidence 
th a t dom estic agents may have anticipated the incoming banking problem  after 
the outbreak  of the Asian crisis. This is indicated by the decline in the share of 
deposits held in private banks and the increase in the share of state  banks (i.e. 
a  flight to safety) th a t occurred after Ju ly  1997. The closure of 16 banks in 
November 1997 validated their anticipation, and  subsequently, there were large 
deposit w ithdrawals from suspect private banks. The political and  social 
uncertain ty  th a t occurred, especially during May 1998, all helped to heighten 
these adverse perception.
Second, blanket guarantees and liquidity support were not credible, 
partly owing to the fact th a t they were not backed with strict controls on capital 
outflows and sufficient foreign exchange reserves. As a  result, bank  ru n s  were 
followed by capital flight. The exodus of cash-rich  ethnic Chinese further 
aggravated the problems.
Third, increases in the in terest rate were not effective in stabilising the 
money supply. The resu lts  in section 9.6 show th a t an  in terest ra te  hike tended 
to complicate the banking sector, provoking fu rther liquidity infusion from the 
authorities. Banks were paralysed by the negative spread and  increase in 
NPLs. Because of the fragile banking system, Indonesia could not afford to 
have such a hike.
Fourth, the im pact of devaluation on output, investm ent, consum ption, 
and im ports tended to be contractionary, while th a t on exports tended to be 
expansionary. However, the expansionary effect could not be fully utilised 
because of disruptions in export supply largely due to the collapse of the 
banking system .16 Moreover, the revival of exports was also ham pered by the 
fact tha t the real exchange rate was close to th a t of the other crisis countries. 
Because of inflationary pressures, the large real depreciation quickly
16 As highlighted, other factors are also im portant. However, the focus here is on the 
banking sector.
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disappeared. Therefore, the improvement in the trade balance mainly came 
from an import implosion, ra ther than an export expansion.
Fifth, an in terest rate  rise was contractionary on o u tpu t and  investm ent. 
The im pacts of an in terest rate hike tended to be more severe th an  th a t of the 
devaluation, especially in the short run. This is because the im pact of such  a 
rise was more broad-based, in tha t all firms were affected, and  because it 
affected the banks more adversely.
Sixth, the increased banking fragility tended to propagate the crisis. 
Increases in NPLs reduced the effective supply of bank  loans, which constrained 
the expansion of healthy firms. In effect, the collapse of the credit m arket 
added recessionary p ressu res and ham pered recovery,
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Chapter 11
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This thesis has examined the role of the banking sector in the origin and 
propagation of the recent financial crisis in Indonesia. This chapter 
sum m arises the m ain findings and their policy im plications.
11.1. Main Findings
This section sum m arises the m ain findings of th is study. Throughout Chapters 
3 to 10, it has been shown th a t the banking sector played an im portant role in 
m aking the economy vulnerable to the financial crisis and  in transform ing it 
into a  full-blown economic collapse. At the onset of the  crisis, two conditions for 
the crisis were satisfied: (1) the balance of paym ents was susceptible to a 
sudden reversal of capital inflows, and (2) a  weak banking system  made it 
difficult to use in terest ra te  policy to deter speculative a ttacks. When the crisis 
se t in, th e  vicious cycle w as inevitable. It further dam aged the  already ailing 
banking system, causing panic, loss of m onetary control, capital outflows and 
exchange rate overshooting. The subsequent collapse of the loan m arket 
prevented exporters from fully benefiting from the real exchange rate 
depreciation, leading to a  massive contraction in ou tpu t. In the course of a  few 
m onths, Indonesia went from being  a  miracle to a  needing one’, and ‘from hope 
to despair’.
Despite high economic growth in the lead up  to the crisis, the financial 
system  was precarious and  vulnerable to an  adverse shock. Deregulation in 
1983 and 1988 transform ed the banking sector from the previous state  banks 
dom inated system  tow ards a  greater role for private banks. Deposits and loans 
grew rapidly, and  competition heightened. However, th is  positive development 
was not accom panied by an overall improvement in ban k  soundness. While the 
state banks rem ained weak, the large private b anks developed problem s similar
to those of state  banks. Fragile private banks were characterised  by ram pant 
connected lending, lower capital and liquidity, and  higher loan growth, foreign 
liabilities and placem ent with other banks. Some of them  were owned by the 
cronies.
Connected lending was especially prevalent am ongst large conglomerate- 
owned banks. Almost 80 per cent of insolvent b anks included in the estim ation 
possessed th is problem with the average of loans allocated to affiliated Firms at 
about 104 per cent of equity capital. This m eans the owners effectively did not 
contribute capital a t all, as any capital injected w as draw n back  as loans. This 
ram p an t self-dealing tactic created low quality and  risky b a n k s ’ portfolio. The 
reasons are, first, with low effective capital there was incentive for owners to 
engage in risky projects, which m ay have been lucrative before the crisis bu t 
were prone to any dow nturn in economic activity. Second, risks were often not 
correctly priced, i.e. affiliates were given concessionary loans. Third, it resulted 
in a  heavy concentration of loans, which reduced  the scope of bank  assets 
portfolios.
There was a  strong association between high loan growth  and bank 
fragility. New opportunities to open b ranches led the larger banks to expand 
their netw ork and deposit base. They had  credibility advantages com pared with 
small new -established banks. Moreover, they offered a  more convenient m eans 
for depositors com pared to the ill-m anaged sta te  banks. This expansion was 
done alm ost w ithout regards for cost and risk. The increase in deposits was not 
accom panied by pruden t lending, which was m ainly due to lack of expertise in 
loan assessm en t and the greed to expand their own busin ess  conglomerations.
Capital adequacy requirement was am ongst the m ost frequently violated 
prudential m easures. At the onset of the crisis, about 50 b anks could not meet 
a  5 per cent CAR, and 6 of them  were technically insolvent. A higher CAR could 
have induced a  disincentive for owners to risk  the banks, as a  larger proportion 
of asse t portfolios were financed by equity capital. The fact th a t banks with a 
lower CAR were am ongst the fragile ones indicates they m ight have been poorly 
m anaged. A lower capital ratio also suggests the ow ners’ low willingness
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a n d /o r  ability to further increase capital to the required level. Therefore, the 
ban k s were less able to cushion the adverse consequences of the crisis.
B anking fragility was also characterised  by lower liquidity. Banks with 
low liquid asse ts  relative to liabilities were less able to lessen the adverse effects 
of b an k  ru n s . Because their cash flow was in terrupted , they had  to rely on the 
in ter-bank  m arket and liquidity support from BI, m eaning th a t they had  to pay 
a h igher in terest rate. In order to reduce fu rther losses, it was necessary to 
liquidate assets. Thus, liquid assets provided a cushion against panic runs.
Placements with other banks increased fragility partly  because the 
governm ent w as slow to honour the guarantee of b a n k s’ th ird  party  liabilities. 
Lending to o ther banks exposed the lenders to a  system ic risk, i.e. one bank 
fails because other banks become bank rup t. IBRA m ade slow progress in 
disposing of its  assets, so th a t these in ter-bank claim s could not quickly 
serviced. So it is plausible to argue th a t the guarantee did not effectively 
reduce the system ic risk.
There was also a  problem with higher foreign liabilities am ongst insolvent 
banks, although it was firms th a t possessed currency m ism atch, and not the 
banks. This suggests th a t currency depreciation indirectly affected the banks 
through deterioration in the quality of loans th a t were denom inated in foreign 
currency.
It is no t surprising th a t the banks owned by cronies were am ongst the 
weakest. As in other sectors, they were given implicit protection and privileges, 
which induced a moral hazard problem. Even if they had  violated serious 
p rudential regulations, the authorities did not penalise or close these banks.
All of th is suggests the m ain problem  was the  weak enforcem ent of 
p rudentia l regulations. Although the au thorities h ad  developed relatively 
stricter regulatory m eans, they were ham pered by political interference and a 
weak legal system .
The problem s were com pounded by competitive pressures, which 
lessened profit m argins and risk provision. The increased num ber of banks and
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branches heightened th is competition. Private banks becam e chronic borrowers 
from BI. From 1995, BI’s claims on domestic banks increased rapidly, a t a  rate 
far higher than  th a t in the early 80s. These claims were the second largest 
com ponent of base money, after foreign exchange reserves. By Ju n e  1997, the 
private b an k s’ share in borrowing from the central bank  was about 47 per cent, 
com pared with only 10 per cent in 1985.
The state  banks continued to depend on capital and  liquidity infusions 
from the authority. Political interference in loan allocation rem ained strong, 
leading to heavy loan concentration on a small num ber of conglomerates. In 
addition, competitive pressures caused these b anks to lose significant m arket 
share.
In sum , during the 1990s, banks continued to accum ulate serious 
problem s, which were buried by the reluctance of the au thorities to be tough on 
banks breaking prudential regulations and, m ost im portantly, by the optimism 
created by rapid economic growth. Thus in the lead-up to the crisis, both  the 
private and state banks were fragile.
The crisis was preceded by a boom in private capital inflows, which led to 
alm ost a decade of an un in terrupted  balance of paym ents su rp lus. These 
inflows were used  to finance persistent b u t ‘m anageable’ cu rren t account 
deficits (CADs). Before the mid 1980s, CADs m irrored official capital inflows, 
which were generated by the need to finance budget deficits. In the 90s, as 
official flows lessened, private agents contributed the  m ost in cross-border 
capital movement. Moreover, ‘short-term ’ private inflows began to dom inate the 
capital account. However, Indonesia’s budget principle continued to be 
dom inated by the ‘Lawson Doctrine’, th a t private sector led CAD is not a 
problem.
The offshore borrowing spree enjoyed by dom estic private corporations 
also changed the s tructu re  of foreign debts. By the end of 1996, total foreign 
debt was about $129 billion, compared to only $25 billion in 1982. The share 
of private foreign debts increased, from about 17 percen t in 1982 to about 53
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percen t in 1996. The share of short-term  debts increased from only about 14 
percent to 25 percent in the same period.
In the ru n  up to the crisis, the balance of paym ents was susceptible to a 
reversal of capital inflows. Three problems stand  out. The first was a high ratio 
of debt service to total exports. Compared with the  o ther four Asian crisis 
countries, Indonesia had the highest ratio, and was actually  close to Argentina’s 
in the early 1980s. Second, foreign exchange reserves were insufficient to cover 
liquid foreign liabilities. Again, in this case, Indonesia together with South 
Korea was the m ost vulnerable. These two indicators m ay not be relevant in a 
period of booming capital influx. However, when capital flows reverse, balance 
of paym ents deficits have to be m et by an  im provem ent in the trade balance (i.e. 
im port implosion and export expansion) a n d /o r  by runn ing  down reserves. 
Third, there was a  currency m ism atch problem  on the  p a rt of Indonesia’s 
corporations. A large fraction of private foreign debt w as no t hedged, partly  due 
to a long record of exchange rate stability. The problem  was particularly 
pronounced in domestic oriented non-tradable industry  such  as property and 
land transport.
It all began in Bangkok on 2 Ju ly  1997. As indicated by MPI, foreign 
exchange m arket pressure in August 1997 was exceptionally high, about 27 
tim es th a t of pre-crisis period. The authorities w asted a round  $1 billion in 
forward transactions. On August 14, the governm ent finally abandoned the peg 
and let the m arket determine the value of the currency.
Moreover, to accompany the float and  to avoid exchange rate 
overshooting, the authorities announced their in ten tion  to tighten m onetary 
conditions by increasing in terest rates and  reducing the central b an k ’s 
purchase of SBPUs. This tight money policy did not stabilise the currency, and 
actually provoked further attacks.
The problem  was that the banking sector w as fragile. By increasing 
in terest rates, b an k s’ balance sheets weakened, com plicating the  problem s. As 
a  result, by the  end of August, liquidity support extended to dom estic banks 
increased by 34 per cent from the previous m onth. In the  following 3 m onths,
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th is  support continued to increase a t an alarm ing rate, suggesting the 
w eakening of b an k s’ financial position.
This is confirmed by the IRFs, which suggest th a t the in terest rate rise 
tended to increase the cost of bank bailout. Moreover, the IRFs also show tha t 
such  a rise could not prevent the currency from falling. In o ther words, interest 
rate  policy was not credible in deterring speculative attacks.
The propagation of the crisis began after the liquidation of 16 banks on 1 
November 1997. Despite some procedural faults in the liquidation process th a t 
may have induced panic runs, domestic agents m ay have anticipated the 
incoming banking problem after the outbreak of the Asian crisis. From August, 
the share  of deposits held in private banks decreased. This is an  indication tha t 
there was doubt about the safety of deposits. The November ban k  closures 
validated their doubts, and subsequently, there were large deposit withdrawals 
from suspect private banks. The political and  social uncerta in ty  th a t occurred, 
especially during May 1998, also helped to magnify these adverse perceptions.
In order to calm down bank depositors and lenders, a  b lanket guarantee 
was introduced at the end of Jan u ary  1998. However, the guarantee was not 
credible, and the ru n s  on private banks continued on a  larger scale. The 
problem was th a t the guarantee was not backed with stric t controls on capital 
outflows and sufficient foreign exchange reserves. T hus it did not cover foreign 
exchange risks. Moreover, the panic was aggravated by the political crisis and 
social violence. Massive withdrawals of deposits occurred, especially am ongst 
wealthy ethnic Chinese anxious to escape the country. Consequently, bank 
ru n s  were followed by money expansion, capital outflows and  exchange rate 
overshooting.
In order to stabilise the money supply, a  high in terest ra te  policy was 
again introduced in late February 1998. As a result, the banks were paralysed 
by the negative spread and the increase in NPLs. Because the banks made 
losses, the need to bail them  out increased. Consequently, the in terest rate 
policy failed to reduce the money supply.
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Moreover, in terest rate increases produced a recessionary effect on 
o u tp u t and  investm ent, and the effect on investm ent was even more 
pronounced. In other words, the adverse effects were m ainly channelled 
th rough  investm ent spending. It can be concluded th a t the in terest rate hike 
induced  a downfall in economic activities and increased banking  fragility.
Massive rup iah  depreciation also generated a  contractionary  im pact on 
o u tpu t, investm ent, consum ption, and im ports, b u t the im pact on exports 
tended  to be expansionary. The effect on im ports w as the  largest, followed by 
investm ent and  consum ption. This suggests the econom y ad justed  through 
expenditure switching. However, the expansionary effect could not be fully 
utilised, because of d isruptions in export supply partly  due to the collapse of 
the banking  sector. Therefore, the im provem ent in the  trade balance mainly 
cam e from an im port compression, ra ther th an  from an  export expansion.
The high in terest rates, depreciation and  economic recession increased 
banking  sector fragility. Increases in NPLs reduced the  effective supply of bank 
loans, and  the credit m arket collapse fu rther w orsened economic activities. 
Therefore, the increased banking fragility propagated the  crisis.
It can be concluded th a t high in terest ra tes  and  depreciation had 
destabilising effects on aggregate real economic activities. These effects were 
aggravated by the breakdown of the banking system .
11.2. Policy implications
Until Ju n e  2000 real investm ent had  yet not revived, and  the positive growth in 
o u tp u t h as so far been driven by consum ption. B ecause investm ent was the 
w orst affected, its revitalisation will stim ulate economic recovery. Moreover, the 
competitive advantage generated by real depreciation needs to be u tilised before 
it d isappears. Exports have performed poorly. The revival in exports and 
investm ent was ham pered by the breakdown of the  credit m arket. Thus bank  
restruc tu ring  is critical for stim ulating and  susta in ing  the recovery.
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In the short run, the authorities should concentrate on policies th a t can 
revive the credit market. The objective of such policies should  be to close the 
deposit-loan gap, which is about 37 per cent of GDP. This can be done through 
recovering and selling bank assets trapped in bad loans. The proceeds can 
then  be injected back into the banking system, hence increasing loanable 
funds.
However, IBRA seems unable to accelerate the recovery of the assets. 
Some asse ts  sales have been postponed. Moreover, IBRA seem s to suffer from a 
lack of cohesive planning and a sense of urgency. Its im m ediate target is very 
limited to service some fraction of the interest paym ents on governm ent bonds. 
Because of this, the loan m arket is unlikely to recover quickly in the near 
future, thereby holding back economic recovery.
In the long run, the policy em phasis should be on preventing the crisis 
from recurring. This requires, inter alia, sound and p ru d en t banking practices. 
As discussed, the main problem was not due to a  lack  of strict prudential 
regulations. It was the weak enforcement of such regulations th a t created the 
problems. As of now, it is not clear whether the institu tional capacity of the 
authorities will improve significantly in the near future.
283
Bibliography
Ades, Alberto and Federico Kaune (1997), A New Measure o f Current Account 
Sustainability fo r  Developing Countries, Goldm an-Sachs Emerging M arkets 
Economic Research.
Agenor, Pierre-Richard, Jagdeep Bhandari and Robert Flood (1992), ‘Speculative 
A ttacks and Models of Balance-of-Payments C rises’, IMF S ta ff Papers, 39 
(June), pp. 357-94.
Agenor, Pierre-Richard and Peter J . Montiel (1999), Development 
Macroeconomics (second ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Agung, J u d a  (1998), ‘Financial Deregulation and the Bank Lending C hannel in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia’, Asian Economic Journal, 
12(3), pp. 273-94.
Arndt, Heinz W. (1974), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f Indonesian  
Economic Studies, 11 (2), pp. 1-29.
A thukorala, Prem a-C handra (2000), ‘Capital Account Regimes, Crisis and 
A djustm ent in M alaysia’, Working Papers in Trade and Development, no. 
0 0 /6 , Division of Economics, Research School of Pacific and  Asian Studies 
and  Asia Pacific School of Economics and M anagem ent, The Australian 
National University (May).
A thukorala, Prem a-C handra and Jam es Riedel (1991), T he Small Country 
Assum ption: A R eassessm ent with Evidence from Korea’,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 127(1), pp. 138-51.
A thukorala, Prem a-C handra and Jam es Riedel (1996), ‘Modelling NIE Exports: 
Aggregation, Q uantitative Restrictions and Choice of Econometric 
Methodology’, Journal o f Development Studies, 33(1), pp. 81-98.
A thukorala, Prem a-C handra and  Peter G. Warr (1999), Vulnerability to a 
C urrency Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Experience’, Working Papers in 
Trade and Development, no. 9 9 /6 , Division of Economics, Research School 
of Pacific and  Asian Studies and Asia Pacific School of Economics and 
M anagem ent, The A ustralian National University (June).
Banejee, Anindya, Ju a n  Dolado, John  W. G albraith and  David F. Hendry 
(1993), Co-integration, Error Correction, and the Econometric Analysis o f 
Non-Stationary Data, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
B ank of Thailand (1998), ‘Focus on the Thai C risis’, Quarterly Review o f 
Thailand’s  Economic Issues, 2 (April-June).
Bensaid, Bernard and Olivier Jeanne (1997), The Instability of Fixed Exchange 
Rate System When Raising the Nominal In terest Rate is Costly’, European 
Economic Review, 41, pp. 1461-78.
Berg, Andrew (1999), The Asia Crisis: C auses, Policy Responses, and 
O utcom es’, IMF Working Paper No.9 9 /1 3 8 , In ternational Monetary Fund 
(October).
Bernanke, Ben S. (1983), ‘Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 73, pp. 
257-76.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Alan S. Blinder (1988), 'Credit Money, and  Aggregate 
D em and’, American Economic Review, 78(2), pp. 435-9.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1989), ‘Agency Costs, Collateral, and 
B usiness F luctuations’, American Economic Review, 79, pp. 14-31.
B em anke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1990), ‘Financial Fragility and Economic 
Perform ance’, The Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 105(1), pp. 87-114.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1995), ‘Inside the  Black Box: The Credit 
Channel of m onetary Policy Transm ission’, Journal o f Economic Perpective, 
9 (fall), pp .27-48.
B lackburn, Keith and Martin Sola (1993), ‘Speculative Currency Attacks and 
Balance of Payments Crises’, Journal o f Economic Surveys, 7, pp. 119-44.
B lanchard, Olivier Jean  (1983), ‘Debt and the C urrent Account Deficit in Brazil’, 
in Pedro Aspe Armella, Rudiger D ornbusch, and  M aurice Obstfeld (eds.), 
Financial policy and the world capital market: The problem o f Latin 
American Countries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Blanco, Herminio and Peter M. Garber (1986), ‘R ecurrent Devaluations and 
Speculative Attacks on the Mexican Peso’, Journal o f Political Economy, 94, 
pp. 148-66.
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum  and Sergio Rebelo (1998), ‘Prospective 
Deficits and the Asian Currency Crisis’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 
7734, National Bureau of Economic Research (October).
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum  and Sergio Rebelo (1999), ‘Hedging and 
Financial Fragility in Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes’, NBER Working Paper 
Series, no. 7134, National Bureau of Economic Research (May).
Caballero, Ricardo and Arvind K rishnam urthy (1998), ‘Emerging M arket Crises: 
An asset m arkets perspective’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 6843, 
National Bureau of Economic Research (December).
Calomiris, Charles W., and Garry Gorton (1991), T he Origins of Banking 
Panics : Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation’, in R. Glenn H ubbard (ed),
285
Financial Markets and Financial Crises. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 109-73.
Calomiris, C harles W., and R. Glenn H ubbard (1990), ‘Firm Heterogeneity, 
Internal Finance, and Credit Rationing’, Economic Journal, 100, pp. 99- 
104.
Calvo, Guilermo A., (1998a), Capital Flows and  Capital-M arket Crises: The 
simple economics of sudden stops, Journal o f  Applied Economics, 1(1), 
pp.35-54.
Calvo, Guilermo A., (1998b), ‘Varieties of Capital-M arket C rises’, in Calvo G.A. 
and M. King (eds.), The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary 
Policy, New York: St. M artin’s Press.
Calvo, Guilermo A., Leonardo Leiderman and C arm en M. R einhart (1993), 
‘Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation: the Role of External 
Factors’, IMF S ta ff Papers, 40, pp. 108-51.
Calvo, Guilermo A., Leonardo Leiderman and Carm en M. R einhart (1994), The 
Capital Inflows Problem: Concepts and Issu es’, Contemporary Economic 
Policy, 12, pp. 54-66.
Calvo, Guilermo A., Enrique G. Mendoza, Jo h n  A. Rogers, and  Andrew K. Rose, 
(1996), ‘Foreword’, Journal o f International Economics, 41, pp. 219-22.
Calvo, Guilermo A., and Enrique G. Mendoza (1996), ‘Mexico’s Balance-of- 
Paym ents Crisis: a chronicle of a death foretold’, Journal o f International 
Economics, 41, pp. 235-64.
Calvo, Guilermo A., and  Carm en M. Reinhart (1999), ‘When Capital Inflows 
Come to a Sudden Stop: Consequences and policy option’, mimeo (June), 
h ttp ://w w w .bsos.um d.edu /econ /ciecalvo .h tm .
Cam eron, Lisa (1999), ‘Survey of Recent Development’, Bulletin o f Indonesian  
Economic Studies, 35 (1), pp. 3-40.
Caprio, Gerald, J r . (1997), ‘Safe and Sound Banking in Developing Countries: 
We’re not in Kansas Anymore’, in George G. Kaufm an (ed), FDICIA: Bank  
reform five  year later and five  year before, London: JAI Press, pp. 79-97.
Caprio, Gerald, J r . and Daniela Klingebiel (1996), ‘B ank Insolvency: Bad Luck, 
Ban Policy, or Bad banking?’, in Annual World B ank Conference on 
Development Economics, W ashington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 79-104.
Cavallari, Lilia and Giancarlo Corsetti (1998), ‘Shadow  Rates and Multiple 
Equilibria in the Theory o f Currency Crises’, mimeo (July)
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco (1998), T he Asian Liquidity C risis’, NBER 
Working Paper Series, no. 6796, National B ureau  of Economic Research 
(November).
286
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco (1999), ‘Liquidity Crises in Emerging 
M arkets: Theory and policy’, in Ben B em anke and  Julio  Rotemberg (eds.), 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Cam bridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 11- 
78.
C hant, Jo h n  and Mari Pangestu (1994), ‘An A ssessm ent of Financial Reform in 
Indonesia, 1983-90’, in G. Caprio J r ., I Atiyas, and J.A. H anson (eds.), 
Financial Reform: Theory and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 223-75.
Chinn, Menzie, Michael Dooley and Sona S h resth a  (1999), ‘Latin America and 
E ast Asia in the Context of an Insurance Model of Currency C rises’, 
Journal o f International Money and Finance, 18 (August), pp. 659-81.
Cole, David C. and  Betty F. Slade (1996), Building a M odem Financial System: 
The Indonesian experience, New York: Cam bridge University Press.
Corbett, Jen n y  and  David Vines (1999), T he Asian C urrency and  Financial 
Crises: Lessons from vulnerability, crisis, and  collapse’, World Economy, 
22 (March), pp. 155-77.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini (1999a), W hat Caused 
the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part I: Macroeconomic
Overview’, J a p a n  and The World Economy, 11 (October), pp. 305-373.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini (1999b), ‘Paper Tigers?: 
A model of the Asian Crisis’, European Economic Review, 43 (June), pp. 
1211-36.
C ranston , Ross (1997), Principle of Banking Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Cumby, Robert E. and Sweder van W ijnbergen (1989), ‘Financial Policy and 
Speculative Runs with a Crawling Peg: Argentine 1979-1981’, Journal o f 
International Economics, 27(2), 111-27.
Daniel, Jam es (1997), ‘Fiscal Aspects of B ank R estructu ring’, IMF Working 
Paper, no. 9 7 /5 2 , International M onetary Fund (April).
Daniel, Jam es, Jeffrey Davis, Andrew Wolfe (1997), ‘Fiscal Accounting of Bank 
R estructuring’, Papers on Policy A nalysis and A ssesm ent, no.9 7 /5 , 
In ternational Monetary Fund (May).
Davies, E. Philip (1988), ‘Industrial S tructu re  and  Dynam ics of Financial 
M arkets : The Primary Eurobond Market, Discussion Paper No. 35, Bank of 
England.
Davies, E. Philip (1990), ‘An Industrial Approach to Financial Instability’, 
Discussion Paper No. 50, Bank of England.
287
Davies, E. Philip (1995), Debt, Financial Fragility, and  System ic Risk, Oxford: 
C larendon Press.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache (1998), ‘Financial Liberalization 
and  Financial Fragility’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1917, World 
B ank (May).
Diamond, Peter and  Phillip Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank R uns, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity’, Journal o f Political Economy, 91 (June), pp .401-19.
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos (1965), Exchange Rate Devaluation in Semi-Industrialized  
Country , Cambridge, Maa: MIT Press.
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos (1985), ‘Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial 
C rash ’, Journal o f Development Economics, 19 (September-October), p p .l-  
24.
Dooley, Michael (1997), ‘A model of Crises in Emerging M arkets’, NBER Working 
Paper Series, no. 6300, National B ureau of Economic Research 
(December).
Dooley, Michael (2000), ‘A model of Crises in Em erging M arkets’, Economic 
Journal, 110 (January), pp. 256-72.
Drazen, Allan (1999a), ‘Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative Attack under 
Asymmetric Inform ation’, mimeo (February).
Drazen, Allan (1999b), ‘Political Contagion in C urrency C rises’, NBER Working 
Paper Series, no. 7211, National B ureau of Economic Research (July).
Drazen, Allan and Paul Masson (1994), ‘Credibility of Policies V ersus Credibility 
of Policymakers’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 109 (August), pp .735-54.
Edwards, Sebastian (1984), The order o f Liberalization o f the External Sector in 
Developing Countries. Essay in International F inance no. 156, Princeton 
University.
Edwards, Sebastian (1986), ‘Are Devaluations C ontractionary?’, Review o f 
Economics and Statistics, 68 (August), pp. 501-8.
Edwards, Sebastian (1989), Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation and Adjustment: 
Exchange Rate Policies in Developing Countries, Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press.
Edwards, Sebastian (1995), Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to 
Hope, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edwards, Sebastian (1999), ‘On Crisis Prevention: Lessons from Mexico and 
E ast Asia’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 7233, National B ureau of 
Economic Research (July).
288
Edw ards, Sebastian and Carlos A. Vegh (1997), ‘B anks and Macroeconomic 
D isturbances Under Predeterm ined Exchange R ates’, NBER Working Paper 
Series, no. 5977, National Bureau of Economic Research (March).
E ichengreen, Barry (1999), Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A 
Practical Post-Asia Agenda, W ashington, DC: Institu te  for International 
Economics.
Eichengreen, Barry and Ashoka Mody (1998), ‘Interest Rates in the North and 
Capital Flows to the South: Is there a  Missing Link?’, International 
Finance, 1 (October), pp. 35-58.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose and Charles Wyplosz (1996), ‘Contagious 
Currency Crises: First Tests, Scandinavian Journal o f Economics, 98(4), pp. 
463-84.
Engle, Robert F. and Clive W.J. Granger (1987), ‘Cointegration and Error 
Correction: Representation, Estim ation and Testing’, Review  o f Economics 
and S ta t i s t i c s 64 (2), pp. 231-53.
Fane, George (2000), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f Indonesian  
Economic Studies, 36 (1), pp. 13-44.
Fane, George and Timothy Condon (1996), T rade Reform in Indonesia’, Bulletin 
o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 32 (3), pp. 33-54.
Fisher, Irving (1933), The Debt-Deflation Theory of G reat D epressions’, 
Econometrica, 1, pp. 337-57.
Flood, Robert P. and  Peter M. G arber (1984), ‘Collapsing Exchange Rate 
Regimes: Some Linear Example’, Journal o f International Economics, 17 
(August), pp. 1-13.
Flood, Robert P., Peter M. Garber, and Charles Kram er (1996), ‘Collapsing 
Exchange Rate Regimes: Another linear exam ple’, Journal o f International 
Economics, 41 (November), pp. 223-34.
Flood, Robert P. and Nancy Marion (1998), ‘Perspectives on the Recent 
Currency Crisis L iteratue’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 6380, National 
B ureau of Economic Research (January).
Flood, Robert P. and Nancy Marion (2000), ‘Self-fulfilling Risk Predictions: An 
Application to Speculative A ttacks’, Jou rna l of In ternational Economics, 
50 (February), pp. 245-68.
Forbes, Kristin and Roberto Rigobon (1999), ‘No Contagion, Only 
Interdependence: M easuring Stock Market Co-M ovement’, NBER Working 
Paper Series, no. 7267, National Bureau of Economic Research (July)
289
Frankel, Jeffrey A., Andrew K. Rose, (1996), ‘Currency C rashes in Emerging 
M arkets: An empirical trea tm en t’, Journal o f International Economics, 41 
(November), pp. 351-66.
Gertler, M ark (1988), ‘Financial S tructure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An 
Overview’, Journal o f Money, Credit and Banking, 20(2), pp. 559-88.
Girton, Lance and Don Roper (1977), ‘A Monetary Model of Exchange M arket 
P ressure  Applied to the Postwar C anadian Experience’, American Economic 
Review, 67(4), pp. 537-48.
Glick, Reuven and Michael Hutchison (1999), ‘Banking and  Currency Crises: 
How Common are Twins?’, Working Paper No.PB99-07, Center for Pacific 
B asin M onetary and  Economic Studies, Federal Reserve B ank of San 
Fransisco (December).
Goldberg, Linda (1990). ‘Predicting Exchange Rate Crises: Mexico Revisited’, 
Journal o f International Economics, 36 (May), pp. 413-30.
Goldfajn, Ilan and Rodrigo Valdes (1997), ‘Capital Flows and  the Twin Crises: 
The Role of Ligquidity’, IMF Working Paper No.9 7 /8 7 , In ternational 
M onetary Fund (July).
Goldstein, Morris, (1998), The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, cures, and  
system ic  implications, W ashington DC: Institu te  for In ternational
Economics.
Gorton, Gary (1988), ‘Banking Panics and Business Cycles’, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 40, pp. 751-81.
Greenwald, Bruce C., and Joseph  E. Stiglitz (1988), ‘Imperfect Information, 
Finance C onstraints, and B usiness F luctuations’, in M. Khan and  S. C. 
Tsiang (eds.), Finance Constraints, Expectations, and Macroeconomics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
G uttentag, Jac k  and Richard Herring (1984), ‘Credit Rationing and  Financial 
D isorder’, Journal o f Finance, 39(5), 1359-82.
Habir, Manggi (1994), ‘Bank Soundness Requirements: A Commercial B ank 
Perpective’, in McLeod, Ross H. (ed.), Indonesia A ssessm en t 1994: Finance 
as a key  sector in Indonesia's Development, Singapore: Institu te  of 
S ou theast Asian Studies.
Hahm, Jon-H o and  Frederick S. Mishkin (2000), ‘C auses of the  Korean 
Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy’ NBER Working Paper Series, no .7483, 
National B ureau of Economic Research (January).
Hardy, Daniel and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998). ‘Leading Indicators of Banking 
Crises: Was Asia Different?’, IMF Working Paper N o.98/91, In ternational 
M onetary Fund (June).
290
H erm alin, Benjam in E. and  Andrew K. Rose (1999), ‘Risks to Lenders and 
Borrowers in In ternational Capital Market. NBER Working Paper Series, 
n o .6886, National B ureau of Economic Research.
Hill, H ai (1996), The Indonesian Economy Since 1966: Southeast Asia 's Emerging 
Giant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, H al (1999a), The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, consequences, and  
lessons, New York: M artin’s Press.
Hill, Hal (1999b), ‘Indonesia: The Strange and Sudden Death of a  Tiger 
Econom y’, Working Papers in Trade and Development, no. 9 9 /5 , Division of 
Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies and  Asia Pacific 
School of Economics and Management, The A ustralian National University 
(June).
Hill, Hal (1999b), ‘Indonesia: The Strange and Sudden D eath of a  Tiger 
Econom y’, Oxford Development Studies, 28 (2), pp. 117-39.
Inder, Brett (1993), ‘Estim ating Long-run Relationships in Economics: A 
Com parison of Dofferent A pproaches’, Journal o f  Econometrics, 57 (1), pp. 
53-68.
Ito, T akatoshi (1999), ‘Capital Flows in Asia’, NBER Working Paper Series, 
n o .7134, National B ureau of Economic Research (May).
Jea n n e , Olivier (1997), ‘Are Currency Crises Self-fulfilling’, Journal o f 
International Economics, 43 (August), pp. 263-286.
Jo h an se n , Sorens (1988), ‘Statistical Analysis of C ointegrating Vectors’, Journal 
o f  Economic Analysis and Control, 12 (2), pp. 231-54.
K am as, Linda (1992), ‘Devaluation, national O utput, and  the  Trade Balance: 
Some Evidence from Colombia’, Welwritschaptliches-Archiv, 128(3), pp. 
425-45.
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and  Carm en M. Reinhart, (1996), T he Twin Crises: The 
causes of banking and balance-of-paym ents Problem s’, International 
Finance Discussion Paper No. 554, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, W ashington, DC.
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and  Carm en M. Reinhart, (1999), T he Twin Crises: The 
causes of banking and  balance-of-paym ents Problem s’, American Economic 
Review, 89(3), pp. 473-500.
Ken w ard, Llyod R. (1997), ‘Financial Deregulation and  the Cost S tructure  of 
S tate and  Private Banks in Indonesia: Some Evidence from Microeconomic 
D ata’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 33(3), pp. 63-78.
Kindleberger, Charles (1978). Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History o f 
Financial Crises, New York: Basic Books.
291
K rugm an, Paul (1979), ‘A Model of Balance of Paym ents C rises’, Journal o f 
M oney Credit and Banking, 11 (August), pp. 311-28.
K rugm an, Paul (1998), Currency Crises, mimeo (July).
K rugm an, Paul (1999), W hat Happened to Asia?’, in Ryuzo Sato, Rama 
R am achandran  and  Kazuo Mino (eds.), Global Competition and Integration, 
BostonL Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 315-28.
K rugm an, Paul and  Taylor, Lance (1978), ‘Contractionary Effects of 
D evaluation’, Journal o f International Economics, 8(3), pp. 445-56.
Lahiri, Amartya, and Carlos A. Vegh, (2000), ‘Delaying the inevitable: Optimal 
in te re s t rate policy and BOP crises’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 7734, 
N ational B ureau of Economic Research (June).
Lane, Timothy, Atish R. Ghosh, Javier Hamman, Steven Phillips, Mariane 
Schulze-G hattas, and  Tsidi Tsikata (1999), IMF-Supported Programs in 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand: a Preliminary A sse ssm e n t  W ashington, D. 
C: IMF.
Limdgren, C arl-Johan, Tomas Balino, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Guide, Marc 
Q uintyn and Leslie Teo (1999). ‘Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: 
Lessons from Asia’, IMF Occasional Paper 188, In ternational Monetary 
F u n d  (September).
Lopez-M eija, Alejandro (1999), ‘Large Capital Flows: A Survey of the Causes, 
C onsequences, and Policy Responses’, IMF Working Paper No.9 9 /1 7 , 
In ternational Monetary Fund (June).
M ankiw , N. Gregory (1986), The Allocation of Credit and  Financial Collapse’, 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 101, pp. 455-70.
M arshall, Kathryn G. (1994), The Case Against Deposit Insurance in Indonesia’, 
in  McLeod, Ross H. (ed.), Indonesia A ssessm en t 1994: Finance as a key  
sector in Indonesia’s  Development, Singapore: Institu te  of Southeast Asian 
S tudies.
M asson , Paul (1998), ‘Contagion: Monsoonal Effects, Spillovers, and Jum ps 
Between Multiple Equilibria’, IMF Working Paper No.9 8 /1 4 2 , International 
M onetary Fund (September).
McLeod, Ross H. (ed.) (1994), Indonesia A ssessm ent 1994: Finance as a key  
sector in Indonesia’s Development, Singapore: Institu te  of S outheast Asian 
S tudies.
McLeod, Ross H. (1997a), ‘Postscript to the Survey of Recent Developments: On 
C auses and  Cures for the Rupiah Crisis’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 33 (3), pp. 35-52.
292
McLeod, Ross H. (1997b), ‘Explaining Chronic Inflation in Indonesia’, Journal o f 
Development Studies, 33 (3), pp. 392-410.
McLeod, Ross H. (1999), ‘Control and Competition: Banking Deregulation and 
Re-regulation in Indonesia’, Journal o f the Asia Pacific Economy, 4(2), 258- 
97.
McLeod, Ross H. and Ross G am aut (eds.) (1998), East Asia  in Crisis: From being 
a miracle to a needing one, London: Routledge.
McKibbin, Warwick (1998a), The Crisis in Asia: an  Em pirical A ssessm ent’, 
D iscussion Papers in International Economics 136, Brookings Institution.
McKibbin, Warwick (1998b), ‘Risk Re-evaluation, Capital Flows and  the Crisis 
in Asia’, in R. McLeod and R. G am aut (eds.), East Asia  in Crisis: From 
Being a Miracle to Needing One?, London: Routledge.
McKibbin, Warwick and Will Martin (1998), T he East Asian Crisis: Investigating 
C auses and Policy Responses’, Working Papers in Trade and Development, 
no. 9 8 /6 , Division of Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
S tudies and Asia Pacific School of Economics and  M anagem ent, The 
A ustralian  National University (June).
McKibbin, Warwick and Andrew Stoeckel (1999), ‘E ast Asia’s to the Crisis: A 
Q uantitative Analysis’, Discussion Paper in International Economics 
No. 149, Brookings Institution (September).
M cKinnon, Ronald I. (1991), Money and Capital in Economic Development. 
W ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
M cKinnon, Ronald I. (1991), The Order o f Economic Liberalization, Baltimore: 
J o h n s  Hopkins University Press.
M cKinnon, Ronald I. and  Huw Pill (1998), The Overborrowing Syndrome: Are 
E as t Asian Economies Different?’, in Reuven Glick (ed), Managing Capital 
Flotus and Exchange Rates: Perspective from  the Pacific Basin, New York: 
Cam bridge University Press.
M cKinnon, Ronald I. and  Huw Pill (1999), ‘In ternational Overborrowing: A 
Decomposition of Credit and Currency R isks’, World Development, 26 
(July), pp. 1267-82.
M ilesi-Ferretti, Gian M aria and Assaf Razin (1996), ‘Sustainability  of Persistent 
C u rren t Account Deficits’, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 5467, National 
B ureau  of Economic Research.
Miller, Victoria (1996), ‘Speculative Currency A ttacks with Endogenously 
Commercial Bank Crises’, Journal o f International M oney and  Finance, 15 
(June), pp .383-403.
293
Miller, Victoria (1999), T he Timing and Size of B ank-Financed Speculative 
A ttacks’, Journal o f International Money and Finance, 18 (June), pp. 459- 
70.
M insky, Hyman P. (1977), ‘A Theory of Systemic Fragility’, in E.I. Altman and 
A.W. Sam etz (eds), Financial Crises, New York: Wiley.
M insky, Hyman P. (1982), The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Capitalist 
Processes and the Behaviour of the Economy’, in C.P. Kindleberger and 
J .P . Laffargue (eds.), Financial Crises, Theory, History, and Policy, 
Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press.
M ishkin, Frederic S. (1996), ‘U nderstanding Financial Crises: A Developing 
C oun try  Perspective’, in Annual World B ank Conference on Development 
Economics, W ashington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 29-62.
M ishkin, Frederic S. (1991), ‘Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A 
Historical Perspective’, in R.G. H ubbard (ed), Financial Markets and  
Financial Crises, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
M odigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller (1958), The Cost of Capital, 
C orporation Finance and Theory of Investm ent’, American Economic 
Review, 68(June), pp. 261-97
M uscatelli, Vitto A., T.G. Srinivasan, and David Vines (1992), ‘Demand and 
Supply Factors in the Determination of NIE Exports: A Sim ultaneous 
Error-Correction Model for Hong Kong, Economic Journal, 102 (415), pp. 
1467-77.
Myters, S tew art C., and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984), ‘Corporate Financing and 
Investm ent Decisions: When Firms Have Information th a t Investors do not 
Ha ve’, Journal o f Financial Economics, 13, pp. 187-221.
N asu tion , Anwar (1994), ‘Banking Sector Reform in Indonesia, 1983-93’, in 
McLeod, Ross H. (ed.), Indonesia A ssessm ent 1994: Finance as a key sector 
in Indonesia’s  Development, Singapore: Institu te  of Southeast Asian 
Studies.
O bstfeld, Maurice (1984), ‘Balance of Payment Crises and  D evaluation’, Journal 
o f  Money Credit and Banking, 16(2), pp. 208-17.
O bstfeld, M aurice (1986), ‘Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance of Paym ents’, 
American Economic Review, 76 (March), pp. 72-81.
O bstfeld, M aurice (1994), The Logic of Currency C rises’, Cahiers Economiques 
etMonetari.es, 43, Banque De France, Paris, 189-213.
O bstfeld, M aurice (1996), ‘Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling 
F ea tu res’, European Economic Review, 40 (April), pp. 1037-48.
294
O bstfeld, Maurice (1997), ‘Destabilizing Effects of Exchange Rate Escape 
C lauses’, Journal o f International Economics, 43 (August), pp. 61-77.
O bstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (1995), The Mirage of Fixed Exchange 
R ate’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 9 (Fall), pp .73-96.
O bstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (1996), Foundations o f International 
Macroeconomics, Cambridge, Mas: MIT Press.
O sfry, Jo n a th a n  D. (1997), ‘C urrent Account Im balances in ASEAN Countries: 
Are They a  Problem?’, IMF Working Paper N o.97/51, International 
M onetary Fund (April).
P an g estu , M aru and Manggi Habir (2000), The Boom, B ust and  Restructuring o f 
Indonesian Banks, paper presented at In ternational Conference on 
Financial M arkets and Policies in East Asia, Asia Pacific School of 
Economic and Management, The A ustralian National University and  IMF 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
Phillips, Peter C.B. and Bruce E. Hansen (1990), ‘S tatistical Inference in 
Instrum enta l Variables Regression with 1(1) Processes’, Review  o f Economic 
Studies, 57 (1), 99-125.
Polackova, H ana (1998), ‘Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Risk for 
Fiscal Stability’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1989, World Bank 
(October).
Postlew aite, Andrew and Xavier Vives (1987), ‘Bank R uns as Equilibrium  
Phenom enon’, Journal o f Political Economy, 95(3), 485-91.
R adelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1998a), The O nset of the  E ast Asian 
F inancial Crisis, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 6680, National B ureau of 
Economic Research (August).
R adelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1998b), The E ast Asian Financial Crisis: 
Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects’, in William C. B rainard  and  George L. 
Perry (eds.), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp.1-74.
R ajan , R am kishen R. and Iman Sugema (1999a), ‘Governm ent Bailouts and 
M onetary Disequilibrium: Common Fundam entals in the Mexican and 
E as t Asian C rises’, CIES Discussion Paper 9 9 /2 2  Centre for In ternational 
Economic Studies, University of Adelaide. (Forthcoming in the North 
American Journal o f Economics and Finance)
R ajan , Ram kishen R. and Iman Sugema (1999b), The Collapse of the  Thai Baht 
an d  a Simple “New Second Generation” Currency Crisis Model’, Working 
Paper 99, Swiss Asia Foundation (November).
R ajan , Ram kishen R. and Iman Sugema (1999c), “C apital Flows, Credit 
T ransm ission and the Currency Crisis in South E ast Asia’, CIES
295
D iscussion Paper 99/25, Centre for In ternational Economic Studies, 
University of Adelaide.
R einhart, Carm en M., and Carlos A.Vegh (1996), Do Exchange Rate-Based  
Inflation Stabilizations Show the Seeds o f their Own Destruction?, mimeo, 
In ternational Monetary Fund.
Rodrik, Dani (1998), ‘Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?’, in ‘Should 
th e  IMF Pursue Capital Account Convertibilty?, Princeton E ssays in 
International Finance, 207, International F inance Section, Princeton 
U niversity (May), pp. 55-64.
S achs, Jeffrey, Aaron Tornell and Andres Velasco, (1996a), T he Mexican Peso 
C risis: Sudden death or death foretold?’, Journal o f International
Economics, 41, pp. 265-83.
S ach s, Jeffrey, Aaron Tornell and Andres Velasco, (1996b), ‘Financial Crises in 
Em erging Markets: Lessons from 1995’, in George L. Perry and William 
C .B rainard  (eds.), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 147-198.
S ach s, Jeffrey, Aaron Tornell and Andres Velasco (1996c), T he Collapse of the 
Mexican Peso: W hat Have We Learned?’, Economic Policy, 22 (April), pp. 
15-63.
Sal an t, S tephen and Dale Henderson (1978), ‘M arket Anticipations of 
G overnm ent Policies and the Price of Gold’, Journal o f Political Economy, 
86 (August), pp .627-48.
Shaw , Edw ard S. (1973), Financial Deepening in Economic D evelopm ent New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Sheehey, Edm und J . (1986), ‘Unanticipated Inflation, D evaluation and  O utput 
in  Latin America’, World Economy, 14 (May), pp. 665-71.
S oesastro , Hadi and M. Chatib Basri (1998), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’ 
Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 34 (1), pp. 3-54.
Spiegel, Mark. M (1995), ‘Sterilization of Capital Inflows th rough  the Banking 
Sector: Evidence from Asia’, Economic Review, 3, Federal Reserve Bank of 
S an  Francisco, pp. 17-35.
Stiglitz, Jo sep h  E., and Andrew Weiss (1981), ‘Credit Rationing in M arkets with 
Im perfect Inform ation’, American Economic Review, 71, pp. 393-410.
Stiglitz, Jo sep h  E., and Andrew Weiss (1983), ‘Incentive Effects of Term inations: 
Applications to Credit and Labor M arkets’, American Economic Review, 71, 
pp. 912-27.
S toker, Jam es  (1994), ‘Intermediation and the B usiness Cycle u n der a Specie 
S tandard : the Role of the Gold S tandard  in English Financial Crises, 
1790-1850’, Mimeo, University of Chicago, Chicago.
296
T ornell, Aaron (1999), ‘Common Fundam entals in the Tequila and  Asian crises’, 
JVBER Working Paper Series, no. 7139, National B ureau  of Economic 
R esearch (May).
T ornell, Aaron (2000), ‘Lending Booms and Currency Crises: Em pirical Links’, 
in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger (eds,), Regional and Global Capital 
Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, forthcoming.
V an Rijckeghem, Caroline and Beatrice Weder (1999), ‘Sources of Contagion: 
F inance or Trade?’, IMF Working Paper No.9 9 /146 , In ternational Monetary 
F und  (October).
V an-W ijnbergen, Sweder (1986), ‘Exchange Rate M anagem ent and  Stabilization 
Policies in Developing Countries’, Journal o f Development Economics, 23 
(January), pp. 227-47.
V elasco, Andres (1987), ‘Financial Crises and Balance of Paym ents Crises: A 
Simple Model of the Southern Cone Experience’, Journal o f  Development 
Economics, 27 (October), pp.2263-83.
W igm ore, Barrie A. (1987), ‘Was the Bank Holiday in 1933 C aused  by a  Run on 
the  Dollar?’, Journal o f Economic History, 47(3), 739-55.
Yositom i, M asaru and Kenichi Ohno, (1999), ‘Capital-Account Crisis and Credit 
C ontraction’, ADBI Working Paper, no. 2 (May 1999), Asian Development 
B ank Institute.
297
